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  In this thesis, I investigate sense-making processes in financial markets. My focus is on 
the role of narratives in these routine activities in digital market places or what Cetina and Preda 
(2007) describe as scopic market systems. I conceptualize narratives told by market professionals 
in these systems as another form of market device (Callon et al., 2007) which combines different 
modes of knowing and explanation to cope with flows of data/information and funds, and works 
to generate value from assets exposed to markets. From a sociological perspective, I argue that 
the substitution of social network-based information search and face-to-face exchange 
relationships in financial markets with flow-based and anonymised representations and exchange 
relationships do not undermine the importance of social networks in shaping sense-making and 
decision-making in financial markets. However to argue so, I broaden the concept of social 
network with the help of Bourdieu’s (1997) notion of economic, social and cultural capital. I 
introduce the notions of field and meta-field of power, habitus, and position-taking by Bourdieu 
(1997, and Wacquant 1992) to my conceptual discussion of financial markets. In light of this, I 
describe financial markets as hierarchical and competitive structures inhabited by different 
groups of investors and intermediaries and shaped by competition and conflict among these 
groups. I argue that these groups’ position in the field is conditioned by their economic, social, 
and cultural capital which are generated and sustained within and outwith the field. 
Consequently, I suggest that these groups’ sense-making and investment activities and 
their use of market devices including storytelling acts should exhibit distinctive modes in 
accordance with the specific positions they have voluntarily or involuntarily taken in the field. To 
substantiate these claims with narrative evidence, I present the case of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) in Turkey. Opened in 1985, the ISE provides an instrumental case to study the 
role of sense-making narratives as another form of market device in scopic market systems with a 
Bourdieusian sociological framework. As gathered from publicly available information and early 
pilot fieldwork in the ISE headquarters, the ISE as a field has been occupied by three dominant 
investor types since 1991. These are domestic retail (DRIs), domestic institutional (DIIs), and 
foreign institutional investors (FIIs). These three groups have a dominant weight in either trading 
volume or share ownership in the ISE. Drawing on my (participatory) observations between 2008 
and 2009 in an asset management company and four brokerage houses which served DRIs and/or 
DIIs and FIIs, I present evidence on how distinct combinations of economic, social and cultural 
capitals among these dominant investor-intermediary groups shape their sense-making activities 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is 19 February 2008 and it is the first day of my field observation in a brokerage house in 
Istanbul. I am sitting next to the strategist G and investment advisor S. There are six 
computer screens on our table, four of them are powered by local data vendors and two of 
them by the global data vendor Bloomberg. These scopic screens constitute the ultimate 
market device where events and actions in a plethora of markets and geographies including 
the ISE are temporalised and turned into streams of data/information flows and reflected 
through the scopic market screen to remotely operating market actors like G and S (Cetina 
and Preda, 2007). Both G and S are watching their scopic screens with intensity and 
preparedness to react to these flows according to their high frequency trading and high net 
worth clients’ sense-making and investment activities.  I, on the other hand, am observing G, 
S and other investment advisors with intensity and preparedness. My material devices for 
recording in situ events and conversations are my notebook and pen. All of a sudden, another 
investment advisor Gl, who is sharing a larger table that accommodates three more 
investment advisor and two scopic screens for each, shouts:  
Gl: ‘What’s the deal behind Germany?’ 
The strategist has a glance at his screens and says ‘it is profit realisation’ 
S to Gl in a tongue-in-cheek tone: ‘does everything have to happen for a reason?' 
Gl ‘then the guy [his client] is asking on the phone and I have nothing to say!' 
 
Despite the relatively unlimited representational capacity of scopic market screens in 
capturing data/information flows, there was something missing in this universally used 
market device. The scopic market screen did not explain “the deal behind Germany”. Yes, it 
showed on a real time basis the changes in the value of the DAX in Germany but left it there.  
Nor did it explain why three market actors in Istanbul had to worry about the DAX index in 
Germany. The strategist had to attribute causal agency, motive and unity to otherwise 
anonymous investors in the DAX to help Gl reach an explanation about “the deal behind 
Germany”. I was told later on by Gl that his client had scopic screens in his home office too, 
which attested to the fact that the client also wanted to go beyond mere visual perception. S, 
despite his initial tongue-in-cheek reaction to Gl’s wish to move beyond visual perception, 
later told similar short sense-making stories to his client on the telephone line about the 
global and local market indexes. Towards the end of my first observation day and after 33 
pages of observational material and 31 additional stories by the residents on the trading floor, 
I got the initial impression that telling stories before scopic market screens was a common 
way of dealing with uncertainty about the past, present and future of markets as represented 
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on the scopic market screens. However, the ISE was a complex market in terms of dominant 
investor types and intermediaries that represented them. The question that needed further 
exploration for the case of the ISE was what routine and stable role in situ storytelling would 
have in the ISE’s scenes of different investor and intermediation types. The question that 
needed a further concomitant conceptual exploration was why on earth market actors would 
tell stories before scopic market screens which was a very sophisticated market device that 
characterized what Mackenzie (2004:556) described as the domain of finance that was 
increasingly ‘scientized’ and ‘technologized’. 
 
In this thesis, I try to answer these two questions by exploring the role of storytelling in 
sense-making and decision making activities in financial markets in general and in the ISE in 
particular. I do so by relying on the existing sociological literature on financial markets with 
a focus on the notions of scopic market system (Cetina and Preda, 2007) and market device 
(Callon et al., 2007). Both notions capture the dominant modes of cognitive and decision-
making activities in today’s digitized, automated and globally connected financial market 
places. It is argued that scopic market screens encourage a feeling based explanation of the 
past, present and future which are also manifest in storytelling acts. This is contrasted with a 
cognitive mode that is based on routine and stable calculation models based on the 
abstraction of events and actions into numerical signifiers (Cetina and Preda, 2007).  Market 
devices, on the other hand, are conceptualized as doing the latter (Callon et al., 2007). They 
do so moving events and actions within and outwith the market into a calculable space by 
framing what is calculable and relevant. This refers to a form of ‘disembedding’ or 
‘economisation’ of complex entities and abstracting the so called economic aspects into 
alpha-numerical signifiers in a routine and stable manner (Callon et al., 2007: 2-4).   
 
In this thesis, the narrative mode of knowledge and explanation, which informs storytelling 
acts before scopic market screens, is therefore conceptualized as an anti-market device that 
re-embeds the calculated entities such as trading and investment acts into the social, political 
and cultural contexts where they are located. This re-embedding is argued to help market 
actors cope with uncertainty about the past, present and future that is inherent in scopic 
market systems. From a socio-linguistic perspective, this re-embedding as a cognitive 
activity is expected to be influenced by market actors’ material, cultural and social resources 
and dispositions in the field of financial market practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
This is also in line with the sociological literature on financial markets which points to the 
empirical evidence on the existence of multiple local rationalities of sense-making and 
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decision making (Abolafia 1998, Smith 1998). 
 
Methodologically, the thesis relies on a mix of data collection and analysis methods: (1) 
(participant) observation in four intermediary and one buy-side organisations in Istanbul to 
understand the nature of cognitive activities and collect in situ oral sense-making stories 
(multi-site ethnography ensuring sociological sampling); (2) interviews with market actors 
and regulators in Istanbul and London (ensuring triangulation of observational findings); and 
(3) generation of basic descriptive statistics on different aspects of the collected oral sense-
making stories to be able to demonstrate the effects of different dispositions and capital 
resources market actors have on story outcomes. These data collection and analysis activities 
have led to the generation of a 1,261 strong story dataset. From this dataset, detailed 
descriptive statistics are generated about each story’s causal structure, its use of private and 
public information, frequency of human and non-human protagonists in the story dataset, 
and each story’s temporal orientation.  The discussion of the descriptive statistics is made in 
accordance with the observational, interview-based, secondary literature-based insights into 
the ISE and its intermediary and investors types since its opening in 1985.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the sociological literature on the role of narratives and combines this with 
a detailed discussion of Bourdieu’s essential concepts in order to substantiate the arguments 
presented above. Chapter 3 substantiates the methodology of the thesis in a reflective 
account about the choice of topic, case study, data collection methods and the effects of the 
researcher’s social, cultural, and material sources on these research processes. It also 
introduces an operationalised definition of sense-making narrative, which informs the 
identification and quantification of narratives and their semiotic structures in the evidence 
chapters. Chapter 4 provides an account of the formation and evolution of the ISE field and 
its dominant investor and intermediary types since the ISE’s opening in 1985. This account 
also demonstrates the evolution of the scopic market screens since 1994 when they were first 
introduced to the ISE. Chapter 5 is a brief discussion on the organisational and individual 
market actors directly observed in the study. This discussion focuses on the material, 
cultural, and social resources of these actors and their dispositions, and how they are 
positioned alongside other organisational and individual actors in the ISE field in accordance 
with these resources and dispositions.  Chapter 6 to Chapter 11 are empirical discussions of 
each observation site, which demonstrates the narrative outcomes of in situ sense-making 
activities in different pockets of intermediation and investor types in the ISE. The concluding 
chapter provides a brief comparative discussion of the field sites and highlights similarities 
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and differences among them with regards to sense-making narratives and ties them back to 




CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I begin this chapter by reviewing the sociology literature on markets with a focus on two 
concepts. The first is the scopic market systems which conceptually capture the dominant 
modality of digital and automated representation and exchange mechanisms in today’s 
financial markets. The second is the market device (Callon et al., 2007) which indirectly 
explains the sociological and technical foundations of scopic market systems as a 
‘deterministic’ and ‘operational’ market device that hosts a multitude of analytical and 
observational market devices. This discussion establishes the conceptual explanation for the 
role of narratives as another market device that is actually working against one of the two 
essential functions of market devices, namely to abstract, to take away things and ‘move 
[them] into a formal calculative space’ (Callon et al., 2007: 4).  The abstraction act that 
storytelling achieves before scopic market screens is explained from a generation of 
knowledge and explanation perspective in reference to the literature on human cognition. 
The literature on human cognition points to the foundational aim of storytelling acts, namely 
attributing cause, intention, and blame to actions and events. This cognitive act construes not 
only humans but also objects and abstract entities as ‘self-propelled’, ‘independent and self-
motivated’ subjects, and it often glosses over the ‘ontological and causal structure of the 
most social processes’ (Tilly 1999:264). On the other hand, sociological literature on 
financial markets points to local rationalities or different cognitive schemata across different 
types of market actors, including professional investors. 
 
If there are different types of rationalities in financial markets, then what should one expect 
about the use of the scopic market screen as the market device from the perspective of 
storytelling acts? Would some types of market actors never resort to storytelling because the 
scopic market screens and other market devices provide them a market experience of 
calculable, explainable, and predictable phenomena? If all types of market actors resort to 
storytelling, then would their stories be similar to each other in their semiotic (meaning) 
structure? Callon et al. (2007) provide a conceptual answer to this by arguing that 
introduction of market devices should not be seen as leading to ‘the bifurcation of agency’, 
namely social, material, and cultural dispositions of market actors on the one side, and 
market devices as stable technical constructs on the other. Nor do market devices lead to 
‘homogeneous systems’ in the form of ‘the object, the subject, the language’ (Callon et al., 
2007:2). Instead, market devices are seen to posses multiple capacities, or ‘fixtures or 
furnishings’ that help market actors to reconstitute market objectivity and their subjectivity 
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(Callon et al., 2007:3). This refers to the involvement of human agency in not just the design 
and production of a market device or the market itself, but also the way it is used by market 
actors in enacting their subjective preferences for objects of exchange, such as company 
shares and government bonds.  
 
From a storytelling perspective before the scopic market screens, one can therefore expect 
different modes of storytelling acts among different types of market actors with different 
dispositions and occupying different positions in a market. To conceptually trace the origins 
and current manifestations of these dispositions of market actors to think, speak, act, and use 
market devices in distinctive ways, I introduce Bourdieu’s sociological theory (1977; and 
Wacquant, 1992) on formation of subjective preferences in a given field of  practice for 
production, consumption and exchange of ideas and objects. Although Beckert (2009) calls 
for application of Bourdieu’s notions of economic and cultural capital to an exploration of 
the formation of value and subjective preferences in exchange of objects in markets, this has 
not been applied to the financial markets. I argue that the application of Bourdieu’s 
sociological framework to exploration of creation of value and subjective preferences in 
financial markets should also include social capital and be extended to the evolution of a 
market in question from the emergence and use of market devices including storytelling as 
an anti-market device. Only by this, can one reach a sociological understanding of the role of 
narratives in financial markets and different semiotic or meaning outcomes generated in 
storytelling acts.  
 
Financial Markets and Scopic Market Systems as a Market Device 
 
Cetina (2006) argues that financial markets, especially the secondary financial markets, such 
as organized exchanges and OTC markets where issued securities representing rights and 
obligations for investors/creditors and debtors are exchanged, cannot be solely 
conceptualized for mechanisms for bringing together buyers and sellers of a product for 
consumption as it is in consumer markets. In fact, primary financial markets are more akin to 
consumer markets in the sense that there are initially non-alternating roles of buyers and 
sellers of credits, rights and obligations (Abolafia, 2006). Moreover, debtors and rights 
issuers can consume funds that are collected from creditors outside the market place for 
various purposes such as physical investments. On the other hand, the driving logic behind 
the economic activity in secondary financial markets is discovering the existing market value 
of these rights and obligations and finding opportunities for investment and speculation by 
means of making sense of the exchange value and concomitant exchange of securities 
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(Cetina, 2006: 555). In that sense, secondary financial markets have an alternating role 
structure of buyers and sellers (Abolafia, 2006). Moreover, there often emerges a tenuous 
link between the security and its underlying referent (Cetina and Preda, 2005:4), the latter 
being a company’s actual production performance, a country’s macroeconomic performance, 
or a spot security underlying a derivative product, so on and so forth.  Speculation and 
investment activities and aggregate market dynamics might therefore lead to emergence of 
exchange values which are often detached from underlying referents.  
 
In financial markets, one recent trend seems to shape the modality of value discovery and 
exchange of securities, namely computerisation of the market (Cetina and Brugger, 2002; 
Zaloom, 2006; Mackenzie, 2009a). Cetina (2006) and Cetina and Preda (2007) introduce the 
idea of scopic systems to study this recent phenomenon. Scopic systems refer to ‘electronic 
and informational mechanisms of observing and contextualizing market reality and of back-
projecting this reality onto the computer screens of globally operating traders and financial 
units (Cetina, 2006:555). Cetina (2006: 555) makes an important distinction here as to where 
the market is among network-based markets and scopic markets with reference to reflexivity 
of actors and the market interface. The essence of the reflexive mechanism of projection is 
that there is a constant feedback loop between the images reflected on the screen and actors’ 
reactions to them. This is contrasted with network-based markets in which coordination in 
information and data gathering, processing and decision making are made via ‘the pipes that 
link the network nodes’ (Cetina and Preda, 2007: 116).  
 
The notion of scopic systems and the flow markets as proposed by Cetina and Preda 
(2007:129) therefore provide three important postulates regarding the computerized financial 
markets and sense-making and meaning making activities in them. Firstly, the notion of flow 
refers to a non-metaphorical type of reality that is different from our spatial and temporal 
experience of daily events. Although most of the events and actions that are projected onto 
the market screen happen in specific geographies (in executive boardrooms, in war theatres 
and on trading floors of financial institutions), their presentation on the market screen is 
stream-like and temporalised as narratives and numerical signifiers representing these events 
are projected onto the screen at a specific point in time, followed by another.  
 
Secondly, Cetina and Preda (2007: 131) argue that this type of flow reality shapes the coping 
mechanism of the market actors with the market. The foundational mechanism is the 
continuous observation of the screen (market) with ‘intensity and preparedness’.  Intensity 
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refers to an actor-screen based physicality in which market actors orient their utmost 
attention to the flow on the screen with a certain physical posture and full allocation of the 
relevant senses and cognitive capacities to the screen (see Zaloom, 2006 for an account of 
this in the case of remotely accessed LIFFE). Therefore, market actors do not just observe, 
which is ‘seen as a distanced and distantiating activity... intensity points in the opposite 
direction’ (Cetina and Preda, 2007: 132). Preparedness on the other hand refers to a related 
physical and mental state that allows traders to promptly react to the flow on the screen in 
the form of trading activity. Cetina and Preda (2007:132) make another important point 
about preparedness, namely the mode of reaction, calculation and decision making. This 
mode, inspired by research on currency markets and traders (see Cetina and Brugger, 2002), 
is similar to ‘Mead’s model of a conversation of gestures than to models of deliberation and 
calculation’... ‘a form of following and anticipating the flow, grounded more in a structure of 
feeling than in modes of calculation’ (Cetina and Preda, 2007:132).  
 
Thirdly, Cetina and Preda (2007: 132) postulate that there are institutionalised formats that 
integrate sense-making and trading responses into scopic market systems in a sequential flow 
format. These include conversation channels, order matching systems with algorithms and 
rules that determine trading sequences.  Other components of the scopic system such as tools 
for archiving and retrieval of information/data perform this in a sequential manner too. 
Cetina and Preda therefore add that market actors’ observation and trading activities also 
follow individualised sequential moves around the components of the (market) screen: 
‘Sequencing, then, is the main mechanism that turns a spatial networkscape into a temporal 
world’ (Cetina and Preda, 2007: 132). 
 
The scopic market system therefore provides the highest level of abstraction regarding a 
given market and its calculative, discursive, geographical and temporal components. This 
form of abstraction turns market and its constituent parts that include market events and 
actions into narratives, numerical signifiers such price data or other value metrics, charts and 
other tools to further analyze these quantified flows. These tools help market actors to make 
sense numerically and discursively, to calculate and predict trajectories of market events and 
actions, and to attach values to the exchangeable products. In this respect, scopic market 
systems can be seen as a platform market device which hosts other market devices.  
 
Market devices are ‘material and discursive assemblages that [not only] intervenes in the 
construction’ (Callon et al., 2007:2) but also in the reproduction of digitized market activity. 
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In that respect, assemblages include machines, theoretical and calculative tools that manage 
risks and assist valuation activities and price discovery, and humans’ cognitive and physical 
capacities which are increased by the use of these artefacts.  Callon et al. (2007:2) explain 
what makes a material device market device in reference to material devices’ involvement 
with reconfiguration of market activity and the market itself. In this vein, some market 
devices become more deterministic in the operation of a market such as the introduction of 
the stock ticker to the NYSE trading floor (Preda 2006, cited in Callon et al., 2007). 
Development of this technology was in fact encouraged by a high status group in the NYSE, 
namely Regular Board members, who wanted to consolidate the legitimacy of their status 
with a monopoly over authoritative price data vis-à-vis the Open Board members who 
formed a large, noisy and rather chaotic and untrustworthy crowd (Preda 2006:765). The 
introduction of the real time prices in the floor and in brokerage house offices also 
contributed to the transformation of chart analysis as an observational and analytical market 
device into a more minute and accurate visualisation and prediction device. This 
transformation also modified the persona of the stock market analyst. The ticker tapes’ and 
chart analysis’ potential to achieve abstractions about a plethora of events and actions within 
and outwith the market in the form of prices led to emergence of  specific ‘metaphorical 
baggage and discursive modes’ in the use of charts by stock market analysts such as ‘ ‘points 
of resistance’, ‘double bottoms’, ‘tops’ and ‘shoulders’’(Preda, 2006:770). 
 
As can be seen above, the introduction of a market device has not only material and 
cognitive but also political and cultural motivations and consequences. In this sense, Callon 
et al. (2007:3) introduce the notion of ‘economisation’ and ‘economic agencements’ to 
further clarify the process of a material device attaining market device status. Economisation 
refers to ‘a historical, contingent and disputable’ process that ‘render things, behaviours, and 
processes economic’ (Callon et al., 2007: 3). Callon et al. argue that the substance of 
“economic” is open to debate but in the liberal market economies, economic has come to be 
understood as formation of market mechanisms for value discovery and exchange for goods 
and services, not to mention provision of rules and regulations that legitimize and stabilize 
these processes. In this respect, market devices are economic agencements, namely 
compounds of human and non-human agencies, which have a transformative capacity on 
market structures (Preda, 2006: 755). The first function of market devices or economic 
agencement refers to transformative or intervention acts on market structures at important 
historical junctures such as the invention and introduction of the stock ticker to the NYSE or 
the application of an academic valuation model, namely Black-Scholes, for valuation of cash 
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settled derivatives traded in the CBOE, which lent legitimacy to the practice in the eyes of 
regulators (Mackenzie and Millo, 2003). The second and related function refers to the 
aforementioned process of abstraction of events and actions and moving them into the 
calculative space, namely making them measurable, comparable and calculable, and 
disentangling them from non-calculable aspects (Preda, 2006: 755).  
 
Although such a representational mode relying on metrics that represent abstractions may 
sound antithetical to narrative mode of explanation, there is still scope for conversation, 
narrative and feeling-based coping mechanisms in scopic market systems in making sense of 
the flows and anticipating their future trajectory (Cetina and Preda, 2007). This is mainly 
because the level of abstraction reached on scopic market screens such as price or aggregate 
trading and settlement data or what Sassen (2005:57) calls simple datum comes with the 
problem of detachment of intentions and motives of anonymous human actors from price and 
trading acts and ultimately that of market actors from the objects of exchange. Therefore, 
simple datum as routine and stable product of the market device, namely the scopic market 
screen, does not solve the problem of reducing uncertainty about the past, present and future. 
As Cetina and Preda (2007:130) acknowledge it about the scopic market systems: ‘despite 
the fact that market and realms that surround it are always present on the screen, markets are 
ill-defined with respect to the direction they will take at the next moment and in the less 
immediate future’. In a context like this, market actors need to generate what Sassen 
(2005:57) calls ‘higher datum’. Higher datum refers to outcomes of sense-making work by 
market actors that provide ex-post, current and ex-ante explanations that are not necessarily 
available on scopic screens of digitized markets.  Higher datum may explain why things 
happen as they happen, and what they imply for returns on existing and prospective trading 
and investment activity.   
 
 
As market devices used by market actors, forecast models, calculative frames and formulas, 
charts, and so on generate a higher datum about returns or price movements expected from 
investments. Some of these devices may have assumptions about uncertainty from the risk 
perspective, namely  calculable and a priori probabilities such as Capital Asset Pricing 
Model or Black-Scholes Options pricing theory that are based on the neoclassical axioms 
about human rationality (Mackenzie and Millo, 2003). Others may work according to 
subjective probabilities and calculative frames as generated by individuals and organisations 
(Beckert and Dequech, 2006: 583) as in the case of subjective analyst assumptions or frames 
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and their consequences on model-based calculations on companies’ economic performances 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Beunza and Garud, 2007). Some sense-making and meaning making 
activity on the other hand may wittingly or unwittingly work on the premise of Knightean 
uncertainty or ambiguity which points to a future that cannot be predicted in a Bayesian 
manner due to lack of necessary information to calculate probabilities, and that of 
fundamental uncertainty which is a concomitant lack of knowledge about predetermined 
outcomes (Dequech, 2000, cited in Beckert and Dequech, 2006:583). Sense-making 
narratives can be seen as an anti-market device from the perspective of abstract and 
calculative space created by market devices and the scopic market system. Although sense-
making narratives mix narrative and referential or paradigmatic discourses in reducing 
uncertainty of the past, present and future (Polkinghorne, 1988:51), they do so by attributing 
agency, motive, and blame to human and non-human actors in explaining the abstractions 
observed on the scopic market screens, such as price, trading volume and so on. In that 
sense, they attach meanings on abstractions or disembedding acts that market devices 
achieve in a routine, stable and orderly manner such as discovery of exchange price, 
recording of trading activities, and representation of events and actions within and outwith 
the market on an almost real-time basis in the form of alpha-numerical figures and simple 
news stories.1 In the following section, I draw on the literature on modes of knowledge and 
explanation to further explain the nature of sense-making narratives as an anti-market device. 
 
Sense-making Narratives as an Anti-Market Device  
 
The literature on knowing and explanation among human beings (Bruner, 1986; 
Polkinghorne, 1988; Tilly 1999; 2006) explain different methods by which we make sense of 
what goes around us and generate knowledge about these, namely narrative and logico-
mathematical modes. The narrative mode refers to making sense of our experiences in causal 
and temporal continuums by attaching significance and meaning to single events and actions 
according to their contribution to the overall outcome that we try to explain. In linguistics, 
story refers to what individuals experience and narrative to its discursive representation 
(Schiffrin et al., 2001; Toolan, 1988; Johnstone, 2001; Fransozi, 1998). By discursive 
representation, narrative goes beyond raw experience. It becomes an edited work, an 
ordering beyond pure chronology (Czarniawska, 2004). It generates meanings about a set of 
1 Price and trading volume data despite being uncertain in regards to their future trajectory are 
presented in real-time in financial markets. One can also add to these real-time representations the 
data/information releases that are announced to be made at a particular time of the day. On the other 
hand some unexpected events and actions outwith the market are often represented with a delay on 
scopic screens.  
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singular events and actions and ties them together to an overall meaning. In this respect, 
narrative is an oral or written discourse beyond a sentence (Gabriel, 2008:78) that represents 
‘a perceived sequence of non-randomly connected events' by a storyteller (Toolan, 1988:7).  
 
The logico-mathematical or deductive mode, on the other hand, achieves explanation in 
reference to categorical or universal rules and laws by demonstrating an event as an instance 
of the former. In that sense, the randomness issue is solved, not by connecting events and 
actions together to explain an observed situation, but by referring to what is previously 
known about this situation as a manifestation of a universal phenomenon.   Although both 
modes of knowledge and explanation are complementary to each other in generating 
explanatory discourses (Polkinghorne, 1988:57; DiMaggio, 1997:269), the narrative mode 
has more flexibility in achieving explanation under informational uncertainties, especially if 
a universal knowledge about all probable events and actions with their causes and effects are 
not known in advance. The causal framework or what linguistics calls a plot in each instance 
of narrative mode of explanation is not necessarily the most accurate from a deducto-logical 
or scientific perspective that is applicable to all circumstances. However, actors often opt for 
such a ‘best possible explanation’ ‘abductive... nonmonotonic’ option instead of not 
achieving a sense-making outcome at all (Lundberg, 2000:694). In this vein, sense-making 
narratives and meanings they create are open to modifications, refutations and abandonment 
by arrival or discovery of new information and/or going through new experiences.  
 
How then would sense-making stories look like in scopic market systems? Sense-making 
stories are narratives that plot events and actions as represented in textual and numerical 
symbols on scopic market screens in order to come up with larger meanings and reach a 
verisimilitude about what actually goes on in financial markets (Bruner, 1986). Despite being 
open to modifications, creation of larger meanings, no matter how inconsequential or 
insignificant these meanings may be on storytellers’ and/or audiences’ market actions, 
provide a higher datum that is not readily available on the scopic screen. Larger meanings 
are concerned with finding connections between various symbols, figures and discourses on 
the scopic screens that represent abstraction of a multitude of market events and actions, 
which lend themselves to an explanation of the past and present that is not readily available 
on scopic screens. Finding or imposing connections between events and actions is possible 
by creating novel ways of bringing them together in order to reduce fundamental uncertainty 
(Weick, 1995), or by imposing available schemata based on referential (logico-mathematical) 
and/or narrative modes of knowing and expressions on those events and actions 
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(Polkinghorne, 1988:31).  
 
Sense-making stories as changing reactions to flow of information/data on scopic screens are 
ultimately interested in human action in markets beyond sensory descriptions.  Otherwise 
market events, like any other social event, would be uninterpretable and/or left uninterpreted 
(Macintyre, 1981, cited in Czarniawska, 2004:3). Therefore, events are usually re-enacted as 
outcomes of intentional actions in sense-making stories. Proxy data such as price and the 
attribution of different qualities to otherwise anonymous actors help infuse meanings into 
sensory descriptions of the scopic screens, and make them the purposeful actions of 
otherwise anonymous investors in digitized markets (Gabriel, 2000:35-8). The use of 
rhetorical tropes also help turn abstract and concrete things, such as oil price, carry trade, 
earthquake and so on and forth, into ‘actants’ that can achieve or undergo acts like human 
beings without a fixed character (Czarniawska, 2004:80). Therefore, sense-making story is 
an outcome of social cognition which seeks interpretation beyond ‘simple sensory inputs 
coming into contact with memory’, and to achieve ‘apperception’, namely putting something 
more meaningful and broader on sensory perception (Klein et al., 2006b: 90) in order to 
reduce uncertainty and act more effectively (Bless et al.,  2004:9). 
 
Literature on sense-making points to the importance of mental schemata in creating a 
framework for interpretation of data (Klein et al., 2006a, b; Weick, 1995; Sanner, 1997; 
Bless et al., 2004). These schemata are the stored memory of personal knowledge based on 
experiences, learning and beliefs and so on. Sense-making stories also work on this principle 
of mental schemata. They invoke stored knowledge about the markets in their emplotment.  
Therefore, a sense-making story is not a fantasy or fiction-based narrative. It takes into 
account social and cultural conventions of the realm of meaning (Salmon and Reissman, 
2008:77-8), as well as principles of our organic world (Polkinghorne, 1998:178). As Klein et 
al. (2006b) put it, schemata are build on narrative and theoretical knowledge but they can be 
revised in the face of new information and data. Therefore, sense-making stories are open to 
such scrutiny by their creators. Another important factor in ensuring that sense-making 
stories are not fiction-based is the audience effect. Even the stories that are told to oneself are 
under the scrutiny of one's accumulated knowledge unless one is suffering from a mental 
disorder. Otherwise, concerns about credibility, believability, effectiveness and reputation are 
firmly in place whilst one tells his/her sense-making story before the scopic market screen 




Sense-making stories are also told under time constraints due to scopic market systems’ 
sequential architecture and its capacity to instantaneously and contemporaneously represent 
a plethora of market events and actions. Therefore, time constrains can be consequential on 
story contents when one tries to check the relevancy of information/data flows on his/her 
existing and prospective investments. Literature on social cognition attest to the effects of 
time constrains as well as humans’ capacity to process information in cognitive activities 
(Bless et al., 2004). The consequence of these limitations is patterns or habits of sense-
making to reduce cognitive load on sense-makers. These cognitive schemata classifies raw 
information/data, decide what is relevant and what is not for one’s particular circumstances 
and goals. Although knowledge schemata are open to modification (Klein et.al., 2006b), 
social cognition literature observe several habitual processing patterns in cognition. The first 
pattern of social thinking is consistency searching which involves ignoring new information 
or interpreting current situation by imposing an existing schema. The second pattern takes 
the form of a ‘naïve scientist’ who tries to gather all relevant information and come up with 
an unbiased account. The third pattern is ‘cognitive miser’. This is similar to naïve scientist 
but time constrains and informational load lead to use of short cuts and over simplifications 
that stem from existing cognitive schemata (Bless et al., 2004:9).  
 
From a plot-making perspective, these patterns may explain how story tellers provide 
‘transition sequence’ (Klein et.al., 2006b) which refers to imposing logic and coherence on 
selected events and actions in creation of a higher datum. In sense-making stories in financial 
markets, these logics can be classified as cause-effect and correlation among screen figures 
and narratives, and similarity between the past experience and what the present looks like. 
The effectiveness of these logics in making sense of market outcomes are assisted by visual 
confirmations on scopic screens  and/or personal and vernacular knowledge and experience 
about the market and its actors in question. Another possible transition sequence is 
randomness which implies a failure to impose a more coherent plot onto a set of events and 
actions as observed on scopic screens. Although these logics provide retrospective 
explanations, they can also predict how future trajectories of relevant events and actions will 
be like, by drawing on the existing cognitive schemata about these logics. By that, sense-
making stories become narratives about past and present occurrences as they unfold with a 
view to predicting their future trajectory. 
 
To substantiate these points about narrative sense-making as a market device, I present two 
examples from scopic market systems. The first is about the generation of analyst reports and 
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the second one is about in situ sense-making activities of market actors before their scopic 
screens. In predicting the future price of a share that is unknown, market actors resort to 
calculation of the share’s fundamental value: ‘the net present value of its future cash flows, 
discounted using (investors) risks characteristics’ (Shleifer, 2000: 2). Such a calculation is 
present in analysts’ reports on companies (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Beunza and Garud, 
2007; Ortiz, 2009). It constitutes the numerical conclusion of analysts’ qualitative 
judgements about a company’s future cash flow performance based on its past and present 
revenues and costs. This calculation is an essential part of any analyst report that makes 
long-term predictions for share value of a company. The prediction is translated in to a target 
share price and a call for trading action, such as “buy”, “hold” or “sell”. The analyst reports 
combine the qualitative assumptions of analysts and paradigmatic calculations of a valuation 
method such as Discounted Cash Flow. The models inform what type of judgements an 
analyst has to make. The calculations of the model, on the other hand, are affected by the 
qualitative judgements. Thus, analyst reports provide technical narratives of combined 
explanation and knowing logics, and they are akin to scientific reports that predict the future.  
 
Making sense of the present flooded with information/data on scopic market screens is a 
more mundane and a bigger challenge for market actors when it is compared with the 
fundamental valuation activity by analysts.  The mainstream finance theory as popularized 
by Fama (1970) assumes that all publicly available information is quickly reflected in prices 
(see Schuster, 2006 for review). Market actors do the actual constant work of incorporating 
information into prices by bidding them up or down according to their judgement as to 
whether particular information is good or bad with regard to associated securities. In in situ 
sense-making situations, the uncertainty is concerned with not only making the judgement of 
whether certain information is good or bad for a given security, but also judging whether that 
information can actually affect the price of a given security and hence pondering on the 
intentions of anonymous market actors. A higher datum, such as analyst reports or more 
generally what Smith (1998) calls ‘fundamental view’ about a company which is generated 
thanks to the categorical or theoretical knowledge a market actor possesses, can answer such 
a question. However,  the actual market practice may bring forth idiosyncratic and market 
specific sense-making activity in finding the answer, namely what Smith (1998) calls 
‘insider view’. The latter refers to vernacular knowledge about market dynamics not 
reducible to the fundamental value of a company. To give an example, if the price of Garanti 
Bank share, which is the leading financial sector company in the ISE with a very significant 
weight in the ISE 100 index, is going up without any news related to the company or 
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banking sector in general, market actors may have to find a meaningful data/information on 
or off the screen to explain this price movement instead of dismissing it as a meaningless 
trading activity in the first place. Continuous observation of a scopic market screen with 
intensity and preparedness and finding explanatory connections between events and actions 
may, in the long run, provide stable sense-making frames that process a large part of 
information/data flows on the screen and link them to each other in routinised and stable 
ways. In this respect, a seemingly meaningless trading activity can make sense, even with a 
view about its future trajectory. 
 
Another important part of in situ sense-making activity, which is related to vernacular 
market knowledge, is to contemplate about investor behaviour that may trigger such price 
events or how market events may affect investor behaviour (Keynes, 1936; Davis, 2006). 
However these events are also hard to subject to metrological analysis because data about 
investor identity are usually anonymised on trading platforms (Davis, 2006). Moreover, any 
meaningful information about investor motivation behind a specific buy or sell activity or 
investor emotion in the face of market events is practically impossible to provide given the 
possible costs of collecting them and loss of trading advantage by revealing such 
motivations. Therefore, the most meaningful data to make such considerations about investor 
motivation and emotion is price and aggregate trading volume data as disclosed on scopic 
platforms and classified by intermediary organisations or institutional investors. However, 
this limitation is compensated by narrative imagination. What is meant by narrative 
imagination is making the otherwise anonymous investor figure an agent with motive and 
emotions by looking at changes in price and trading volume data as well as taking into 
consideration news stories and on-going themes about a share, a market or an economy. The 
investor figure with motives and emotions can therefore become a cause behind price and 
trading movements. Equally this anonymous investor figure can become susceptible to 
market and price events and can be turned into an effect in a cause-effect plot of a narrative 
 
Once market actors start to generate knowledge about the past, present and future of events 
and actions in a market place, this knowledge not only shapes their subjective preferences or 
actual price or return predictions they attach to a certain security in a market place but also 
becomes part of the general body of subjective knowledge they hold about the market in 
question. For instance, analysts’ reports generate subjective preference for a share as 
justified by narrative and paradigmatic modes of explanation that lead to an exact numerical 
prediction about a share price. However an analyst report also draws from and adds on the 
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existing knowledge about that company, its sector in the real economy and the larger 
economic, political and social milieus where they are located. Similarly, an in situ sense-
making story not only provides an instant explanation about the current state of the market 
and often makes a prediction about its future trajectory, but also draws from the general 
knowledge about the market and adds onto it. Although an analyst report and an in situ story 
work on different premises of calculation and prediction, both essentially draw from and add 
onto the existing knowledge about different components of a market and the larger milieus 
where this market is located.  
 
This thesis aims to explore not only the actual process knowledge generation in in situ sense-
making narratives but also the existence of different subjectivities and their origins among 
market actors in a market place that may account for the differences in knowledge 
generation. In Appendix 1, I provide a description of a typical scopic screen that can be 
found in different brokerage houses and buy-side organisations in the ISE. This description 
gives a conceptual picture about how narrative mode of knowledge and explanation becomes 
a prominent anti-market device in sense-making before scopic screens in the ISE in 
conjunction with the use of market devices integrated to the screens. These market devices 
include analysis tools that make use of the past and present data/information flows by 
turning them into observable alpha-numerical figures and metrics about a plethora of index 
moving factors such as anonymous investors’ intentions, a security’s metric relationship to 
the index value and so on and so forth. These alpha-numerical figures are then made more 
meaningful with the help of narrative imagination and/or vernacular knowledge.  
 
In the following, I tie the above conceptual discussion to the question of formation of 
subjective preferences in financial markets. Formation of subjective preferences for objects 
of exchange or attachment of value to them is identified as a market coordination problem by 
Beckert (2009). Beckert (2009) argues that this problem is not wholly solved by the 
availability of a set of market devices which provides a calculative embeddedness to market 
actors. Nor do those solutions to macro coordination problems, namely competition (a fair 
and transparent exchange without any monopoly or oligopoly) and cooperation (fulfilment of 
obligations in an exchange), which are based on the social, cultural and institutional 
embeddedness of market actors as well as the introduction of deterministic market devices, 
help us wholly understand the formation of subjective preferences on the part of market 
actors. Consequently, although market actors do not constantly aim to attain a better 
rationality and calculative power to solve these two macro coordination problems under a 
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fundamental uncertainty situation, they are still faced with the task of generating higher 
datum about the state of markets and their existing and prospective investment activities. 
This is essential in being able to attach a value to objects of exchange and sustain a 
subjectively coherent preference set to justify one’s market activities.  
 
How to understand individual solutions to value as the third coordination 
problem 
 
Beckert (2009) reminds us of the importance of market devices that assist market actors in 
reaching standardisation and calculability of values attached to an object of exchange. These 
market devices often help market actors reach cognitive anchoring or cognitive reference 
point such as price or a comparable ratio across similar objects of exchange (Beckert, 2009: 
254).  Moreover, the technical and regulatory arrangements in a market endow a security 
with certain properties, for instance the increments by which its prices change in a given 
exchange, or what rights and obligations it endows to its owner, and so on and so forth. 
These may also have a bearing on the subjective perceptions of value held by diverse market 
actors. While price discovery mechanisms in markets constantly bring together these 
subjective perceptions of anonymous actors and help reach constant but fluid equilibriums in 
market prices, this does not wholly explain how market actors reach the underlying 
subjective perceptions or numerical or discursive predictions on the exchange value of a 
security in the form of a target price or on the general direction of numerical or discursive 
value that they attach to a security or an index. Beckert (2009: 253) therefore encourages us 
to see the value problem also as a problem of ‘constitution of actors’ preferences’ and he 
highlights the need to theorize on this to be able to understand how market actors socially 
construct knowledge about the state of value attached to objects that are subject to exchange 
and how market actors create demand for these objects and facilitate exchange (256). 
Formation of value is therefore not just a matter of having stable price discovery and 
exchange systems and valuation methods, all of which act in the capacity of a deterministic 
or analytical market device, but also about the construction of individualized and vernacular 
knowledge by market actors about objects of exchange, which subsequently informs the 
subjective dynamics in price formation and exchange of securities. 
 
In the case of financial markets, Smith (1999), Abolafia (1996; 1998), and Beunza and Stark 
(2005) demonstrate different but occasionally overlapping cultures of sense-making, 
investment, and brokerage activities on Wall Street on the part of amateur and professional 
investors, traders and brokers. Zaloom (2006) provides similar insights from the CBOT and 
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the LIFFE where futures and options traders of respective markets have different cognitive 
and investment practices due to each market’s microstructure and its unique historical 
evolution. Siu (2008) explores the changing cognitive, social and political embeddedness of 
Chinese market actors in different commodity futures markets in China.  In these and other 
ethnographic accounts of financial markets, one thing is common, namely local rationalities 
of observation, sense-making and decision-making with stable scripts created by market 
actors to be able to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity peculiar to their environments 
(Abolafia, 1998:74). These scripts can be seen as part of the vernacular knowledge that 
markets actors possess and have faith in, as accurately reflecting how the market functions 
with its different types of actors, intermediaries and regulators and how it interacts with other 
milieus such as other markets, economy and politics. In this respect local rationalities are 
bound by not only the features of environments where market actors operate but also the 
perceptions held by those market actors about these features. This hints at a probable 
existence of different “realities” attached to a single phenomenon such as a market by 
different actors with different modes of material, cultural and social existence in the market 
environment.  
 
Beckert (2009) therefore highlights the importance of the material and cultural capital of 
market actors as well as their habitus (dispositions to act and think in particular ways), as 
theorised by Bourdieu (2005 cited in Beckert, 2009: 256), as the foundations of market 
actors’ vernacular knowledge. These foundations also inform the formation of market actors’ 
subjective preferences and the process of attachment of particular values to objects of 
exchange in question by these actors. These foundational material and cultural resources 
therefore have the potential to inform how market actors use the scopic market screens and 
other market devices including narrative mode of knowledge  and explanation as described 
above, and in Appendix 1.  Besides this, one should also incorporate Bourdieu’s (1997: 51) 
notion of social capital, defined as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintances and recognition, or in other words, to membership in a group’. If 
one broadens the notion of social capital into membership in a type or group of investors in a 
market place with distinctive combinations of cultural and economic capital, then it is 
possible to trace the origins, operations, and outcomes of different capital resources and 
habituses or dispositions that investor types have and utilize in their knowledge generation 




Sources of positionality: economic, social and cultural capitals  
 
Local rationality as discussed above is the main outcome of positionality or what Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1992) call position-taking acts in a market. The positionality is similar to the 
notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) in that it rejects the idea of a unitary actor who 
is able to  assimilate all relevant information once it is public and pursue his/her interest until 
an optimal solution is reached irrespective of social circumstances he/she finds himself in. 
The bounded rationality assumes that human beings are limited in their capacity to seek and 
process information, thus they satisfy rather than optimize (see Baker, 1984 for an example 
of bounded rationality in a futures exchange). From a sociological perspective, whether 
markets are efficient or not and whether the market actors satisfice or optimize are rather 
secondary considerations. More important consideration is the effects of the institutionalized 
role structures in a financial market on individual or organized social action. These 
institutional role structures refer to routine and stabilized action roles, norms and beliefs 
within a field of practice that have developed over time and they are not subject to sudden 
changes and reversals (Abolafia, 1998; Smelser, 1963). The role, norm and belief structures 
in a given field of practice are not reducible to formal rules and regulations that partly or 
wholly describe and enact them. They are also informed by historical and on-going practices 
in the field by different types of actors who order their meaning world in which they practice 
according to tacit, explicit, informal and formal knowledge references that constitute their 
culture. 
 
Positionality stems from material, social, and intellectual resources one has at his/her 
disposal in an institutionalized setting such as an organized equity market. These resources 
can be understood in reference to Bourdieu's forms of capital, namely economic, cultural and 
social (Bourdieu, 1997; Wacquant, 2002), and his notions of habitus and field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu defines capital as ‘accumulated labour...in objectified or 
embodied forms’ which can be appropriated by people on ‘a private, i.e. exclusive basis’ 
which ‘enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour’ 
(1997:46).  Therefore, the notion of capital is associated with control or power over labour 
activity which can be appropriated in an objectified (artefacts, assets) or embodied form 
(acquiring knowledge and using it). According to Swartz (1997: 78) the notion of social 
energy or ‘energy of social physics’ is used because Bourdieu argues that there are different 
forms of control (read capitals) over labour which co-exist and are convertible to each other 
and ‘no one form is more fundamental than the others or can be treated independently of the 




This proposition sounds rather antithetical to notion of participation in financial markets as 
an investor, which, as a minimum requirement, is dependent on possession of money or 
assets as objects of economic capital that are convertible to each other in market exchange. 
To this point, Bourdieu (1997) responds by two things. First, he points to the importance of 
different forms of capital by stating that they constitute ‘the principle underlying the 
immanent regularities of the social world’ (46). This means that different types of capital, as 
a form of power or resource that is convertible into other forms of control, make the social 
world a non-random place and subject to reproducing itself in accordance with the 
distributions of capital types and their consequences among the members of this social 
world.  Secondly Bourdieu argues that although economic capital is at the root of other types 
of capital, the conversation does not take place as easy as buying a bag of fruit from a grocer 
or shares in a digital market place (1997:53-4).  
 
To better understand this argument, it is necessary to define cultural and social capital.    
Bourdieu calls cultural capital in its broadest sense as ‘informational capital’ (1992:119) that 
can be found in three states, embodied, objectified, and institutionalized. In all these forms, 
cultural capital denotes possession of knowledge about doing particular things in particular 
ways and/or knowing things in particular ways. From Bourdieu’s (1997:48-50) discussion of 
these states, it can be seen that the possession of knowledge in one’s mind and use of it 
through body reflexive practices, such as eating, speaking, using objects, or investing in 
shares constitutes the embodied state of cultural capital. In the embodied form, the 
appropriation of accumulated labour actually refers to one’s own time and investment in 
learning and practicing a certain activity. In some activities, the mode of appropriation seems 
to be dictated by one’s immediate environment such as family and closer milieus and the 
process of socialisation from the early years of one’s life. The validity and valour of this 
form of capital is dependent on its successful (re)demonstration of particular competences 
under particular circumstances.   
 
In other activities, the mode of appropriation may take place through learning and experience 
outside family or close milieus.  The institutionalized state of cultural capital refers to the 
process of learning provided by academic or professional bodies and the institutional 
recognition by these bodies granted through examinations of one’s competencies in a 
specific set of knowledge and practice. This acquisition process actually severs the links 
between embodied histories within and outside academia or professional practice and the 
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ownership of certain competencies as recognized by the granting institutions. In between 
these states, there is the objectified state. This state is concerned with cultural goods for use, 
consumption, and exchange such as paintings, media and instruments. The appropriation of 
these objects can be achieved by economic capital yet this does not ensure appropriation of 
knowledge/information that allows its owner to appreciate or use the cultural goods 
according to its ‘specific purpose (defined by the cultural capital, of scientific or technical 
type, incorporated in them)’ (Bourdieu, 1997:50).  
 
The social capital on the other hand is defined by Bourdieu (1997:51) as ‘the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition-or in other 
words, to membership in a group’. The significance of social capital is that these networks or 
memberships in groups provide members ‘credit’ or resources that can be converted into 
material or symbolic gains such as status. Bourdieu argues that social capital that is 
convertible into different form of gains necessitates both initial institutionalisation of 
relationship and subsequent relationship work in the form of exchange of both material and 
symbolic things. This exchange which Bourdieu calls ‘sociability’ therefore not only ensures 
the (re)affirmation of recognition but also draws the boundaries of group membership. 
 
Symbolic capital as disguised form of economic capital  
 
All in all, the point Bourdieu makes about different forms of capital is that they are resources 
of power or forms of control which can be converted into each other. He also adds that both 
cultural and social capital are ‘disguised forms’ of economic capital and this conversation 
from economic to cultural and social capital takes the form of ‘more or less great effort of 
transformation which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in 
question’(1997:54). I shall discuss the notion of field alongside habitus below but the notion 
of disguised forms of economic capital should be discussed further. Because both cultural 
and social capital seem to be disassociated from notion of appropriation of accumulated 
labour in the form of time, energy, and economic resources dedicated to learning and 
practicing and doing relationship work, there is a tendency to perceive the fruits of cultural 
and social capital as ‘symbolic capital’ which is ‘unrecognized as capital and recognized as 
legitimate competences, as authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition’ (Bourdieu, 
1997:49). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:119) state that symbolic capital’s roots are 
embedded in these types of capital and it takes the form of symbolic capital when dominant 
perceptions about it ‘misrecognize the arbitrariness of its possession and accumulation’. This 
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means that a new understanding is attached to a set of acts which cognitively disassociate 
them from arbitrary pursuit of economic, cultural and social interests.  According to 
Bourdieu (1990, cited in Swartz, 1997:91-2) charitable acts or acts that serve the interest of 
the less powerful by the more powerful lead to a form of ‘advance’ or ‘credit’ or 
‘recognition’ and ‘legitimacy’ given by the former to the latter.  
 
Field and Habitus: concretizing the forms of capital in a game  
 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:98) state that in order to accurately determine the existence 
and detailed properties of the above discussed types of capital social scientist should focus 
on the boundaries and properties of the field. They define field as a ‘configuration of 
objective relations between positions’. Positions refer to ‘objectively defined’ institutional 
roles ‘occupants, agents or institutions’ take on according to their ‘present and potential 
situation in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital)’. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant remind us that possession of these species of power for occupants mean 
differential access modalities ‘to the specific profits that are at stake in the field’ (1992:97). 
They use the analogy of game to explain the competitive and conflictive nature of the field. 
The difference between a field and a game is that the former exhibit ‘rules and regularities 
that are not explicit and codified’ (1992: 98). For participants in the field game, the stakes 
are the result of competition and the worthwhile nature of participating in the game and they 
are accepted without questioning. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:98) call this ‘collusion’ 
between participants which allow them to compete in the game. They use the metaphor of 
‘trump cards’ to refer to different types of capital that participants posses and use in the 
game in their pursuit of stakes. They add that the competition is not just for the stakes but 
also about the trump cards and when they can be effectively converted into other sources of 
control and how they can be lessened in their effectiveness. When applied to the notion of 
market, Bourdieu’s concept of field is tantamount to what Swartz (1997:120) calls a ‘force 
field, wherein the distribution of capital in the market reflects a hierarchical set of power 
relations among the competing individuals, groups and organisations.’ Swartz (1997:120) 
adds that ‘field is a more inclusive concept than market; as a spatial metaphor it suggests 
rank and hierarchy as well as exchange relationships between buyers and sellers’.   
 
Habitus as proposed by Bourdieu (as explained in Thompson, 1992) is ‘a set of dispositions 
which incline actors to act and react in certain ways’ (12). Thompson (1992:12-3) explains 
the features of dispositions which characterise one’s habitus. Dispositions are closely related 
to one’s process of socialisation from the early childhood but formal educational and 
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professional practice experiences can be seen as part of this learning process. As Thompson 
(1992:13) puts it, ‘habitus tends to generate practices and perceptions, works, and 
appreciations, which concur with the conditions of existence of which the habitus is itself the 
product’. This allows us to go beyond one’s early socialisation and think about the habitus 
that is acquired during professional and amateur practice in a given field. Dispositions are 
‘structured’ as they reflect one’s particular milieus in upbringing, education and professional 
practice (read cultural capital). Dispositions are ‘durable’ and embodied. They are ‘not 
readily amenable to conscious reflection and modification’ (Thomson, 1992: 13). Finally, 
dispositions are ‘generative and transposable’ meaning that people bring their embodied 
cultural capital into other fields of practice and this may inform their practices in a given 
field (Thomson, 1992: 13). The most important implication of the concepts of dispositions 
and habitus from a sense-making perspective is summarized by Wacquant (2002: 552). As he 
puts it, Bourdieu’s sociological framework approaches the study of the field from a ‘double 
objectivity of the social’ perspective, namely ‘distribution of material sources and positions’ 
and ‘embodied classifications through which agents symbolically construct and subjectively 
experience the world’. The second objectivity points to different cognitive activities and 
schemata in relation to field relations, reified and/or living labour, and embodied practices in 
the field, which are ultimately shaped by one’s material sources and positions which 
constitute the first objectivity.   
 
To recap the concepts of types of capital, habitus and field before attempting to apply them 
to the sense-making activities in the ISE field, Bourdieu encourages us to see the notion of 
capital as a multifarious form of control over reified or living labour. The existence of 
different types of capital and their unequal distribution among social actors form the 
structure of the field which is hierarchical (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:198).  As a 
consequence of these differences, Bourdieu points to varying subjective realities 
symbolically constructed and subjectively lived by actors with different dispositions and 
positions in the field. The notion of symbolic capital is also a product of this symbolically 
constructed reality which grants legitimacy to arbitrarily acquired resources by more 
powerful social actors in the field.  The structure of the field also determines what types of 
capital can be utilized and converted into what other types in pursuit of stakes. In this vein, 
relationships in a field among different groups are not just for access to stakes of the game. 
They are also concerned with changing the rules and codes of engagement or structure of the 
field. This is because the structure reflects the unequal distribution of different forms of 




This final point brings us to the boundaries of the field and its relations with other fields. 
According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:102-5), one essential concept to consider when 
researching about fields is their historicity in relation to the above mentioned dynamics. This 
intimates that the boundaries of fields are dynamic and subject to change as the stakes in the 
game involve not only profits (accumulation) but also the question of who can participate in 
the game and under what conditions. Another point is that in understanding the historicity of 
a field, one should try to map out ‘the position of the given field vis-à-vis the field of power’ 
(104). The notion of field of power should not be taken as limited to political field which 
comprises national assemblies, governments, etc. This is actually a ‘meta-field that operates 
as an organizing principle of differentiation and struggle throughout all fields’ (Swartz, 
1997:136). In this sense, one can incorporate multiple fields and their interactions in an 
analysis of the competition or struggle for short-term stakes and over the structure of the 
field in question. And the final component to explore in order to make sense of the dynamics 
of a field is ‘the habitus of agents’, namely the dispositions of different groups in the field 
and the trajectory of these dispositions in relation to social and economic conditions in which 
they started their formation and continue reproduction. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992:99) 
use the term ‘position-taking’ to refer to the outcome of this investigation, namely 
determining what strategy and game an actor plays in a field given his/her capital resources.  
 
In lieu of Conclusion: Applying Bourdieu to cognition in scopic financial 
markets 
 
A reappraisal of the literature on financial markets discussed in the chapter with Bourdieu’s 
theoretical framework can allow us to see financial markets as fields of competition and 
conflict over stakes that are associated with not just returns on exchangeable securities but 
also norms and patterns of engagement between competitors in the field. These norms and 
patterns stem from not just a range of formal rules and regulations but also capital sources 
and dispositions of individual and organisational market actors. The determining feature of 
financial market as a field of exchange relationships for pursuit of financial returns is that it 
is a hierarchical social structure populated with individual and organisational actors that 
possess different combinations of economic, social, and cultural resources and concomitant 
extra-field and intra-field dispositions and position-taking acts. The ongoing competition and 
conflict in the field over short-term stakes such as returns on investment and speculation 
activities,  and structural stakes such as norms and rules of competition, and the field’s 
symbiosis with the meta-field, subject investors and intermediary and regulatory 
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organisations to voluntary or forced change in their cognition, investment and/or 
intermediation activities.  Differences among combinations of capitals and consequent field-
specific dispositions mean that one can expect different cognitive activities and investment 
modes among different types of investors and those intermediaries which exclusively serve 
them.  
 
In this thesis, the empirical focus is on the second type of objectivity in the field, namely 
sense-making narratives as cognitive products or anti-market devices shaped by the first type 
of objectivity, namely market actors’ resources at their disposal and their dispositions and 
positions in the ISE field. The thesis therefore explores the sense-making narratives not only 
from a semiotic but also socio-linguistic perspective. The former perspective specifically 
looks at how meanings are created within narratives whereas the latter perspective 
concentrates on how social structure of the field, material, cultural and social resources, and 
dispositions of actors affect the generation and use of narratives and creation of meanings. 
The thesis postulates that material, cultural, and social resources market actors have 
generated in or brought to the ISE field would manifest themselves in specific cognitive and 
investment activities and emergence and use of distinctive cognitive schemata during in situ 
sense-making activities. These differences in dispositions and certain positions occupied in 
the ISE field by different types of investors and their intermediaries would also lead to 
generation and use in distinctive ways of certain market devices that assist cognitive 
activities such as the scopic market screen itself with its integrated market devices as 
explained in Appendix 1, the in situ sense-making narratives as the anti-market device, and 
research analyst reports on companies and macro economic and political themes.  More 
specifically, manifestations of these differences in in situ sense-making narratives can be 
measured not only in number of in situ narratives told before scopic screens but also 
according to sense-making narratives’ semiotic structure. The latter is constituted of 
narratives’ plot structures, their attribution of cause, credit, and blame to certain events and 
actions in explaining the outcomes observed on scopic screens, types of data/information 
used in sense-making narratives, and so on.  By capturing these stories and analyzing them 
according to these semiotic features, one can demonstrate material, social and cultural 
sources of double objectivity at work in sustaining distinctive sense-making and investment 
activities in financial markets.  In the following chapter, I turn to the methodology of the 
thesis to substantiate how this two-pronged exploration is achieved in the thesis. The 
Methodology chapter also makes a brief introduction to the historical development of the 
ISE as a scopic financial market and as a field since 1985 from the perspective of dominant 
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investor and intermediary types. This brief introduction helps justify the selection of 
observation sites. Chapter 4 substantiates the brief introduction by reviewing the field’s 






CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY: ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE ISE 
 
This chapter contextualizes the findings of this dissertation in relation to selection of the ISE 
and the specific field sites, access issues and field relations with informants, and data 
collection and analysis methods. In the following sections, I firstly provide a rather formal 
conceptual discussion of key concepts that, to a large extent, informed what I experienced in 
the field.  These key concepts, such as ethnography, and the epistemological and ontological 
background to this particular methodology had informed many of the practical decisions I 
had to make before and once I was in the field. From a theory and method perspective, a 
generalist but improving understanding of some theoretical notions such as social and 
organisational identities, and sociological perspectives on information, cognition and 
interpretation in digitized financial markets, and the literature on narrative mode of 
knowledge and explanation helped me refine my data collection methods whilst I was in the 
field. However, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework had been a post-field work addition to the 
second order explanations of the sense-making and decision-making scenes found in the ISE.  
The section titled ‘The Study’ provides a relatively formal account of the trajectory of this 
PhD research. The Appendix 2 complements this by  a conceptual discussion on embodiment 
and reflectivity of researcher in ethnographic studies,  the nature of ethnographic writing,  
the issue of ethics in social science research, and credibility tests on ethnographic studies 
such as validity, reliability and objectivity and tying them to a more informal version of ‘the 
Study’. The Appendix 2 therefore recounts the practical and empirical outcomes of my 
involvement in this study as a researcher with multiple identities, specific insecurities and 
feelings. The honesty with which this complementary story is told should be seen as a 
reflective recognition of the effects of being who I had been in the last four and a half  years 
on my overall field research experience as well as the ultimate output for the formal degree 




Ethnography as a social science concept refers to not only a data collection method but also a 
style of writing in regards to presentation of research findings (Bryman, 2008). Ethnography 
aims to immerse into the meaning and practice world of groups of people found in different 
realms and social institutions by means of focussed investigation of a small number of cases. 
This is an inductive and iterative exploration process without any formulation of hypotheses 
and their testing, attempts to manipulate research settings, or immediately imposing pre-set 
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analytical categories on collected data (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1995:248). Moreover, 
because an ethnographer can be in the field only for a limited period of time, it is important 
to go beyond what is immediately available/observable to the researcher in order to 
contextualize findings historically and make sense of them holistically and sociologically. 
Therefore, multiple methods of data collection are used such as (participant) observation, 
informal discussions  and interviews with informants about the past and present, and review 
of primary and secondary literature on the history and present state of field sites as well as 
the relevant academic literature (Fetterman, 2008:288-9).   
 
Like all other social science research endeavours, ethnography starts with a research question 
no matter how general or vague it may be and this question is revised with back and forth 
movements as the research progresses by means of  being in the field and in constant 
dialogue with informants (O’Reilly, 2005)2. The latter is one of the foundational data 
collection principles of ethnographic research as field data is constructed by natural actions 
of informants and researcher’s discussions (co-construction) with informants about their 
activities with a view to understand meanings of these actions without any normative or 
conceptual stance on the spot (Berg, 2001:139). Only by this data collection protocol, can 
researchers access to ‘emic’ or native explanations which can later on be turned into ‘etic’ 
reflections of researcher on the fieldwork findings as informed by existing or newly 
constructed analytical concepts for the phenomenon under investigation (Fetterman, 
2008:289). 
 
In the case of sociological and qualitative research on financial markets, ethnography or 
(non)participant observation is acknowledged as a more advantageous method of 
investigation and data collection than standard interviews for topics that concentrate on 
cognition and decision making in financial markets (Preda, 2007a:520). For instance Cetina 
and Brugger (2002:916) who studied in situ sense-making and trading activities of global 
currency traders argue that ethnographic method goes beyond the formality and co-
construction of knowledge in interviews between interviewer and interviewee and allows 
researchers to generate ‘richer materials’ and ‘refined analysis’ of what actually goes on in 
financial markets. Accessing natural settings and observing informants over a certain period 
of time allow researchers to collect naturally occurring data such as conversations and 
narratives of informants (Preda, 2007). Although it might be expected that cognition in 
2 One should add the dialogue between researcher and his/her academic superiors/supervisors. 
Although PhD is rather an independent study, it is moulded by the dialogue between student and 
his/her academic colleagues and superiors. See Appendix 2 for my experience of this.  
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financial markets can be performed silently as per thinking (Preda, 2009: 681), the 
ethnographic sites observed in this study, i.e. one asset management company and four 
brokerage houses,  are conducive to thinking aloud and distributed cognition (see for 
instance, Beunza and Stark, 2005).  
 
Ontology and Epistemology  
 
This dissertation ontologically and epistemologically leans towards a reformed 
understanding of naturalism or what is usually labelled as ‘interpretivism’ or 
‘constructivism’. The term interpretivism can be understood as an umbrella term that 
contains several sociological schools of thought such as symbolic interactionism or 
phenomenology or as a general philosophical approach to social inquiry (Atkinson and 
Hammersley, 2007:7; DeCrop, 2004: 157-8). Interpretivist philosophy encourages 
researchers to perceive social reality and action as products of meaning construction and 
interpretation by individuals and social groups and hence as ‘socially constructed, multiple, 
holistic and contextual’ (DeCrop, 2004:157).  Social action is therefore something to be 
understood rather than demonstrated to be part of causal relationships or manifestations of 
universal laws (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007). Adopting the naturalistic paradigm to 
understanding and investigation of social life necessitates a double understanding for 
research that consists of the following. Firstly, if social action is oriented according to 
meanings attached to events and actions of oneself and others, this meaning creation and 
invoking process should be one aspect of inquiry into social action. Secondly, researcher 
should immerse into naturalistic settings of the observed with minimum obstruction and 
manipulation of settings and social actions in order to be able to observe, if possible 
participate,  and record naturally occurring interaction via field notes or other recording 
techniques. This allows the researcher to progressively learn the meaning world of the 
observed from his/her experiences, observations and captured data as well as his/her 
dialogue with informants about topics under investigation (Schwand, 1994:123). On the 
other hand, the notions of embodiment and reflexivity help the researcher to acknowledge 
his/her effect on the research on data collection and research findings. Once these effects are 
integrated to this double understanding of the field from observations and discussions, a third 
aspect of the nature of an interpretive inquiry follows, namely the fashioning of the field and 
field experiences by the researcher into ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973). These refer to 
second order explanations which are beyond rich but mere descriptions of field events or 
purely autobiographic accounts of researcher’s fieldwork experience called ‘auto 




Theoretical Frameworks and Methods 
 
In the above ontological and epistemological stances I take, conducting ethnographic study 
should not be understood as an end in itself, limited to immersion into practice and meaning 
world of a group of people with ‘convenience sampling’ or access by chance,  devoid of any 
methodological and theoretical guidance and vigour for theory-building (Bryman, 2008; 
Saumare and Given, 2008).  It should aim to contextualize the ethnographic findings in 
relation to the coordinates of the field sites and informants within the milieus where these are 
found (Mills, 1959). This should be done firstly to attain what Gold (1997) calls 
‘sociological sampling’ in ethnography, namely finding a number of sites and informants 
who have potential to exhibit and reflect on various emergent themes related to the 
phenomenon investigated. This increases the external validity or transferability of 
ethnographic findings in specific field sites when other similar sites of social action are 
considered (Bryman, 2008:33). Secondly, sociological sampling should help contextualize 
the field sites and research findings in relation to general theoretical/sociological concepts 
discussed in the literature review. By incorporating these sociological/theoretical concepts 
into the on-going inductive and iterative process of ethnographic immersion and 
interpretation, the researcher starts to ground his/her findings into broader second order 
explanations coming from the literature as well as his/her contribution and/or critique to the 
former in light of the ethnographic findings. This grounding helps research attain 
theoretical/purposive sampling (Palys, 2008; Bryman, 2008: 415) to ease the process of 
attaining thick, second order explanations that are  meaningful in relation to variety of 
meanings and practices in the field as well as to existing concepts and theories on the 
phenomenon. 
 
The Study  
 
Although formally started as an investigation into the relationship between sense-making and 
decision-making into financial markets and real-time TV broadcasts, the investigation for 
this PhD study had turned into the role of narrative mode of knowledge and explanation in 
sense-making and decision making before scopic market screens in the major hubs of sense-
making and decision-making in financial markets, namely intermediaries serving retail and 
institutional investors. As explained in Appendix 2, the original case study proposed for the 
original research question was the ISE equity market and the CNBC-e TV channel. Starting 
with the pilot fieldwork in the ISE headquarters in July 2007 and subsequent academic 
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discussions, it gradually became apparent that real-time TV broadcasts played a secondary 
and less customizable role compared with scopic market screens. Therefore I was advised by 
my supervisors and 1st year PhD review board members to focus on the user side, namely 
market professional and investors.  Another preliminary finding during the pilot fieldwork 
was the existence of different investor types such as retail and institutional investors in the 
ISE as well as corresponding divisions in the brokerage sector. This was another topic 
advised by the 1st year board to be further investigated and addressed methodologically. The 
notion of narrative sense-making and explanation was explored and gradually integrated into 
the data collection and analysis framework after the 1st year board as one board member, 
Prof. Richard Taffler recommended me to look into myth-making activities of traders in their 
attempts to explain what was going on in financial markets.  
 
The CMB Advance Licence Exam 
 
To increase my chances for access to brokerage houses and to gain familiarity with 
theoretical, vernacular, and formal aspects of being a market professional, I decided to take 
the CMB advance licence examination in the January 2008 diet before setting out in the 
field. This turned out to be a not very useful thing from the perspective of increasing my 
access prospects as brokerage houses did not seem to be very interested in ‘interns’ or 
‘researchers’ not to mention an enthusiastic researcher with an advanced licence which 
allows a university graduate to start his/her career in one of the more skilled career tracks 
such as investment advisor or fund manager.  Although I failed to get the licence after two 
attempts and passing only seven modules out of eight, this made no difference in regards to 
my access.  From a learning process, I think I got a generalist understanding of macro 
economy in theory and in Turkey as well as valuation methods for different securities in 
general and how these might manifest themselves in market actors’ cognition and decision 
making activities in the field. Yet like many of my learning processes for exams, I gradually 
forgot most of the things I learned for the exam. This was also the case because the study 
material hardly contained any vernacular knowledge about the state of the brokerage 
industry as well as investor types. Nor was there anything about how data screens fed by data 
vendors should be used in relation to technical and interpretative aspects. These three topics 
constituted the main thread of investigation in understanding the role of narrative mode of 
knowledge and explanation in cognition and decision-making. Therefore, it became apparent 
that in situ observations were necessary to immerse myself into these practices in brokerage 






Once an access to a brokerage house, which was tentatively arranged during the pilot 
fieldwork in the ISE, faltered in January 2008 due to the resignation of my contact from the 
house, I ventured to secure access to a brokerage house myself. My main strategy of 
selecting a target house was based on checking publicly available information about 100 plus 
brokerage houses from their websites and ISE trading volume statistics. Both signalled clues 
about their level of trading activity and possible types of clients served in brokerage houses 
and also whether any of them formally accepted interns. Another strategy for access was 
looking for any type of network relationship I had that I could mobilize to secure access. Yet 
this search was shaped by my awareness about the necessity to observe brokerage services 
for both retail and institutional investors either within a large one-stop-shop brokerage house 
that served different types of investors or in multiple houses with varying success in service 
to different types of investors. Although I managed to find several senior network leads to 
start the access process, these leads were from either successful mid-size one-stop shop 
houses (House B- in top 30 in trading volume in 2007) or foreigners-only house with a very 
significant trading volume (in the top 10 in 2007). Despite the network relationships I 
discovered I was in, negotiation for access proved to be very slow for House B and failed for 
the foreigners-only house after a month-long email and telephone exchanges. In the end with 
the help of my family’s relationship networks I started my field work in House A which was 
a DRI only house in the bracket of top 30-40 brokerage houses in terms of trading volume in 
2007. This was three weeks before access to House B was finally secured. House A’s core 
client group, which I had the chance to observe indirectly and directly, turned out to be high 
risk appetite and very short-termist investors who were interested in the VOB as well as 
volatile and/or rather thinly traded shares in the ISE equity market. It seemed like the House 
A’s management was more focussed on providing a seamless execution and, to a smaller 
extent, good research service to this core client group who seemed to have strong convictions 
about their methods of investment.   
 
In House B, I had the chance to observe a DRI group which was larger in numbers and more 
dependent on what their investment advisors told them. The organisational culture of House 
B’s domestic sales team was rather restraining and more oriented towards fundamental value 
approach that was complemented with chart analysis and interpretation of data/fund flows on 
scopic screens. In House B, I could not access the IRS department for in situ observations. 
Yet, sharing the same skyscraper floor with this department, the sister AMC provided me the 
chance to observe Turkish fund managers in situ.  This was a good case of convenience 
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sampling/access as I did not attempt to observe any one of the 22 remaining asset 
management companies in Turkey beyond this mid-size company which had around 110 
million USD under its management. Instead, I interviewed three fund managers and a chief 
executive officer from two leading and one mid-size asset management companies in Turkey. 
I shall later explain why this convenience sampling would not undermine the transferability 
of my observations in the AMC to other similar DIIs with bigger assets under management. 
 
During my stay in the AMC, I continued my search for houses that served FIIs. This bore 
fruit with access to House C as intern proper who would help the head of research and the 
analyst in their IRS department and learn by practice. House C, from their website and ISE 
statistics, seemed like an independent broker serving foreigners only with significant success 
in relation to trading volume. However, House C turned out to be quite a useful field site, 
without a prior planning or awareness on the part of me, to learn more about the DRI scene 
in relation to high net-worth and high risk-taking figures, also known as domestic 
speculators. Before House C, I had tentatively heard about this figure of investor in House B 
from more senior staff but they always argued that this investor figure had long gone and left 
only the memory of their glory days in the 1990s. However, in House C, there was a 
concentration of dealers who have had very close relationships with this investor figure.  I 
could not observe domestic sales team directly in House C due to my ‘intern’ status and the 
tasks and learning processes that came with that status in the IRS department. However I had 
to chance to explore the domestic sales team’s meaning and practice world via long informal 
discussions and several interviews. Moreover, I attended their regular morning meetings and 
observed how they collectively made sense of or disagreed about different aspects of the 
markets they followed. 
 
After I finished in House C, there were still gaps in the data collected with reference to 
dynamics in a larger IRS department as House C seemed to be stronger in trade execution 
rather than idea creation for FIIs. Although I tried to fill that gap by conducting interviews 
with IRS professionals from top performing houses including local branches of global 
investment banks, I was aware that in situ observation and learning would provide unique 
insights that could not be gained via interviews. Therefore I continued my search for a 
suitable house and finally managed to access House D, a one-stop-shop brokerage house for 
retail and institutional investors. House D was in the top 10 in terms of trading volume in 
2007-8-9 in the ISE. During my stay in House D, I had the chance to observe the domestic 
sales desk for two-weeks and after that I spent three weeks in IRS department as non-
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participant observer. My stay in house D was possible almost a year after I finished in House 
B. Although not a strategic decision I made, visiting the general field a year after the longer 
field stay in 2008 allowed me to check continuities and changes in cognitive and decision-




As explained in detail in Appendix 2, selection of these four brokerage houses and the AMC 
was based on practical issues with access as much as it was based on with a concern for 
sociological sampling. In this study, sampling was thought of along the lines of 
organisational coordinates of brokerage houses and types of investors they might be serving. 
This was a necessary decision as the ISE has around 90 intermediary organisations. Although 
my targets for access were initially based on rudimentary statistics and publicity materials 
and motivated by finding an easy access by top-down contact (as in House A), these 
decisions turned out to be rather well-made in relation to investor numbers and size of equity 
portfolios held by investor types as learned from my informants and crossed-checked by 
annual reports provided by the ACMIT on the state of Turkish financial markets, brokerage 
industry, and investor numbers, preferences and activities. Table I provides a summary of 
these figures since 1999 which include average aggregate portfolio holding periods and 





TABLE I  
Trading Volume and Portfolio Size According to Investor Types 
 
Percentage of market 
value of shares owned in 
USD (%) 
Percentage of trading- 


















Type DR DI FR FI DR DI FR FI DRI FRI DRI FRI ISE100 Dep. Bond 
2009 19.7 13 0.4 66.9 68 17.8 0.3 13.9 28 322 123 90 101 14.4 4.9 
2008 17.5 15 0.3 67.2 57.4 16.2 0.3 26.1 37 231 -58 -59 -63 7.1 6 
2007 15.5 12.3 0.2 72 61.4 14.8 0.3 23.5 35 275 72 61 72 10.9 8 
2006 20.9 14.1 0.2 64.8 65.5 15 0.4 19.1 34 280 12 -2 -6 9.8 5.7 
2005 22.4 12.8 0.3 64.5 64.6 15.6 0.3 19.5 30 204 72 48 59 13.3 10.2 
2004a 32.2 12.3 0.4 53.7 71.7 15.3 1 12 26 207 62 44 40 15.8 14.6 
2003a 37.9 10.1 0.5 50.2 75.5 16.7 0.4 7.5 23 213 101 97 111 22.5 28.8 
2002ad 44.6 11.1 0.4 42.4 77,5 12.6 0.6 9.4 27 242 -24 -39 -34 24.5 -9 
2001bd 50.5 49.5 80.8 11.7 0.3 7.2 33 292 -41 -29 -32 -24 46 
2000ab 53.7 44.33 78.9 12 1.4 7.8 28 250 -21 -49 -50 5.8 0 
1999abc 37.6 62.3 81.1 9.7 0.4 8.8 22 283 208 224 239 15 13 
 
Source: ACMIT annul capital markets reports 2002-2009, the explanation of calculation methodology for holding period 
and annual returns can be accessed in English at the ACMIT’s website (www.tspakb.org.tr/eng). 
a- Market value of shares for each investor type will not add up to 100 % due to unidentified accounts. 
b- There is no breakdown of figures according to investor type. 
c- For 1999 to 2002 returns on Deposit and Bond annual returns, the table on ACMIT (2003:39) is used. This 
table charts the real average return of 100 TL invested in  different securities between 1990 and 2002 
d- These volumes for 2001 are as of 5 April 2002 and for 2002 as of 31 January 2003. 
Abbreviations: DR-domestic retail; DI-domestic Institutional; FR-foreign retail; FI-foreign institutional; DRI-domestic 
retail and institutional; FRI-foreign retail and institutional; Dep-deposit account returns-1 year maturity; Bond-1 year 




According to the ACMIT, at the end of 2009, there were 89 brokerage houses operating in 
the ISE as sole intermediaries for equity and futures markets.3 All these houses were 
headquartered in Istanbul. These houses served just around 990,000 DRIs who had just over 
1.1 million open accounts. Of these 990,000 DRIs, over 310,000 of them resided in Istanbul 
and owned 60.5 % of the total value of shares held by DRIs in Turkey (ACMIT, 2010). 
Therefore, Istanbul and its brokerage houses as the field research sites could be seen as the 
core of domestic retail investment and brokerage activity in the Turkish equity market. Table 
II summarizes the organisational coordinates of the houses in relation to annual trading 
3 All the statistical data used about investor numbers and trading activities come from the ACMIT 
Annual Capital Markets reports unless otherwise stated. 
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volume (average of 2008 and 2009), branch network, and active DRI numbers. In Chapter 5, 
further details about each house’s ownership structure and its material, cultural and social 
resources as an organisation are given with a view to locating them in distinctive 
intermediation pockets in the ISE.  
 
      




Annual trading volume (in billion  TL 
and as % of total annual volume of the 
ISE -814 billion TL/ and approximate 






28 billion TL / 3.5 percent / 6th 
27 branches in parent bank 
premises throughout Turkey 
~10000 active 









12billion TL/ 1.5 percent / 25th 







8.3 billion TL /1.1 percent/ 31st 
19 branches in parent bank 
premises throughout Turkey 
~2200 active 
accounts out of 
~22000 accounts 
 
As can be seen in Table II, the selected field sites cover almost 8 percent of the annual 
trading volume in the ISE between 2008 and 2009. However, the total number of active 
accounts in all four houses is around 15,000 and constitutes only 1.4 % of total number of 
DRI accounts.4 This is not a surprising figure for the domestic sales and marketing managers 
of the houses I observed as they were well aware of the existing DRI profile in the ISE in 
terms of funds dedicated to equity investment and trading frequency. According to the 
ACMIT (2010), this profile points to approximately 175,000 DRIs, a mere 0.25 percent of 
the country's population, who own between one million TL and 10,000 TL worth of shares in 
their brokerage house accounts. On top of this figure, only 1,888 investors have more than a 
million TL worth of shares in their accounts. 
 
All four brokerage houses tapped into this small group of DRIs most of which resided in 
Istanbul. This group have also constituted around 10 % to 15 % of all DRI numbers in the 
post 2002 period but have held more than 95 % of the total value of equity portfolio held by 
the DRIs. Therefore, in each field site, there was an opportunity to indirectly observe this 
4 Active accounts can be defined as accounts with funds or equity in it with a reasonable turnover rate 
to generate commission fees for brokerage houses. These are accounts of investors who are worth 
attending to by dealers, and who show a willingness to take risks and trade.  
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core DRI profile which had generated the significant bulk of trading volume and portfolio 
ownership by the DRIs in recent years. In House A, the VIP dealing room  was observed 
over a three week period where five dealers served around 50 investor between them most of 
whom were based in Istanbul and dedicated several hundred thousand TL to several million 
TL to their accounts in House A to trade in the VOB and the ISE. Then for a week, between 
three to five DRIs were directly observed in a branch whilst they were day trading in the 
equity market. This group of investors were not as wealthy and/or trading volume generating 
as the VIP room clients but they seemed to be involved with domestic speculation networks 
as well as very wealthy but low frequency trading investors who were clients of other 
brokerage houses. 
 
In House B, a two week observation was made in the headquarters in which nine dealers 
served around 650 clients from Istanbul each of whom had equity accounts ranging from a 
minimum of 75,000 TL to 20 million TL. The client profile in House B was different from 
that of House A in the sense that House B restrained most of its clients from taking higher 
risks by day-trading or short-selling in the equity market or encouraging them to trade in the 
VOB.  In House C, the domestic sales team’s morning strategy meetings were attended to 
observe and record pre-market trading sense-making activity among dealers some of whom 
also worked as day-traders in the ISE. In House D, a week was spent in observing the 
headquarter-based dealers who served high frequency and/or large equity fund holding 
investors from Istanbul. These observations provide the evidence for local rationalities and 
routine sense-making and investment activity for the core DRIs.5 
 
FII Scene  
 
As shall be discussed in the next chapter, the post 2001 period has witnessed an explosion in 
the number of FIIs investing in the ISE. This has also transformed the relationship between 
IRS teams and FIIs dramatically. From a numerical perspective, the ACMIT annual reports 
between 2002 and 2009 point to 200 % increase in FII account numbers and 600 % increase 
in active accounts among this type of investor/organisation. This translates into current FII 
5 In the evidence chapters, dealers in House A, B, and D shall be called investment advisors. 
Investment advisory is different from dealing as the latter gives the right to brokerage houses to give 
investment advice to clients rather than sole order execution. There are 57 brokerage houses out of 
103 existing and 89 active brokerage houses with the advisory licence (only 6 of them are held by no-
branch, discount brokers). House C does not have this particular advisory licence. Discount brokers 
usually attract high frequency investors and do not feel the need to expand their client base via 
branches and investment advisory. Data on intermediation licences are taken from the CMB website, 
available at http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/afd/mevcutyetkiler.aspx?tur=banka&submenuheader=-1  
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number of 2,053 mutual fund products and 956 banks, asset managers, brokerage houses and 
other corporations that are domiciled abroad. The 956 FIIs are served by around 39 IRS 
departments, up from 29 in 2002. However, these figures of FIIs and IRS departments do not 
tally up with what my informants from these departments had to say about the nature of the 
competition in their organisational field and their client numbers. According to them, there 
are around 20 IRS departments vying to get a greater share of this FII pie. Among my 
interviewees only two heads of IRS departments mentioned a client number around 200 to 
300 out of which 10 % to 20 % were consistently most active. These managers presided over 
their departments in the two biggest one-stop-shop brokerage houses in the ISE in terms of 
trading volume and investor numbers in the last three years. 6 Otherwise, House D had the 
largest IRS team that I managed to observe. Although not as big as those of the above two 
houses, House D had a portfolio of approximately 150 FIIs and a similar picture of 10 % to 
20 % most consistently active clients. Moreover, I was told by my IRS informants that those 
most consistently active FII would hardly work with a specific IRS department only.7 This 
was especially the case after local IRS teams started to attack the bourgeoning FII market in 
the post-2001 period instead of serving only global investment banks that worked as global 
brokers for the Turkish market. There was therefore an overlap of most active to less active 
FIIs in respective portfolios of top performing IRS teams including House D. In this respect, 
House B did not fare as well as House D in terms of client portfolio and trading volumes. 
The head of institutional sales in House B stated that they had around 100 existing and 
prospective clients 60 % of which hardly sent any orders or wanted to hear what his team 
had to say about trading opportunities (Interview, 17 April 2008). It was House C which had 
the smallest client portfolio of around 40 clients. Yet it was observed that most of the orders 
to House C were coming from a core 15 clients most of which were global or regional 
brokers that were also served by the top IRS departments in the ISE. These clients apparently 
had long-term relationship with the two veteran sales traders who moved to the House C in 
May 2008 from the Istanbul branch of a global investment bank.  

6 IRS departments are often unsuccessful in reaching each and every 959 FIIs investing in Turkey. 
These FIIs often use global investment banks in their access to Turkey. Therefore reaching an FII 
client number of 100 to 300 can be seen as reaching a larger figure of mutual funds than a mere 100 to 
300 but not totally covering the whole FII universe.   





Trading volume breakdown according to DRI and FII in House B, C and D 
 
In relation to trading volumes, there is no publicly available break down of the houses’ 
trading volume according to investor types. Although an aggregate breakdown of trading 
volume by investor types is provided by the ACMIT reports and is presented in Table I 
above, my informants in House B and D gave me round up figures of 40 % to 45 % of the 
their aggregate volume in each house. In the case of House C, I had no such lead from the 
sales traders or head of the house but a slightly lesser ratio could be expected for 2008. This 
is because after the sales traders started in the house in 2008, House C made a leap of almost 
40 % in their trading volume compared with 2007, a year which was apparently not very 
promising in relation to FII trading volume. All in all, these approximate trading volume 
figures for 2008 and 2009 mean that the directly observed field sites (House C and D) 
generated on average around 10 % of the total volume generated by the FIIs in the ISE. 
House B probably generated around 2.5 % to 3 % of the average annual volume by the FIIs 
in the same period but I was not allowed to observe their in situ activities. Otherwise my 
interviewees and their departments in the rest of the local IRS in the so called top 20 IRS 
departments covered more than 50 % of the average volumes in these years.8 As for the 
direct observation of FIIs in situ, I could not manage to do that for the reasons I explained in 
Appendix 2. However I managed to conduct interviews or have informal discussions with 
FIIs based in Istanbul and London.  
 
Before moving on the DIIs and where the AMC fit into the DII scene, it should be stated here 
that the actual DRI trading volume generated by the all four houses are around 5 % of the 
overall trading volume in the ISE when the FIIs’ volume are deducted. Yet the DRI profiles 
in these four houses correspond to what can be described as the core DRI profile in the ISE 
that contribute to trading volumes with meaningful share and cash funds and/or a knack for a 
relatively high frequency trading with the help of loan facilities provided by brokerage 
houses. A significant amount of daily and annual trading volume by the core DRIs was in 
fact generated by domestic speculators and day-traders (professional or home/office based). 
The origins and routine trading activities of these DRI figures mentioned here shall be 
substantiated in the next chapter.  

8 These figures are rounded up from company reports and interview material. It has to be repeated 
here that trading volume generated for foreigners is a sensitive topic in this over-brokered market not 
only because of competition among the IRS teams but also the dynamics between domestic 




The DII Scene 
 
The biggest reason for limiting my in situ observations to one asset management company 
and then four interviews with fund managers in other companies was that by the time of 
observation the asset management industry in Turkey continued to be very conservative 
thanks to the CMB rules and regulations on asset management. But more importantly, the 
lack of interest on the part of Turkish retail savers in equity-based funds continued unabated. 
The limitation by CMB regulations shall be explained in greater detail in Chapter 9. For now 
the following figures explain the lack of interest among the Turkish retail savers in equity 
market and equity-based fund products. To begin with, the ACMIT figures since 2000 show 
that investment in equity market was consistently at the bottom of household saving 
preferences in Turkey. Although the figures in household saving preferences between 2004 
and 2009, as gathered by the ACMIT (2009; 2010) from the State Planning Organisation, 
show an increasing stock of household and institutional savings allocated to equity assets in 
this period, this can be explained by the rising asset prices and expanding economy in this 
period. Moreover, the share of equity investments via direct purchase of shares or equity-
based mutual funds in saving preferences hardly constituted more than 15 % of the overall 
saving stocks in Turkey in this period. The contribution of the equity-based mutual fund 
products was no more than 7 % of the overall savings stock owned by DRIs and DIIs in 
Turkey.  
 
In fact, in the post 2000/1 period the share of equity-based mutual funds in the overall 
mutual fund portfolio size have shrunk relatively and had hardly managed to go over 5 % 
mark (ACMIT, 2002: 40 and 2010:74). These equity-based funds had reached an 
approximately 190,000 investors who owned only 14 % of the all available units in these 
fund products.9 Although the private pension system in Turkey had been in place since 2003 
and despite the significant progress it had made in terms of investor numbers, the private 
pension companies’ investment in the ISE equity market had never gone over 10 % of their 
assets under management (Emeklilik Gozetim Merkezi 2010:53-4).  The AMC with around 
110 million USD under management therefore seemed like a microcosm of much larger 
banked-owned asset management companies. Like the AMC, these asset management 

9 The data is compiled from the following URL by using figures for 31/12/2009 
http://www.fonbul.com/yat_tercih.asp?TT=1&DT=0 . Fonbul is the data portal for investment funds. 
It is provided by Finnet, a specialized data provider on company and sector balance sheets for most of 
the research departments in the brokerage house sector.  
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companies managed their own and pension funds’ fund products. After the observations in 
the AMC and the interviews, it became obvious that irrespective of the size of assets under 
their management, the asset management companies in Turkey, due to the sector-wide 
regulations and the general lack of interest from Turkish retail savers in equity-based mutual 
funds, had relatively marginal equity exposures, and were similar to each other in their 
routine sense-making and investment activities as well as the fund products they offered and 
managed for Turkish retail savers.  In Chapter 4, I provide a discussion of possible reasons 
behind this general lack of interest in the ISE equity market and professional asset 
management on the part of Turkish retail savers.  
 
Taking Field notes: limitations 
 
During my stay in each field, my main method of recording field events and informal 
discussions was using a notebook and a pen. This was in line with most modern 
ethnographic practices (Spradley, 1979; Emerson et al., 1995; Atkinson and Hammersley, 
1995). Note taking was useful in two respects. Firstly, it allowed me to describe field sites 
and field events which could not be achieved by filming and/or voice recording only. 
Although the latter method is much superior in accuracy of details, it needs to be 
accompanied by apperception, namely subjective meanings attached to signals perceived. 
Although my aim was to keep a record of everything happening in the room via note-taking 
without any bias or normative judgement, one aspect of this note-taking was to incrementally 
integrate my informants’ and my subjective interpretations of field events into their written 
descriptions.  This act of reaching apperception would be easier to do via note-taking rather 
than tape recording or video recording signals only which might have necessitated lengthy 
re-runs of recorded data, transcription, and detached interpretation/apperception off the field 
site. Despite this preference for notes, I made the utmost effort to take contemporaneous 
notes when it came to conversations among my informants as well as their narratives to their 
clients.  
 
The second benefit of contemporaneous note-taking was that I did not need to sit down and 
try to transcribe or re-watch over five hours of trading material over 47 full-days of non-
participant observation in Houses A, B, and D and 26 days of participant observation in 
House C, not to mention dealing with getting permission to use a significantly obtrusive 
recording technology, and other logistical and technical decisions regarding where to put the 
digital recorders, buying tapes, and so on. Once a trading/observation day was over, it was 
much easier to go through an average of 20 to 40 pages of daily notes and filling the gaps 
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and adding comments, and then trying to write my diary at home if I had any energy left. A 
more socially situated and embodied set of reasons behind my decision not to use digital 
recording technologies are explained in the Appendix 2. Due to these reasons, the collected 
in situ data are confined to field notes detailing site events, providing almost-verbatim 
transcripts of conversations that could be heard, and descriptions of my screen observations 
and field settings, and events and conversations that I witnessed or took part when I was 
away from my desk and my note-taking gear. In note-taking, it was possible to reach a great 
level of approximation to verbatim conversations because most of the in situ sense-making 
stories were terse and formed of maximum three to five sentences. This made them easy to 
write down almost contemporaneously.   
 
All these factors mean that the basic statistical descriptors about stories presented in this 
thesis should not be taken as 100 % accurate numerical portrayal of all the things said in the 
room.10 At times I could not hear/record what was discussed, especially when more than one 
informant talked to their clients or if they were far away from where I was. Sometimes I had 
to go to the lavatory or take a break and freshen up. At other times I was at the desk of an 
informant talking to her/him and did not have the chance to put down conversations among 
others in the room. However, the numerical values assigned to the plot categories as well as 
sources of information categories are the direct result of the narrative analysis of my story 
dataset and hence reflect my unambiguous analytical judgement about where they should 
belong to. The reasoning beyond these classifications is explained in the ‘Narrative Analysis’ 
section. 
 
Triangulation and Interviews 
 
One of the reasons why (participant) observers in ethnographic studies conduct formal 
interviews or informal discussions is to ensure triangulation in data collection process 
(Denzin 2006). Triangulation is done to collect different types of data such as observational, 
interview, written/documentary as well as using the correspondent methods to collect them. 
One of the aims of triangulation is ensuring validity of findings by one specific method such 
as observation by squaring them with findings from another method such as informal 
discussions or unstructured interviews (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007:182-3). This can be 

10 The numerisation of these narratives was actually recommended by Prof. Taffler after a presentation 
of my topic in a Behavioural Finance Conference in Cass Business School, London in December 
2009. He told me that a numerical perspective on stories would put things into perspective in relation 
to frequency of stories, their temporal orientation, and so on.  
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done with the observed informants as I did through my informal discussions at their desks or 
via quick questions at lunch time or after trading hours to ensure the validity of my 
interpretations and learn more about different aspects of their activities which was not 
immediately available through observation. I also ventured into other departments that I did 
not observe in situ and had informal discussion with managers and junior staff there to get 
their perspective on my general topics of investigation. This helped me to square my 
observational findings in one department with interview data in another department. In inter-
organisational settings conducting interviews were necessary to ensure applicability of 
findings in the field sites to other hubs of similar activities such as IRS departments, DIIs, 
domestic sales teams and domestic speculators in the ISE. On top of this, I also interviewed 
regulators, and FII managers and traders in Istanbul and London. In total, I managed to 
interview 53 market professionals from these organisations. Most of my early interviews 
with market professionals started with relatively unstructured interview guides as they aimed 
at exploration on various topics that were not accessible via secondary literature. However as 
I increased my knowledge about the field, my interview guide became more semi-structured 
to able to square the existing observational and interview findings with new ones and to fill 
in the gaps in my data. As might be noticed in the following chapters, I do not refer to each 
and every interview I conducted during the study. As most of these interviews aimed at 
triangulation, I incorporate the general common themes from these interviews into my 
discussion of different topics and I often quote from certain interviews which dramatically 
capture these general themes. From a technical perspective, all interviews were tape-
recorded unless the interviewee did not agree for that or I was in one of the observation sites 
and did not use my digital recorder for reasons explained in the Appendix 2.  In cases where 
voice-recording was not permitted, I used an interview notebook to write down what was 
asked and answered. A strategy of jotting down the interviewee’s words contemporaneously 
and then filling up the gaps right after the interview was used in such instances. It was also 
observed that informants would speak at a pace that made my note-taking more 
manageable.11   
 
Narrative Analysis and Operationalising Sense-making Story  
 
The theoretical postulates on the narrative mode of knowledge and explanation in 

11 Non-taped interviews and informal discussions outwith the five observation sites are indicated with 
an asterisk.  None of the informal discussions/interviews with informants resident in the observation 
sites were taped-recorded with the exception of all the interviews and some informal discussions in 
House D.  
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organisational sense-making in financial markets, which are discussed in the literature 
review, inform the narrative analysis adopted in the thesis. More specifically, I introduce an 
operationalised definition of sense-making story for the thesis to be able measure their 
semiotic and socio-linguistic aspects in each field site.  Sense-making stories are verbal 
discourses with more than one sentence that are produced by market actors who use the 
logics of cause-effect, correlation, similarity, and randomness (random or chronological 
sequencing with a view to express unease) to connect screen-visible events and actions or 
proxies that they believe to represent these, in order to come up with a higher datum or 
interpretation beyond simple sensory description. These stories can be about explaining the 
past and present state of the market (and its investment related components) and/or 
predicting its future trajectory. Sense-making stories may also use contra-logics which refer 
to underlying cognitive schemata’s failure and express unease on the part of storyteller. A last 
type of plotting logic is called observation which is derived from the notion of proto-story 
(Gabriel 2000). Proto story, despite having more than two sentences has a rudimentary plot 
which is short of delivering a definitive explanation of the past and present, and/or making a 
future prediction. 
 
The reason why I look at oral narratives only in the thesis is that each field site observed 
exhibits different features in reference to written sense-making stories. For instance, in 
House A, the strategists uploads to the House A’s website around 10 written sense-making 
comments a day, each around two to three sentence. Whereas in other houses, such a 
commentary is usually substituted with daily reports which summarize what happened a day 
before and what should be expected today. Therefore, identifying sense-making stories from 
the in situ oral reactions recorded during the field work provides uniformity across the field 
sites and promises more accuracy in providing an approximate numerical representation of 
stories collected as well as effects of the positionality of storytellers in the ISE field on these 
narrative reactions.  
 
The logics of sequencing used in this thesis are derived from Boje’s (2001:101) causality or 
stream analysis and adopted to what has been observed and learnt in the field. In this respect, 
all logics are derivatives of cause-effect logic, and most of them including cause-effect itself 
establish relationships between events and actions on the basis of outcomes being observed 
(Polkinghorne, 1988:21). This turns actors and non-human entities into actants 
(Czarniawska, 2004) which are capable of acting and being acted on. A complementary 
distinction is made between private and publicly available information. While publicly 
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available information refers to content available on scopic market screens, private 
information is knowledge gathered from social networks such as email groups, colleagues 
and friends, and so on.  Last but not least, the temporal orientation of narratives are classified 
into past, present and future combinations. This demonstrates that narratives are not just post 
hoc explanations without any predictive content.   
 
Why the ISE as the ethnographic case? 
 
Before turning to the history of the ISE since 1986, a couple of things should be said about 
the selection of the ISE as my ethnographic case study.  To start with, case study is not a 
method of inquiry/data collection but a method of site selection (Stake, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 
2006). In my exploration of the role of narratives in cognition in digitized financial markets 
with a semiotic and socio-linguistic perspective, another market setting could have been 
selected. Although explained in greater detail in the Appendix 2, in a nutshell my decision to 
study the ISE for this research topic was one of convenience. Being a native of the country 
and rather familiar with language and settings in general and a specific initial puzzle about 
financial markets I had noticed through the ISE in particular motivated me significantly in 
my decision to study the ISE. However from a theoretical and empirical perspective on the 
research topic, the ISE has proved to be an interesting organized equity market. This stems 
from the fact that a large portion of shares in the ISE are owned by FIIs whereas most of the 
trading volume is generated by DRIs. Because there is neither a market-maker nor any large 
financial institutions which engage in programme trading, DRIs fill the liquidity gap and 
trade in high quantities and high frequencies. In this respect, the ISE seems like an intrinsic 
case (Stake, 1994:237) of a very significant phenomenon of local retail investor activity 
which might have counterparts in other emerging markets such as Taiwan and South Korea 
where stock turnover rates show very significant rates and domestic retail investors seem to 
be generating the bulk of the trading volume (ACMIT, 2010; Chen, 2010). On the other 
hand, from exploration of the role of narratives in sense-making and decision-making before 
scopic market screens, the ISE is actually an instrumental case study (Stake, 1994:237) 
because it gives the researcher a chance to observe the use of scopic screens by market 
professional and investors alike, which could be achieved in another similar market setting. 
However, from a sociological perspective, it has hard to ignore the effects of the prevalent 
individual and organisational identities and resources as well as the history of the ISE on 
how prevalent cognitive schemata and their narrative outcomes are generated, sustained and 
modified. In the following chapters, these effects are explored in detail by using Bourdieu’s 






CHAPTER 4 THE HISTORY OF THE ISE SINCE 1985 
 
In this chapter, I substantiate my short introduction to the ISE and the dominant investor and 
intermediary organisation types by tracing their historical evolution as well as the ISE’s 
evolution as a field since its formal opening in December 1985.  I do so by applying the 
theoretical concepts proposed by Bourdieu to the case of the ISE. This chapter also prepares 
the ground for the empirical discussion of the sense-making stories in the next five chapters 
for each field site. Because there is a dearth of literature on the ethnographic history of the 
ISE in the post-1985 period (Fertekligil 1993 and Kazgan, 1995 provide more formal 
histories), I mainly rely on six sources: very detailed journalistic accounts by Yildirim on the 
first decade of the ISE (1995; 1996), a memoir by a former brokerage house manager 
Cevikel (2002), the website of the ISE which contains the timeline of important events and 
some audio-visual material on the ISE’s first decade, the interviews I conducted with ISE 
staff and employees of brokerage houses, the annual reports of the biggest brokerage house 
in Turkey in terms of equity and client base, IsYatirim, in 1999 and 2000 which give some 
numerical insights into the first decade of the ISE from the perspective of investor numbers 
and their investment activities, and last but not least formal studies on the ISE from micro-
economics field that provide insights about the ISE’s properties in terms of informational 
structure, investor profile, and index dynamics.12  For macro economy and political history of 
Turkey in the first two and a half decades of the ISE, I use academic literature on Turkey. For 
the post-2001 crisis transformation in the ISE, I also rely on interviews I conduced with 
market professionals from various brokerage houses, asset management companies, and 
regulators, and on the ACMIT annual reports on Turkish financial markets and 
intermediation sector.  
 
Pre-1985 History  
 
The ISE is the only organized securities market in Turkey and it is home to the primary and 
secondary Turkish and foreign equity markets, and the secondary Turkish government bond 
and bill markets. Re-opened in late 1985, the ISE has been an integral part of Turkey's re-
integration to the global financial markets (Kazgan, 1995; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). A stock 
exchange was formally founded in 1866 in the Galata business and trade district in Istanbul 
during the Ottoman Empire under the name of “Dersaadet Tahvilat Borsasi” which served as 
12 Unfortunately, on the ISE, the CMB or the ACMIT websites, there is no publicly available statistics 
until 1997 about investor numbers, trading volumes and share ownership classified according to 
investor types. Therefore, I rely on secondary literature available for those statistics.  
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a primary and secondary market for the Ottoman government and corporate bonds, equities 
and foreign currency (Toprak, 2008). During the Republican Era, the stock market virtually 
became inoperational, a situation which began with the Great Depression and then further 
institutionalized by the successive governments’ decision to centralize and nationalize 
economy planning and depress financial markets in the pre and post WWII era (Fertekligil, 
1993; Kazgan, 1995, Chambers, 2005). Despite government policy, there existed a legal 
framework for joint-stock companies and subsequent public offerings and issuance of 
corporate and saving bonds (Kazgan, 1995). This meant that there was room for the 
formation of an informal secondary market for those securities. This market operated in the 
1960s and 1970s in the Galata district of Istanbul or in securities departments of major 
national banks such as IsBank which was a market maker in this limited secondary market 
(Yildirim, 1995, Kazgan, 1995; IsYatirim, 2000:13).  
 
In line with the advent of deregulation and liberalisation currents in the global economy, in 
January 1980 the Turkish government decided to deregulate the economy and financial 
markets, and to shift to an export-led growth model (Kazgan, 2005). Unfortunately, the 
decision to lift the stranglehold on the money markets led to a  so called “bankers crisis” in 
the early 1980s mostly in the form of Ponzi finance schemes encouraged by runaway banks 
and high street shops of so-called individual bankers. Both figures attempted to outflank 
mainstream banks in a race to offer the highest interest rates to retail savers. According to 
Denizer et al. (2000:7) the cost of bailing out those delinquent financiers was around 2.5 % 
of the GDP in 1982. After this disastrous experience, the state moved in to regulate the 
nascent financial markets by paving the way to the first ever independent regulatory board, 
the Capital Markets Board (CMB) and a dedicated code for Turkish capital markets. 
Moreover, plans were devised to reactivate the ISE to centralize all the OTC activity in 
equity and bond markets for more effective regulation, and more importantly for 
encouraging retail savers to participate in what was hoped to be an open and outward looking 
Turkish economy by becoming shareholders in Turkish companies.  
 
Yet, this process was not fast and smooth. The first decade of the ISE was plagued with 
problems of institutionalisation in trading, clearance and custody, data/information flows 
from and to the market place, regulation of brokerage houses, use of leverage in trading and 
short-selling, prevention of insider trading and intervention by politicians and government 
ministers in the working of the markets, investor rights and protection as shareholders and 
clients of intermediaries, prevention of manipulation and group trading and so on (Yildirim, 
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1995: 362-8; 1996; Muradoglu, 2000). The institutional wrangling among the CMB,  the ISE 
and state ministers responsible for the capital markets over these and other matters meant 
that there were occasional crises in the market which resulted in brokerage house 
bankruptcies, extreme volatility in stock prices and loss of investor capital due to fraud and 
manipulation (Yildirim, 1996:159-251; Muradoglu, 2000).13 In sum, the re-opening of the 
ISE was made without taking into full consideration all possible issues and loopholes in the 
existing legal framework. Issues and loopholes were to be fixed after significant incidences 
in a make-shift manner.
 
1986-1994: The Cagaloglu and Karakoy Years 
 
From its inception of trading on 3 January, 1986 until the move to its new trading floor in 
Karakoy, the ISE operated in a 50 square meter room in an office in the Cagaloglu district 
rented from IsBank. There were 36 intermediary organisations present on the ISE floor 
which apparently was designed like a classroom. The representatives of these intermediaries 
would sit down at desks and the bourse manager would conduct the auction from his table 
with the help of his assistants (Yildirim, 1995:17). On the other hand, investors were allowed 
to watch the session directly in the trading room or in a separate room called the “listening 
room” where they would listen to the trading session via a speaker connected to the 
microphone on the order matching table of the bourse experts (Yildirim, 1995:20, 28).14 
According to the description by Muharrem Karsli, the first head of the ISE, the trading day 
would start with a blind opening-price session (confidential limit and price orders put in a 
box by brokers for determination of the opening price and matching of orders by the bourse 
expert on order/price proportion basis). This was to be followed by continuous auctions for 
each share. Because everything had to be done manually by the bourse experts, there were 
virtually two price formed every day, the opening price and the closing price, and most of the 
daily volume would be recorded with the opening price (Yildirim, 1995:52-4). A broker 
member who was present in that room remembers sitting at desks as if they were in a 
classroom and buzzing an electric bell at their desk to call the floor official who would 
13 Muradoglu (2000) notes that in the earlier years of the exchange the ISE officials could hold stocks 
of companies quoted in the ISE without any scrutiny of whether this constituted a conflict of interest. 
On the other hand, Yildirim (1995) demonstrates that some senior ISE officials did not show any 
restraint in having direct relationships with prominent investors, company owners and brokers.  
14 Yildirim notes that the listening room in Cagaloglu did not have any formal status as a trading floor. 
Despite this, an informal market emerged there with real-time prices 10% below or above the official 
floor prices. This room was shut in September 1987 once this informal market became widely 
discussed in the national media, especially after the first biggest crash of the market in August 1987. 
However, this did not prevent a congregation of investors and informal brokers outside the stock 
market building during and after the trading hours (Yildirim, 1995, Cevikel, 2002).   
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collect his order paper and take it to the order matching desk to be matched with other orders 
(Interview, 22 June 2009). The most important consequences of this manual and very slow 
matching system were the lack of liquidity during market hours, low market trading volume 
compared to shares in circulation (1.23 % on average-Yildirim, 1995:22) and sprouting of a 
street market outside the exchange floor.  
 
To solve these problems, boost liquidity and accommodate for the soaring demand from 
investors, in November 1987, the “tahta” – board system (multiple price-continuous auction 
based on price and time priority) adapted from Jordan Stock Exchange was introduced to the 
ISE’s new trading floor in Karakoy, which was a few minutes away from Galata on foot 
(Yildirim, 1995: 50-4). In this system, floor brokers would get orders from company 
headquarters via phone or directly from investors observing the trading floor from visitor’s 
section during the two-hour trading session between 10:00 am and 12:00 pm, and then write 
buy/sell orders on a whiteboard in designated columns and match them according to order-
matching regulations set by the ISE. This process was overseen by the ISE officials for 
enforcement of rules by means of standing near the whiteboards and constantly observing 
what floor brokers were doing (Interview, assistant general manager Surveillance, ISE 27 
June 2007).  Thanks to the change in the trading system, the ISE consolidated nominal 
trading volume in TL increased 213 % in 1988. In 1989, this increase was 734 %. The 
number of annual contracts also showed a 220 % increase in 1989 (no statistics for 1986 and 
1987). Between 1990 and 1994, the annual trading volume in USD increased by 396 % and 
the number of contracts had expanded by 655 %.15 Although the number of floated 
companies had increased from 76 in 1989 to 176 in 1994, the change in the order matching 
system and trading floor had dramatically increased the trading volumes and the general 
public’s interest in the ISE equity market.  
 
Major actors in the formation years  
 
In the first five years of the ISE, the existing actors in the field were those intermediary 
organisations active in the OTC market, namely securities departments of large banks 
scattered around Istanbul, and independent stock brokers working in Galata. These actors 
traded the shares of a few public companies. The state was a significant force in the market 
as it owned a few companies which were open to the public and traded in these shares via its 
15 The annual nominal trading volume in TL denotes a 6510 % increase probably due to the 
devaluation in 1994 as there is an approximately 300 % increase between 1993 and 1994. All figures 
are from the ISE database available at http://www.ise.org/data/stocksData.aspx  
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Public Corporations Authority. There were also private-sector companies which, alongside 
the state-owned companies, became the quoted companies in the opening of the ISE in 1986. 
On the investor front, most DRIs in the pre-ISE years seemed to own shares for investment 
purposes not for speculation as there was no liquid and organized market that would allow 
them to engage in short-term speculation. Share ownership was like house ownership in 
Turkey. One would buy shares as a form of long-term investment, either because they were 
an employee of the issuing company or had learnt to use shares as an investment/saving 
vehicle in their close milieus or thanks to publicity campaigns that encouraged public 
participation in the IPOs of holdings in the 1970s (Yildirim, 1995; Cevikel, 2002).16 There 
were initially no institutional investors in the ISE such as pension funds or asset management 
companies from Turkey or abroad. These were to enter the market in the early 1990s and 
some insurance companies started investing in the ISE as it offered better returns than other 
asset classes (Muradoglu, 2000: 367). Moreover, up until 1991, there was no free currency 
exchange market or an institutional arrangement to repatriate profits outside Turkey, which 
virtually prevented any meaningful FII entry to the market (Yildirim, 1995). 
 
On the intermediation front, the division between securities department of national banks and 
those independent stock brokers from Vakifhan, a business mall in Galata, meant two 
different modalities of access for DRIs. On the one hand, an investor could get the 
intermediation services from a national bank where there would be a standard service of 
investment advice, execution, custody and borrowing. The downside of this mode of access 
was that this relatively reliable service came at a cost, higher commission fees and probably 
less personalised service due to large number of clients the house would have. On the other 
hand, investors could opt for the services of independent stock brokers who would give a 
faster and cheaper service to their clients.17 Yet this often meant extra risks such as custody, 

16 Muradoglu (1989 as cited in Muradoglu 2000:367) conducted a survey to capture the dominant DRI 
profile in the ISE in the late 1980s. Her findings pointed to a middle-aged male university graduate 
who earned way over the GDP per capita and held a diversified stock portfolio. Muradoglu argued that 
this profile pointed to the dominance of ‘upper classes’ in the retail investor universe. Yildirim 
(1995:79) summarizes a survey conducted by the ISE in January 1988 among those investors who 
came to the ISE building to trade. Among them, university graduates were more than 50 % and 34 % 
of them were those who held shares before the ISE’s opening in 1986. More interestingly, more than 
55% of the respondents believed that at least a six month holding period of shares were needed to 
generate meaningful returns from equity investment! Muradoglu (2000:367) refers to another survey 
of investor profile conducted by the ISE in 1994. From the graphs she presents, it could be seen that 
this particular investor profile continued its dominance between 1989 and 1994 albeit with a more 
balanced asset allocation and less exposure to the equity market.  
17 The fixed commission rates were introduced towards the middle of 1990s. Interestingly, it was the 
non-bank owned discount brokers which lobbied the CMB for a minimum commission rule. Even 
after the introduction of fixed commission rates, it was not unknown that brokerage houses were using 
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misleading investment advice and execution, and so on. Despite these differences, it should 
be remembered that equity investment in an organized market was a novel thing not only for 
investors but also for many of the financial intermediaries in Turkey. Today’s staples for 
analysis such as use of charts, fundamental analysis for companies’ future performances, or 
even simple analysis of balance sheets were things that were rather novel and had to be 
introduced into the intermediation practice by individuals who had exposure to these tools 
abroad as students and/or practitioners of finance (Interview, chief strategist House B, 12 
May 2008; Interview*, head of the IRS in a local broker 13 June 2008). Moreover, as 
Muradoglu (2000: 365) chronicles, it was only at the end of 1989 that publishing of interim 
financial reports became compulsory for the quoted companies. On the other hand, IPOs and 
quotation of companies’ shares in the ISE were not subject to any formal principles until 
1990. The lack of timely and comprehensive information about companies also meant that 
insider trading was easy for company officials and investors, but harder to detect by the 
regulators. This was exacerbated by the fact that it was only in 1990 that legislation was 
passed against insider trading (Muradoglu, 2000: 365).18  
 
Trading in the streets 
 
Despite these problems related to quality of intermediation, valuation and exchange services, 
the interest in the equity market was very high due to amazing returns recorded in the market 
mainly due to supply-demand imbalances in shares (Interview, head of domestic sales House 
D 4 September 2008). Moreover, what was happening in the ISE was publicised on a daily 
basis via journalists on the trading floor from a designated area, which fuelled the interest of 
the general public in the ISE. Consequently, the board system began to be inadequate. The 
designated investor area on the exchange floor could only hold 500 investors. As a result, 
many investors were left out of the exchange floor and became disgruntled with their brokers 
and the ISE staff (Yildirim 1995:188; Cevikel, 2002:70). As a solution, investors yet again 
started to spill over to a street market that was formed near the Karakoy floor. Unfortunately, 
this informal street market proved to be rather detrimental to the unsuspecting and 
uninformed investors. Self-made brokers in the street market with their stalls, briefcases and 
rebates to allure investors These rebates were formalized in 2002 and then in 2006, an unregulated 
commission fee market was re-introduced in the face of free-riding brokerage houses which broke the 
rebate rules (Interview head of domestic sales House D 4 September 2008; Asst. general manager 
ACMIT 15 June 2009). Currently, the bulk of the brokerage house incomes come from trading 
commission fees (around 70 %- ACMIT 2003 and subsequent annual reports).  
18From Yildirim’s (1995) account between 1989 and 1992, it seems that legislation on insider trading, 
alongside other market events such as short selling, was discussed as part of a new capital markets 
code. It was only in 1992 that this code was promulgated.
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calculators as their market devices would tout the shares they were able to sell and were 
willing to buy. The incentive for these street brokers was to buy shares much cheaper than 
the market price that was formed a few meters away on the trading floor and do the opposite 
when they would sell to investors (Informal discussion, a former street trader, now dealer in 
House C  11 August 2008). Collusion between formal brokers and street brokers were not 
unknown in the form of last minute price hikes in the floor. These artificial prices would then 
be used to justify higher street prices (Yildirim, 1995:188).  
 
Worst of all for unsuspecting investors were the existence of scammers and tricksters in the 
street market who would sell forged or stolen shares, spread false rumours, fail to include 
dividend coupons in transaction prices and swindle investors’ money with no formal record 
of what was being bought and sold. However, there were several advantages to using the 
street market. First of all, settlement was made on the spot so no one had to wait a couple of 
days for physical delivery of shares or money. For more informed investors, there was scope 
for price negotiations as there was live telephone connection between the floor and the street. 
Thirdly, in the street market, small quantities could be traded without any discrimination by 
brokerage houses due to favouring larger client orders in the floor. The automation of trading 
starting from 1993 and the move to the new stock market compound in Istinye on the 
outskirts of Istanbul in 1995 put an end to the street market. (Cevikel, 2002:66-8). 
 
As for the investor section on the trading floor, after a bomb scare in late January 1990 
outside the exchange, the ISE executive board permanently banned investors from the floor 
(Yildirim, 1995:118). This decision helped the street market and led to opening of trading 
session rooms in brokerage house headquarters and branches. In fact, the ISE’s trading floor 
was not designed to hold more than 500 people but it was swamped with more than 1000 
people who consisted of most privileged investors, brokers, and bourse officials (Yildirim, 
1995:118). The working conditions in the floor were really poor. The floor was converted 
from two adjacent offices in a business mall reaching approximately 600 square meters. 
Because there were many people in the floor, the daily work experience was chaotic, dusty, 
smelly and noisy (Interview, assistant general manager, Surveillance, ISE 27 June 2007) 
 
FIIs entering the ISE  
 
In August 1989, the law on full convertibility for Turkish currency was promulgated 
(Chambers, 2005:152). Before the full convertibility, the liberalisation of investment by 
foreigners in Turkish shares were rather restrictive and confined to the idea of letting 
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foreigners buy privatised state company shares in a closed-end mutual fund that would be 
issued by the government. This, starting from 1987, led to the gradual liberalisation of the 
law that protected Turkish currency and regulated investment in Turkish equities by 
foreigners. It was only in February 1990, that the currency and investment law was fully 
liberalized and foreign investors could freely buy and sell securities in the ISE and take 
profits back to their countries as they pleased (Yildirim, 1996:65-6). Despite the slow pace of 
deregulation, the interest of FIIs bore fruit in the ISE. Between 1989 and 1992, the net 
foreign equity ownership as the percentage of free float market capitalisation in the ISE had 
risen from approximately 5 % (17 million USD) to 20 % (359 million USD), which then rose 
to 35 % (1.98 billion USD) in 1995 (Yildirim, 1996: 68). In October 1993, the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission recognized the ISE as a ‘designated offshore securities market’. 
In May 1995, the Japanese Securities Dealer Association recognized the ISE ‘as an 
appropriate foreign investment market’ for Japanese investors 
(http://www.ise.org/AboutUs/History.aspx).  
 
Yildirim (1996:69) argues that the foreigners in this period took a long-term investment view 
and did not feature significantly in the ISE’s annual trading volume. He backs up this claim 
by presenting the trading and ownership figures for 1995. The foreign investors, most being 
institutional ones,  accounted for only 6.94 % of the total trading volume ‘despite holding 50 
% of the total share stock’ in 1995 (Yildirim, 1996: 219). Yildirim (1995:70), based on the 
Takasbank (Clearing House) data, states that the foreigners in the same year had owned a 
third of the stock market in value. There was therefore a pattern that was emerging for the 
FIIs’ trading and investment activities in the ISE in the second half of the first decade of the 
ISE. This continued to be observed in the latter half of the 1990s but with an increased 
momentum. For instance, the annual trading data in 1997 and 1998 show that the FIIs 
recorded an average of 8 % contribution to the annual trading volume in the ISE.19 On the 
other hand, the FIIs’ ownership in total value of stocks was approximately around 40% in 
1996 and 1997, and 44 % in 1998. These figures pointed to an increasing ownership and 
trading volume in the ISE by the FIIs. This was to continue in the first decade of the new 
millennium with a much stronger momentum as was demonstrated in Table I.  
 
19FII trading volume and portfolio value figures are retrieved from Finnet 2000, a financial data portal 
run by Finnet, a major data vendor company in Turkey. The total transaction volumes and total market 
capitalisation figures are retrieved from the ISE http://www.ise.org/Data/Consolidated.aspx .  For 
1995, Yildirim (1996:70) gives a 24 % free float rate for the ISE as a whole. The above calculations 
for FIIs ownership percentages in1996, 1997 and 1998  are made assuming that free float rate in the 
ISE had been around 25 % between 1996 and 1998. 
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On the intermediation front, the FIIs were served by a select few local brokerage houses. 
This was mainly because, as a bourgeoning field, the ISE lacked the necessary cultural 
capital, namely language skills and knowledge about different aspects of international equity 
investment practices. A veteran of the field who started his career back in 1992 in an IRS 
department recalls how they were incrementally introduced to this body of knowledge by 
those Turks who left their finance related careers in North American and European countries 
and came back to Turkey and helped in the foundation of local brokerage houses that could 
serve FIIs (Interview*, 13 June 2008).20 This was like a crash course in the fundamentals of 
serving FIIs. Moreover, budding finance professionals started to acquire MBAs and other 
finance-related university degrees in Turkey and abroad. Despite the increase in their 
institutionalized cultural capital, the institutional arrangements for information/data flows 
from quoted companies and about the Turkish economy were not timely and comprehensive 
enough for these budding market professionals to be able to reach the quality and breadth of 
analysis that could be achieved abroad (Muradoglu, 2000:385). Moreover the state of the 
Turkish economy and politics which I shall touch on later in the chapter were not the most 
conducive one for a stable investment environment. One former senior research analyst, now 
a hedge fund manager in an Istanbul office, reminisces about the 1990s and the repercussion 
of these exogenous effects on their research activities in the following way:  
I started in 1995 and for six years [until the post-2001 crisis] we were going through 
the motions when we published research reports about companies; company balance 
sheets meant nothing, there was no IFRS [international financial reporting standards], 
investing was not based on information...we always had high inflation and high 
political risk. After 2003, the Turkish market matured, those negatives have been 
reversed, the market stopped being a Mickey Mouse market, now it is a market that 
moves with fundamentals and it is liquid, of course this is thanks to the Turkish lira 
having stopped being a naff currency (Interview*, 23 June 2009).  
 
In a context like this, with one or two exceptions, the bourgeoning IRS department activities 
in the ISE field were confined to execution services for global investment banks acting as 
brokers (henceforth global brokers) (Interview*, head of research, local broker 8 August 
2008). The IRS departments struggled to reach what is called “end-clients” in IRS parlance, 
namely the asset management companies or pension funds, and had to be local brokers of 
global brokers, and serve their sales and trading teams based in major financial hubs such as 
London and provide them data/information flows which were not readily and publicly 
available. The exception to this was a local broker called Global Yatirim which managed to 

20 A similar situation was the case in the formation of the ISE. Yildirim (1995) gives detailed profiles 
of the founding members of the ISE and the CMB most of whom had some form of exposure to 
financial markets abroad as either students of finance or practitioners of finance or both.  
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form an IRS team who were educated and worked abroad in finance, reached end-clients, 
and went into head-on competition with global brokers with no expenses spared (Informal 
discussion with two former sales traders from Global, Af from House C, 18 July 2008; T 
from House D 18 May 2009).21 Global Yatirim managed to serve more than 150 foreign 
institutional clients including global brokers in the 1990s (Yildirim, 1996:199; Global 
Yatirim, 1998).  After the 2001 crisis in Turkey, the subsequent forceful re-entry of FIIs to 
the ISE with much larger numbers and global brokers’ increasing presence in Istanbul 
offices, this rather peripheral role for IRS departments had reversed and it had  undermined 
Global Yatirim’s leading role in the IRS field. As the sales trader, Br22 from House C recalls, 
the post 2001 crisis period was a period of a dramatic transformation in their field:  
Everything has changed since the late 1990s. Before that, they did not know Turkey, 
they were like “where is Turkey by the way?” When we used to go to London to visit 
clients, they would not even spare five minutes for us. But after the European Union 
and the JDP stories, in the last five years, everything has changed significantly, now 
we are being selective with whom to work. (Interview*, 29 July, 2008).  
 
The automation of the ISE  
 
The board system was fully digitized on 18 November 1994 under the name “ELIT” after a 
year of gradual digitization (Yildirim, 1995:297). The same year also ushered in the 
afternoon session between 14:00 and 16:00 pm. The gradual digitization paved way to the 
‘near real-time basis’ broadcast of price and index data on teletext and telephone subscription 
services (Yildirim, 1996: 248). Before this, the transmission of data from the ISE to the 
outside world was done rather manually. The lack of remote access and proper real-time data 
broadcast outwith the ISE meant that the floor was the market. One had to be there to be in 
the market. One of the traders serving FIIs in a large one-stop shop brokerage house 
remembers his experience as a research analyst in brokerage house headquarters in the early 
1990s: ‘there was one large CRT monitor for Reuters. Everybody was around it but it was 
like two news stories, two price quotes a day. There was no proper real time flow’ 
(Interview*, 2 June 2008).  
 
Despite the necessity and advantages of being in the floor, there was an excessive amount of 
manual work in the board system such as physical jostling among brokers and the ISE 
surveillance team to log and match orders and enforce the exchange rules; and logging of 
trade data to brokerage houses’ and the ISE’s trading books. This manual labour meant 
21 ‘Af’, ‘T’ are pseudo-abbreviations for the names of these figures. I use such abbreviations as these 
figures feature extensively in the evidence chapters.  
22 Same above.  
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excessive physical and emotional strain among the floor workers and back-office staff. 
Besides, as discussed before, the floor was not designed as a stock exchange floor. It was 
cramped and dusty and was open to frequent commotions after significantly large orders 
(Interview, assistant general manager, Surveillance, ISE 27 June 2007).  Although the trading 
happened only for two hours in the morning, the floor brokers and bourse officials had to 
stay there sometimes until 18:00 pm to settle trades and do the routine paper work (Cevikel 
2002: 92). 
  
The abuse of clients and the road to automation 
 
The manual nature of the whole trading system coupled with loopholes in custody 
regulations meant that brokerage houses could abuse clients’ accounts and orders depending 
on the prevailing market condition:  
Back in those days, it was so hard for an investor to relay an order during a trading 
session. If you manage to do so, your order would not be registered in any system 
and if the market turns into your favour your stocks were often given to a more 
privileged customer and they would buy your shares at a higher price. The ELIT 
system abolished all those games with investors (Informal discussion*, assistant 
general manager Stock Market Department ISE, 11 September 2008).  
 
An investment advisor-cum-trader in the House A branch, who started his career as a day 
trader in one of the worst offending brokerage houses remembers those days:  
The respected houses, they would sign an agreement or keep paperwork between 
client and the house for all transactions but in most of the houses that paperwork 
were either missing or meant nothing. There was a CMB code but it was useless 
because there was no proper regulation and enforcement to keep paperwork, very 
few documents were around as a proof of what was going on.  The CMB had no idea 
of something called a trading book, also loans to clients were given without any risk 
assessment...before the ELIT system, brokers were sultans, collusions and price 
manipulations were widespread (Informal discussion, 5 March 2008).  
 
Yildirim (1996:185-9, 227) lists a catalogue of abuses by brokerage houses on client funds 
and orders such as pooling client orders, unsolicited ‘fund management’, use of client funds 
for collateral and quoting transaction prices to the disadvantage of clients. Most of these 
abuses were made easier by the fact that brokerage houses also acted as the custodians for 
clients’ shares without any legal requirement for client-based documentation. This issue was 
solved permanently in March 1995 when the Takasbank started custody services on a client-
account basis. Interestingly, the FIIs had never used custody services of local brokerage 
houses. Instead they relied on international custodian banks in Turkey such as Citibank or the 
Ottoman Bank. This ensured that FIIs would remain unscathed during these few wilderness 
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years in the ISE (Yildirim, 1996).  
 
All these negative factors made digitization of the trading and settlement system an 
imperative. Nevertheless, not all brokerage houses were very eager to support this.  Both of 
the ISE managers I quoted above were involved in the design of the ELIT system and both 
argued that the design team had encountered resistance from many brokerage houses because 
brokerage houses did not want to give up their privileges in the board system which 
consisted of a lack of real-time surveillance, being able to physically capture the market in 
the floor, and all the other unruly ways that were made possible by the manual board system.  
 
The resistance was not surprising when one also considers the explosion in the number of 
brokerage houses in Turkey from several dozens of independent brokers and securities 
departments of large national banks. Although there was a frenzied rush by DRIs to the ISE 
since its opening and this made it only natural that there would be more brokerage houses 
opening, in 1991 the existing brokerage houses successfully lobbied the CMB and the ISE 
and the state ministry to put a cap on the number of licences dished out to new brokers. 
Yildirim (1995: 191-2) gives the number of brokers when the cap on the licence came into 
effect: 100 independent brokers and commissioners and 54 banks having around 600 brokers 
in the floor. Yildirim argues that getting a licence by then was a quick short-cut for many 
new licensees to trade in the floor as well as abuse clients’ money. After the cap, an informal 
brokerage licence market emerged by means of brokerage house take-overs as well as the 
selling of “gomlek”- or coloured vests worn by brokers, which gave budding day-traders 
access to the floor as a broker (Cevikel, 2002:136; Interview, day trader-broker in the floor, 
19 July 2007) 
 
Although the ELIT successfully digitised the trading system, the general manager of 
surveillance in the ISE (Informal discussion*, 29 August 2008) remarks that the pressure by 
brokerage houses led to a digital replication of the old board system in respects related to 
availability of trading data/information on digitized screen which included the first five buy 
and sell orders registered with brokerage house names.  The essence of this automated 
system from a trading perspective was being able to see and infer from the existing buy and 
sell orders the direction of the share price, and then trade accordingly. During the manual 
trading days of the ISE, there was a certain regularity in physical cues coming from brokers 
and written-figures on the boards about where the market would be heading. Brokerage 
houses wanted to enjoy these cues in digitized form. After all, the bulk of the daily trading 
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was made by DRIs and fundamental investment strategies linked to company performance or 
macro economy were confined to a small minority of institutional investors (Yildirim, 1995; 
1996). However, the latter’s actions in the market were closely followed by brokers of DRIs 
and the day-traders via observing physical cues coming from the institutional investors’ floor 
brokers (Interview,  assistant general  manager Surveillance  ISE, 27 June 2007).  
 
In that respect, there were regularities about brokerage houses’ activities in the floor, 
observation of which led to predictions about the direction of the market. Observation of 
outside world was made via telephone.  Brokers were connected to other markets in Istanbul 
such as the street currency market in Tahtakale which had always been popular with retail 
currency investors in the deregulation era (Yildirim, 1995:148-9). In fact, the currency and 
gold dealers in Tahtakale and the Grand Bazaar had become important players in the ISE and 
channelled funds of retail savers all around Turkey into the stock market. For this purpose, 
there were direct telephone lines between currency and gold dealers and brokerage houses or 
even floor brokers (Yildirim, 1995:148). Changes in currency and gold prices in Tahtakale 
and share orders coming from currency/gold dealers in Tahtakale would therefore be closely 
followed as a gauge of where ‘hot money’ was heading (Interview,  a retired floor broker, 25 
June, 2007).   
 
The digitization however did not mean redundancy for trading floors. The floor brokers were 
still the key actor in order execution and information gathering and distribution due to a lack 
of remote in-depth data/information screens (Informal discussion, former chief broker in the 
floor, House A 28 February 2008). One way of keeping investors up to date and encourage 
them to trade was setting up “session rooms” in brokerage houses premises. In these rooms, 
there would be TVs and telephone speakers and rudimentary data screens. Investors would 
listen to brokers’ live commentary about the floor in Karakoy, and then from May, 1995 from 
two trading floors in Istinye, in the new high specification building of the ISE. Despite 
available assistance from budding chart analysts and investment advisors in imposing some 
sort of rationale on investing, not all brokerage houses could or in fact did want to provide 
restraint on DRIs who took unnecessary risks (Interview, chief strategist House B 12 May 
2008). In fact, most of these session rooms were designed for important and high frequency 
trading investors. There would sometimes be disagreements between analysts and clients 
about ‘better’ stock choices (above interview). Therefore, these rooms were quite conducive 
to peer influence or herd behaviour among investors who traded on a daily basis and left 
significant commissions to their brokers (Yildirim, 1996:227-9, Informal discussion, former 
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chief floor broker House A).   
 
Despite the digitization of the trading system in 1995, the ISE did not fully become a full-
blown scopic market system for all the brokerage houses until 2002. It was in this year the 
remote access system called Ex-Api had become operational in all the brokerage houses. In 
the intervening years, there had been digitization of settlement and clearing-house systems as 
well as other markets in the ISE, which were gradually integrated to subscription-based data 
distribution screens.23 This meant that a larger number of cues about the direction of the 
index that used to be found on the exchange floor or was not available at all in real-time, 
such as trading volume and custody figures classified by brokerage houses were now 
digitized and broadcasted in real-time on data/information platforms and stored in their 
databases. The digitization of price and volume related data as classified according to 
brokerage houses made the rudimentary data screens more sophisticated in their 
representation of data/information and fund flows as early as late 1996. With increasing 
digitization of different aspects of the market, brokerage houses demanded from the ISE’s 
executive board to broaden the scope of the data/information broadcasts on these platforms. 
For instance, despite the protests from the managers from the departments involved in the 
design of the ELIT, eventually brokerage houses secured representation of five aggregate ask 
and bid orders or ‘in-depth screen’ on data/information platforms.  This was seen as another 
case of the virtual replication of the board system that ‘put everything on the table’ (Informal 
discussion*, general manager of Surveillance, ISE 29 August 2008).  
 
After the remote access system started to work to full capacity, it was possible for the 
brokerage houses to significantly reduce their dependency on floor brokers for order 
execution. By 2008, the number of floor brokers went down from more than 1000 to less 
than 400 (Interview*, a floor broker 19 July 2007). The current head of the ISE stated on 7 
November 2008 that the floor generated around 15 % of the annual trading volume despite 
executing 5 % of the total number of orders (CNNTurk; 7 November 2008). This imbalance 
was partly due to the existence of some 100 to 150 day-trading brokers or “gomlekcis” in the 
floor some of whom entered the ISE in Karakoy in the early 1990s by buying brokerage 
house vests (Interview, day-trader broker in the floor, 19 July 2007). Their modus operandi 
in the ISE is explained in the following section.   

23Information is complied from the CMB and the ISE's websites, and the Takasbank’s annual reports 




Emergence of domestic speculators  
 
Domestic speculator is a type of DRI who emerged in these early wilderness years of the ISE 
and entrenched their position in the field by means of developing skills in various trading 
strategies, generating economic capital by trading, using their social capital and doing 
relationship work, and worse, by manipulating share prices. The early domestic speculators 
were high net worth individuals who have had professional attachment to the ISE in the form 
of brokerage house ownership and/or senior managerial and dealing positions in brokerage 
houses. These professional figures were also in contact with DRIs who had a penchant for 
making a lot of money and taking a lot of risk within and outside the rules and regulations of 
the ISE and the CMB. These two types of domestic speculators, i.e. brokerage house-based 
and retail-based, had left their mark in the ISE in the 1990s and early 2000s via controlling 
large sums of money and shares, concerted trading moves to influence prices and index 
values and by the trading and share ownership bans handed over to them by the CMB. Most 
of these bans were handed in accordance with the CMB's definition of manipulation in its 
statute number 47. Number 47 covers manipulation attempts that rely on acquisition of 
insider information, dissemination of false information and creation of an artificial supply 
and demand in share  that results in a 'perception of an active market’ (CMB statute, 2008: 
121). Interestingly, most of the ban decisions were made due to dissemination of false 
information and creation of an artificial supply and demand which could be achieved by the 
mastery of the trading system and having a large network of people by which one could pool 
more economic capital into trading operations and spread rumours to a larger group of 
people.   
 
According to the informal discussion and interviews I had with former domestic speculators, 
and those dealers, brokers and domestic sales managers who worked for domestic 
speculators, one can make a further distinction between the brokerage house-based and 
retail-based domestic speculator figure in relation to their modus operandi in the ISE. To 
begin with, some brokerage house owners operated as market-makers by amassing large 
number of shares in large-capitalisation companies and kept the price of these shares under 
control by frequently buying and selling and providing a liquid market. This informal market 
making activity, especially determining the “right” price, was not just based on a whim. As 
explained to me by a former dealer of a well-known domestic speculator-cum-brokerage 
house owner, Mr Ilhami Suaydin, these speculators did not shy away from benefiting from 
research analysts’ cultural capital.   ‘Initially it was the old valuation methods, those from the 
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initial years of the exchange. Then in Erciyes [the name of Mr Suaydin’s brokerage house], 
they founded a research department. Those big DRIs, they will use CFAs if they need them.  
They are usually backed by professional researchers’ (Interview, senior dealer-Is, House C 
10 August 2008).  
 
A second type of domestic speculator entered the ISE either as an ordinary retail investor or 
a dealer/broker and then had become a domestic speculator under the auspices of brokerage 
house owners and favourable loan and trading services provided to them. Some of these 
speculators who used to be dealers and brokers of the first type of domestic speculators 
became quite self-sufficient and moved independently. One example to this was Mr Ziya 
Sesel who actually worked as Mr Suaydin’s broker (above interview) but then managed to 
become one of the most prolific domestic speculators in the ISE. According to one of his 
former brokers, Mr Sesel took intra-day trading positions in multiple liquid shares and acted 
like a scalper as described by Hussein (2005) and Zaloom (2005) by continuously buying 
and selling large quantities of shares from multiple brokerage houses and closing the day 
without any share exposure. The second activity Mr Sesel would pursue was taking longer-
term positions in shares which had news-event related expectations (informal discussion* 
with Mr Sesel’s former broker, 20 August 2008). Another peculiar thing about Mr Sesel is 
that the emergence of the term ‘moustached foreigner’ is attributed to him as he is claimed to 
be the first DRI to create and use off-shore funds in the second half of the 1990s (Star Gazete 
5 April 2009).24 This aimed to evade the effects of the new taxation regime introduced in 
1998 on bourse profits. The regime was unfavourable to DRIs with a 10 % withholding tax 
imposed on their bourse profits. This was not applied to FIIs (Milliyet 22 September 
1998:9).25  

24 The term moustached foreigner got inspiration from Turkish men’s preference for wearing 
moustaches in contrast with the foreign men who did not. I think this was something that belonged to 
the 1990s as during my field I have not interviewed or observed any male informant with a 
moustache! 
25 The unequal taxation regime was finally revoked in November 2008 and all types of investors 
became exempt from any withholding tax. Before this decree, the former head of the CMB made a 
rather unsurprising remark on CNBC-e in a programme co-hosted by the veteran bourse journalist 
Yildirim (Hurriyet, 20 August 2008) and confirmed numerically what some figures in DRI circles told 
me. He basically said that the CMB reckoned the 70 % plus FII portfolio ownership in the ISE 
included around 30 % moustached foreigners in it, which virtually takes the FII and DRI ownership 
balance to almost 50/50! Around three weeks later, the head of the ISE, Mr Huseyin Erkan was asked 
his opinion about Mr Erol’s revelation (Sabah, 9 September 2008). Although he did not comment on 
the figure given, he acknowledged that there was an unfair taxation system and this encouraged 
significant off-shore activity. Almost two years later after Mr Erol’s remark, Mr Erkan made a 
statement during an international conference on Turkish Capital Markets about the OTC activity in 
Turkish equities in different global financial hubs, but especially in London. He stated that the trading 




The domestic speculators who started their investment career as ordinary DRIs occasionally 
had little economic and/or cultural capital relevant to stock market activity when they 
entered the ISE field. However, they learned, invented and implemented various strategies 
for generating guaranteed revenues from their trading activities. These included  controlling 
the price of thinly traded shares over a long period of time by using a large network of 
investors, spreading false rumours via anonymous columnists such as Investor Ali in popular 
investment magazines and so on (Interview, former broker of a domestic speculator, 18 June 
2009).26 Because they did not have any formal identity in the intermediation sector, these 
domestic speculators coming from retail investor backgrounds seemed to be more daring in 
their “investment activities”. The head of domestic sales in House C, M had worked in the 
sector for 18 years and served domestic speculators in various domestics-only brokerage 
houses (Interview, 4 August 2008). Like the former dealer of Mr Suaydin, the head of 
domestic sales makes a distinction between ‘manipulators’ and ‘speculators’. For them, 
speculation refers to provision of liquidity to the ISE by means of continuous buying and 
selling of shares, sometimes in a market-making manner, and respecting the territorial space 
of fellow speculators and not getting into direct and vicious competition with each other to 
deplete their competitors’ material resources. On the other hand, manipulation is made by 
those speculators whom M calls ‘problematic people’. It refers to rather malicious trading 
strategies mentioned before. The idea of manipulating share price by social networks 
referred to starting a move in a share based on a false rumour or creation of a specific 
investment theme related to a company, whether or not it was warranted, which would be 
preceded by collection of shares. Once these rumours were spread from small to larger 
networks of people, more investors would be allured by the increasing share price, and once 
the speculator decided to start selling, the price then would start a sharp slide. Those who 

this to the larger price ticks and high volatility in the ISE and lack of cancellation order (HaberTurk, 
14 April, 2010). These reasons alongside the opportunism of DRIs and lack of closing session were 
highlighted as main micro-structural problems in the ISE by my informants in IRS departments, the 
head of the Turkish and Eastern European desk in a global broker in London (Email interview 5 
November, 2009), and the head of the prime brokerage department in that same broker (informal 
discussion*, Edinburgh Graduate Meeting, 23 October, 2009). By November 2010, all these problems 
were solved by introduction of smaller price ticks and order cancellations. However it is hard to say 
whether off-shore funds of moustached foreigners have returned to Turkey. At least the figures in 
Table 1 say the opposite.  
26 In Appendix 3, I discuss the case of Investor Ali which was a popular anonymous column in a 
bourse magazine that gave weekly tips about shares. Bilgin and Muradoglu (2002) looked at the case 
of these tips and their returns over a five year period between 1993 and 1998. They argued that this 
column’s share tips and the consequent excessive returns, which would be around 1500 % per annum 
for a ‘preferred investor’ , could only be explained by a pre-tip collection of shares, alluring investors 
by the public announcement, and then subsequent dumping of shares.  
 
 68 
joined these guided moves later would be hit hardest whereas those who joined early but 
could not resist the temptation to sell would regret seeing the share price going up by several 
hundred percent (above interview; Informal discussion* with a former speculator, 24 July 
2008).27 In relatively thinly traded shares, territorial marking and fighting was another 
common sight unless an agreement was struck between two or more speculators on the 
trajectory of the manipulation in a share (Interview, former broker of a domestic speculator 
18 June 2009; and the above informal discussion with the former speculator).  
 
My informants on domestic speculators think that the number of domestic speculators which 
fitted into one or more of these types was more than 50 but less than 100 in the 1990s.  The 
first type speculators were more respected in the ISE as they had formal responsibilities as 
brokerage house owners or managers, which balanced their opportunism in the field.  Those 
who acted independently were more controversial because of their preference for more 
guaranteed returns from their “investments”. In addition to these figures, there were around a 
couple of hundred  day trading brokers/dealers or what is called “gomlekci” in the ISE who 
acted in coordination with domestic speculators, either as their “yanci” – sidekicks,  fulfilling 
trading tasks given to them by the speculator, or as momentum traders who followed the cues 
on the trading floor or on data/information platforms about what domestic speculators might 
be up to (Informal discussion, former dealer of a first type domestic speculator-U, House C  
6 August 2008).28 These three DRI figures whose aggregate numbers were not more than 300 
would therefore significantly sway  the direction of the ISE index or specific share prices by 
committing their resources and full-attention to daily or longer-term trading activity. The 
physical and symbolic cues  they generated about their intentions on the trading floor and 
subsequently on computer screens were closely followed by ordinary DRIs and their 
dealers/brokers to benefit from price and volume dynamics created by domestic speculators 
and day-traders (Informal discussion, senior investment advisors, Sr and Ay,  House B 8 
April 2008).  
 

27 This gentleman in his early 30s used to be a “yanci”-sidekick of a brokerage house owner-
speculator. He is now working in House C as a dealer and the trader for House C’s portfolio 
management service. He is abbreviated as H in Chapter 10.  
28 Gomlek means shirt in Turkish, and gomlekci in the ISE parlance has its origins of the Karakoy 
floor era when, as mentioned before, brokers wore coloured vests to be easily identified by the 
surveillance staff and the investors who were in the floor in their designated era. Becoming a broker to 
day trade was “wearing the shirt” (Cevikel, 2002; Interview*, chief floor broker, one-stop-shop house, 
9 September, 2008) 
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The reaction of DRIs and domestic speculators to the entry of FIIs 
 
On the DRI front, the entry of FIIs as early as 1989 but in a more direct manner after 1991 
was welcome news for the brokerage houses as this meant a new injection of capital to the 
ISE floor which was then turned into an opportunity to make profits by domestic speculators. 
When FIIs started to enter the ISE, the market was very volatile due to supply-demand 
imbalances (Yildirim, 1995). Moreover, the ISE index was sensitive to the macroeconomic 
and monetary variables as a more reliable and timely set of information, compared to limited 
microeconomic data (Muradoglu, 2000). Related to this, DRIs had a short-term investment 
horizon (Muradoglu and Metin, 1996). A type of investor, namely FIIs, who would take 
exposure to a set of shares for the long-term, and demand proper corporate governance and 
steady data/information flows from quoted companies, was therefore a positive novelty. This 
would bring some sort of fundamental rationality to the ISE.29 Otherwise, as mentioned 
before, the entry of the foreigners did benefit very few local brokerage houses in terms of 
gaining clients and generating more commission fees due to the lack of required cultural 
capital to serve these institutional investors. Language skills in not just English but also the 
language of global finance was the lacking component in the cultural capital of a great 
majority of the brokerage houses in Turkey. Even among those few local brokers that were 
able to serve FIIs, only a handful could reach end-clients directly. The other houses with IRS 
departments seemed to be serving global brokers in trade execution and provision of contacts 
and necessary information/data from companies and the Turkish economy. On the other 
hand, those houses which could not serve global brokers and end-clients due to lack of 
cultural capital would take advantage of their newly formed relationships (social capital) 
with IRS personnel to front-run foreign tickets and further benefit from the existence of 
long-term buyers in the ISE (Informal discussion, sales trader-Af, House C 13 July 2008; 

29 In a study on the stock market reactions to dividend announcements, Aydogan and Muradoglu 
(1998) look at such events in the ISE between 1988 and 1993. They divide the period, with 1990 as 
the watershed moment due to an approximately threefold increase in the annual trading volume in the 
ISE. Their conclusion is that before the regulators demanded companies to issue regular statements on 
the fundamentals of company performances, investors used proxy data, such as dividend 
announcements, as a signifier of “good fundamentals”. However in the post-1990 period, such 
‘irrational’ positive reactions faded away, unlike the pre-1990 period. Aydogan and Muradoglu 
attribute this to the growing mix of investor types (including the entry of FIIs in the market), maturing 
of the ISE from the perspective of improving standards in information disclosure, and investors’ 
learning in the face of these improvements. However, in a subsequent study in 1999, both authors 
point to another interesting effect of the changing investor mix, namely the shifting of the event date 
for dividend announcements/stock splits to the actual implementation day from the announcement 
day. They attribute this to the increasing number of domestic retail investors in the market (Aydogan 
and Muradoglu, 1999 cited in Muradoglu, 2000). On a related study Yuce (1996 cited in Muradoglu, 
2000) observed that after the entry of the FIIs one had to hold a more diversified stock portfolio in 
order to better capture the variance in the ISE index.  
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Informal discussion sales trader-Br, House C, 14 August 2008; and informal discussion*, 
former broker of Mr Sesel, 20 August 2008).30 Additionally, the entry of FIIs to the ISE 
meant that domestic speculators could try to pass themselves off as an FII by using 
brokerage houses that were thought to serve FIIs, a game which was aptly called “foreigners 
are buying” (Yildirim, 1995:200-1; former broker of Mr Sesel).  
 
Despite these opportunistic acts that were at times detrimental to FIIs, DRIs actually lost a 
significant amount of market share to FIIs in terms of share ownership. As put by one of the 
brokerage house managers in the 1990s who now day trades in large-capitalisation  shares 
with several million TL orders at once, the early 1990s was quite a conducive period for 
domestic speculators to entrench their dominance in the ISE. However, FIIs gradually carved 
out a position for themselves in the field at least in terms of share ownership:  
Before the foreigners put their foot down here, you could do all sorts of tricks... it 
was mid 1990s and the foreign share ownership was around 30 %. DRIs were not 
very fond of banks and beverage companies, by then some of them were religious I 
guess, against the idea of usury and drinking alcohol [smiles]. It was the foreigners 
who took the undervalued large-capitalisations up after 1995. But before that, large-
capitalisation shares you could buy and buy and buy and at some point others would 
realize and jump on the bandwagon, but now, you start buying and buying, but no 
one cares, they sell, now there is a competitor who is stronger than you. But even by 
then the aim was not market making, it was money making.  
 
I shall explain the situation in “now” and who that competitor might be in the current era 
later in the chapter. For now it should be stated that the former manager captures something 
very important in this quote. That is domestic speculators were in the ISE to make money. 
The manager thus blurs the distinctions I have drawn above among the speculators. This 
blurring was despite the fact that some first type domestic speculators never got a CMB ban 
for manipulation attempts. All in all, domestic speculators’ and day-trading brokers’ activity 
was very much based on seizing short-term opportunities provided by observation and 
trading on the data/information and fund flows in the 1980s and 1990s. The domestic 
speculators were a close-knit group, which facilitated generation and dissemination of 
private information among them in addition to the publicly available data/information. 
Although they could benefit from a fundamental view, i.e. company activities and 
prospective returns, the domestic speculators’ commitment to the ISE as full-time market 
professionals and investors allowed them to develop knowledge and skills to spot and benefit 

30 It should be stated there that several IRS personnel became well-known domestic speculators in the 
ISE thanks to rather unscrupulous execution services they gave to FIIs and their connections with 
other domestic speculators. However, the number of IRS-originated domestic speculators seems to be 
relatively low compared to DRI-related ones.  
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from different types of opportunities, such as the insider view as substantiated by Smith 
(1998). In the following I discuss how this peculiar disposition shaped ordinary DRI 
dispositions in the ISE.    
 
DRIs appropriation of short-termist disposition  
 
DRIs had to go through a painful process of learning and acquiring dispositions peculiar to 
the ISE field. As mentioned in the beginning, several years before the opening of the ISE, 
Turkish retail savers were hit hard by the bankers crisis caused by Ponzi schemes. With the 
opening of the ISE, different types of risks were poised to affect them. Foremost among 
these was the lack of regulation in the brokerage sector. Although this led to occasional 
scandals in the sector, the general lack of knowledge on the part of virgin DRIs and the 
speculative and short-termist disposition of most local brokerage houses meant that DRIs 
were poised to take these dispositions onboard. If DRIs wanted to be informed of investment 
opportunities and the state of their existing investments, speculation and short-term betting 
seemed to be the most viable way of existence in the ISE because most domestic brokerage 
houses knew nothing but this. In fact, the more economic capital one had the more chances 
for that person to convert this into a speculative and short-termist cultural capital of 
investing. If he -chances were it was probably a male investor- managed to make a break 
through in this path; he would increase the economic capital at his disposal. Otherwise it was 
either a waiting game or worse losing every bit of assets that were exposed to the stock 
market. The introduction of equity funds and the entry of DIIs to the ISE towards the mid 
1990s provided an opportunity for existing DRIs to get regulated and professional 
investment services with a long-term view. However this failed to transform the ISE’s retail 
investor scene.  
 
This failure was probably due to fact that a great number of DRIs were already immersed in 
the short-termist and speculative dispositions of their brokers and learnt from them how to 
make profits or wait until their losses were recuperated. In fact, when one reads Yildirim’s 
(1995) recounting of major events in the ISE in the formation decade, one can see many 
references made to the general investor and public curiosity and discussion about what the 
ISE’s index value would be in the coming days or months. These discussions were usually 
ignited by spectacular rallies or spectacular crashes in the ISE due to news events which was 
then followed by a general depression among DRIs and unfortunately some sad incidences 
such as suicides.  Muradoglu (2000:365) provides a numerical insight into this volatility. 
Although the ISE 100 index generated a six-fold return in USD between 1986 and 1996, the 
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volatility pushed the index to 300% plus increases and 70% plus corrections in this period. 
More interestingly, not only the head of the ISE but also bureaucrats and state ministers got 
involved in the public discussions about the direction of the ISE index in the face of the 
volatility. It seems like they occasionally swayed the direction of the ISE index by their 
public statements and decisions to dump publicly owned shares onto the ISE without prior 
warning. The tone of the public debate in those formation years seemed to present the ISE 
and equity markets in general as sui generis entities that had a mind of their own rather than 
as a field with distinctive structures, characters and their dispositions. On top of these ISE-
related peculiarities, there was a larger, more insidious and powerful factor behind the DRIs’ 
appropriation of a short-termist disposition, namely the problems in the meta-field. Before 
substantiating them, I present a discussion on the effects of automation on dispositions of 
DRIs and FIIs. 
 
Effects of automation on dispositions: more speculation and manipulation 
 
How did the automation and digitization of the market affect the dispositions of actors in the 
1990s? The greatest effect must have been felt among floor brokers and day-traders in the 
floor as they lost the privileges that stemmed from being in the floor. Digitization also meant 
that floor brokers needed to learn to use keyboards instead of their bodies and board-markers 
to be successful in the market. However, it is questionable that this technological revolution 
changed anything in day-traders’ and domestic speculators’ general investment disposition in 
the market. In fact, considering that it was now possible to observe all the shares in the 
market with the stroke of a key rather than running around in the dusty and cramped trading 
floor in Karakoy, domestic speculators and their brokers, and day-traders in the floor could 
easily spread their sphere of influence over the whole market. Further digitization in custody 
services and broadcasting of custody figures over real-time data platforms also meant that 
social network relationships to gather private information about who was doing what in the 
market could now be backed or even double-checked on the remotely available data 
platforms. Last but not least, the introduction of data platforms also allowed speculators and 
day-traders to better follow markets abroad and find a justification for their trading activity 
in the ISE. However, it should be remembered that almost all my informants told me that the 
1990s were not a decade of trading in the ISE on global market events on a daily or even 
minute basis. The latter is generally thought of as a phenomenon that had emerged in the 
post-2001 crisis period.  In fact, the 1990s were more about controlling share trading by 
means of owning many shares and acting like a market maker; manipulating share prices 
over a certain time period; front-running FIIs’ orders  and moving the ISE index according to 
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topical news from Turkey and abroad.  
 
In an environment like this DRIs did benefit from the digitization to the extent that they 
could now monitor the market themselves without relying on their intermediaries. They also 
started benefiting from more robust surveillance mechanisms and measures taken to prevent 
unscrupulous brokerage house activities. The digitization and computers becoming more 
affordable machines and connected to internet also meant that DRIs were now able to learn 
how to do simple analyses such as chart and/or fundamental analyses on their own. All these 
were great improvements when one remembers the usual raw deal DRIs got in the street 
market in Karakoy up to 1994 or by their brokerage houses in the manual trading era.   Yet, 
as it shall be discussed later, the digital revolution did not lead to an explosion in DRIs’ 
numbers.   
 
On the FII front, automation and digitization meant that they could monitor the ISE afar 
thanks to broadcasting of real-time price and volume data. The second half of the 1990s also 
witnessed the entry of proprietary traders from London to the ISE. These traders would 
contribute to the trading volume in the ISE by short-term positions. Their trading activities 
would be observed by intermediaries of DRIs alongside those of domestic speculators. 
However, it should be noted that the share of FIIs trading had never gone over 10 % in the 
1990s. Compared with the period between 2005 and 2008 during which proprietary traders 
were said to be quite active in the market by my IRS informants, the FIIs contributed to the 
approximately 22 % per annum to the ISE’s annual trading volume. Moreover, the FII 
ownership of stocks in the ISE in the 1990s did not exhibit the spectacular increase of 
ownership by the FIIs in the new millennium. The latter had been possible by a new flow of 
end-clients who felt confident about the viability of Turkey as a promising emerging 
economy. However, as mentioned before, there was something particularly wrong about the 
ISE in the 1990s, not only from the FIIs’ point of view but for all the investor types, namely 
the structure of the meta-field.   
 
Bad Macroeconomic management in the 1990s and 2000/1 
 
Despite the revolutionary improvements in micro structure, transparency and investor rights, 
the ISE had continued to be a very volatile market since the beginning of trading in 1986. 
This volatility was in tune with the macroeconomic business cycles that the Turkish 
economy had gone through in the 1990s as well as the lack of timely and quality 
information/data on companies which encouraged investors to closely follow 
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macroeconomic and monetary data (Kasman and Kasman, 2003; Muradoglu, 2000). More 
importantly, despite the fact that the post-1980 era was supposed to be an era of 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatization in Turkey, the 1990s turned this era into a 
‘coupon pool capitalism’ (Erturk, 2003). This meant that successive governments opted for 
populist and expansionist policies in the public sector instead of a retreating state.31 The 
macroeconomic mismanagement of the 1990s and early 2000s had taken the shape of a high 
inflationary environment (on average 80 % during the 1990s) and excessive government 
presence in fixed-income markets to deal with budget deficits, current account imbalances 
and high inflationary environment (Erturk, 2003). Moreover, state-owned enterprises 
accounted for 60% of the industrial output in the country and the state was also a major actor 
in the stock market thanks to the Public Corporations Authority and its trading activities 
(Muradoglu, 2000:371; Yildirim, 1995).  
 
Coupled with the capital accounts liberalisation in the early 1990s, the country's economy 
and the stock market had become more vulnerable to global macroeconomic business cycles 
as well, thanks to the presence of short-term capital flows into the Turkish fixed-income and 
equity markets (Alper and Onis, 2003). One important consequence of this exposure was 
occasionally the flight of capital in the face of unfavourable government policies towards the 
interests of global investors. The first such major capital flight happened in 1994 after the 
government decided to monetise the national debt, which was then followed by sovereign 
rating downgrades by credit rating agencies and the flight of portfolio investments (Alper 
and Yilmaz, 2004). Moreover, major financial crises elsewhere in the global finance system 
would show contagious effects on the ISE in the form of short-term capital flights and 
returns, and a concomitant volatility.32 In less eventful times in world politics and economy, 
the Turkish economy and the ISE would suffer from the persistent high inflation and 
unstable political scene which were associated with half a dozen coalition governments in 
the 1990s. Muradoglu and Metin (1996) argue that the high inflationary environment, and 
the long-term uncertainty created by it, was one of the reasons behind the DRIs’ short-
31 In the early 1990s, the governing party reduced the retirement age to 38 (female) and 40 (male) 
years for state employees! 
32 Chambers (2005:7-8) mentions the flight of portfolio capital from Turkey in 1997/8 due to the East 
Asian and Russian crises, yet she adds that as early as 1999, foreigners came back to the ISE equity 
market, buying back what they had sold. Muradoglu et al. (1999) register a 13 fold increase in 
volatility in the ISE compared to its pre-crisis period. A similar “exit and entry” strategy on the part of 
foreigners is reported by Yıldirim (1996) in relation to the 1991 Gulf War and 1994 Turkish currency 
crisis. The 1994 currency and the 1997/8 East Asian and Russian financial crises in Turkey and 
irregularities in brokerage sector claimed 16 brokerage houses throughout the 1990s with several 
hundred millions of dollars of investor money either lost or partially compensated (Yildirim 1996, 
Radikal 5 August 2002). 
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termism. Muradoglu (2000), on the other hand, notes the effects of political events on the 
index volatility. 33 
 
Interestingly, in the face of these macroeconomic and microeconomic issues undermining the 
sustainability of the Turkish economy and the ISE, the leading figures of the Turkish 
capitalist class such as large family-owned holdings did not put any pressure on the 
government to reverse the populist policies and effectively deal with high inflation and 
budget and current account deficits in the 1990s. Although the coupon capitalism and a 
crowding-out state was inimical to the interest of non-finance capital, there were two 
peculiar factors about the Turkish capitalists which effectively undermined any possible 
attempt by them to lobby against the governments’ populist policies. The first was the state-
guided and protected development of the Turkish capitalist class since the establishment of 
the Turkish Republic in 1923 (see for instance Gulalp, 1993; Kazgan, 2005). Despite this 
guided development, the state was still the dominant force in the real economy (Muradoglu, 
2000). The second was the fact that most holding companies had a large presence in banking 
and finance sectors and this meant that they could actually benefit from the crowding-out 
state in financial markets. They therefore continued to play the game of “borrowing cheaper 
from abroad and selling dearer to the state” until the music stopped. When the music stopped 
in February 2001, Turkey woke up to the aftermath of the worst financial and economic 
crisis in its short Republican history and some of these holding companies were actually 
bankrupted. Some of them had to be rescued by informal emergency loans given by the 
government (Interview, head of branches, House A 14 March 2008). 
 
At a more specific level, many national companies which opened to the public via the ISE 
seemed to perceive the utility of the stock market as quick access to cash. They would then 
try to raise more cash via occasional rights issues but they would not give back to their 
investors as much, thanks to their dividend policies. The head of domestic sales in House D 
who had been in the field since 1986 remembers how easy it was for companies to raise cash 

33 In another study Muradoglu et al. (1999) cast a similar light on how investors in the ISE might have 
adjusted their stock market investments by measuring economic and political risks according to the 
changes in monetary variables such as the USD/TL parity, interest rates, money supply and so on. 
Both of these studies analyse the dynamics of the ISE with models that used aggregate 
macroeconomic and stock market data that were not classified according to investor types. However, 
they demonstrate the effects of macroeconomic and political factors on the ISE’s volatility and return 
dynamics, and show how DRIs might have adjusted their stock market strategies in the face of 
economic and political instability in Turkey as well as lack of timely and comprehensive information 
on companies. Both studies argue that this type of macroeconomic data use is endemic to emerging 
stock markets where timely and in-depth information about companies is limited.  
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in the ISE in the early years of the ISE thanks to the unprecedented demand for stock market 
investments from the DRIs (Interview, 4 September 2008): 
In the early years, there were two motivations for the IPOs. One was that of those 
companies which needed cash. The other was that of those large holding companies 
which understood being in the ISE as a natural consequence of their national 
reputation. So the first group of companies actually went into the ISE with high free 
flotation rates of 80% or 90 %. Some of these companies were actually on the verge 
of bankruptcy. The solid companies which had the second motivation actually 
entered the ISE with ridiculous flotation rates, like 3 % or 5 %. These rates allowed 
many people to generate amazing returns due to supply-demand imbalances. 
Although now it has improved, both the number of quoted companies and free float 
rates in the ISE, there are still those companies with the first motivation and with 
very high flotation rates but dreadful financial performances.  
 
According to a research report (Bizim Menkul Degerler, 2010) on rights issue and dividend 
policies of 193 ISE companies since the opening of the ISE, 95 of these companies have 
produced negative compound returns for investors after their quotation/IPO in the ISE.34 On 
average this was 1.89 % loss per annum.  Worse, these loss making companies have asked 
for almost half of the capital that was raised in the rights issues since 1986 but they have 
contributed only 20 % to all the dividends given to investors by the 193 companies. There 
are 20 companies which had received almost 10 % of all the capital raised via rights issue 
but they have never given any dividends back to investors. Worse, 18 of these companies 
have generated negative annual returns since their IPOs. Considering that the ISE 100 index 
has returned a 3.43 % annual compound rate since 1997, and the 98 dividend-paying 
companies have returned 4.58 % annual compound rate in the same period, 93 companies, 
few of which are large-capitalisation companies, have become loss-making traps for 
investors. Bizim Menkul Degerler’s report (2010:10) concludes with the following verdict 
for the contemporary DRIs which could have easily resonated with DRIs and their 
dispositions in the 1990s:  
We conclude that the investment environment for domestic retail investors is that of 
profit generation by betting on short-term price changes rather than becoming long-
term share-holders. We are of the view that companies can win long-term investors 
only by giving a steady dividend and fair rights issue policies.  
  

34 Bizim Menkul Degerler is owned by a conglomerate which also owns an Islamic Bank.  There are 
more than 310 companies currently quoted in the ISE but the research looked at only 193 companies 
as right issue and/or dividend giving companies.  On the other hand, large IRS departments in local 
brokers usually cover around 80 to 100 companies for their FII clients. This analyst-covered group of 
companies in the ISE represent de facto investable, organisationally sound companies and they 
constitute more than half of the total market capitalisation of the ISE.   
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The 2001 Financial Meltdown 
 
The 2001 crisis was yet another currency crisis but this time, it happened after the 
‘spectacular’ failure of the IMF imposed ‘soft peg’ or the ERBS programme that started in 
late 1999. The IMF programme was designed  to reduce the high inflation rates (around 80 
% in 1990s) and the continuous budget deficits and implement structural adjustments in the 
economy and privatizations to put an end to the boom and bust decade of the 1990s 
(Akyurek, 2006; Capoglu, 2004; Akyuz and Boratav, 2003; Alper and Onis, 2003; Ertugrul 
and Selcuk, 2001). The 2001 crisis is seen as the worst and most significant in the 
Republican economic history due to major bank failures, extensive state intervention to save 
the national banking system and the unprecedented austerity and structural measures that 
followed (Dufour and Orhangazi, 2009; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). Interestingly, the 1999 IMF 
program, which is seen by many as one of two main culprits of the 2001 crisis –the other 
being the government in bringing about the eventual collapse of the Turkish financial system 
in 2001 (Akyuz and Boratav, 2003; Capoglu, 2004; Akyurek, 2006) also led to a short-lived 
boom in imports, in the GDP and in the ISE index in the first half of the 2000. These 
developments were due to the fixed-currency rate and the government’s initial success in 
reducing interest rates on its bills and bonds. However, this was overshadowed by a 
widening current account deficit due to the explosion in imports (Capoglu, 2004:92).  
 
At this juncture, Cizre and Yeldan (2005), and Alper and Onis (2003) point to the continued 
dependency of the government on short-term global speculative capital and the local private 
finance institutions in its management of the disinflationary and deficit-reduction 
programme. The fixed-exchange rate and the necessity of high levels of government 
borrowing meant that local banks could engage in interest rate arbitrage which consisted of 
short-term borrowing at lower rates from global markets and lending these funds at higher 
rates to the government (Defour and Orhangazi, 2009). Such a dependency on global 
portfolio capital meant that any doubts about the government’s capacity to sustain the 
stability programme would mean a flight of capital as experienced before elsewhere in the 
world in ERBS programmes (Capoglu, 2004: 84). In the end, the government’s loss of 
credibility due to its failure to convince global financial capital about its commitment to the 
ERBS programme and structural reforms led to the first flight of capital in November 2000 
(Akyurek, 2006:21). This was followed by an intermittent IMF bailout (Ertugrul and Selcuk, 
2001: 26). The eventual collapse of the pegged currency system came about in February 
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2001 after a second run on the reserves (Akyuz and Boratav, 2003:1556).35  
The explosion of DRI interest in the ISE before the meltdown in 2000/1 
 
One of the consequence of these problems in the meta-field exacerbated by the shortcomings 
in the ISE’s microstructure was the volatile DRI numbers. Yildirim (1995; 1996: 212) 
reported about falling number of active investors from one million to a quarter of a million 
after major crashes in the ISE such as 1991-2 Gulf Crisis, 1994 Mexico Peso Crisis and the 
subsequent Turkish debt crisis. On top of this, one can add the volatility and crashes in the 
ISE caused by 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian crises. There were rallies in the intervening 
years but it was only in 1999 and 2000 that there was an explosion in DRI numbers as, for 
the first time, Turkey seemed to harness the exorbitant inflation and interest rates of 80% to 
90 % with the help of an IMF structural adjustment programme. Therefore, the 1990s were 
like a minefield for DRIs. Taking the wrong step, namely entering the market at a wrong 
time or worse with loans borrowed from a brokerage house meant a painful waiting process 
until “rescued” by those who could move the market (domestic speculators and FIIs). 36 
Although the 2001 crisis wrecked the ISE, the 1990s wrought an insidious and a very lasting 
damage to the ISE, namely alienating the Turkish retail savers from the equity market despite 
the micro-revolutions that were taking place in the ISE. The 2000/1 crisis was a very sour 
topping on this very volatile dish. 
 
What was the specific effect of the 2001 crisis on the ISE index performance and the DRIs? 
The crisis happened after several significant rallies in the ISE. The 1999 was a year of 
rebound after the Asian and Russian crises, which ended with a high note as the IMF’s ERBS 
programme was finally signed in December. Consequently, there was a surge in DRI 
numbers and the interest in mutual funds that invested in the ISE equity market. This surge 
in the ISE was mainly due to the declining real interest rates and the search for higher yields 
on investments (IsYatirim, 1999: 8; 2000:14). This is understandable as the 112 A-type funds 
35The second run was infamously triggered by a cut-short National Security Council meeting on 19 
February 2001. The Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit alleged that the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who 
was chairing the meeting, had thrown a constitution booklet at Ecevit’s side of the table to clarify a 
disagreement over the State Supreme Audit Board’s investigation into the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (established with the ERBS programme).  On the same day, the ISE 100 index 
fell by 14 % and overnight rates jumped to 780 %. The run on the Central Bank of Turkey reserves 
amounted to an exit of 7.6 billion USD (Yeni Safak, 20 February 2007).  
36 It can be added here that domestic speculators were also capable of bringing fresh assets that 
belonged to others with the promise that there would be amazing returns. They usually delivered their 
promises but this also meant an upward rally followed by dumping of shares on other investors. It was 
then important to have the right place in the social capital of the protagonist to be able to enter and 
exit the board at the right time.  
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which by the CMB decree had to have at least 25 % exposure to the equity market  fared 
quite well in 1999 with an average 228 % return.37 The ISE all index started the year 2000 at 
2.521 points and ended it at 14.197 points, recording a 337 % increase in the ISE All return 
index in 1999 in USD.38 In 1999, there were 937,000 ‘open accounts’ in the Takasbank 
(1999:10) yet this number surged to 2 million at the end of December 2000 (Takasbank, 
2000:6-7). Although these numbers do not just represent DRIs’ accounts, the number of DIIs’ 
and FIIs’ accounts in the Takasbank should not be more than 10,000. This is a very liberal 
estimate considering the number of banks, brokerage houses, and institutional investors 
operating in the Turkish financial markets. When it comes to the actual active DRIs’ numbers 
which is expected to be lower than the number of accounts registered with the Takasbank, 
the IsYatirim annual reports provide an insight. In 1999, IsYatirim claims that they had 
218,000 active equity accounts which represented 37 % of the 590,000 active equity 
accounts in Turkey (IsYatirim, 1999:21). In 2000, the number surges up by more than 100 % 
and reaches 526,000 that represented 40 % of the all 1.3 million active equity market 
accounts across the intermediation sector (IsYatirim, 2000: 13).  
 
In an economic environment where the interest rates were consistently declining and the 
equity market was rallying, Turkish retail savers turned their attention to the ISE. Capoglu 
(2004:94) also highlights the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 as another catalyst in 
the continuation of the ISE’s rally in the first half of the 2000. At this summit, the EU 
recognized Turkey’s candidacy to the full EU membership with a view to starting 
negotiations in the following years. Capoglu (2004) argues that this decision boasted the 
confidence of investors in the IMF backed programme due to the Maastricht budgetary 
discipline criteria being one of the stipulations for Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU. It 
is however questionable whether DRIs were really informed about stock market investment 
and/or macroeconomic and political developments with a long-term view as put forward by 
Capoglu (2004). The head of marketing department in the AMC reminisces about the ‘crazy’ 
days of 1999 and 2000 when there were long queues of investors in House B to fill in 
investment account forms and start benefiting from the rallying stock market after the slumps 
in the previous year. Yet, clerks and marketing advisers in House B would sometimes be 
surprised by the profiles of some investors who had no interest in the nooks and crannies of 
37 The CMB monthly statistics for December 1999 is taken from 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/indexcont.aspx?action=showpage&showmenu=yes&menuid=9&pid=0&subid=
3&submenuheader=0  
38 The ISE all index comprise of all shares traded in the ISE. The return index figure is given in USD 
for a more accurate picture of returns due to the inflation effect.  The figures are from the ISE daily 
bulletins and monthly consolidated data available at http://www.ise.org/Data/StocksData.aspx . 
 
 80 
equity investment apart from making quick and significant profits (Interview, 15 May, 2008). 
The naivety and motivation of those investors were to push them into a situation from which 
they would not recover for several years in the post-2001 period. The head of branches in 
House B argues that most of the virgin mutual fund investors developed an attraction to the 
ISE due to positive economic climate in 1999 and 2000. But they were badly hit by the crisis 
in 2000/2001 due to the decline in fund values and high management fees that they had to 
pay despite the dramatic losses in their investments (Interview, 1 September 2008).    
 
Buy Favori but what does Favori do? 
 
The head of domestic sales in House D tells the following story that reflects the quick profit 
motivation of new investors in the ISE equity market as well:  
In early 2000 in January and February, the index shot up from 7k to 20k. The 
coalition government was doing quite well. The minister of economy made the 
statement at the end of 1999 that the interest rates were to fall. Indeed the overnight 
rates fell from 35 % to 8 %, and newspapers were quick to announce, ‘the main 
target is the stock market, march, march!’ and people attacked the market like mad. I 
was at Xbank by then and orders were sometimes coming like this  
-I have 5 million TL, buy me shares’  
-what shall we buy?’  
-‘well, shares’  
-‘well, there is only Favori which has not hit the ceiling [price]’  
-‘then buy that, and by the way what is a ceiling and what does Favori do?’  
-‘it is the 20 % cap on maximum price in a session, and it is a tourism company’ 
Favori made its IPO with 1.5 lira and by then it was 10 lira... 
 
The manager also mentioned the volatile market in the remainder of 2000, with a solid 
declining trend in the second half of the year which is line with Akyurek’s (2006) 
observation about the increasing doubts in the market about the sustainability of the IMF 
programme. According to the manager, other factors that contributed to the despair of ‘naïve 
investors’ were the second run on the reserves in February 2001 and the ensuing all out 
financial crisis in Turkey and the 9/11 attacks which shook the global markets including the 
ISE:  ‘After all this, small shares had actually went back to their real values, Favori fell from 
10 to 1.5 [TL]. We had the actual losses [of naïve investors] there; virgin investors fled the 
market after that, not to return’. It was not only companies like Favori which were on the 
verge of collapsing in the post-2001 crisis period.39 In 2000, there were a record number of 

39 In an announcement dated 22 October  2001, the ISE executive board warns the company about its 
outstanding debts with a view to reconsider its quotation in the ISE equity market (source 
http://bigpara.ekolay.net/M3/haber_detay.asp?id=384687 )  
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35 IPOs in the ISE, including the highly anticipated IPOs for industry leaders like Turkcell40 
and secondary public offerings for Tupras41.  The reason why most of these IPOs were 
misguided was the rather anticipated collapse of the ERBS programme. Despite this, as most 
of the IPOs were set in motion long before the negative signals in the economy, they 
proceeded as planned. In total, the IPOs in 2000 raised 2.8 billion USD, and Turkcell alone 
raised 1.7 billion USD (ACMIT, 2002:38).  However, in terms of returns for the general 
public, the Turkcell share price reached its initial offer price level again only at the end of 
2004.  
 
The head of institutional sales in House B (Interview,  17 April, 2008) remarks that high 
profile IPOs in 2000 like Turkcell had disappointed DRIs in the sense that those investors 
had anticipated great returns on a leading company like Turkcell. Without any stop-loss 
strategy or proper diversification,  
all the negative events of 2000 and 2001, Yahoo bubble, dot.com bubble, our 2001 
crisis, the constitution book throwing, and 9/11, the market fell so much, the 
domestics could do nothing but sit on their investment until it recuperated the losses. 
They were exposed to the stock market significantly and they could only close their 
positions in 2005. When such things happen, it is word of mouth that spreads the bad 
incidences such as those to prospective investors and making them stay away from 
the market. 
 
The ISE All return index figures in USD attest to this dismal return picture for stock market 
investors. In the 1999 rally, the index reached 1,690 points. In 2000, this was halved to 847 
points, followed by 589 and 405 points in 2001 and 2002. It was only in 2003, the index 
returned back to its 2000 levels with 852 points. In 2004, it came closer to its 1999 level with 
1,200 points. In 2005, the index reached a record 2,013 points. In TL, this amounted to an 
almost 20,000 point surge from 27,989 points to 46,388 points between 2004 and 2005.  
 
Board Closures in the post 2000/1 crisis 
 
Another factor that badly hit DRIs was the so called ‘board closures’ or de-listing of stocks 
from the ISE equity market. Between October 2000 and May 2004, there were 23 companies 
that were permanently de-listed from the market all due to financial hardships or total 
bankruptcy. Around half of the companies in this list were national banks, finance 

40 Turkcell is the biggest mobile telecommunication company in Turkey. The IPO was made on 11 
July 2000 both in the ISE and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Turkcell is the only Turkish 
company to be quoted in the NYSE. Information is taken from www.turkcell.com.tr  
41 Tupras is Turkey’s biggest oil refinery. Information about the secondary public offering is taken 
from www.tupras.com.tr. Data about IPOs are from the ISE’s database. 
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corporations and large industrials (the ISE database). It was widely known within the finance 
industry that most of the remaining national banks, which today are the locomotive shares of 
the ISE such as Garanti Bank and IsBank (owner of the IsYatirim) were saved by the IMF 
bail-out and emergency assistance from the Treasury (Interview, head of branches, House A, 
14 March, 2008). Although the scale of the 2001 crisis was unprecedented in the Turkish 
economic history, some scholars attribute the bankruptcies after the crisis to ‘crony 
capitalism’ (Koch and Chaudrey, 2001; see Cizre and Yeldan, 2005 for a critique and 
argument for ‘casino capitalism’ as the major culprit). Some of the de-listed companies 
above were owned by large conglomerates that used their political and economic clout in 
different sectors of the economy including the national media to run large financial 
institutions which eventually collapsed. From the perspective of investors, the bankruptcies 
and the badly timed IPOs meant that most of their investments turned out to be either 
‘wallpaper’ or ‘something to sit on’ for a few years. The veteran chief floor broker in 
domestic sales for a leading one-stop shop brokerage house uses the term ‘normal domestic 
investor’ to refer to the those who were adversely affected by the 2000/1 crisis (Interview*, 9 
September 2008):  
In the past, normal domestic investors would do 40 % of the trading volume. After 
2000, these had disappeared as 50 shares turned into wallpaper. There has been no 
influx of new investors after them. The survivors were those who could do lots of 
volume with small capital, with a view to receiving commission rebates from 
brokerage houses and generate daily profits from trading.   
 
The Bourse-wrecked: the domestic retail investor  
 
The term “borsazede” -bourse-wrecked refers to victims of fraud in intermediation sector, 
and to delisting of companies due to bankruptcy or financial difficulties. An article featured 
in the March 2008 issue of the magazine Ekonomist on bourse-wrecked puts forward a 
number of 52 companies delisted from the exchange over the two decades since the ISE’s 
opening. According to the ISE’s delisted company database, there are now seven delisted 
companies from the exchange that are allowed to be traded in an OTC market among 
brokerage houses. Additionally there are 10 other delisted companies shares which are not 
traded in any OTC market. Considering that none of the companies mentioned in the 
Ekonomist article plus the 10 delisted companies found in the ISE database are traded 
anywhere, there are 62 companies that had been permanently delisted from the exchange, 
ruling out any form of cash conversion for investors’ existing shares. Hence the ‘wallpaper’ 




The number of companies delisted in the 1990s according to Ekonomist was 20, which 
attests to equally turbulent time for investor rights and losses in the 1990s. Only between 
1998 and 2001, during a period of international and local financial boom and bust, there 
were 31 companies that were delisted from the ISE equity market. This affected 280,000 
investor accounts (ACMIT, 2002:37). The total cost of these de-listings until March 2008 is 
estimated to be affecting 310,000 accounts with a total cost of approximately 700 million 
USD to investors who are mostly DRIs (Ekonomist, March, 2008).  
 
Despite the bankruptcies in banking sector, the 2001 crisis did not hit the brokerage sector as 
hard as it did the banking sector. The brokerage house closures in 2001 were confined to 11 
and only among the 49 brokerage houses owned by banks. On the other hand, the number of 
privately-owned brokerage houses went up from 74 in 2001 to 81 in 2002 (ACMIT, 
2003:63). This relatively unscathed performance of the brokerage houses in the 2001 crisis is 
probably down to high profile brokerage house bankruptcies in the 1990s mentioned before. 
These failures were followed by the introduction of stricter regulations by the CMB on 
brokerage houses’ equity requirements in 1999. In the 1990s, there were 16 such brokerage 
house bankruptcies, leaving 25,000 investors with frozen accounts which would be partially 
compensated by the newly founded Investor Protection Fund (Radikal, 5 August 2002).  
Most of these bankruptcies happened between 1994 and 1998. Other factors that led to 
brokerage house closures were continuous violation of the CMB and the ISE rules and 
fictitious book-keeping activities in the early 1990s to increase a brokerage house’s equity 
leverage (Yildirim, 1995:230-8). The December 1999 amendment to the law of capital 
markets advised the financial intermediation organisations to set up a self-regulating 
association to deal with sectoral problems, ensure standardisation of intermediation 
operations and service quality to investors and boost the investor confidence in the Turkish 
financial markets (ACMIT, 2002). The Association of Capital Market Intermediary 
Institutions of Turkey started its activities in March 2001.  
 
All in all, the 2000/1 Turkish financial crisis dealt a heavy blow to the DRIs. In the following 
three years, the stock market could not rebound back to its 1999/2000 levels from which 
many virgin investors joined the equity market. The average daily trading volume in the ISE 
had dramatically declined after the peak year of 2000 from around 800 million USD to 
around 300 million USD in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the average daily volume hit 
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400 million USD and 600 million USD respectively (ACMIT, 2005:47).42 The declining 
daily trading volume is an important indicator as it is related to the presence of DRI activity 
in the market. Between 1999 and 2001, it was the DRIs who clocked approximately 80 % of 
the annual trading volume in the ISE. The DIIs and the FIIs on the other hand clocked on 
average 11 % and 8 % respectively. The remaining 1 % was made by foreign retail investors 
(ACMIT, 2002:54). As shown above in Table I, the share of DRIs in annual trading volume 
had declined by around 26 % between 2002 and 2008, which is an evidence of damage 
wrought by the 2000/1 crisis on DRIs and their declining interest in the equity market. In that 
respect, the changes in figures of active equity accounts and the DRIs’ numbers in the post-
2001 period support this estranged relationship between the DRIs and the equity market.  
 
As mentioned before, the number of active equity investors in 2000 shot up by more than 
100 % to 1.38 million investors (ACMIT, 2002:93). However, this number had fallen 
continuously since then and first saw 1.28 million at the beginning of 2001. It then fell to 
1.032 million at the end of March, 2002, which was followed by a figure of 973,000 at the 
beginning of 2003 (ACMIT, 2003:118). A year later, in January 2004, the number fell by 
70,000 to 900,000 (ACMIT, 2004: 124). Between 2004 and 2005, the numbers further 
declined to 887,000 (ACMIT, 2005:143). In this period, on average only around 2500 of 
these investors were DIIs and FIIs but these institutional investors managed to keep a 
continuous rise in their overall numbers from 2207 in 2002 to 2905 in 2005. Despite their 
minuscule contribution to the investor numbers, the institutional investors, especially the 
FIIs, were to increase their weight in share ownership in the post 2000/1 crisis, as is 
demonstrated in Table I.  
 
The institutional losers and winners in the post 2000/1 crisis period 
 
Although DRIs suffered in this period, the aftermath of the financial crisis were not all very 
negative for FIIs and for those national enterprises who survived the crisis. The austerity 
measures imposed by the IMF and the World Bank were passed without any opposition in 
the parliament due to the severity of the crisis. The World Bank’s very own Mr Kemal Dervis 
was summoned by the Turkish government to Ankara as the man in charge of economy 
(Akyurek, 2006:27). The free floating currencies and the strict application of the austerity 
42 The annual volumes in TL also attest to the declining trend despite the fact that the currency was 
devalued more than 100 % in the post-2001 crisis (figures in new Lira). In 2000, it was 110 billion 
TL, which fell to 92 billion TL in 2001. This was followed by 105 billion TL in 2002 and 145 billion 
TL in 2003. It was in 2004 when the index broke its volume record in TL by 206 billion TL (Source, 
the ISE database).  
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programme and independence given to the Central Bank of Turkey to fight inflation meant 
that the Turkish economy could now get out of the high inflationary environment and start 
looking like a “structurally sound” economy in which investors grow a long- term interest. 
For instance, the private and public external debt levels in relation to GNP between 2001 and 
2005 almost halved and came down to 47.5 % (Defour and Orhangazi, 2009: 206).  The 
consumer price index in the post-2001 period registered a record fall from an average of 70 
% between 1990 and 2002 to 18.4 % in 2003. It then fell to 7.7 % in 2005. Similarly the 
producer price index recorded a three fold fall in the post-2001 period (Turkstat, 2010). The 
Turkish economy also registered record growth rates between 2002 and 2004 by an average 
8 % (World Bank, 2006:3).  
 
Beyond these very significant macroeconomic improvements, Kemal Dervis also accelerated 
the Turkish convergence with the EU by getting the national assembly to pass long-waited 
reform packages for EU membership. But more importantly, with the support of his former 
employer and the IMF and taking advantage of the tattered state of opposition inside and 
outside the parliament, Kemal Dervis managed to put in motion a real era of deregulation, 
privatization and retreat of the state, a project that spectacularly failed in the 1990s. 
Interestingly, those capitalists who survived the crisis welcomed the great transformation in 
the meta-field. The fact that they survived the biggest economic and financial meltdown in 
the country’s history coupled with the abandonment of a crowding-out state meant that the 
economy field was to be gradually left to them with many opportunities.  
 
The biggest losers in this great transformation were those failed banks and companies and 
their employees, the great majority of “virgin” DRIs and domestic asset management 
companies (DIIs) which alienated a large number of equity fund investors with their 
traditional quasi index-tracker funds and management fees. Another big loser in this great 
transformation was the three-party coalition government. In the November 2002 snap-
elections, the coalition parties lost their elector support so dramatically that none of the 
parties apart from the far-right Nationalist Movement Party have managed to come back to 
the parliament so far. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) won a landslide victory in 
2002 elections only several months after its foundation.43 However, the JDP had surprisingly 
adopted the language of fiscal prudence, retreating state, and advancing private 

43 This party was founded by a breakaway and reformist group from a so-called Islamist party which 
was for several years the co-ruling party in collation governments in the 1990s. The former party was 
banned by the Constitutional Court in 1999 after it lost its seat in the government by a military coup 
by memorandum in 1997.   
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entrepreneurship as advised by the World Bank and the IMF, and pressed on with further 
reforms on this path and the path to EU membership. This was despite the fact that JDP’s 
votes mostly came from disillusioned and/or destitute voters. The JDP's allegiance to the 
IMF and World Bank programme and the rhetoric of fiscal austerity and extensive 
privatisation kick-started the transformation of the Turkish state from a paternalist, large and 
cumbersome structure into a smaller but much more effective regulatory structure (Onis and 
Bakir, 2005). 
 
Another catalyst for the post-2000/1 reforms was Turkey's full-membership candidacy in the 
EU. The Union's rules and regulations about ‘fiscal soundness’ enshrined in the Maastricht 
criteria, and the Copenhagen political and economic criteria for new members (Aydin and 
Keyman, 2004) have meant that Turkey as a candidate country was on the way to ‘converge’ 
financially, economically and politically with the developed nations of the EU as exemplified 
by the experiences of new members of the EU (World Bank, 2006). The material steps 
towards convergence by the Turkish government  led to the start of official accession 
negotiations in early 2005, as decided in December 2004, two years after the December 2002 
Copenhagen Summit, which advised the European Commission to monitor Turkey's progress 
with a view to recommending the Council to start negotiations.44 The so called “EU peg” 
contributed significantly to the rebound in Turkish economy and financial markets.  
 
In this improving macroeconomic and political context, even though the ISE All return index 
failed to return to their 1999/2000 record levels in TL and USD until 2003 and 2005 
respectively45, thanks to the significantly disinflationary environment, the ISE proved to be a 
good investment venue relative to fixed income securities.  The return figures presented in 
Table I for the ISE 100 and fixed-income investment vehicles show that the ISE equity 
market once again became a more attractive investment venue for those who persevered and 
kept their exposures to the equity market. Moreover, the real returns in all the three 
investment vehicles in Table I are in line with what Defour and Orhangazi (2009) argue 
about the post-2001 period, namely a period of very favourable conditions for international 
and domestic finance capital despite the decreasing cost of borrowing for the state.  In 2003 
and 2004, the net income outflow from portfolio investments of foreigners shot up to 1.2 

44The highlights of Turkey's 47 years of yet-to-be-finished accession journey  into the EU can be 
found at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678  
45In TL terms, in 1999 the index closed at 15,554 points. It was in 2003, the index hit 20,389 points. In 
the intervening period, the index saw 9.784 points in 2000, 14,577 points in 2001 and 11,482 points in 
2002 (Source, the ISE return indices available at http://www.ise.org/data/stocksData.aspx ).  
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billion USD per year from 800 million USD in 2002 (Defour and Orhangazi, 2009: 111).  
 
To sum up, those equity investors, retail or institutional, who had economic capital at their 
disposal and who decided to take higher risks by investing in the equity market have 
received significant returns in the post-crisis period. The prospect of the EU convergence has 
consolidated the role of institutional investors, especially FIIs in Turkey since 2004. It has 
also transformed the ISE field significantly. Table I in the Methodology chapter gives a 
summary of the numerical consequences of the post 2000/1 crisis in share ownership and 
trading behaviour according to investor types. In the following, I look at how this forceful re-
entry of FIIs have transformed the social, cultural, and economic capital of IRS departments, 
DRIs and domestic speculators.  
 
The transformation in the ISE field in the post-2001 period 
 
With the country on its track to fight inflation and the state retreating into a regulatory role, 
the wilderness journey of the ISE back to its 1999/2000 peak points was a slow, but rather 
unidirectional and foundational one. The concrete steps taken towards EU convergence and 
structural adjustment of the economy were not only welcomed in the ISE in the form of 
confidence in the market and less volatility but also noticed and appreciated by the global 
investment community with a new influx of end-clients and global intermediaries entering 
the ISE.  The global investment banks started to buy up the almost defunct local brokers and 
had become competitors to their “loyal” local brokers. Coupled with the new demand for 
Turkish securities, there was a confidence boost for local IRS departments and they started to 
venture into end-client business. Now they had less to lose by becoming direct competitors 
to global brokers who had become locals in Istanbul’s top-end offices.  
 
Some of the local IRS departments in independently owned brokerage houses were 
successfully converting their cultural capital into economic gains as they were snapped up by 
European investment banks. On the other hand, the existence of global brokers in Istanbul 
and lack of supply in IRS personnel meant that IRS personnel became sought after 
commodities in the labour market and their wages increased significantly in the post-crisis 
period. The expansion in IRS personnel’s social capital by means of new end-clients started 
to convert into higher economic capital for them. On the other hand, the increasing weight of 
the FIIs in the ISE and the entry of global intermediaries into the sector were welcomed by 
the local intermediaries who did not have to run IRS departments. This was because now 




A new type of rationality that is not reliant on domestic speculators 
 
On the domestic speculators and their brokers’ front, the 2000/1 crisis is generally argued to 
have dented their power in the ISE coupled with the forceful re-entry of the FIIs. It is 
probably true that some of the names in the 1990s have lowered their profile in the ISE in the 
aftermath of the crisis. More importantly, with the entry of the FIIs and the structural 
transformation in the Turkish economy, it seemed like the figure of domestic speculator 
started to become discredited and lost its symbolic capital around the DRI circles and the 
media. It was easy to find quite interesting investigative journalism pieces from the late 
1990s and first couple of years of the new millennium which somehow normalized domestic 
speculator figures’ “necessary” function in the ISE due to their imposing presence not only in 
volume generation but also share ownership. However,  the more recent news about these 
and newer figures of domestic speculator are about either alleged/charged manipulation 
cases or how the older figures had lost their power to the FIIs as confirmed by spectacular 
ownership ratios of FIIs hovering around 60% to 70 % since 2005. In a context like this, 
domestic speculator figure was no longer the reason why the market had moved or would 
move in a particular way. With the proliferation of simple data about global and local 
markets via business TV broadcasts, and with cheap or sometimes free access to in-depth 
market data, followers of the ISE, whether an investor or a commentator, could now see a 
different rationale at work in the movements of the ISE index. Narratives about the ISE told 
on a daily basis were now globally oriented in their plots as the existence of foreigners had 
become a sort of master narrative that dictated cause-effect or correlation relationships 
between global financial centres and the ISE without questioning the fact that the bulk of the 
volume in the ISE was still generated by the DRIs!  A domestic sales manager from a 
domestics-only, bank-owned brokerage house remarked the following about this change 
(Interview*, 1 September, 2008). As he explained to me, the manager’s house, which had 
been in the top five trading volume during the field-work, served half a dozen domestic 
speculators who were capable of generating more than 10 billion TL per annum in trading 
volume.  
10 years ago, the market would rally with Ilhami [Suaydin], now the shopkeeper in 
Afyon [a small Anatolian city] asks about the future of Tom [DOW] Jones [we both 
laugh and he adds this really happened], then you hear in a village in Kars [an 
Eastern province bordering Iran and Armenia] ‘what will the FED do’ [this was a 
joke]. So, this is one of the reasons why the effect of speculators has declined is this 
data expansion phenomenon. Now people [average DRIs] look for a story, a 
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justification before they trade.46  
 
Compare this with that of a senior female investment advisor from House B, Sr who told me 
that in the second half of the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium what they 
used to follow in the ISE were ‘day-traders from London [proprietary traders], foreign origin 
funds, and Ilhami, Ziya and Dundar [names of famous domestic speculators] making the 
boards, say making Tupras board’. Her colleague, Ay who is equally senior in House B 
added the following: ‘before it was about guessing which move belonged to which group, 
and it was easier to do so and take positions accordingly. Now it is mostly foreign-owned 
brokerage houses doing everything and it is hard to understand their intentions. Now you 
can’t predict the market’ (8 April 2008). Sr also explained to me during the same informal 
discussion how the scopic screens would be adjusted to accommodate for an increasing 
number of global indicators that were now broadcast on the data/information platforms:  
The way we put these indexes on the screen is by experience. I remember one day 
when there was this unexpected, unexplained fall in the index here, an ex-colleague 
told us that it was the Shanghai index, which had slumped by 8 %, so from then on I 
keep that index on my screen’ [The second investment advisor added] you also call 
your friends from other houses and see what they say about it or you tell them if you 
know why, so it is easy in this market, the word spreads very quickly. 
 
However this new schemata among DRIs which seem to exclude domestic speculator 
activity does not mean that domestic speculators are no longer in the market. When one 
considers the dominating share of the DRIs in annual trading volume but the relatively small 
number of core DRI numbers mentioned in Chapter 3, it would not be hard to imagine that 
the bulk of these volume figures are generated by high frequency trading investors. In fact, in 
all the houses except in House B, I indirectly observed the second type of domestic 
speculators in action. Although some of these would fall into the ‘problematic’ category 
using off-shore funds and controlling rather thinly traded middle-capitalisation and small-
capitalisation shares, I was fortunate enough to observe one momentum trader in action at his 
home office, and interview another one over the phone. The first momentum trader is the 
informant I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter when I described the Cagaloglu years 
and the order-matching system there. This gentleman, now in his mid 40s after a successful 
career in brokerage house management, has become a momentum trader. He defined what he 
does in the ISE with the metaphor of being a “kabzimal”-middleman in the fruit and 

46 The Tom Jones joke was made occasionally in the field sites. Both cities are rather marginal in 
relation to DRI numbers and equity investment exposures. For instance Kars has the smallest average 
portfolio per investor with only 5,600 TL (ACMIT 2010). Afyon probably fares better than Kars as 
House B has one of their four branches there!  
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vegetable wholesale market (22 June 2009): 
I am like a middleman in the wholesale grocery market. I go to the market, pick 
things depending on supply and demand that is present, buy them cheap and sell 
them dear. My source of information is what I see before me [shows his double 
screen on his desk]. Every bit of information and news is included on this screen so 
all you have to care about is the cash flow. So there is no need to check somewhere 
else when you are very much concentrated on your positions in shares. 
 
The middleman uses House D and several other brokerage houses to order execution, to get 
market intelligence about companies and to use house loan facilities.  His trading strategy is 
to make quick entries and exits by buying and selling in liquid shares in the ISE 10 and the 
ISE 30 indices, and adjusting his timing in accordance with momentum in shares and the 
indexes such as the DAX in Germany and the DOW in the US (spot and futures) which a 
large majority of domestic investors believe are moving the ISE market. During the 
interview, the trader clocked 4.5 million TL trading volume by selling, buying and selling 
again in a large-capitalisation  bank share  in a span of 10 minutes from two houses. This 
trading activity constituted approximately 9 % of the bank’s trading volume on that day. He 
traded in anticipation of several up tick moves but later explained to me that due to 
deterioration in the momentum in the US futures market, the local momentum reversed and 
made him close the position with an approximate 10,000 TL loss.  
 
The other momentum trader calls himself a ‘flow-trader’ but his presence in the ISE as a DRI 
is much more significant than the middleman. The flow-trader can generate around 5 % of 
the annual ISE trading volume (Interview, 24 June 2009). This is possible by not only trading 
according to momentum in large-capitalisation shares but also generating that momentum by 
his significant economic and social capital in the IRS and FII scenes. The latter stretches to 
end-clients and global brokers based in London as well as the IRS departments with whom 
he closely works for trade execution. In that respect, he, alongside several other retail 
investor figures, is also very active in the OTC options and equity market for ISE shares in 
London. He acts as counterparty in large share options and block-trades (above interview; 
Interview, interbank broker, London, 21 February 2009). One peculiar thing about the flow-
trader is that he alleges that he does not use off-shore funds unlike “moustached foreigners”. 
Moreover, he makes sure that he is not involved with trading groups and controversial large-
capitalisation and middle-capitalisation shares where many of my DRI and IRS informants 
believe company bosses collude with domestic speculators to control share prices.47   

47 Some of my informants who were involved with the domestic speculator scene claimed that the 




During these two interviews I got the impression that both interviewees wanted to distance 
themselves from the historical and problematic speculator figures and their on-going 
practices in the ISE. According to my informants and some accounts in the national media, 
some of these old figures are said to have retired from the ISE and been replaced by new 
domestic speculator figures after the 2001 financial meltdown. On the other hand, contrary to 
the claims that some old figures have retired from the market, a senior female broker in 
House C, who has served a few domestic speculators in her 17 years career in various local 
brokerage houses, makes the following remark: ‘these speculators are still here because they 
know nothing but the market. If they have managed to succeed in something else, they still 
cannot help but return to the market’ (Informal discussion, 15 August, 2008). According to 
my informants and news and rumours on national media and popular bourse forums, the new 
figures excluding the large-capitalisation momentum traders seem to fall into the second type 
of domestic speculator category and even in the “problematic” sub-type category rather than 
generating and benefiting trading momentum in large-capitalisation shares.  
 
All in all, it can be said that in the post 2001 period, the domestic speculator figure is still an 
important force in the ISE field by their volume generating and market moving capacities 
thanks to their economic, cultural and social capital that is apt for this role. However, due to 
the aforementioned new rationality based on the “globalised” ISE field, a great number of 
DRIs and their intermediaries do not actually try to follow what the enigmatic domestic 
speculator figure is up to. As shall be substantiated in the evidence chapters, during my 
indirect observation of the most privileged DRIs in all four houses, namely those investors 
with significant economic capital and who wanted to engage in relatively short-term trading, 
there was hardly any talk about domestic speculators among the dealers and such privileged 
investors. The discussions were centred on data/information flows from the global economy 
and markets as well as Turkish economy and politics. The exception to this was only 
observed in House A branch which was a den of what I call “abandoned DRIs” and 
“problematic” type domestic speculators.  
 
What I mean by abandoned DRIs are those investors who have social capital in scenes where 
“problematic” domestic speculators are quite active. By doing relationship work via sharing 
tips and private information about intentions and exposures, these investors try to benefit 
how revenues for this group were generated by front-running and so on. There was polyphony of 
stories about this figure but one thing is for sure, he has a formidable presence in trading volume 
generation in the ISE.  
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from rather guided moves in shares. The reason for the term ‘abandoned’ is that in all the 
four brokerage houses I observed, and during the interviews with domestic sales managers 
from other brokerage houses, there was some sort of contempt towards this type of DRI by 
managers and dealers alike due to the fact that these investors had strong convictions about 
certain shares and the ISE itself as informed by their social and cultural capital valuable in 
abandoned DRI circles. This would generally lead to significant returns or losses which 
depended on where these investors would join the “game” orchestrated by domestic 
speculators.  
 
From a brokerage house perspective, these were relatively dangerous games and would lead 
to being stuck in certain shares and diminishing commission fee returns for brokerage 
houses. After all, brokerage houses strived to protect economic capital of their DRIs to 
ensure that they generated sustainable commission fees from clients’ trading activity. It was 
important for the brokerage houses I observed and those domestic sales managers I 
interviewed to create, sustain, and apply a certain cognitive schema that was not based on 
whims of some enigmatic figures. A more sustainable and healthier schema would be based 
on a more routine and stable and easy-to-predict mechanism that was based on dynamics of 
global and national economies, markets, and politics. Scopic market screens had made this 
possible by representing a multitude of symbols and narratives about these elements and 
encouraging market actors to make sense of these in a narrative mode. Moreover, thanks to 
the  popular demand for different sense-making products such as analyst reports and 
commentary about markets, economy and politics by market professionals, the distinction 
between simple datum and higher datum as made by Sassen (2005) seemed to be blurred in 
the ISE field. This blurring between the simple and higher data had also been possible by the 
nature of social capital in DRI scenes as well as the availability of dissemination 
technologies such as email and scopic markets screens.  
 
Social capital and spread of higher datum and dispositions 
 
According to the annual ACMIT reports on the Turkish capital markets since 2002, the total 
number of brokerage house staff had never been more than 9,000 in the post 1999 period.  
Among them investment advisor, dealer, broker numbers were around 6,000. Considering 
that this group has served around 100,000 to 150,000 active DRIs in the same period, it is 
not hard to imagine how novel commentaries of professional observers and/or students of the 
markets and economy might spread very quickly among other market professionals and their 
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clients and then take on a role of describing “reality” among a large number of investors and 
thus shape their trading reactions. In this sense, social capital in the DRI scene among market 
professionals and investors were really conducive to spreading new dispositions, knowledge 
and objects. As an example for the latter, analyst reports are worth mentioning. These reports 
once published privately to clients of brokerage houses would start spreading via private 
email groups and personal networks and sometimes analysts or email senders would 
complain that they received their own (emailed) report in their e-mail inbox. Although 
reports would always be sent first to the most valued clients of IRS departments, these then 
would spread to the different pockets of the ISE not just by private email networks but also 
via internet portals and even the data platform, the Euroline.48 At a lower intellectual labour 
level, it was noted during my observations that the daily market reports of most brokerage 
houses based on major global and then national news and their chart-based commentaries 
were passed by the data platforms through their news wires. These public and private 
dissemination activities for high-end and low-end higher datum actually reinforce the 
prevalent cognitive schemata in the field, especially among the DRIs.  However as Bourdieu 
(1997) had reminded us ownership of economic or social capital does not ensure the ‘right’ 
usage of objects which are acquired by individuals. It is doubtful whether most of these IRS 
analyst reports would trigger trading action among DRIs and domestic speculators with a 
view to holding shares of a company for a few months until its share price reached its stated 
target. The average holding period statistics presented in Table I tell otherwise. 
 
A similar situation of overlapping social capitals and easy access to simple and higher data 
applies to FIIs and IRS departments. As put to me by my informants in House B, C, and D 
and by interviewees from other IRS departments, global brokers and asset managers in 
Istanbul and London, end-clients and global brokers would work with multiple local brokers 
to be able to access the greatest breadth of public and private information and to spread their 
trading presence over multiple brokerage houses. The latter would ensure access to better 
execution and helps prevent having a high trading profile in the market at any given time. In 
this vein, it is hard to talk about an IRS-FII universe where the most active FIIs would not be 
served by the leading twenty or so IRS departments. However, this close-knit group does not 
mean that IRS departments could easily make their FII clients adopt a cognitive schema that 
48 Some internet platforms have the full reports. Other public platforms give a very short executive 
summary with the recommendation. I did not have the chance to check what type of access is possible 
on the Euroline platform but this feature is advertised on their website as ‘foreign reports’ and the 
rationale for putting this feature on the platform is explained as ‘in a market which is 70 %  owned by 
foreigners what can be more important than foreign reports and bulletins...an unprecedented service’ 
available at http://www.platodata.com.tr/u_euroline_tumozellikler.asp  
 
 94 
is conducive to short-term trading activity that would blend insider view as explained by 
Smith (1998) with data/information flows from abroad and Turkey. This is due to two factors 
as explained below.  
 
Firstly, compared to their IRS colleagues, FIIs both individually and as organisations are 
equally, if not more, endowed in terms of cultural capital on global financial investment and 
trading.  In that respect, there is not much that IRS personnel can transfer to an FII staff apart 
from specific objects such as analyst reports and market updates generated by research 
departments. These objects are designed to be used most effectively according to the 
institutionalized and career-based cultural capital of FIIs. Secondly, most FIIs invest in other 
countries alongside Turkey. This gives them a broader perspective on the state of multiple 
markets and economies as well as the institutionalized responsibility to keep a balanced and 
routine exposure to different markets. And tied to these factors is the preciousness of their 
time due to their punishing workload. Therefore, IRS departments are required to speak a 
much regimented language which is generally composed of comparative company 
performances within the ISE and across emerging and developed markets, events in the 
Turkish macro economy and politics that are blended with the global macro outlook, and, if 
it is about an order, the market colour, namely who is buying or selling how many shares via 
the house.  As put by the head of IRS in House B ‘there is no bullshitting, jabbering or 
babbling in our job, it is right-to-the-point investment advice based on what our research 
team say and what our clients demand from us’ (Interview, 17 April 2008). As shall be 
discussed in the evidence chapters, most sales traders get their research analysts’ brief on a 
share or the Turkish economy and politics before contacting their clients to prevent any flops 
on the phone. Moreover, sales traders hardly contradict what their research analysts formally 
say on the Turkish companies, economy and politics.  
 
It is without doubt that FIIs, with some exceptions as shall be discussed later, have a more 
categorically-informed and bureaucratized approach to investment compared to DRIs and 
their intermediaries. When coupled with their unquestionable dominance in share ownership 
in the ISE, at least according to the official statistics (but we must not forget the moustached 
foreigners), this leads to a widespread belittlement of domestic speculators and DRIs by my 
IRS informants. The belittlement usually focuses on the DRIs’ ostensible opportunism and 
penchant for short-term trading, which IRS personnel believe is futile and, worse, 
detrimental to DRIs’ economic capital and at times to the trading performance of IRS 
departments due to front-running attempts by day-traders. More specifically, IRS personnel 
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who do not have any contact with a domestic speculator figure rule out any sphere of 
domestic speculators’ influence where FIIs have dominance in terms of share ownership and 
to some extent trading volume generation: ‘In big index shares, the domestics cannot enter 
there, there the majority of shares belong to the foreigners, 90%, 95 %.  If you try to get in 
there, you will become the grass on which giants wrestle’ (Interview, head of institutional 
sales, House B, 17 April 2008).  Compare this with what the flow trader has to say about IRS 
personnel who share the above view: 
Trader: Those guys saying this in those IRS departments, either they don't know who 
I am or they don't know anything about the house they are working for. In Garanti 
Bank, today on average, I do half of the trading volume there 
Tarim: (laughs) I see! 
Trader: If not Garanti, then where, this is the most liquid share in the ISE, and I do 5 
% of the whole ISE trading, and besides, all my trades are in the ISE 10, they are 
beyond liquid, mine is flow trading, I think having flow traders like me is an 
advantage for foreigners, because foreigners, they do one way ticket trades, and we 
by buying and selling make them move more freely, and that is also the case in the 
world [markets]. 
 
A more balanced view can actually be found among IRS personnel who are in contact with 
and sometimes serve domestic speculators mainly in order execution, and among those 
domestic sales managers who serve them in a comprehensive manner. The consensus view 
among these figures is that domestic speculators have a strong combination of economic, 
social, and cultural capital to be able to operate effectively as momentum traders in large-
capitalisation shares and like informal market-makers in middle-capitalisation and small-
capitalisation shares for a longer period of time. However when it comes to the movement of 
the ISE index, no one, but especially the ordinary DRIs who are active in the ISE field via 
brokerage houses’ comprehensive services, seem to give any credit or thought to individual 
domestic speculator names and their whims.  
 
The shifting symbolic capital and the stance of regulators on liquidity 
 
The above discussion about DRIs’ and FIIs’ and their respective intermediaries’ perception 
about domestic speculators can be seen as a general manifestation of changing dynamics in 
attribution of symbolic capital in the ISE. As far as the DRIs and their intermediaries are 
concerned, new breeds of domestic speculators are effective in middle-capitalisation and 
small-capitalisation shares with a dozen or so exceptions that seemed to be venturing into 
large-capitalisation shares. For those abandoned DRIs that I observed directly or read about 
via online discussion platforms, domestic speculators who are effective in middle-
capitalisation and small-capitalisation shares are like schizophrenics who are capable of 
 
 96 
playing the angel and the villain in the market. The emphasis here is that these speculators 
have the ability to move the share price and make many abandoned DRIs happy or depressed 
depending on at which point the abandoned DRI joins the game. When it comes to large-
capitalisation shares, the language of the dominated figures changes into one of an 
uncertainty and the unknown figure of “they” that might be holding the index, a specific 
share, buying or selling consistently and so on and so forth. “They” is a figure that may refer 
to speculators, hedge funds, pension funds, proprietary traders and company bosses. Because 
the volumes involved in large-capitalisation trade are so great (blocks of millions bought and 
sold in seconds), sometimes even the day-trading brokers seem not to be able to make sense 
of the game, let alone participate in it (as noted during House C morning meetings). 
 
In this vein, the predictable and routine games of domestic speculators in the 1990s in large-
capitalisation shares are a relic of the past. For the former dealer of Ilhami Suaydin, the loss 
of legitimate competence on the part of domestic speculators was possible because ‘the state 
decided that Turks could not manage this bourse business. It was that conviction that “the 
foreigners know better and they should control the market” which led to the cleansing of 
these people [speculators].  We have this mentality everywhere now after the crisis’. In 
general, it can be argued that in the new millennium the regulatory bodies such as the CMB 
and the ISE have increased their regulator clout in the ISE. One great example of this is the 
establishment of an intermediary organisations body, the ACMIT and the introduction of 
licence examinations to regulate individuals’ entry into the intermediation field. Although the 
ACMIT is an interest-seeking organisation on behalf of its members, it does have regulatory 
power over its individual members as well as employees in the sector.  
 
Another good example of increasing regulatory clout is the increasing number of speedy 
bans handed to problematic domestic speculators who have made it a habit to create artificial 
price movements in relatively illiquid shares. On the other hand, these regulatory bodies 
seem to be more lenient towards domestic speculators who do not resort to very explicit 
price manipulation. In the summer of 2008 when I re-visited the ISE headquarters, I pressed 
a surveillance officer and the general manager of the Surveillance Department  on whether 
they were lenient towards volume generating and speculating DRIs (Informal discussion*, 
29 August 2008). The impression I got from them was that they actually did not follow 
individuals’ trading activities. It was more about observing share trading and noticing 
abnormal volume and price movements and whether there is an unwarranted financial gain 
(the officer). The general manager of Surveillance added the following about the dilemma 
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the ISE faces:  
There is a dilemma here in the ISE; you want to give the impression that the ISE is 
one of the most liquid markets among the Emerging Markets, maybe the third or the 
second. That is okay, but then you ask us to crack down on people who provide most 
of the trading volume that you boast of. This is a dilemma. 
 
In fact this quotation refers to several facts. To begin with, the surveillance in the ISE is 
fragmented. The ISE and the CMB do not work in tandem. They have their respective 
surveillance teams and this may lead to ISE team’s reports being ignored by the CMB which 
has the ultimate authority on starting a formal investigation. In fact it was only in January 
2010, the CMB established its own real-time surveillance team in Istanbul to be more hands-
on in manipulation cases and directly intervene during the trading session. This move comes 
25 years after the establishment of the ISE (Radikal, 18 February 2010). The second fact is 
that there might be a higher political will over the bureaucrats of the ISE and CMB to make 
the ISE a liquid market and this would conflict with the aim of constant vigilance over what 
individual traders and organisations are up to. It is not unknown for the CMB and the ISE to 
warn brokerage houses and individual traders if they seem to be in breach of the rules and 
regulations before these regulators take a formal action against them.  
 
The assistant general manager of the stock market department in the ISE (informal 
discussion*, 11 September 2008) told me that, compared to the past, his department writes 
less number of reports on suspected manipulations. On the other hand, my informants in the 
surveillance department did refrain from giving a figure of report numbers which might 
reveal the fact that most of them were ignored by the CMB. When I met a disgruntled ISE 
staff from one of these departments back in December 2009 in London, he told me that it 
was the CMB which ignored many of the cases reported by the ISE. The assistant general 
manager of the stock market department said the following which captures the management 
strategy of the ISE, the CMB, and the ACMIT when it comes to solving these manipulation 
problems:  
Banning these people or banning trading won’t be the solution. The solution and our 
aim are to increase volume, depth and investor-base in the ISE so that these guys 
won’t be as free as they used to be... with a bureaucratic mind things won’t be 
solved, otherwise we would have to stop trading in the ISE long time before [smiles].  
 
Despite the public image associated with domestic speculators, it can therefore be argued 
that in practical terms, the regulatory organisations accept the reality of domestic speculators 
but refrain from any statement/action that might imply attribution of any legitimate 
competence to domestic speculators such as establishing a formal market making mechanism 
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and invite brokerage houses and individual traders to bid for this role. The new head of the 
CMB stated that the amount of trading volume which was subject to manipulation cases 
were ‘only 1 or 2 % of the volume. But the perception is that it affects 60% or 70 % of the 
trading volume. But even this has created a mistrust of markets among the investor masses’ 
(Sabah, 3 June 2009 quoted in Tarim 2009, 5.35). This can be seen as an indirect admission 
that the CMB or the ISE do not see most of the domestic speculator activity as problematic 
as the bulk of the trading volume is generated by these figures.  
 
Challenges to the new incumbent of the symbolic capital: Are foreigners 
crooks?  
 
The dominance of FIIs in share ownership and their direct presence in Istanbul in the form of 
Istanbul branches of global investment banks make the FIIs a not-so-distant investor type in 
the ISE. Their activities and intentions can be indirectly followed via scopic market screens’ 
variety of representation, classification and monitoring tools such as FII ownership ratio, 
‘money entry-exit’, headline news about their analyst reports so on and so forth. It is also 
well-known in DRI circles, thanks to publicly available statistics compiled by the ACMIT 
and their popularisation by the national media with sensationalist stories, that FIIs are unlike 
them and foreigners are here for the long-run and they act on fundamentals of the Turkish 
economy and companies. Despite this perception, the very same scopic market screen tools, 
which are used to monitor FII activity, when combined with narrative imagination often lead 
to different interpretations of FII activity by DRIs and their intermediaries. Although 
proprietary  trader and hedge fund trading activity often cause significant short-term changes 
in the ISE index as was frequently observed between 2006 and 2008 until the Lehman 
Brother’s collapse and the global financial meltdown,49 the challenges by DRIs and local 
media pundits to the new incumbent of the symbolic capital has a more sinister side about 
the FIIs’ activity, that they manipulate the market by insider information and swaying the 
price of shares at the expense of DRIs (Tarim, 2009 and Tarim, 2011a look at specific 
accusations as such). Any seemingly untoward event that seems to be associated with FIIs as 
observed before scopic screens and/or learnt from the media has therefore a great potential to 
stir strong anti-foreigner emotions among DRIs and their intermediaries. This is mixed with 
a nationalist sentiment that the Turkish establishment in all realms of politics including the 

49 These activities involved a dozen very well-known proprietary traders and hedge fund managers 
from London who would move large-capitalisation shares and hence the ISE 100 index. This 
increased trading activity was also reflected in the increased FIIs’ share in the ISE trading volume in 
2007 and 2008. Some IRS traders and the flow-trader reminisced that period as the time when 
foreigners acted like domestic speculators who were active in large-capitalisation shares! 
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financial markets as well as your average Turkish person in the street give an unwarranted 
credit to everything that is (done by) foreigners (Informal discussion, head of domestic sales,  
House A, 3 September 2008).  
 
Coupled with the differential treatment by the legislators and regulators to DRIs and FIIs 
such as the taxation regime based on investor type and lack of surveillance on short-selling 
by FIIs50, the daily observation of scopic screens, which is partly dominated by what other 
brokerage houses do in the ISE, invariably leads to occasional resentment against those 
brokerage houses which are believed to represent the foreigner figures. This is especially the 
case if investment advisor/dealer and/or his/her DRI client are interested in day-trading in 
ISE futures contracts in the VOB and/or day-trading or taking short-term positions in the 
equity market. Both of these activities are often subject to significant intra-day and inter-day 
volatility. On the other hand, during my observations in the four houses, I frequently heard 
the existence of foreigners in a share, as confirmed by settlement and trading figures, as a 
seal of approval for investing in that particular share or for selling it if selling was the 
intention, as would be “approved” by foreigners’ sellings and/or negative analyst reports by 
global brokers.  
 
The specific accusations directed to FIIs as discussed in Tarim (2009 and 2011a) seem to be 
repeated in DRI circles and the media whenever a similar untoward situation is observed on 
scopic screens. Against these,  the CMB, the ISE and the ACMIT as regulatory organisations 
usually respond by hinting at FIIs’ (legitimate) competence in generating timely and accurate 
research outputs, and how FIIs are internally well-governed by their high level of 
institutionalization and division of labour, and how they are externally well-regulated within 
their home countries and in Turkey. Despite these public endorsements of the symbolic 
capital of FIIs, the regulators would not refrain from investigating high profile manipulation 
accusations toward FIIs or those untoward situations they themselves notice. However, so far 
such investigations have only led to one temporary ban handed to a hedge fund based in 
London.  Against these popular accusations, FIIs and IRS staff have always kept their 
silence.  
50 Short-selling in the ISE is subject to up-tick rule and formal identification of the order as short-
selling in the remote access system. On the ISE trading floor this is done by pushing the short-sell 
button on the broker keyboard.  Naked short-selling is banned and brokerage houses are given the 
responsibility of ensuring that their clients have borrowed the shares or have the necessary collateral 
in their accounts. This rule virtually does not apply to FIIs as IRS-FII relationship is based on the 
notion of ‘line’ i.e. a certain quota of trading volume given to each FII client by the IRS based on 
clients’ economic and reputational capital. No IRS trader can ask their client whether it is a short-sell 






In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that the field of ISE exhibit conflict and 
competition among different investor and intermediation groups. These investor and 
intermediary groups have taken different positions in the field. Some of these positions such 
as those of DRIs and their intermediaries reflect their histories in the ISE since the late 
1980s. In this respect, I think the most significant case of position-taking and habitus 
formation in the field happened among DRIs; domestic speculators; and DRI-only brokers.  
These groups have had shaped the field by their distinct investment and intermediation 
practices that reflected the opportunities and challenges they faced in the field. Some of these 
challenges and opportunities were created by games in the meta-field such as the coupon-
pool capitalism and the haphazard and top-down approaches of politicians and bureaucrats to 
the ISE. These meta-field challenges shaped DRIs dispositions. Some other challenges were 
actually DRIs’ and their brokers’ own-making such as unscrupulous custody practices and 
the desire to make a lot of money in very short-time periods, which often led to the loss of 
significant amounts of economic capital and prevented the formation of a cultural capital that 
appreciated long-term investments.  
 
In the early 1990s, two new groups of investors entered the field, namely the FIIs and the 
DIIs, as potential competitors against the DRIs. The DIIs had to learn and co-found the asset 
management business in Turkey with the regulators. Once established towards the mid 
1990s, DIIs actually had the chance to attract DRIs by offering them a more reliable and 
long-term asset management service but this failed to materialize probably due to already 
ingrained short-termist and opportunistic disposition of DRIs as well as the nature of the 
mutual fund products that were allowed by the CMB. The FIIs, on the other hand, entered 
the ISE with their dispositions and strong types of capital formed in the global finance 
system. Thanks to these, they benefited from spectacular returns in the ISE and from 
Turkey’s cheapness and promising long-term prospects as an emerging market. FIIs were in 
fact competitors against DRIs in the sense that the latter were sellers of equity assets to the 
former for short-term profits. The question was, in the long-run who was making the right 
decision by engaging in this transaction? In the second half of the 1990s, proprietary traders 
also entered the market and brought a novelty to the market, namely very short-term fund 
entries and exits from London and other global financial hubs.  
 
The 2000/1 crisis created a disjunction in the field of ISE and in the meta-field of economy 
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and politics in Turkey. For some observers, the IMF programme that preceded the crisis had 
failed because of the loss of the confidence of international creditors in Turkey’s 
commitment to structural economic change. To prevent this loss of confidence happening 
again, the new political will imposed one of the most significant changes in Turkish 
economy in the recent decades which was followed by the transformation in the political 
scene. The supporting power behind this political will was the global finance capital and its 
representative organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. This structural 
transformation had brought more FIIs to the ISE and they had become the dominant power in 
terms of share ownership and appropriation and holding of the symbolic capital in the ISE. 
In the 1990s, FIIs were urged make timely entries and exits and somehow took a similar 
disposition to that of DRIs in the face of occasional stock market rallies and crashes. 
However,  in the new millennium  FIIs had gradually amassed a larger proportion of shares 
and portfolio values in the ISE, kept their portfolios intact for more than five months per 
year, and did not exit Turkey even during the worst global financial crisis of the last 50 
years, if not the century. Some FIIs actually hold their equity portfolios relatively unchanged 
for several years and earn the nickname ‘custody company’ by some of my IRS informants. 
On a related note, it had usually been the FIIs who have had a more cool-headed approach to 
the Turkish politics and economy compared to that of DRIs thanks to their cultural and social 
capital in the global finance field and their exposure to multiple countries and assets (see the 
JDP closure case as an example in Chapter 10). Turkey, for them, is not the biggest deal!  
 
Whilst the position taken by the FIIs is this, the DRIs and domestic speculators in particular 
had decreased their share ownership in the ISE and continued their short-termist and 
opportunist investment disposition formed in the 1990s with a slight increase in their 
portfolio holding periods up until the year 2009. In fact, the biggest difference in the general 
DRI disposition between the 1990s and the 2000s is probably the aforementioned cognitive 
change in their cultural capital thanks to the introduction of new observation and sense-
making technologies and re-entry of FIIs to the ISE with a new mode of presence. DRIs had 
therefore gradually turned their attention to what goes on in global financial markets and 
they would make these global events effective on their sense-making narratives and their 
investment activities in the ISE. Ironically, this modification in DRIs’ dispositions and the 
subsequent cognitive activities is usually justified by the dominant presence of FIIs and the 
consequent “globalisation” of the ISE. However, the FIIs’ dominant presence in the ISE 
often invokes distrust and irritation among DRIs and their intermediaries when it is coupled 
with a narrative imagination about FIIs’ specific investment and trading activities. In the 
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following chapters, I first contextualize the observation sites according to their capital types 
and positions in the ISE field.  Following that, I present the evidence chapters on sense-
making activities of DRIs, DIIs, and FIIs as gathered through my field observations in 2008 
and 2009. As stated before, I treat these sense-making narratives as products of different 
types of capital and specific habituses and positions owners of these capital types occupied 




CHAPTER 5 CONTEXTUALIZING THE OBSERVATION SITES IN THE ISE  
 
In this brief chapter, I first present the following table drawing on my theoretical and 
empirical discussion about the ISE as a field in the previous chapters. Table III has various 
forms of capital, namely economic, social and cultural, which each brokerage house and its 
different departments and employees enjoy as individuals and as an organisation. In 
economic/material capital, I include the houses’ equity size, loan facilities to help client 
trading, and other material sources that enable the house to function as a comprehensive and 
highly institutionalized broker. In social capital, I look at a range of investor types that the 
brokerage houses serve, and then state whether employees are in a relationship with 
investors and other market actors that may provide them with epistemic and material 
resources. In cultural capital, I comment on the investment culture that prevails in the house 
and shapes the organisational arrangements to cater to this culture. I then provide a short 
commentary on where these capital sources place these houses in the ISE field by discussing 
the number of similar houses.  
 
Table III: Capital Sources of Brokerage Houses 
House A 
Economic/material  
Despite being categorised by the general manager as a boutique brokerage house, House A has a 
solid equity base (8 million TL)-supported by a parent bank with loan facilities provided by the 
bank based on investors' assets and risk profile, a well-functioning scopic market system in the 
headquarters and branches, a sophisticated division of labour among the 77 employees, and the 
operational risks are well-managed. In terms of salaries given to its employees, the junior dealers 
in the headquarters and branches receive relatively low salaries between 1,000 to 2,000TL per 
month. More senior dealers can get around 3,000 to 4,000 TL which is still relatively low 
considering their seniority.  It should be said that there are lower salaries in the sector than the 
salary levels mentioned here. For instance the assistant researcher in House A got something 
around 800 TL and one junior dealer told me that his salary in the previous house (one of the 
biggest, conglomerate-owned, DRI-only house) was 20 % less than what he got in House A. 
House A is located in one of the most upmarket areas in Istanbul where there are shops of global 
designers and very expensive dwellings. Yet most employees of House A can neither afford living 
there nor going to lunch in one of the “uber-cool” restaurants apart from a couple of senior 
managers and lucky dealers who have good personal connections with high-net-worth investors! 




Social  Capital  
The social capital of House A consists only of the DRIs. Among them there are a dozen or so high 
net worth individuals who are well-known around domestic pockets of the ISE. The remaining 
clients are highly speculative, short-term investors in the ISE and the VOB. It is not unknown for 
new professionals to be employed by House A due to their client portfolios. The management is 
informally well-connected with similar houses, and the ISE. The research departments’ 
connections with quoted companies in the ISE are very limited compared with those of a proper 
IRS department. There is a high media profile of its strategist thanks to his regular appearances on 
TV and finance portals featuring his commentary. The strategist also gives market commentary to 
Reuters, Turkey. 
Cultural Capital 
House A is truly a world of domestic retail investors, short-term investment and opportunistic 
traders. There is a wealth of knowledge in House A about the ISE's internal dynamics in terms of 
trading. In the VIP room, domestic clients’ whims coupled with manager pressure (concerns about 
speed of informing client and executing their orders) occasionally overwhelm dealers.  
Fundamental investment research is subordinated to this investment culture. The management is 
concerned with the sustainability of the brokerage sector and the figure of the DRI, but as an 
organisation House A is very viable thanks to its VIP clients in the headquarters and branches. All 
in all, it is business as usual in House A in terms of cognition and investment activities. There is 




House B has a solid equity base (11 million TL) which is supported by a parent conglomerate that 
has operations in multiple business areas and is a patron of arts in Turkey. The  loan facilities of 
House B is relatively limited by choice as its DRI base is sustainable via higher commission fees, 
and because the House is generally conservative in its approach to intermediation. There is a well- 
functioning scopic market system (one of the co-creators of the ISE scopic market systems was the 
IT department of House B). There is a sophisticated division of labour among 166 employees, and 
the operational risks are very well-managed.  The salaries of investment advisors in domestic sales 
start from 2,500 to 3,000 TL per month and may go up to 5,000 TL when bonuses are included. 
The IRS salaries should not be less than 5,000 TL as a starter. The house is located in the Levent 
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business district, which is flanked by two contrasting residential areas. To the east an upmarket 
residential area stretching down to the Bosporus, and to the west, a concrete jungle of buildings 
without proper title deeds. The high rise which homes House B and the AMC have a nice and 
affordable restaurant, and like House A, House B employees get lunch tickets. For lunch, some 
employees like to go to ‘uber-cool’ shopping centres in Levent which are also home to some of the 
global brokers in their business towers.  
Social  Capital 
The investor base of House B is formed of DRIs and FIIs. There is a strict policy of not working 
with high risk and high net worth individuals acting as domestic speculators. The management is 
not very well- connected with houses similar to House B (conglomerate owned) -- though some 
senior staff has considerable knowledge about the historical development of the ISE's brokerage 
sector. There are formal and unproblematic relations with the ISE. The research department is a 
comprehensive one serving foreign and domestic institutional clients including the AMC, and it is 
well-connected to 70 plus covered companies. There are occasional media appearances by the 
head of the house. The investment advisors provide commentaries to CNBC-e on a daily basis just 




There is a rather sanitized investment and organisational culture that attempts to restrain investor 
excesses in the domestic side and attempts to teach them about “rational” activity of investing. 
This is despite some investment advisors having long-term clients who were quite experienced in 
short-term investment and trading. The head of institutional sales is known for his no-nonsense 
approach to business with foreigners - hence I was not allowed in their department ‘due to risks 
posed by a researcher’ (this reasoning was mocked by his former colleagues in House D). There is 
a wealth of well-educated employee profiles (MBAs from Turkey and abroad). For most of the 
employees including investment advisors for DRIs, their job is routine, and not highly subject to 
individual whims coming from clients and superiors.  
House C 
Economic/material  
House C is a boutique and privately-owned brokerage house which has a small equity base (2.5 
Million TL). The loan facilities are very limited due to this and its relatively small client base. 
Despite this there is a well-functioning scopic market system but an unsophisticated division of 
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labour among 30 plus employees. The operational risks are therefore not very well-managed due 
to the small size of the relevant departments, and the profit-oriented and seamless service oriented 
approach in order not to drive away existing clients. The two veteran IRS traders probably earn 
around 15,000 to 30,000 TL per month based on the amount of commission fee they generate. In 
domestic sales, senior dealers receive around 2,500 to 4,000 TL depending on their experience and 
potential to generate fees. There are also “gomlekci” dealers who probably do get a small salary 
which is increased significantly by commission rebates. The House is located in one of the many 
skyscrapers in the new business district of Maslak. This area used to be a sparsely populated 
village on the outskirts of Istanbul, and even now you can see in-between the skyscrapers a small 
cottage and a barn, owned by a recalcitrant and probably illegal occupier. Interestingly some of the 
high rises have failed to meet with building regulations and are therefore empty. The lunch issue is 
solved either in restaurants or snack houses scattered around this bourgeoning business district or 
by going to the “uber cool” shopping centres around Maslak where one can also run into ISE 
employees (who are some of the best paid civil servants in Turkey!). Sometimes IRS traders like 
to nip down to the Bosporus to have a lunch by the sea. 
Social Capital  
House C is a tale of two different worlds. On the one hand, there are day traders-cum-brokers or 
dealers who have experienced the ISE in the 1990s, domestic investors as friends and contacts of 
employees of the house, and some high net worth individuals.  On the other hand, there is a small 
institutional sales team serving FIIs but mostly via trade execution. They are supported by a small 
research team that is publishing proper (format-wise) analyst reports in English that can be sent to 
FIIs. The institutional sales team is similarly reliant on personal contacts among FIIs investing in 
Turkey (the two veterans of the business had revived the department since they started in House C 
in early 2008). Beside these market-based social networks, the head of House C is well-connected 
in Ankara, the capital city. There are occasional media appearances by the head of research, and 
the head of domestic sales. The research department gives commentary to Reuters, Bloomberg and  
the local media   
Cultural Capital  
The domestic sales side is very much embedded in the above mentioned culture in House A, but 
without a wide client base.  Some of the House C employees who day-trade churn out significant 
trading volumes. Their opportunism is so that sometimes they front-run House C's orders coming 
from FIIs. The investment culture in the IRS department is based on research team’s analyst calls 
and the sales traders’ ad hoc calls on general index trends and in anticipation of important events. 
The  head of the house and the head of research have CFAs but their main concern as co-owners of 
the house is to sustain it and keep it out of the red, not necessarily providing the best 
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comprehensive research service to foreigners unlike House B and House D.  
House D 
Economic/Material  
House D has a very solid capital base (13 Million TL). It is owned by a national bank (recently 
sold to a European bank). There are extensive loan facilities provided by the bank to House D’s 
clients in accordance with risk assessment of clients by House D’s different departments.  There is 
a well-functioning scopic market system and a very sophisticated division of labour among its 117 
employees. The operational risks are well-managed.  The starting salaries for investment advisors 
in the domestic sales are around 3,000 TL which goes up to 5,000 TL or more depending on 
seniority and fee generation potential. The IRS salaries probably start at 8,000 TL in contrast to the 
senior IRS broker who earns around 4,500 TL. The house is also in Maslak, several hundred 
meters away from House C. Similar conditions apply to dining. 
Social Capital 
House D is similar to House B but it is bigger in size in terms of the client base. Moreover, the 
domestic sales department is managed by a veteran of the ISE equity trading who has a large 
network of contacts among the high net worth investors and the senior and junior managers in the 
domestic sales departments. House D’s domestic sales team work with high risk and high net 
worth individuals but on the house's terms and conditions. That is why some very high profile 
domestic speculators stopped working with the House. Like House B, there is no great need on the 
part of House D to find new clients or to employ market professionals because of their client 
portfolio. Based on these observations, one can say that House D is a well-institutionalized house 
in the ISE field thanks to the parent bank and its large banking client base. Despite these 
institutional strengths, House D has a low media profile. One consistent observation about the 
institutional sales was that they were partially showing order flows coming from FIIs to other FIIs 
and DIIs. Because the client base of the IRS department was large, this private information was 
used to attract other tickets (orders). This was occasionally done in House C’s IRS department but 
their client base was smaller than House D. I could not get any information on this from House B 
but it is highly probable that they do practice this information sharing with their FII clients. Such a 
practice of giving “market colour” would not be acceptable in domestic sales departments unless it 
was demanded by a very privileged client (a domestic speculator) who wanted to go beyond the 
data/information available on the scopic screens.  
Cultural Capital  
Domestic sales department exhibits a wide range of investor profiles including career speculators, 
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experienced short-term investors, and investors who do not have much experience and knowledge 
in the ISE trading. The VIP dealing room culture reflects these variations. The institutional sales 
team work in tandem with the research team (like in House B and House C). The IRS department’s 
culture is very much in tune with the global echelons of institutional intermediation and 
investments. Most of the employees of IRS have experience working and/or studying abroad, or 
they are graduates of top Turkish universities. Employees in both the domestic sales and the IRS 
departments, like those of House B, fulfil their highly routinised tasks. There is therefore no 
constant pressure on them by their managers or clients.  
Asset Management Company 
Economic/Material  
The AMC is owned by House B’s parent company. In this regard, the AMC has a solid economic 
power behind it. Yet, fund management companies hardly ever trade on borrowed funds despite 
the CMB regulation allowing it. Otherwise, in terms of scopic market screens and other 
monitoring devices (including the operations department personnel who measure the fund 
managers’ performance with the help of software) all relevant market devices are firmly in use. 
The approximate number of employees is 15.  Similar to more senior IRS personnel, the salaries 
for fund managers hover around six figures per annum and they are given expensive company 
cars, similar to cars given to all the managers in the houses I observed (the male veteran trader in 
House C, Br used to ride an expensive Harley Davidson motorbike for his daily commute to work 
but insisted that the company lease him a Mercedes C class car during my stay there, which of 
course was to be paid for by House C. The monthly rate for this car could almost pay the monthly 
salaries of two junior dealers in House A, and the car was definitely several times more expensive 
than House A’s domestic sales manager’s compact company car!).  
Social Capital  
There are five fund managers who each have around 15 years of experience in fund management 
industry in brokerage houses or asset management companies. They thus have a few contacts in 
top asset management companies and IRS departments in local and global brokers.  On the retail 
and institutional investor front as the AMC’s clients, the company can be seen as a mid-size asset 
management company among 23 such companies in Turkey. The AMC has a global insurance 
company as a corporate client, and 180 high net worth retail investors. Apart from these, the 
company manages six fund products designed by the general manager of House B and the fund 
managers, and issued by House B. However, like many other fund products available in Turkey, 
most of AMC’s equity and fixed-income fund products are undersubscribed (very small client base 




Both fixed-income and equity-fund managers are well-versed in paradigmatic knowledge on 
finance not to mention their exposure to the field since the early 1990s which is the source of their 
vernacular knowledge on the ISE. Despite this, one can speak of two distinct dispositions among 
the managers. The fixed-income managers have more faith in basic macro-economic facts and take 
positions accordingly whereas equity managers incorporate their vernacular knowledge into the 
management of their tightly regulated fund products. One can therefore speak of macro-oriented 
and market and investor sentiment-oriented managements styles. Despite this, the equity-fund 
managers rarely invest outside the ISE 100 shares, an area which is seen by them and many IRS 
department personnel as “problematic”.  
 
It is not an easy task to pigeon-hole each of these organisations into ISE-wide categories of 
intermediation bearing in mind the notions of field and position-taking. This is mainly 
because a single factor such as the ownership structure or the equity-base of a house does not 
determine its dispositions in investment culture. For instance, House B is one of 
approximately 25 brokerage houses owned by non-financial conglomerates, and one of only 
three or four houses which work as a one-stop shop brokerage house that is able to serve 
FIIs. House A, on the other hand, can be seen as one of 20 or so national bank-owned, 
extensive branch network houses with a good degree of institutionalisation and risk-
management. However it is hard to put House D in this group because none of these 20 
bank-owned brokerage houses have any IRS departments. In this respect House D can be 
seen among the six national-bank owned one-stop shop houses in the ISE. Despite the 
different ownership structures and levels of division of labour, House A and House D’s 
domestic sales scenes resemble that of House C- a boutique owned, small brokerage house, 
but with a greater volume of business with each investor type.  
 
If House C is to be categorized as an independently owned boutique brokerage house, there 
are around 25 such houses. However none of these houses have any IRS departments, but 
like House C they rely on day-traders, “gomlekci” day-traders, and if possible domestic 
speculators as well as a limited number of DRIs who like to play “jump on the rally wait for 
the rebound game”.51 In this respect, House C is an exception to this category due to its IRS 
department. But at a general level, House C is similar to all other groups of houses in the ISE 

51 Domestic speculators use brokerage houses like House C as trading legs. They do so by working 
with some bank-owned and conglomerate-owned houses which can offer them loan facilities with 
preferential interest rates.  
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thanks to the general dispositions of its different DRI types. House B on the other hand can 
be seen an exception in the non-financial conglomerate group. This stems from the fact that 
House B is probably the most conservative in the ISE intermediation field in terms of its 
decision not to work with domestic speculators and due to its culture of teaching and 
restraining clients with stories that are not only based on chart analysis and what happens in 
the boards and abroad! Only houses with a strong research department capable of serving 
FIIs and/or producing company reports that use universal valuation models have the cultural 
capital-basis for such a service for DRIs.  There are around 20 houses which have IRS 
departments that serve FIIs (excluding the 10 or so FII-only brokerage houses) and 10 or so 
DRI-only houses within the bank-owned or conglomerate-owned category that have proper 
research departments.   Also House B is probably the largest house in terms of staff numbers 
despite having four branches outside Istanbul and a small DRI base. Within this 
conglomerate-owned house group, like the bank-owned brokerage house group, there are 
some brokerage houses which are well-known as the most important legs for domestic 
speculators (both for trading and loan facilities) or worse as hotbeds of “problematic 
people”.   
 
At the top of these pockets at least in terms of symbolic capital rest the 10 or so global and 
European investment banks and their local branches in Istanbul which claim to serve FIIs 
only. Although these classifications are not 100 % accurate, especially for those houses that I 
did not observe or visited for interviews, they reflect the knowledge I accumulated by my 
field observations, interviews and informal discussions, as well as from publicly available 
information. In the following chapters, I provide descriptive story tables and story examples 
from the four houses and the AMC to exemplify how momentary sense-making stories 
actually work via emplotment of events and actions observed on the scopic market screens. 
Because momentary sense-making stories are terse and usually invoke cognitive schemata 
and vernacular knowledge that are shaped by past market experiences, I attempt to link my 
semiotic discussion of stories to the types of capital each house and individual story-teller 





CHAPTER 6 HOUSE A 
 
In fourteen full days of in situ observation in February and March 2008, I collected 386 
stories from House A. The first nine days of the observation happened in the so-called VIP 
dealing room in which six resident investment advisors plus a strategist, the head of research, 
a treasurer (trading bonds for the fixed-income and liquid funds of the house), and a research 
assistant constantly observed markets, gave advice to clients, and executed their orders. The 
trading room was open plan and everybody could see and hear each other. The managers and 
corporate finance analysts’ rooms were partitioned from the trading floor by glass panels but 
doors were open for verbal exchange with the exception of the general manager’s door. The 
operations section was on the other wing of the House connected to the dealing floor by a 
long corridor. Each dealer served around five to ten clients whom the head of domestic sales 
Mr B called high net worth individuals.  Some of these investors were actually “moustached 
foreigners” who used House A as a trading leg. What made clients VIP and high net worth 
was not just the capital each client allocated to equity or futures trading but also the trading 
volumes they clocked over a month. Thus, a client with as little capital as 30,000 TL could 
churn out tens of millions of TLs in aggregate trading volume, especially in the VOB’s ISE 
30 futures contract. 
 
VIP clients could therefore be seen as domestic speculators or dedicated day-traders who 
committed significant amount of one or more of the following resources to trading in the ISE 
spot and the VOB: time, capital, and energy. In this respect, they were relatively informed 
about the vernacular “science” of being a retail day trader. Most of them had a 
data/information screen in their homes or offices. They used most of the epistemic tools 
investment advisors used available on their market screens such as chart analysis, settlement 
records, reading basic fundamental data about companies, news wires, and so on. Their 
relationship with the dealer therefore was dependent on the breadth and depth of their 
vernacular skills and knowledge about trading in the ISE, and time and energy committed to 
trading. For instance, some of the clients ran other businesses, so they attended to markets 
intermittently whereas others observed and traded in the ISE markets all day as a full time 
job. Moreover, it should be noted that most of the VIP clients had accounts in other houses, 
which gave them access to extra loan facilities, research output, execution services, and 
market colour about who is doing what. These people some of whom acted as domestic 
speculators were therefore highly mobile and looked for the best infrastructure (fast 
connection to the market via computers and/or investment advisors) and lowest commission 
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fees from houses such as House A. As the manager of the team, B put it:  
These people don’t believe that there can be any better service somewhere else so for 
them it is about commission rates and getting as much as from the house in question. 
People like us [referring to his friend,  House C’s head of domestic sales] have tails, 
we know maybe 100 people like this, high net worth acquaintances, you can maybe 
work with 10 or 20 of them, depending on the size of your house and its capacity 
(Informal discussion, 3 September 2008).  
 
In this setting the VIP investment advisors were a major influence on less experienced and/or 
very busy and less-dedicated clients in terms of making sense of the past, present and future 
of the market and spotting trading opportunities. On the other hand, if clients were 
experienced and devoted most of their time to trading, or got similar services from several 
houses, their reliance on VIP investment advisors was patchy for specific skills such as fast 
order execution, reading charts, and creating higher datum by observing the news flow from 
markets and other relevant realms. Consequently, only 35 % of the momentary stories I 
collected was conveyed to the clients (103 out of 293). The remaining stories were co-
constructed among the VIP room residents to make sense of the current state of the market as 
reflected from the scopic screens. The table below presents the breakdown of stories in terms 
of logics imposed, types of data observed, audience, and temporality.  
 
 





















































































































































D-1 17 3 10 1 1 32 28 8-1 3 7 7 8 4 2 4 
D-2 201 1 22 2 - 45 36 17-0 1 5 9 7 15 1 8 
D-3 11 1 16 1 - 29 26 7-0 3 2 5 5 6 2 9 
D-4 18 5234 24 3 - 50 50 13-0 10 7 10 12 12 2 7 
D-5 115 2 12 2 - 27 25 7-1 3 1 6 8 6 1 5 
D-6 116 17 12 - - 24 19 11-1 5 1 8 6 5 1 3 
D-7 17 3 19 2 - 41 37 19-0 6 6 11 11 7 2 4 
D-8* 5 2 7 - - 14 10 4-3 1 2 4  3 1 4 
D-9* 3 3 9 - - 15 15 2-0 5 2 2 7 2 - 2 
D-12* 7 1 8 - - 16 16 0-0 2 1 3 9 2 - 1 
Total 120 22 139 11 1 293 266 81-6 39 34 65 73 62 12 47 
*On Day 8 I started the observations at 15:00 pm due to having to attend to a private matter until 14:30 pm. on Day 9 spent the 
second session in the office of a portfolio manager-cum-day trader and then in the room of day traders where I was to spent the 





What is wrong with the markets? 
 
The superscripts refer to contra-logics in action. In the following I present these narratives in 
full to demonstrate the paradigmatic or vernacular knowledge that inform narrators’ sense-
making activities. As argued before sense-making is about making connections between 
events and actions with a view to predicting their future trajectory. In this activity, frames or 
schemata informed by paradigmatic and vernacular knowledge generated by market 
experience may provide guidance in emplotting events and actions. When these schemata 
seem to fail, narrators resort to contra-logics and this may explain what is wrong with the 
market by intimating what it should be given the available data/information and knowledge 
they posses.  
1-Day 2-contra-cause-effect: Right after the higher than expected US consumer price 
index data for January 2008, the VOB index momentarily reacted in an opposite way 
as if there would be FED rate cuts. The latter quasi-categorical comment was made 
in the room right before the release. I asked the investment advisor, S why other 
investment advisors started laughing right after the data: ‘they laughed because there 
were buys at the beginning of the [data] release. That was weird; the opposite move 
should have been the case...’ 
2-Day 4- contra-correlation:  the strategist G: ‘we see new records broken abroad, 
and not even a leaf moves here!’ The investment advisor, Gv: ‘yeah, indeed.’ G: ‘I 
wish I’d been born in Brazil [referring to concerted upward move there].’  
3-Day 4-contra-correlation: I observe the investment advisor Gl at his desk, he talks 
to the screen as he frequently does: ‘we logged this 475 order [the six digit contract 
value in the VOB, investment advisors usually do not use the first two digits], it does 
not happen. Interesting, abroad is bad. They [anonymous investors in the VOB] wait 
for the ISE’s afternoon session [the VOB used to open at 13:10 pm after an hour 
break, the ISE second session opens at 14:00 pm].’ 
4-Day 4-contra-correlation: I am still observing Gl. He tries to make sense of what 
EFG; known for its large block moves in the VOB has been doing in the market: ‘the 
DOW and the DAX not moving significantly [futures indexes] but EFG continues to 
sell in the market’ [then Gl checks the average cost of  EFG’s aggregate buys and 
sells in the VOB to have a better guess what they were up to- it does not occur to Gl 
that these seemingly contra-activities that he believes had been going on since last 
Friday might be because of random end-client orders].  
5-Day 5 Contra cause-effect: we are expecting the 15:30 pm US January new home 
sales data. The expectation from Reuters and Bloomberg is -4 %. All the investment 
advisors get ready for the data release; some investment advisors prepare orders to be 
sent to the VOB once they hear whether the data is good or bad. Then the research 
assistant F shouts: ‘-5.3 very bad data’, the investment advisor, U:  ‘awful data’ (I 
observe that a few orders are sent in this 30 second period, mostly sell orders and 
some correction in the order amounts, now U explains to the client what happened: 
‘when the data came, it made 200-300 point down now it gives reaction from that 
point [repeats it to another client].’ Gv: ‘they did not give in accordance with the data 
[the head of research Bk and U concur]’ U: ‘I have been trying to tell you this’. Gl: 
‘they are trying to hold the market.’ U: ‘they [VOB investors] are changing their 
contracts [before the contract expirations at the end of the month] they are taking 
positions...’ Several minutes later, U to his client: ‘here should get some sell hits but 
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the market doesn’t give, our market doesn’t give.’ I hear B shouting the following 
two times from his room: ‘they have balked at it’ [B probably did not expect a 
contra-move or resistance in the VOB after the bad data]. 
6-Day 6 Contra cause-effect: The mortgage-related and general economic woes in 
the US are on the radar of the room. The focus of the room is now on the balance 
sheet of Freddie Mac from the US, the state mortgage company. It is in the daily 
bulletin but there is no fixed time on the calendar, just a note ‘expected before the US 
open’. It is 14:30 pm and all of a sudden the research assistant F:  ‘Freddie Mac, 
balance sheet came bad. The 4th quarter loss is 3.79 per share, that’s 2.45 billion loss’ 
[all figures in USD]. Gl: ‘the expectation was 2 dollars. The previous loss was 401 
million.’ Then he explained to me the reaction of the market: ‘nothing, no event, 
nothing in the DAX, nothing in the DOW [futures], it was bad, it should have 
affected.   
7-Day 6 contra-correlation: the day is over. Gl and G do some chores before leaving 
and they ponder the future of the DOW which seems promising based on chart 
analysis and the state of the index as observed on the screen. However, G overrides 
the idea of correlation between the DOW and the ISE in the short run due to 
worsening political situation in Turkey. The latter was brought about by the 
annulment by the Council of State of the legislation which revoked the headscarf ban 
in universities: 
Gl: what do you say will happen to the bulls [referring to the recent upward trend in 
the US]?  
G: ‘if 12,800 is broken then it will go to 13,000 but here people are suing each 
other!’  
 
As demonstrated above, the investment advisors and G used narratives, chart analysis, and 
some knowledge of macroeconomics to make sense of changing figures and trajectory of 
events on and off the screen. The contra-stories revealed some schemata at work as far as my 
informants were concerned but then these schemata were weakened due to some 
complicating action. What these seven stories reveal is that for my informants what 
happened abroad in developed countries’ economies and markets had to affect the ISE and 
the VOB. This schemata did not work if there was only a local reason such as the one in 
story number 5 ‘they’-VOB investors keeping the VOB high because they rolled their 
positions to the following month (attribution of agency, unity and motive to otherwise 
anonymous investors) or ‘everybody suing each other’ (political instability in Turkey in story 
number 7). Interestingly, as in these contra-stories it was generally the US and Germany, and 
not the UK for instance, as economy and market figures which were closely observed in 
other stories I collected as causes of what was observed in the ISE. For instance I noted 
down on 28 February 2008 that no one paid attention to the 4th quarter 2007 UK GDP data 
announcement which passed through the data platforms. Another item which was frequently 
used if not more than the above “causes” in the plots was Japanese Yen and USD/Yen parity 
due to the phenomenon of carry trade, which is about borrowing in virtually zero interest rate 
currencies and investing in higher yielding currencies and countries.  
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How do stories come in to being: a story about narrative imagination and 
quasi-categorical knowledge at work 
 
During the information/data/news search to make sense of things, these schemata about 
actants abroad observed to be consequential on the plots used for sense-making. For 
instance, a day later on 29 February 2008, I sat with G at the back of the trading floor and 
observed him and the Bloomberg data platform before me.  The first session was generally 
negative for all securities and assets observed. Right before the second session around 13:45 
pm, the negative trend gained momentum, but the investment advisors and F could not find 
any unexpected data or news story to make sense of this random fall or ‘reds everywhere’ as 
represented in colour and numerical symbols. The existing news observed so far did not 
sanction any ‘reddening’. Bk scrolled the news on Reuters and found the then EU trade 
commissioner Lord Mandelson’s statement that global trade was at high risk due to a 
negative economic climate. Bk read this news in English first and then said it in Turkish and 
stressed that it passed the wire with red highlight. The senior investment advisor A did not 
buy into this story as the cause of the fall in the market.  
 
The team continued their search for news. At 13:50 pm, F found news about a UBS report on 
the Bloomberg data platform which stated that toxic securities in financial markets would 
amount to around 600 billion USD. But because the room was a bit noisy she could not make 
herself heard and asked the help of G to shout for her. No one actually gave a reaction to G’s 
update apart from A coming to G’s desk and checking the UBS news on Bloomberg for a 
minute or so. A then went back to his desk and a minute later, out of the blue he muttered the 
following to his client:  ‘if [US interest] rates go down, there might be an opposite move [in 
the parity] and closing of carry trades, we should keep an eye on this...’ But this was not 
picked up by the rest of the room to make sense of the ‘reddenings’ on the screen.  
 
Around 13:55 pm B walked into the room and seconds later he shouted from his office as to 
why the FDAX, the main futures index of Germany was down. A responded ‘no reason, 
nothing specific, it just followed the DOW’. B lamented the missed opportunity of going 
short in the VOB with FDAX falling. A minute or so after this short verbal exchange, the 
strategist shouted, ‘I’ve found the reason, it is the Japanese Yen’. The situation was 
confusing for me as I was listening to the CNBC-e broadcast which tried to explain why the 
US dollar was up against emerging market currencies. I told this to the strategist who was 
still trying to make sense of the USD/JPY parity which was down against the USD. As he 
looked up to see the TV on the wall and hear what CNBC-e had to say, he was delighted to 
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see the graphs of USD gaining value against emerging market currencies. In fact the USD 
was also down against Euro. Then the strategist received a call from a finance correspondent 
of a national newspaper Hurriyet who looked for an explanation of the reddening in the ISE. 
The correspondent wanted to attribute it to the news about the Turkish military’s incursion 
into Northern Iraq to destroy Kurdish insurgents. The strategist was very adamant about his 
newly established story said  
Okay, open your USD/Yen graph, now the USD is down against Euro and Yen, it 
was like this yesterday, today this increased. This leads to carry trade positions 
closed...yes exactly like that, this leads to money exit from emerging markets. So the 
incursion has nothing to do with this. Whether the army exits Iraq or not, it does not 
matter...I am really sorry about this but the fall has nothing to do with the news about 
incursion.  
 
The strategist then plotted the USD/Yen parity and FDAX performances on a graph to show 
it to F to visually confirm what he imposed on these actants on the screen.  For the remainder 
of the day, the strategist updated the rest of the room on the volatility in USD/JPY via this 
graph. In fact, right after G’s “discovery”, the falling USD/JPY parity was the first news on 
the Bloomberg data platforms ‘top news’ section right after it passed through its newswire at 
13:57 pm. The significance of the news was that the parity hit its lowest level since 2005 on 
the FED chairman’s signal that they would support a weaker USD to ‘buoy the economy’.  
After the initial curiosity first verbalized by Bk,  it took G less than 10 minutes to notice the 
USD/YEN parity change and made it consequential on the falls in the markets that they 
followed. The latter was not done in the Bloomberg news narrative.   
 
In this storytelling event, it was crucial for narrators to resort to both narrative imagination 
and categorical knowledge on economy and markets to make seemingly random moves 
connected or correlated. Notice in A’s reaction to B how markets such as FDAX were 
attributed agency and motive in following other markets like FDOW (it was the futures 
market as the US spot market was not open until 15:30 pm Turkish time). Also attribution of 
motive and unity to otherwise anonymous investors gained importance when ruling out or 
attributing causal effect to an event. For instance, A assessed whether anonymous investors 
he observed on a daily basis as an actant would be affected by a statement on the world trade 
by Lord Mandelson at that point in time in the markets. He did not find this credible and 
attributed (prospective) agency and motive to some anonymous investors whom A implicitly 
assumed engaged in carry trade across markets using JPY and other currencies. In the 
absence of such an imagined community of anonymous investors acting according to certain 





How would A and G, who also had to have a similar assumption to be able to tell the above 
story to the journalist, know about this type of speculative trade? In fact, the knowledge 
about carry trade was almost public in the ISE field. Once explanations about it by more 
informed practitioners such as analysts or academics were popularized by the business 
media, then this proliferated to national newspapers with a Turkish slant on it, explaining 
why the ISE would move with the carry trade activity (Interview, former anchor in CNBC-e, 
13 February 2008). The assistant manager of the VIP team, En remembers in 2007 that the 
USD/JPY parity was something they closely followed due to carry trade. But towards the 
end of 2007, the US macroeconomic data started to reign over any other consideration as 
strong signs of recession and global financial crisis started to be observed in the markets 
(Informal discussion, 3 September 2008). The popularity of certain items on the scopic 
screen and in narrative mode of explanation was therefore connected to changing 
macroeconomic themes and some level of categorical knowledge about global economy and 
financial system to be able to make observational adjustments. However, like most 
assumptions and stories about anonymous investors, the assumptions about the carry trading 
investor community were not subjected to some sort of validity test; say by creating 
hypotheses about the relationships between parities, interest rates, and aggregate returns 
across economies and markets and then running analyses on aggregate data to test their 
validity. Assumptions as such despite having quasi-categorical imaginations behind them 
were believed to be validated on a case-by-case basis by constant observation of the scopic 
screens and using narrative imagination about what anonymous investors should be up to 
given the available data/information on carry-trade related news items or proxy figures on 
the screen.  
 
A case of data/news conservatism in observation with intensity and 
preparedness 
 
Because the USD/JPY was not something as incumbent in the agenda as the US data 
announcements in the daily bulletin, it took sometime (around 12 minutes) for the sales team 
to conclusively make sense of the fall in the markets. Once accepted as a successful story, 
there was no challenge to G’s very loud story in the room and the parity graph was closely 
and loudly followed by G.  Towards 16:45 pm, after G had a telephone conversation with a 
local TV, he noticed the change in the USD/JPY graph and asked F the following:  
-is there any good (!) news, the JPY is making further advance against the dollar 
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[they watched the graph together- I continued to sit next to G] what is happening 
now, it’s going below 104?  
The chief broker Z asks: 
-shaft, shaft, shaft, are they shafting it?  
G ‘yes’ keeping his focus on the red blinks on his screen.  
A –sellings come to the market.  
U- I was going to send the order to 64 and but I heard you and stopped.  
 
Z seemed quite busy logging the day trading client’s order as the market was in a slide. I 
observed the fall in the ISE and other markets on the screen. The ISE index was actually 
quite volatile in the last few minutes but it was hovering around –2.5 to -3 %. I then ventured 
into the newswire of Bloomberg before me to find out whether there was any news 
announcement that passed at 16:45 pm and found the US Chicago purchasing managers 
index in February. The expectation was 49.5 and the index came 44.5 in February. I then 
googled the index to find out whether it was important and read in a market portal named 
thestreet.com that it was an important index like the Philadelphia manufacturing index 
(which was followed by my informants in this and other houses). I then doubled checked it 
in the Bloomberg news portal and it was one of the top news. F came back to the Bloomberg 
terminal for the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index at 17:00 pm. I told her my finding 
and she said ‘oh, it is here too, expectation 49.5, figure 44.5’ I said jokingly ‘tell it to the 
room’ she replied ‘not now, let’s not confuse things’. She then shouted the better than 
expected Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, people seemed content with the good news. 
After that she told G about my finding and that the fall in the DOW might be due to the 
Chicago index.  I explained it to the strategist and he said ‘hmmm, now don’t tangle us into 
yet another index!’ 
 
Despite this story, it is hard to argue that there was any conservatism in the VIP room in 
emplotting events apart from the improbability of using an emplotment or attributing actants 
some meta-physical power which may lead people to think that there is a mental problem in 
the storyteller (see Salmon and Reissman 2008 for instance). Otherwise in searching for a 
reasonable explanation, the team first resorted to the schemata they had about the markets to 
fit the existing events and actions in a causal order. It was during this search they could 
become selective as A dismissed Lord Mandelson’s statement or as G dismissed the news 
about the Army incursion. If there had been a demand from the room for an explanation of 
what happened at 16:45 pm, it could have been easily found. Probably because the research 
team missed the Chicago index as an item in the calendar and they were of the view that the 
Michigan index at 17:00 pm was the most important data of the day, they did not want to 
admit the missed data/news announcement to the VIP room. Interestingly, there were no 
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reactions from the dealing room at 16:45 pm about the Chicago index despite the high 
probability that it passed through their local Matriks or Euroline newswires with a certain 
delay of several seconds.  
 
Bearing the above story in mind, it can therefore be argued that the observation of the screen 
and making sense of it was actually routinised by the data calendar and daily bulletin of the 
research team by means of creating anticipation and expectation on the part of investment 
advisors and clients alike. That is why almost everyday I heard investment advisors asking 
the strategist and the research team, “what are the data today?” to be reminded of those times 
of the day where trading action would increase. From the haystack of data in the information 
age, the research team and the strategist actually decided which were the most important data 
to be followed on that day thanks to their specialisation in observation of not just “boards” in 
the stock market, but also economies, politics, and so on. The team’s cultural capital as far as 
markets and economy were concerned was more formalist and superior than the investment 
advisor team (G and Bk had MA and BA degrees in economics respectively and worked as 
analysts in companies and domestic-only brokerage houses before coming to House A,  F 
was studying for an MA degree in economics too. The investment advisors held BA degrees 
in various subjects) Moreover, the research team had more time in their hands to observe, 
read and make sense of macro and micro economic data/information as a consequence of 
division of labour in the room. 
 
The observation and sense-making activity was also routinised and shaped by the existing 
schemata that had come to take hold among these actors. Stories which had an element of 
joke in them explained the workings of the schemata as well. For instance on the very first 
day I started my observation in the afternoon session (19 February 2008), the following joke 
made it clear to me where the ISE stand in the schema of global financial markets as far as 
my informants were concerned: 
B: Everything goes up all together in the world 
S: There is a lot of free money in the world Mr B [referring to low interest rates and 
liquidity excess-then tells his client on the line] if we break this level... [G jumps into 
the conversation with exuberance] – If we break 46,000, outside [global markets] 
will be observing us not vice versa [laughs]! 
 
I was to hear similar jokes in the other field sites not to mention the invoking of the master 
“one-way correlation” between developed countries’ economies and markets and the Turkish 
economy and markets. However, House A’s VIP dealing room was relatively unique among 
the five field sites in its use of this perception frame as it continuously encouraged clients to 
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trade on this. This was mainly by virtue of bidirectional trading of ISE 30 futures contracts in 
the VOB as well as the way House A’s trading and research team made sense of the scopic 
screens. In the following section, I discuss the stories behind the numbers in the above-table 
to further delve into the nature of the sense-making activity in House A’s VIP dealing room.  
 
The story behind the numbers  
 
To begin with, the team generated 139 proto-stories which did not have a dominant logic of 
emplotting events. These stories basically observed simple datum available on the market 
screen and indirectly invoked cause-effect, correlation, or randomness logic. Yet, none of 
these logics featured as the driving logic in the story and achieved an explanation of the past 
and present and/or make a prediction about the future. 35 of these observation stories were 
responses to client probes and routinised market updates during trading hours by investment 
advisors. The remaining 104 stories were on the other hand the product of collective sense-
making among the team members (85) or solo reaction to events observed on the screen. 57 
of these stories highlighted a market item from abroad in their narration of the scopic market 
screens.   
 
The second most invoked logic among momentary stories was cause-effect with 120 stories. 
While these stories singled out news and/or market events as the dominant cause of another 
event (usually changes in index or share price), the investment advisors seldom found an 
event that overrode routinised cause-effect relationships such as data release in the US and 
consequent trading activity in the ISE and the VOB. In fact, among the 120 stories, 72 of 
them (60 %) fixed something that happened abroad as the reason for what (was to) happen in 
the ISE and the VOB. The rest resorted to internal market events and actions to make sense 
of items on the scopic screen. On top of these 72 stories, there were 22 correlation stories 
which explained what happened in the ISE spot and VOB indexes by referring to index 
values abroad. One of these correlation stories actually predicted the FDOW to go up 
because the FDAX was going up! (S to a client, Day 4 p-85, 25 February 2008). 54 of the 
cause-effect stories and nine of the correlation stories were told to the clients. The rest were 
generated among the research and trading team.  
 
Correlation stories were invoked when there was no single news event to explain the local 
index situations on the scopic screens. The correlation imagery was a powerful schema in 
investment advisors’ mind not just to explain but also to act on it by encouraging their clients 
to trade on it. When something disrupted the working of this scheme, investment advisors 
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could get angry.  For instance on Day 5 (27 February 2008), Gl got angry at a local broker 
(EFG) because it reversed the correlation schema and caused the VOB index to be up: 
-Emre come, come [I pull my chair to his desk as we sit back to back] look at the 
FDOW and the FDAX going down in the last 20 minutes [shows me 5 minute and 20 
minute graphics, it is interesting to see how one’s perception changes with the 
change of detail in graph lines when the time frame is changed]. Look at the EFG 
animal, it has brought the market [March ISE 30 contracts] up from 100 to 250 
[points, first two digits missing].  They did this before you know; they are trying to 
keep the market up. 
 
When the team failed to make sense of items on scopic screen, namely when they felt that 
those items and their specific values should not have been as they were on the screen, they 
resorted to the logic of randomness. This logic was seldom invoked in plotting a set of events 
and figures found on the screen. Only 11 stories invoked this logic in the dealing room and 
five of them were responses to client queries. Six of these stories tried to evoke the master 
correlation perception by mentioning market events abroad.   It has to be stated that invoking 
of randomness in these cases did not resemble the idea of randomness or random walk which 
basically sanctions doing nothing as the market is always smarter than individual storytellers. 
Randomness was generally invoked after summarizing relevant simple datum which might 
lend itself to plotting according to cause-effect, correlation, or similarity but any mental 
attempt to do so did not feel right bearing in mind the schemata informed by paradigmatic 
and/or vernacular knowledge. Therefore, randomness as a plotting logic was the last resort 
for investment advisors when they could not make sense of the current state of the market 
given the available data. For example: 
Day 6, investment advisor U to me as I observe him at his station: He complains 
about a 600 point surge in the VOB after he sold some contracts for a client ‘we 
opened the position in the morning, then I sold, then after me it went up by 600 
points, now it is back to where I sold. Why it went up and now it falls, no idea...’  
 
Similarity: the underlying logic 
 
Last but not least, similarity as a logic was invoked only once among 293 stories. What is 
meant by similarity logic is a situation in which a set of events and figures available on the 
screen lend themselves to reminiscing about a similar situation in the past that unfolded in a 
specific way. In this respect, similarity anticipated future trajectory of events and figures by 
mentioning the past event in full story mode. Despite its virtual non-existence as a type of 
logic among 293 stories, the other logics apart from randomness were to a great extent 
product of past observations and trading experiences of market professionals and investors 
alike but in non-verbalised form. In this respect, they were vernacular logics or laws created 
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and re-enacted by storytellers without revealing their respective plot mechanisms in full 
narrative explanations in each and every instance they were used. The validity of these logics 
was confirmed by market professionals and investors’ co-narratives that appraised the 
product of these logics and their utility, i.e. sense-making narratives’ effectiveness in 
explaining the past and present, and predicting the future. Materialization of expected 
economic gains as proposed in momentary stories and/or making sense of economic losses 
retrospectively by imposing one of these logics on a set of events and actions provided a 
constant evaluation of which logic worked with what set of items on the scopic screen and 
which did not. This constant evaluation was possible with the help of continuous flow of 
alpha-numerical figures (price, index value, data, etc) and narratives (news stories) on the 
scopic screen. In that respect, sense-making before the scopic screens was a constant 
feedback loop between logics and numerical value and story outcomes. The latter 
strengthened or undermined these logics’ manifestations in momentary stories. 
 
Consequently, among 293 stories collected and analysed from the House A headquarters, 
there were only 29 story instances in which there were indirect references to categorical 
knowledge about bond markets, carry trade, and macroeconomic items such as inflation and 
interest rates. There were also six stories about shares traded in the ISE which made 
references to categorical components in share valuations.  However, properties of these 
actants as self-propelled agents or actants that were acted upon were modified according to 
figures and narratives available on the screen instead of referring to their fixed properties as 
might be proposed in an economics or finance theory. As mentioned before in the previous 
chapters, this type of explanation lies at the heart of narrative imagination and sense-making. 
Explanations are achieved in temporal and causal continuum as experienced through scopic 
screens, rather than demonstrating them as manifestation of universal laws. In line with what 
was argued before, none of the stories captured in House A were subjected to validity tests 
by using statistical analysis or resorting to academic literature on co-movements or cause-
effect relationships in global economic and financial system.  
 
On a different note in terms of logics, chart analysis was used in 38 stories. Because chart 
analysis is seen as unscientific by the mainstream finance and economics (Preda, 2007b) one 
can put it into any logic except paradigmatic, though Chartism itself has many paradigmatic 
rules. Out of these 38 stories, 23 actually used chart analysis to establish a cause-effect 
relationship. 10 of them used it in observation logic.  Three of the randomness stories 




Making a distinction between public and private information/knowledge 
 
How was public and private information/knowledge used and how did the VIP team deal 
with the issue of anonymity, not only in the ISE but also in other markets and the issue of 
who intended to do what? In classifying stories into public and private 
information/knowledge, I make an important distinction here which applies to the 
subsequent classifications in stories from other field sites. My field research experience in 
the ISE has allowed me acquire vernacular knowledge about houses, investor types and so 
on. For instance, after some days of observation and discussion with my informants, I, like 
most of my informants could know what the code name of a house infamous for working 
with moustached foreigners might mean for intra-day trading, namely high trading volumes 
but no net buy or sell activity, namely churning. I could also reaffirm the validity of this 
knowledge- that this house was basically churning out- by checking the net trading volumes 
and settlement records on Matriks or Euroline. I also quickly learned about shares’ specific 
histories; whether company owners/managers were active in the boards, i.e. share trading, 
whether foreigners were actually there, what major issues and opportunities company faced, 
so on and so forth. Again some of this knowledge could be double checked by public 
information on data platforms.52 These things I quickly learned could be considered public 
knowledge/information as far as the field of ISE was concerned. I call them vernacular 
knowledge which makes it easier to make sense of figures on scopic screens. Their validity 
can be questioned or refuted by painstaking research but market actors do not have time for 
this. Nor would it be possible to get any validation from say EFG whether they work with 
domestic speculators-I tried it two times and got definite No!  
 
Storytellers in House A, like all other storytellers I observed in other houses, therefore relied 
on their market experiences and devices to acquire and use this type of knowledge. They 
could even learn it from their network connections but this did not mean that this acquisition 
was possible just because of their specific network connection, and this knowledge was not 
available outside this network. However some of the stories I collected in House A made 
direct references to network connections. They clarified the seeming puzzles behind local 
numbers and figures on the scopic screens or mentioned specific intentions of the network 
connection or the private knowledge they shared with the storyteller. This knowledge was 
strictly pertinent to the network in question.  There were however only six instances of such 
52 In-depth data service by data platforms is not free but access to this service is usually free for 
brokerage house clients 
 
 124 
private knowledge use in emplotting two or more events together to explain/predict the 
situation on the scopic screen. This finding supports the argument by Cetina and Preda 
(2007) that scopic screens undermine the importance of network-based 
information/knowledge circulation in sense-making. To give one example, on the first day of 
observation 19 February 2008 towards 15:00 pm, the head of the team came to the dealing 
room and started to chat to investment advisors. After a quick discussion of what happened 
in the (F)DAX and the VOB and the ISE spot market so far and what would happen 
tomorrow based on chart analysis, S said the following:  
S-EFG is weird though, what they have done today. 
B-I know who was doing it in EFG, he is a local. 
 
Of course one can argue that the head of the team might have got this knowledge from 
someone else who actually made up a story about it or heard the made up story from 
someone else. However what made B a well-connected person in the ISE field was that he 
managed a team which generated one of the top five highest annual trading volumes in the 
VOB and among his clients there were people who traded via global brokers’ local branches 
and House A at the same time (Informal discussion, 3 September 2008).53 B was the figure 
who cut the deals with domestic speculators about commission rates, use of loans, 
information sharing, etc. He was an important figure in this private network of speculators 
and brokerage house bosses and managers.  
 
Otherwise anonymity issue was solved by narrators with the help of attribution of agency, 
unity, motive, blame or credit to otherwise anonymous investors and brokerage houses these 
investors used. Sometimes the latter took the blame or credit as if a house tried to hold the 
market (index value) up or push it down. But in most of the cases the ubiquitous figure of 
‘they’ came into the stories with specific intentions and motives as verified retrospectively or 
predicatively by figures available on the screen which I call proxy data. In 266 stories out of 
293, proxy data was used to help connect events and actions. Direct news as passed through 
wires was used only in 81 stories. This attests to the importance of going beyond direct news 
and using vernacular knowledge or schemata or just plain narrative imagination about the 
ISE and global markets to reach a sense of control and informedness about the state of the 
markets as observed on scopic screens.54  

53 Though he did not tell me anything about a client in EFG, it was Citi Menkul.  
54 Even when narrators use vernacular knowledge pertinent to the ISE to plot events, from the 
perspective of facts behind figures, the validity of these claims can be seen as equally weak as in 
claims about anonymous investors in the DAX or DOW. In this respect, the anonymity of markets is 




But aren’t stories all about retrospective sense-making, post-hoc 
explanations? 
 
When it comes to temporal orientations of stories, retrospective sense-making narratives 
which made no point about what may happen in the future constituted 59 % of 293 
narratives. The remaining 41 % of the narratives made a prediction about the future, and 
there were 12 narratives among them which solely focussed on the future and made 
predictions based on the expected data release, chart analysis, or on-going themes about 
companies or macro economy. The significant share of future predictions within the total 
number of stories support the conceptual discussion of stories, that stories are also told with 
a view to predicting future trajectories of events and actions. All in all, it can be argued that 
storytelling to make sense of scopic screens was crucial for the VIP team to feel in control 
about inundating flows of data/information and news and to be able to give timely advice 
and warning to their clients. Although sense-making was a routinised and structured activity 
thanks to division of labour within the VIP team (as in the story about the Chicago index) as 
well as past experiences of sense-making and market trading, it relied heavily on vernacular 
knowledge and narrative imagination to be able to make sense of what was present on scopic 
screens. In the following section, I turn to the evidence from a House A branch to put things 
into a perspective of DRI pockets, habituses, and types of capital.   
 






CHAPTER 7 HOUSE A BRANCH 
 
On day 10, I ventured from the VIP dealing room on the 5th floor to the 6th floor of the 
building where House A had one of the branches of its parent bank. In this branch, there were 
at least four private dealing rooms for high net worth and/or high frequency trading clients. 
Interestingly, some of these traders were actually employed by the house.55  I spent the 
remaining five days in one of these rooms. The room I observed had one resident investment 
advisor,  F, and three clients, M, H, and A who shared a large rectangular desk and watched 
the markets through three PCs and four screens and a 14 inch TV on top of a file cabinet in 
the corner. The assistant manager of branches, Bs also shared the same desk. He would join 
the distributed sense-making activities in between his administrative work though Bs had no 
formal responsibility for providing any investment advice or execution service to the clients. 
 
The clients in this room, unlike their counterparts in the VIP dealing room, were more 
interested in equity trading than futures contracts trading in the VOB. While A was an 
inexperienced high net worth investor, M and H were actually both investors and informal 
dealers. A had several million TLs in his accounts in fixed-income products. Because he had 
some bad experiences in the ISE market before, he was rather cautious in his return to the 
ISE. On the other hand the Informal dealers M and H had contacts who in their own right 
were either high net worth individuals (possessing significant economic capital) and who did 
not have too much exposure to equity trading, or experienced investors with differing 
economic capital and epistemic resources. M and H were contacts of the resident investment 
advisor through former business and social relationships.  
 
H who was in his mid 30s devoted some of his time in the room to managing investments of 
several high net worth individuals who seemed not to possess enough knowledge and 
experience in equity trading to be self-reliant.  However H was also a day trader in the ISE. 
According to F, H was one of the few significant day traders in the ISE who could generate 
significant amounts of trading volume by using four or five brokerage houses (one of them 
was actually a global broker in Istanbul!) to buy and sell shares and scalp profits or sway 
board dynamics. In fact, F assisted him in this type of trading by executing his orders coming 
via phone or verbally when H was in the room. Between them, there were occasional 
discussions about share transfers, loan trading, and so on which sounded like coded language 
55 The upstairs was like a maze with many doors. I could notice at least 4 rooms, one of which was 
where I was and the other was occupied by the investment advisor-cum-day trader. The other two was 
occupied by 3 day traders with whom I did not have the chance to meet or create any rapport.  
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to me. Moreover, when they seemed to be trading to sway the boards, they usually whispered 
to each other which made it hard for the rest of the room to hear. Because of this air of 
secrecy and seriousness, it took me two days to get to observe F by sitting next to him and 
looking at his screen when H was not there.  I was sent away to another chair next to M 
when H was there!  
 
F described what they do in the room as the following:  
I see myself as a trader, we value companies for both long and short run, we price 
them and we buy and sell them according to expectation. But we also buy and sell 
during the day. I am not afraid of this day trading. I also give VIP service here, the 
people downstairs they are afraid, afraid to [recommend] buy and sell, because they 
[clients] might complain. In fact [the strategist] don’t talk to them a lot [about shares] 
he comes here and speaks to me. Besides he does not like what they [VIP investment 
advisors] do. I am also in the wrong place but let’s hope they [the management] don’t 
hear it [similes] (Informal discussion, 5 March 2008).  
 
In fact F and H knew a lot about the domestic speculator scene as F explained to me on 7 
March 2008 the investment and speculation (short-term trading) styles of some domestic 
speculators, which houses they worked from and what type of tactics they might employ, and 
whether they had any ‘mercy’ on “kucuk yatirimci” -small investors who would like to 
benefit from moves the speculators created.  
 
M who was in his 50s  was more like a small day trader who would trade in specific shares 
tipped to him or in shares which were anticipated to ‘move’ with news announcements. 
However because M used to run a hair saloon for 30 odd years in the upmarket area where 
House A was located, he knew many high net worth individuals who happened to be his 
clients (some of whom were  celebrities and millionaire businessmen who were running 
holding companies). Several of these people had entrusted or would entrust some of their 
wealth to him for investment in the equity market.  Actually, it was the second possibility 
that kept him in the branch room more than anything else as far as F was concerned. 
However, F was somehow distanced to M (mostly executing his orders, not fully engaging 
with his probes for sense-making) probably because the prospect of more money coming into 
the room via M’s personal contacts was weakening at least in one of the high net worth 
investor leads according to F (Informal discussion, 5 March 2008).   M, thanks to his 
contacts, was also quite informed about the games played by local actors such as quoted 
company owners, domestic speculators and investors like him who tried to benefit from 
these games. He boasted of his vernacular/private knowledge: ‘this market is like my palm, I 
know everything, maybe I don’t know the exact names in every share but you understand 
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what they are doing’ (Informal discussion, 6 March 2008)  
 
In both H and M’s cases, F was in expectation of them bringing in more disposable economic 
capital of their high net worth contacts to invest in the ISE equities via the branch.  During 
my stay in the branch room F repeatedly pressed H and M for this. Because both M and H 
had considerable breadth of investor and market professional contacts trading and working in 
other houses, there were occasional phone calls between them to make sense of what was 
going on in specific shares. On the other hand, A was learning to observe and make sense of 
the market by observing and conversing with others in the room, getting occasional tutorials 
from the strategist who would come to the room for a cigarette -it was a smoking room 
unlike downstairs, and giving orders based on his newly acquired investment skills. F 
devoted most of his time to H in market observation and order execution. 
 
Below, the Table V summarizes the collected momentary stories in the VIP room according 
to the same components in Table IV.   
 
















































































































































D-10 16 - 12 - - 28 22 4-7 6 2 3 8 12 - 3 
D-11* 5 - 7 1 - 13 9 3-1 - 2 1 5 3 - 2 
D-12* 6 3 5 - - 14 10 2-4 - - 1 6 4 - 3 
D-13 11 - 8 - 1 20 15 3-2 5 2 2 6 5 - 5 
D-14* 9 - 10 - - 19 10 7-5 5 2 8 3 5 - 1 
Total 47 3 42 1 1 94 62 18-19 21 8 15 28 29 - 14 
*Day 11- I started to collect stories from 15:00 pm and there was just the resident investment advisor there. Day 12 refers to 
afternoon session only.  Day 14, observations started around 11:30, 2 hours after the market opening.  
 
The story behind the numbers: Different dispositions in the branch 
 
Because the branch room upstairs significantly differed from the VIP dealing room thanks to 
the absence of trading in the VOB,  what branch people mainly observed on the market 
screens was ‘boards’ of shares in which they had invested, or those shares they had noticed 
and would like to invest. The board or the box as described before became the focal point of 
observation and the remaining figures and narratives on the screen were connected to the 
board via momentary storytelling. Another peculiar thing about the room was that due to the 
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social networks these market actors were in, they possessed private knowledge about other 
investors’ trading activities which could be effective on share trading in liquid or illiquid 
shares.  This was sometimes the case for their own trading activity which were then observed 
and asked about by other market actors. Among the 94 narratives collected in the room, the 
occupants resorted to private knowledge in 19 narratives (20 %- this ratio was only 2 % in 
the VIP room downstairs!) 
 
Although from the above description it may seem like the occupants of the room traded 
mainly on proxy data on the ISE trading events and/or private information they gathered 
from their networks, they actually followed relevant direct news flows about companies, 
macro and micro realms in the economic and financial centres of the world as well as in 
Turkey, which could all be effective on shares’ performance. However, only in 18 narratives 
did they refer to direct news and nine of these news events were from other markets, mainly 
the US. Trading activity in this room was therefore not predominantly based on the perceived 
correlated trading momentum and/or proxy data from global and national market indexes 
unlike the VIP dealing floor downstairs.  
 
In fact, in my first two days of observation, M was quite eager to take me under his wings 
and convey his market wisdom to me. He told me how he used the scopic screen and chart 
analysis in a Socratic manner by asking me questions at a level you would expect with a 
primary school student! However more importantly he was giving justifications for the 
shares he had already put on his radar by telling me stories about the companies’ activities 
and the situation in the demand side, not just in Turkey but also in the world, for the goods 
and services these companies produced! There were a few stories in this manner about 
fertilizers, food and beverage companies, energy and construction companies with exposures 
to emerging economies. M’s view was that these companies therefore would not be hit by the 
impending recession in developed countries. In fact, some of these stories were co-
constructed with other occupants in the room with the help of the strategist, and the head of 
research’s calls from downstairs. I do not include these stories in the above table as they 
were not real-time reactions to the scopic screens. 56 
 
56 However this does not mean that M had a discipline of staying away from very volatile and 
relatively illiquid shares some of which happened to have this type of story attached to them. Nor 
were his stories based on a research report or analyst recommendation proper.  He was actually a good 
example of what I call the abandoned DRIs who have become addicted to public and private prospects 
in shares which have “stories”. He was actually stuck in one share as such and he occasionally made 
the point that the price would come back to where he entered the shares.  
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Another example about the repercussions of the lack of VOB trading in the branch room on 
its occupants’ use of scopic screens comes from the activity of observing data releases 
abroad and trading on them or that of observing the global markets minutely and trading on 
this observation. While most of the major data releases from the US and the opening of the 
DOW spot market led to constant over-excitement and sometimes muddled verbal exchanges 
in the VIP dealing room downstairs, the scene in the branch was set by F’s calm personal 
style. If he was interested in the data release, he usually called the research assistant 
downstairs to hear her shouting the figures of data release and whether it was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
(according to expectation surveys of Bloomberg and/or Reuters). He would then say ‘thank 
you’ and hang up the phone. In the mean time the VIP dealing room downstairs were still 
probably struggling to come to terms with effects of data release on the VOB and their 
clients’ immediate trading orders.  Some of these orders were worth hundreds of thousands 
of TL and  sent to the VOB’s central execution system with the click of a mouse by the 
investment advisor in accordance with the initial ‘good’ or ‘bad’ reaction. 
 
On following the markets abroad and trading on it, H made fun of this strategy as employed 
by clients and their investment advisors downstairs or elsewhere in general: ‘they are like 
parrots you know, “the DAX is up, the DAX took off”, it means nothing, we look at the 
fundamentals here’ (Informal discussion 5 March 2009). H was not alone in his negative 
perception about this correlation imagery and consequent trading activity. Even all the three 
correlation stories, which were all co-constructed by F, intimated F’s rather critical 
perception about the trading activity in the ISE according to index movements abroad. On 10 
March, 2008 around 15:30 pm, A was observing the market screen and surprised by the 
sudden sell activity in IsBank. F helped him make sense of the situation: 
A: they are selling IsBank heavily, why? 
F: It is because they are selling abroad 
Around 20 minutes later, A observes the following after talking to a domestic 
speculator apparently who gave him some bad signals about a share he was interested 
in. However he was more distracted by what he saw on his scopic screen: 
A: they are selling again everywhere, why, the DAX is good! 
F: there are sells in the US; they [investors in the ISE] get panicky very quick  
A: they are selling to likes of YapiKredi [national-bank] 
F: But IsBank is positive, 8.5 million TL money entry there [meaning top five or so 
buyers are net buyers, it is probably not churning out] 
After 15 minutes (five minutes after the US consumer goods sales data at 16:00 pm)  
A: eee what, now they are buying! 
F: I’ve told you, they do whatever happens in the US and in the DAX!  
 
In fact F mentioned the US data release another five minutes after the last conversation 
above as he was busy observing his screen with H. Then both F and A decided that the recent 
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rebound in the ISE was because of this data. However F added that that was not a significant 
rebound. As argued before, specific data releases and trading data did not dictate trading in 
the branch as people here were not doing momentum trading. Because they had more faith in 
generating profits from selection of specific shares with public and/or private “stories”, they 
focussed their concentration on the boards on the scopic screen more than anything else.  The 
general news and trading data flow from abroad provided a macro background to their sense-
making activity. In the following, I further discuss the numbers that reflected the narrative 
repercussions of this position taken in the ISE field.  
 
‘Here everything is done with information but not the information and news 
that pass through Matriks’ 57  
 
89 stories captured in the room had a distribution between cause-effect and observation 
logics with 47 and 42 stories respectively. Out of these 47 cause-effect stories, only nine 
stories had a news or market event abroad as the cause of what was (to be) experienced in 
the ISE. With one exception of an ISE index story, the remaining 38 stories were all about 
companies in the ISE which the branch people observed via their scopic screens and social 
networks. Five of these stories relied most strongly on public information to emplot events. 
20 of them relied on proxy data as a cause that was made meaningful with the use of 
vernacular knowledge and/or narrative imagination. 12 stories generated meaning via the use 
of private knowledge. Only one story relied on chart analysis as the strongest cause. 
Otherwise there were five stories which used charts as a complementary explanation in all 82 
narratives. Among the 42 observation logics or proto-stories, nine narratives focussed on 
news and/or market events abroad the most. The remaining 33 stories were about domestic 
events and six of these 33 stories put private knowledge at the forefront in their emplotment. 
20 of the 33 stories focussed on local proxy data such as share price, brokerage houses’ 
trading activities, index value, and overall trading volume in the ISE. Public news and chart 
analysis were in four and three stories respectively as the strongest items within all the proto-
stories. Among the 42 proto-stories only one of them was about non-equity related event 
(about USD/TL and the interest rate in Turkey). 
 
From the above numbers, it can be argued that the branch was heavily involved with the 
observation of boards with intensity and preparedness. In doing so, they relied mostly on 
proxy data, narrative imagination and vernacular knowledge about the ISE. However their 

57 Assistant manager of branches (11 March 2008)  
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use of private knowledge to make sense of the scopic screens was not negligible with almost 
a quarter of the stories using such social capital-based knowledge. As far as the branch 
people were concerned, what went on abroad did not matter as much as what went on locally 
in “boards” and networks. Only 18 narratives mentioned items associated with markets 
abroad in their plot. Adding the three correlation and one randomness stories that included 
items abroad, there were 22 stories (23 %) which invoked the popular one-way correlation 
logic. This was shadowed by 72 local stories of “ISE-boards” which included the 19 private 
network stories mentioned before. Regarding the narratives’ temporal orientation, 51 stories 
were retrospective sense-making attempts whereas the remaining 43 stories predicted the 
future within their plots.  
 
A limited immunity from what goes on abroad but risk of playing the waiting 
game 
 
Shares the branch people invested in or had their contacts invest in kept them fairly immune 
from the daily volatility induced by momentum trading in large-capitalisation ISE 10 and 
ISE 30 shares which seemed to be driven by global markets and news/data flows. However 
H and M seemed to belong to two different circles in the domestic speculator scene. While H 
seemed like a speculator or member of a powerful trading gang, M was more like a member 
of an outer circle who knew domestic speculators directly and/or indirectly. Therefore M’s 
access to private information was a bit less privileged than H. H was the information himself, 
he was the one who “controlled the tap” to use a metaphor my informants occasionally used 
to explain the domestic speculator scene. That is why M was stuck in a very speculative 
holding share due to entering trading at the “wrong time”. M was insisting on playing the 
waiting game. M later admitted to me that he missed opportunities flagged up by F and H 
who were sometimes creating those opportunities with their own trading. On the other hand, 
A was an investor who was willing to benefit from investment advice in the form of public 
stories and private tips and cues. Yet as discussed below, the relationship between F and A 
was not mature enough to allow doing work based on  mutual relationship and any 





The importance of relation work to sustain economic capital  
 
H and F, despite their strong social and cultural capital valuable in a particular DRI scene, 
had to work hard to continue this privileged status by doing relation work. Just because they 
could sway a share price mainly thanks to economic capital of others, they did not do this in 
a rude or opportunistic manner when their “clients” and formal clients were involved. For 
instance, H on a daily basis telephoned a high net worth investor who was to bring several 
million TL to House A. These calls were made to explain this client the situation in the ISE 
and abroad and whether there was anything to be worried about with the investments they 
already made together. In five telephone calls as such, H explained why all the bad data flow 
from abroad would not affect the client’s very sizable position in a middle-capitalisation real 
estate investment trust company too much. It was because foreigners were still in the share 
and/or in the market and that there was nothing to worry unless foreigners started selling, 
and so on. This was despite the fact that H, F, M and other DRI visitors to the room without 
exception dismissed global brokers and their local branches and their analyst reports as 
manipulative and not to be trusted. This belief was confirmed at least three times by the 
observed contra-trading moves after a specific report’s target price and recommendation was 
made public on CNBC-e or data platforms. Despite this, the share custody figures of the FIIs 
under Citibank, Deutsche Bank, and Garanti Bank on the scopic screens (all serving the FIIs 
as custodians) were a safety gauge for the branch people and their exposures in the ISE.  
 
For other clients with smaller assets, F and H would be quite gentle and couch the 
opportunities into a fundamental and/or chart story rather than giving them the ‘insider view’ 
as explained by Smith (1998).58 This gentle attitude was very much the case in their 
approach to A too. In none of the share recommendations given to A by F and H were there 
any direct reference to or persuasion based on any insider view or names of speculators or 
any reference to what F and H were actually doing in those shares. Doing otherwise would 
probably risk giving an impression that everything was guided and under control in a rather 
risky manner because of being dependent on certain individuals’ whims. As mentioned 
before, to be able to get a view or give advice as such, there was not enough of a mutual 
relationship between F and A yet. A had been there for only two weeks.  
 
The same necessity of relationship work to preserve capitals applied to M too. His 
conversation with his contacts sharing similar positions in the DRI scene was witty, full of 
58 With one or two exceptions to this rule when they had expectation from clients such as fund transfer 
or reciprocity and told them to send the money first to get the share tip! 
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local speculator and games jargon but reciprocal by exchange of tips and information about 
what they were up to. On the other hand, he had three conversations with a high net worth 
investor during which this chatty and witty person changed into a quite polite and well-
spoken one mentioning opportunities based on news stories or good board dynamics. During 
these conversations we all had to shush in the room and F would whisper his share 
recommendations to M so that he could convey them to that person.  
 
The notion of reciprocity and intelligence sharing was not just confined to H, M, and F. Bs, 
the assistant manager of branches also received and made telephone calls for intelligence 
sharing for administrative stuff such as employee backgrounds, commission rates, and so on. 
As told by Bs to us (11 March 2008) some calls to him on the other hand were apparently not 
that benign or reciprocal as Bs would be pressed to share information about who was doing 
what as observed on the scopic screens in specific shares. These calls were usually made by 
those figures who wanted to control boards and prices and wanted to know what sort of 
intention was behind what they saw on scopic screens.  This brings me to the last point I 
would like to make about the branch, namely the boundaries and rules and regularities of the 
game played by the DRIs in the ISE and how they manifested themselves in the branch.  
 
Boundaries of the field, rules and regularities in the game: a summary for 
House A Branch 
 
To begin with, if the game was defined as taking positions in a share to benefit from an 
anticipated price hike based on news and/or chart analysis, then the game was the whole ISE 
ranging from the large-capitalisation, very liquid banks to the most illiquid and often 
manipulated boards. However rules and regularities for the latter were probably fought over 
by very few people compared to an ISE 30 share whose trading dynamics were set by tens of 
thousands of institutional and retail investors. In this respect, the discussions in the branch 
among the people and their visitors used telling terms such as “losing the goods [shares]” 
“snatching the goods [shares]” for not just relatively illiquid and smaller cap shares but also 
very liquid shares. 
 
These expressions probably reflected the short-termist disposition of DRIs and market 
professionals who served them. When there was a significant profit opportunity most DRIs 
could not help but sell. This was usually followed by these expressions of snatching or losing 
in the face of further price hikes. In fact, several stories of great (missed) opportunities of 
making one unit of investment 100 units over a longer period of time were told to me by Br, 
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F and several visitors in the room. These opportunities came up because of fundamental 
and/or insider (view) stories. Some former market professionals in these stories persevered 
and at the end reached the Promised Land to enjoy being on the “other side of the phone” 
(being clients rather than investment advisors and eking out a living on small salaries). Some 
others, on the other hand, could not resist the already made profits and sold or dismayed at 
the short-term losses again and sold, but at a loss, and later regretted not seeing the fruits of 
perseverance (not having to come to work everyday as a dealer was one of them!).   
 
If the share in question was a large-capitalisation  share where trading seemed to be done in 
large blocks and swayed by a dozen or so large brokerage houses, then this nostalgia of 
immunity, perseverance, and great returns (or losses) seemed to be substituted by a sense of 
regularity and implicit mechanism. For instance unless there was any specific news flow, 
large-capitalisation financials were seen as the ISE 100 index itself and they would move in 
accordance with the global and/or local financial sentiment. Yet there might be a trick played 
here by the figure of “they” as a fall or a hike in a large-capitalisation share price or the 
index itself was never totally made sense of without checking the notion of money entry and 
exit. If a fall or hike was made without a significant net sell or buy activity by top five or 10 
most actively trading houses, then people would start suspecting the intentions behind these 
index and/or share moves. The figure of “they” might be up to something that might be 
harder to make sense. This figure of “they” at least according to the stories in the branch had 
nothing to do with domestic speculators or specific names. It might refer to a plethora of 
domestic and foreign retail and institutional characters. In that respect, there was a sense of 
loss in direct explanatory power, which was compensated for by narrative imagination and 
vernacular knowledge about macro and micro news flows and index dynamics. 
 
When the investor base in a share started to shrink and some figures seemed to gain 
disproportionate weight on the price irrespective of the size of company and sometimes the 
liquidity of its board, then the mode of entry to a share seemed to change. Entry and exit 
modalities under such circumstances were dictated by few people and the people in the 
branch seemed to confirm these by looking at proxy figures or using their private knowledge 
networks. Good connections in the latter could actually allow them to enter a share with 
confidence as they might get the signal or even the guarantee from the more powerful 
investors/groups that there will not be any contra-move to snatch their goods. Otherwise the 
branch people became extra cautious in trading moves they made. For instance, M during my 
observations bought and sold very small quantities of shares in some small and middle-
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capitalisation shares which were thinly traded. Some of his orders were in weird quantities 
such as 31 (which is an euphemism in Turkish for male masturbation) or in quantities  that 
would make price steps on the board rhyme with each other such 1111 and 2111 (field notes, 
page 189 5 March 2008). However M explained me later on that despite playing these games 
with very small quantities, one had to be cautious not to show any intention of taking 
significant positions in such shares. Otherwise one would risk their goods or money snatched 
(field notes, page 249-0 10 March 2008).59  
 
All in all, it can be argued that as far as the branch people were concerned the ISE as a 
market was not an aggregate of anonymous individuals and institutions. It was relatively 
easy for these people to make sense of the market as represented in alpha-numerical figures 
and codes on the scopic screen. There was only one story captured in the room that had 
randomness as its dominant plot. This was between H and a friend of M who visited the 
room and not surprisingly the story was about how hard it was to predict what was to happen 
in the global markets in the face of mixed news flows about the state of the US economy.  
When it came to foreigners, the branch people were interested in what foreigners intended to 
do as grasped through custody figures, not through what they formally said via their analyst 
reports. The branch people saw value in foreigner activity only if it made sense in the 
custody figures.  They did not even trust live trading figures of global brokers unless there 
was a meaningful net buying or selling by these houses. Only then, would that activity be 
believed to belong to foreigners.  
 
Recapping House A  
 
To conclude, House A provides a good cross section of the DRI scene as discussed in 
Chapter 4. The VIP dealing floor activity was based on informed and relatively committed 
high net worth and/or high cultural capital (of speculation and momentum trading) investor. 
Although social networks of these figures were effective in securing trading, loan and 
custody privileges from brokerage houses and getting market colour (read private 
information), this did not manifest itself significantly during in situ sense-making in the 
room. Sense-making narratives captured there actually pointed to a strong, mechanized and 
rather formal sense-making protocol as far as the investment advisors and the research team 
59 These weird number games were apparently played by many DRIs as I gathered in several internet 
forums. It should be remembered here that DRIs like M are never a formidable opponent for those 
speculators/manipulators who control boards. It is only between “equals” that  board wars may start 
(as told to me by the Investor Ali informant-19 June 2009 and a former speculator/confidant of a big 
speculator who now worked as a dealer in House C) 
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were concerned in their service to the VIP clients. Lengthy stories for investment advice 
were not as much in demand as good execution and easily absorbable terse narratives. The 
fact that most of these clients used House A as a leg for their equity and futures contract 
trading meant that they were relatively self-sufficient in their sense-making activities. In fact, 
three years after the VOB’s opening, House A was already very selective in picking its 
prospective VIP floor and branch clients by checking whether ‘they know VOB’ (Interview, 
head of branches, 14 March 2008). Considering that House A was a formidable player in the 
VOB despite its size and investor base, one could talk of a fast-formed ‘habitus’ of VOB 
investor who could start trading and generate fees for the house straight away. In this respect, 
the dealing team also seemed to have similar embodied cultural capitals when it came to 
serving their clients in the VOB. None of the investment advisors seemed indispensable as 
their order executions as well as their sense-making stories were routinised and repetitive.  
 
On the equity investment front, the VIP dealing room did not feature as an important hub in 
the ISE equity field. Despite their small size, the research team including the strategist and 
two analysts- strong corporate finance team were capable of generating and using objects for 
model-based valuations which reflected their institutionalized cultural capital. This meant 
that the research team could go beyond reading company fundamentals and some ratios 
generated on scopic screens which actually passed as research activity in a large number of 
DRI-only houses. The team could generate valuation reports for companies using models, 
make annual forecasts on macroeconomic indicators and share these with the parent-bank 
clients, and with DRIs if requested. For the latter group, a weekly model portfolio with stop 
loss points was constantly updated in line with news flows, the team’s fundamental view on 
these shares and chart analysis.60 However, the objects generated out of these activities 
hardly became the most important item in in situ sense-making stories. There were 24 cause-
effects and 42 proto-stories about shares traded in the ISE out of the 259 cause-effect and 
observation logic stories (25.4 %) and in 26 of them (40 %), members of the research team 
were the plot providers in the narrative.  It was highly probable that some high net worth 
investors used internet trading services or brokers of House A on the ISE floor to trade in the 
ISE equity market rather than wasting their time talking to already busy investment advisors 
in the VIP room. Otherwise, as mentioned before in the Chapters 4 and 5, and manifest in 

60 In fact the head of research was so confident in his cultural capital of fundamental and chartist 
investment strategy he put weekly and annual returns of his model portfolio in the weekly portfolio 
reports. He also criticized those DRIs and their dealers in branches who ‘seem to know the best better 
than anyone else’ and never paid attention or appreciated the head of research’s calls (Informal 
discussion, 3 September 2008). 
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these numbers, if an input was necessary from the research team, these mysterious investors 
would call for the expert knowledge and objects (research reports).  
 
The branch people including the visitors and those in other House A branches as my 
informants described them consisted of the following types: day-trading high net worth 
and/or high frequency individuals (or their informal dealers); less-informed and 
inexperienced lower frequency trading investors like A; and those abandoned investors such 
as M and his contacts in other House A branches or brokerage houses. Both the first and the 
third category of investor referred to a more informed habitus and a richer social capital in 
relation to equity trading in the ISE despite differences in levels of economic capital that 
could be utilized to seize opportunities in the market. However the third group due to their 
disposition for high risk but high return investments in problematic shares and their lack of 
economic power in terms of influencing market dynamics usually ended up with great 
disaster or profit stories.  
 
The investor category in between these two groups actually had a good potential to convert 
their economic capital into social and cultural capital within the field, which should ideally 
turn into more economic capital. However, as argued before, this necessitated considerable 
amount of relationship work and building of trust and mutually beneficial relationship 
between investor and (informal) market professional. In smaller brokerage houses like House 
A, there was more chance for this type of relationship growing due to smaller investor base. 
Whereas in larger houses like House D and its competitors such a possibility was rather faint 
due to large number of second category investors. Yet because of the general issue of trust in 
the utility of the stock market and brokerage houses on the part of the Turkish retail savers, 
and very powerful synergies created by their large banking operations in the country, it is the 
bank-owned large brokerage houses which attract the largest number of such investors who 
usually end up getting a relatively expensive and rather unbespoke service.  
 
Despite these nuances within client-investment advisor relationships, an important historical 
point should be made here. During my observations, I gathered that a considerable number 
of investors in House A were playing the waiting game. This was because after a record 
breaking year in index values in 2007, the ISE indexes plunged significantly due to very 
negative macro and micro news/data flows from the core centres of the global financial and 
economic system. Between January and 19 February 2008, the index lost 9,400 points from 
54,444. When I said goodbye to House A on 14 March, the index had lost another 2,600 
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points.61  It was thus natural to overhear several stories about losses in the equity and the 
futures market which significantly trimmed the size funds of a few investors. Apparently 
even some VIP dealing room clients lost big amounts in VOB trading. However, because 
most DRIs unlike dedicated day-traders and “gomlekcis” were not used to the idea of short-
selling and/or stop-loss, they were forced to play the wait and hope game in this negative 
market environment. In that sense, “the Market” started to become the consequential master 
narrative over all smaller narratives about opportunities and events as observed on the scopic 
screen in the first few months of 2008. In the next chapter, I present evidence from House B 
and the AMC between April and May 2008 when things were to become worse and more 








CHAPTER 8 HOUSE B 
 
I started my observation in House B’s Istanbul headquarters branch on 7 April 2008. I was 
given a desk and double scopic screen desktop computer next to Bn, a senior female 
investment advisor (investment advisor). The dealing floor was almost as big as the whole 
House A. The female manager of the floor, Z called the room a golf course due to its size 
which spanned almost two thirds of the skyscraper’s floor (Informal discussion, 2 April 
2008). In the floor, there were 10 investment advisors, 5 male, 5 female, each serving around 
50 to 80 clients. This amounted to approximately 600 clients served by the team. Clients 
gained the privilege to be served by this team when they committed more than 75,000 TL to 
invest in the Turkish financial markets via House B. Clients who committed less than this 
amount were assigned to the call centre of the House which provided relatively limited 
investment advice service given by telephone dealers. This service consisted of repeating 
research department’s model share portfolio and giving chart-based advice. Client numbers 
in the floor were generally evenly distributed among each investment advisor, with one 
exception, Br who had a handful of high frequency trading clients, which necessitated 
undivided attention by Br. Geographically, the team looked after clients in Istanbul, the 
leading city in terms of both DRI numbers (a third) and size of equity funds held by DRIs 
(two thirds) in the ISE (ACMIT, 2010). The manager had a small team of marketing staff-all 
female who frequently went to 'the field' and tried to attract new clients to the house.  
 













































































































































D-1 4 1 4 - - 9 9 1-0 2 - - 3 3 - 3 
D-2 4 612 5 - - 15 15 1-0 - 1 4 4 4 1 1 
D-3 10 534 10 1 1 27 26 3-0 5 1 2 10 7 - 7 
D-4 4 - 5 - - 9 8 2-1 -  1 5 3 - - 
D-5 8 - 5 2 - 15 11 6-1 4 1 3 6 4 - 1 
D-6 13 16 11 1 15 27 20 20-2 3 1 4 7 6 2 7 
D7* 8 378 4 - - 15 11 5-1 5 1 2 3 5 - 4 
D-8* 59 - 4 1 1 11 7 1-0 3 - 1 2 6 - 2 
Total 56 16 48 5 3 128 107 39- 5 22 5 17 40 38 3 25 
* Day 7 and 8 were half-day observations. 
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What is wrong with the markets? 
1-Day 2-contra-correlation: Br is angry at the market as Koc Holding (large-
capitalisation holding company) price goes up four ticks after he sold it. ‘What kind 
of market is this, the DAX is almost -1.5 and we are about to be positive' Hn 
responds, ‘Germany is -0.80 now -1 [%], but the VOB is up' he then notices 
Kardemir (middle-capitalisation steel producer) trading upwards and says 'aha 
Kardemir, now it is an optimistic market then'. 
2-Day 2-Contra-correlation: the above duo are puzzled by negative markets abroad 
but the ISE 100 index being 0.15 % up towards the end of the afternoon session. Br 
observes ‘what this is, we are up, and look at the other markets all red. Okay I got it, 
tomorrow is the big fall day then!’ Hn disagrees ‘I don’t think so’, Br responds ‘okay 
then it will be negative then positive!’ (There is no explanation as to why they 
predict tomorrow that way; it is not a serious sense-making attempt towards the end 
but notice how Br attributes intention to anonymous investors by implying some sort 
of plot to hold the market today and take it down tomorrow).  
3-Day 3 Contra-correlation: Ky is puzzled by negative markets abroad and the 
positive ISE without any obvious reason for this: ‘very weird, abroad is all minus and 
we are up [with a sarcastic tone says] thanks to our “strong economy!”’  
4-Day 3-Contra-correlation: Fr gives an update to a client: ‘China is down, their 
inflation came high, European markets are down, but Turkey is up!’  
5-Day 6-contra-similarity: Ky gives an update to client about the situation in the ISE 
and other markets and economies after explaining why the ISE opened negative in 
the morning-because of the negative US market close: ‘otherwise the ISE is 
exceptionally strong in the face of all these negative [US macroeconomic] data, if it 
was two months ago, it would be really bad here, but now it is more about the 
microeconomic [US] data, which matters for the market’. 62     
6-Day 6- Contra-correlation: Br gives update to a client right after the trading 
finished in the ISE: ‘yeah the market was weird, they were trying to hold it here and 
keep it up while the rest [of the markets] were down.’  
7-Day 7- Contra-correlation: Br and Hn narrate the screen respectively as they 
wonder why the ISE index is rather pedestrian in catching up with the positive 
markets abroad (the ISE 100 is only 0.20 % up as of 16:00 pm), ‘look at the FTSE, 
up by 2 %!’ ‘Wow, what kind of thing is this?’ Ky joins the conversation and says, 
‘there is something odd here [the ISE], the BOVESPA is up by 1 %...’ Br finishes the 
story by saying in a confident manner:  ‘it will happen at the end of the session!’ 
(Observing the boards and anticipating the “they” figure doing something soon). 
8-Day 7- Contra-correlation: Br is angry at the VOB. As he closed his short position 
in the VOB, the ISE 30 futures index goes further down, which if he had waited, 
would have provided him more profits in his odd VOB trading. Ky wonders why Br 
is angry despite the fact that all the markets are up:  Br: ‘God damn it, we closed the 
position at 52,800 and it is now 52,400, this Germany foiled everything!’ Ky: ‘what 
else do you want, it is up by 1 %, the FTSE is up 2 %’ Br says ‘I closed the position 
because the FTSE and others were up, I trusted them’ Ky: ‘no, but our market has 
worsened a lot.’  
9-Day 8 Contra-cause-effect (due to anticipation of intent on the part of some 
62 On the morning of 9 April 2008, the investment advisors were told by Z that this micro economy 
theme was highlighted in House B’s weekly strategy meeting of the managers of different sales and 
research departments, economists and the strategist. Then the team in their impromptu sense-making 
discussion decided it was time to give very short-term trading opportunity calls to clients and avoid 
recommending several-month positions as the future of the world economy (read US) was uncertain. 
In the next six days, there were eight references to this theme in the collected narratives.  
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investors or “they” figure): The bad macro-data from the US housing market is 
followed by positive US company profit announcements including JP Morgan, the 
markets abroad seem quite resilient in favour of the positive data. Yet, Br wonders 
why it looks like ‘they are fighting here to hold the index in Garanti and the rest’ 
referring to trading activity in the leading shares of the ISE 30. Bn likens the trading 
activity in Garanti to ‘a cat and mouse game’, Br responds ‘maybe they are trying to 
make people sell here; you never know what will happen here tomorrow!’  
 
The stories behind the numbers 
 
In a room where around 600 clients were served, 128 stories over seven full days of 
observation may seem quite limited compared with story and client numbers from House A's 
VIP dealing room (293 over eight and a half days full observation with around 50 clients and 
seven investment advisors), and the branch (94 stories over three and a half full observation 
days with three clients and an investment advisor). An explanation to this numerical outcome 
was indirectly provided by Z and several investment advisors. According to them, the time 
period when I was there in House B was exceptional and most of the clients were stuck with 
their investments due to the continuous fall in the market since the late December 2007. This 
meant that around 90 to 95 % of clients were inactive.63  
 
There was also an air of uneasiness and uncertainty in the room which was caused by mixed 
news-events about global economy and financial system that seemed in turmoil for several 
months. This exacerbated clients’ existing disposition of not using stop-loss strategy or short-
selling in the ISE or using the ISE 30 futures contracts traded in the VOB. Besides, these 
strategies were hardly recommended by the investment advisors with one or two 
exceptions.64  Another less-preferred strategy by clients was buying more shares to lower the 

63 A technological explanation albeit not as effective as the explanation above about the lesser number 
of stories comes from the position of my desk as my story capturing devices consisted of my notebook 
and my ears! The following description of the floor can reveal the technological limitation in action.  
Each investment advisor in the floor shared a 10x10 ft space with another investment advisor, with the 
exception of Fr who was in the far end of the room near the glass wall looking over the Levent 
financial district. These spaces were partitioned from each other by computer screen high partitions.   
Fr was at least 10 meters away from me. My desk was next to Br and Hn who had their section just by 
the door of the floor next to the managers glass partitioned office. I had the other seven investment 
advisors opposite me, sharing their respective sections 3 to 8 meters away. Kr who sat next to Fr’s 
section was hard to hear as he was a silent speaker (2 stories by him to me whilst at his desk) unlike Fr 
who made himself heard many times (11 stories from him, 3 of them to me whilst I was at his desk). 
On the other hand, I never witnessed Ay who sat next to Kr updating a client or constructing a sense-
making story apart from the instance when she connected to live CNBC-e broadcast. Ky (30 stories), 
Se (7 stories) who shared the section just opposite me were loud speakers so it was easy to hear them. 
However half of the stories I captured came from Bn, Hn and Br who were sitting next to me.  
64 It seemed like most of the investment advisors with three exceptions did not feel comfortable with 
trading in the VOB. Only Fr used this strategy very effectively, at least in terms of number of 
contracts. Ten of his 50 or so clients had 90 percent of House B’s total exposure in the VOB in April 
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average cost of their exposure which was recommended six times by investment advisors. 
Yet, clients seemed unwilling to dedicate more funds to the already loss-making investments. 
In sum, there was not too much sense-making and trading activity in the room compared 
with busy periods that coincided with a relatively straight upward trend such as the one in 
the latter half of 2007.65 
 
Tips and insider info? 
 
Despite this relative inactivity in the room, the stories captured in the room reflected the 
general impression I got about House B from my informants and observations. To begin 
with, there were only six instances of private knowledge use among the stories, five in cause-
effect and one in proto-story categories. This can be seen as a reflection of the house policy 
of not working with domestic speculators or problematic people. It seemed like the house’s 
definition of problematic was not just confined to figures like Investor Ali. They extended 
this to volume churning speculators who scalped profits by using multiple houses (Informal 
discussion with Z, 13 April 2008). This policy was actually reflected in House B’s relatively 
low trading volume despite its organisational strengths mentioned before. Lack of high 
trading volume however was partially compensated by one of the highest commission rates 
in the ISE intermediation field.  
 
However, Br, Kn and Se told me that they worked with domestic speculators before (Br and 
Kn in other houses and Se actually in House B back at the beginning of 2000s until her client 
bankrupted himself in trying to make ‘the board of Net Holding’-field notes, page 22, 11 
April 2008). In fact, the head of branches told me that they used to work with speculators in 
the 1990s and some of them might be still using their electronic trading platforms (Interview, 
1 September 2008). The six instances of private knowledge therefore not surprisingly came 
from two of these investment advisors. One instance came from Kn who told me that he got 
a tip from a contact about a speculator taking a position in a share. He was rather cautious 
about this despite the fact that two previous tips from the contact worked quite well.  Kn thus 
observed the chart and board dynamics to check the validity of the tip. The other five 
instances were by Br to his client. All of them referred to their trading in the middle-

contracts! (Informal discussions, 10 and 11 April 2008). Two other investment advisors, Br and Mr 
seemed to use the VOB like it was used in House A but with less momentum in trading and with many 
less contracts.   
65 This was the reason why I was encouraged by Z and Bn to go and spend time with other investment 
advisors at their desk when market seemed idle. Whilst at a desk talking to a specific investment 
advisor it was hard to capture sense-making narratives happening elsewhere in the room.  
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capitalisation real estate investment trust company. Their trading activity constituted 
approximately a quarter of the volume on the board during my observations. I inferred from 
what Br said that there was no single figure on the board that controlled the trading. In all 
these instances of private knowledge use, Br referred to news expected to come.  Yet it was 
not clear whether this expectation was already public or something that was known in private 
networks. By observing the board dynamics and actively trading houses over the days and 
incorporating his vernacular knowledge about these houses, Br reiterated that the news was 
genuine and ‘there was no scam’ (Field notes page 32, 14 April 2008).  
 
Sounds like private knowledge but everybody knows it-even I do! 
 
Apart from these instances, there were four stories which referred to large-capitalisation 
financial and media holding company shares which were believed to be controlled by their 
bosses at the time when these stories were told. However I heard this belief in all four houses 
I observed plus from my informants about domestic speculators. Considering this and the 
content of the specific stories, it was therefore hardly a case of using private knowledge that 
only belonged to specific investment advisors in the room at that particular time. Another 
story which was between Br and Hn on 9 April 2008 discussed the elusive “they” figure and 
what they would do next based on proxy data and chart analysis. Br told Hn to wait for the 
second session which signalled a move by “them”. Then Hn had a joke referring to the flow 
trader I interviewed on 24 June 2009 to explain several tick moves in a large-capitalisation 
board (four days after the Forbes Turkey interview the flow trader gave). I put these stories 
under vernacular knowledge/narrative imagination category.  
 
The omnipotent “they” figure propelled by narrative imagination 
 
The relatively negligible private knowledge use mostly by one investment advisor was 
compensated by the use of vernacular knowledge about brokerage houses and company 
bosses as above and also by referring to the “they” figure in 22 narratives (17 %) to make 
sense of proxy data in the face of direct news or lack thereof. Like instances of referral in 
House A, the “they” figure mostly referred to anonymous investors in the ISE. Only in one 
case, Ky argued that “they” (investors buying abroad) got a leak on the forthcoming data to 
explain the rebound in the markets before the data announcement (field notes, page 48 16 
April 2008)66. In the remainder of the cases, the “they” figure was attributed unity and 
66 This logic was also invoked by the House A strategist to explain the sells before the data 
announcement on 20 February 2008. Not surprisingly the data was from the US. In another instance 
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motive to (have) act(ed) in a certain way to bring forth what was (to be) observed about 
boards and the ISE index on the scopic screens. These reactions were in the face of either 
direct news flow (nine global and one local news instances) or a situation in markets abroad 
(two instances) or what investment advisors merely observe on boards in the ISE (nine 
instances). All these cases were examples of narrative imagination at work in which the 
otherwise anonymous “they” figure was attributed unity and motive to explain what needs to 
be explained on the scopic screen.  
 
Making US data and markets consequential on the ISE 
 
As mentioned before in footnote 65, House B was not very eager to market the VOB trading 
as a viable investment service to their clients. In fact the conservatism of House B was put 
into margin requirements for clients. As told to me by Z, House B would ask a larger margin 
requirement than what the VOB formally set (Informal discussion 2 April 2008). This lack of 
widespread VOB trading based on momentum in global markets and the insistence on a 
long-only strategy in the ISE equity market however did not mean that the investment 
advisors did not pay any attention to news events from abroad.  Out of 57 cause-effect 
stories, 27 stories took news events abroad as causes of what (was to) happen in the ISE. In 
48 proto-stories on the other hand seven narratives referred to proxy market data abroad and 
another eight narratives referred to news events abroad as the focal point of the given story. 
With the addition of 16 correlation, 3 randomness and one similarity stories, there were 62 
narratives in total (48.5 %) which focussed on events abroad to make-sense of the scopic 
screen.  Although US data releases were followed via a speaker phone connection to the 
chief economist upstairs, there was no immediate trade based on the instant interpretation 
provided by the chief economist. In that sense these narratives either anticipated the direction 
of data/news to sanction a holding or selling of clients’ positions in the ISE or were used to 
make sense of the present and future direction of the ISE index. In total, only 25 of these 58 
stories (13 cause-effect, five-observation, and 6 correlation logics) were told to the clients.  
 
Markets are not like they used to be in the good old days 
 
In fact, these numbers were a reflection of two things. The first was the short-term trading 
strategy based on the global economy theme as discussed in footnote 63. The uncertainty in 
the global economy and financial markets were monitored with a plethora of data releases 
Ky implied that US retail data might come better than expected due to the rebound in European 
markets before the data release (field notes, p 34 14 April 2008). 
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from the US economy and companies. Moreover, both the DOW and the DAX were 
followed closely to gauge the daily market sentiment in light of these news/data flows before 
and after their announcement. It was hoped this would help investment advisors spot solid 
short-term trading opportunities in the ISE by using charts and observing board dynamics 
(25 narratives used charts, 11 of which had the most focus on charts) and following company 
news flows if there was any (only two instances of quoted company related news featured in 
the stories, one about a dividend announcement, and the other one about a global investment 
bank rating downgrade for Turkey). However, even following the news/data announcements 
with anticipation did not provide a sense of control and confidence over the present and 
future of the markets.  Sometimes the markets did the opposite of investment advisors’ 
expectations about news flows and the predicted market moves. These contra-moves seemed 
to upset some investment advisors due to missing these intra-day or inter-day rallies 
(Informal discussion with Ay, 9 April 2008). The omnipotent “they” figure acted in ways that 
were harder to predict. The market was not like what it was back in the late 1990s and early 
2000s when a dozen or so figures such as domestic speculators, ‘big foreign funds’, ‘day 
traders from London’, and their brokers in Istanbul exhibited routine trading acts (Informal 
discussion with Sp and Ay 8 April 2008).  
 
Client typology  
 
The second was, during my stay between 9 and 17 of April 2008, it was probably maximum 
of 30 different clients who had one or more discussions with the investment advisors. Among 
this group, I observed the following distinctions in light of my informal discussions with the 
investment advisors and Z. The first group (were) called very frequently, some on a daily 
basis, some others once or twice a week and sought to take trading positions or review the 
ones taken to make the best entry or exit to shares in question. Some of these investors were 
quite informed not only about the market but also different valuation techniques such as 
reading balance sheets, doing chart analysis, and so on. Some of them were self-taught; some 
others had pursued finance related careers before.  Those who did not possess these 
techniques were happy to rely on their investment advisors’ cultural capital to sustain and/or 
increase their economic capital in the field and make informed decisions.  Yet such a trust 
level was possible only by a long-term mutual relationship work in which investment 
advisors would demonstrate a personal approach to the client and his/her specific life stories 
and investment aims. This then would be rewarded with increasing cash funds dedicated to 
the House by the client (Informal discussions with Bn and Ky, field notes page 30-1, 11 April 
2008). In fact, House A management was aware of this and made it a performance criterion 
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for investment advisors the number of client visits and more importantly how much rapport 
was created (Informal discussion with Bn, 7 April 2008).  
 
The other group on the other hand seemed to be lacking quite significantly in cultural capital 
relevant to the ISE, and did not pay too much respect to their social capital (namely their 
investment advisors). Investment advisors Bn, Se, Ky, Ay, and Hn all complained about this 
type of client who would say nothing in a downward trend because “everybody loses” but 
when an opportunity to make quick profits arose and if they thought they missed it because 
of their investment advisors, then they would have no hesitation in exposing their anger to 
their investment advisors. I actually observed six instances of such arguments between three 
investment advisors and their clients. The accusations by clients ranged from “you made me 
buy or sell at the wrong time” to “you didn’t allow me to buy it”. These accusations usually 
came from clients who did not have scopic screens before them or the necessary cultural 
capital to use them as effectively as their investment advisors. Some of them were also 
swayed by tips given by friends and by news in the media about shares.  
 
Z told me that one had to deal with this type of investor to prevent them from acting 
irrationally and dwindling their economic capital. The downside of this type of teaching 
activity was that these clients were sometimes very bad tempered and slow to understand. Z 
gave the example of a share recommendation she had given to one of these clients. It was for 
Bagfas, a fertilizer company which like its peers had soared in value since the second half of 
2007. This surge had a global fundamental story behind it about the increased demand for 
food, bio fuels, and so on. When Z gave this recommendation and sent a report in Turkish 
about Bagfas, the client did not read it and told Z that ‘the price was too high’, just because 
Bagfas had a three digit unit price!  Z argued that small investors with less economic capital 
had a higher risk appetite but a lower disposition to listen, learn, and act on the knowledge 
they were encouraged to acquire. On the other hand, some high net worth clients were not 
that much eager to double or triple their wealth by taking higher risks or big exposures in the 
equity market (Informal discussion, 10 April 2008).  
 
This last group can be seen as the third type of client who would take long-term positions in 
the market ranging from a fortnight to several months, depending on a major trend change or 
a news story and be relatively content with their fortunes in the market. Otherwise, pushing 
these clients during “normal” market periods with ‘too many updates’ could lead to a gentle 
reminder from the client that he/she was not that interested (Informal discussion with Bn, 7 
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April 2008). Although it was hard to find out the exact numbers for each type of client, it 
was generally around 5 to 20 clients out of an average 50 for each investment advisor, which 
would fall into the first and second group and keep investment advisors busy. This also 
reflected the conservatism of House B.  It did not strive to convert the third group into the 
first group to generate more income or worse push them into the abandoned DRI realm by 
offering loan trading and trade calls in problematic shares outside the research department’s 
company coverage universe.   
 
Stories and risks managed according to client types  
 
It was observed on 8 April 2008 that Bn told two quite pessimistic stories about the index 
and specific shares based on the global economy theme. In the first story, she convinced a 
third type client not to take position in a large-capitalisation share and encouraged him to 
keep a quarter of his portfolio liquid (in House B’s liquid funds managed by House B 
treasury department). In the second story, she convinced a loss-making first type client to sell 
Koc Holding as he had already made 9,500 TL in this share. The story was that the DOW 
would probably open negative and his profit would go down. This was a response to the 
client who queried about a possibility of the share price going up based on chart dynamics.  
The third story on the other hand was a regular market update to a first type client with a 
better performing portfolio, and pointed to a good index that was about to hit 42,500 points. I 
asked her why she painted two contrasting pictures about the market. She said what she does 
is ‘like psychological counselling, giving the appropriate explanation to specific people’. 
When asked what she thought about narrative imagination in the face of anonymous figures 
and proxy data, she pointed to the importance of better cause-effect stories in their sense-
making service to clients ‘well they ask you and you need to appropriate something when 
they ask why market is up. You can’t say “someone has just bought a big chunk of shares. 
That is why”, this is not possible’.67  
 
Bn added that striking the right balance between ‘the wallet’ (read commission fees and 
investment advisor bonuses) and ‘the conscience’ (caring for clients and ensuring a long-
term relationship) was the hardest part of their job (Informal discussion, 15 April 2008). That 
is probably why most investment advisors told me that their job was stressful because of not 
only the need to observe the markets constantly but also getting stressed with clients’ mood 
changes and stinging comments in the face of losses (Informal discussions with Ky, Fr, Se, 

67 This is similar to Gl’s cry for explanation mentioned before in Chapter 6 House A.  
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Hn). The taxing nature of the relationship work was summarized very nicely by the 
following quotes:  
yeah it is good money we [make clients] earn without physical effort but we take 
risks, look at my hair, it is already whitening [he was 28 years old] and the customer 
takes risk, he has a million lira exposure, yes when you land a good trade, good but 
when you lose 10 %, it is a big loss, so one need to be aware of risks (Informal 
discussion with Ky on 9 April 2008 after I observed him talking to his client about 
the profit they made by short-term trading in Halkbank-a large-capitalisation national 
bank). 
 
We are like a lightening rod you know, you are hit by angry customers and then you 
kind of become morose at home, when the markets are good, we are happy and 
become very nice husband [laughs] and behave very well, when it is bad then you are 
down. You have to deal with this pessimism [of clients] (Informal discussion with Fr 
10 April 2008) 
 
Managing risks: effects of investment advisors’ cultural capital 
 
Despite differences in personal stories of clients, there were some commonalities among 
them (including those who did not call) that stemmed from dispositions applicable to a large 
number of DRIs in the ISE. I think the most significant of this was perceiving equity 
investment as something akin to risk-free savings vehicle such as bank deposits or 
government bonds. Especially for relatively novice DRIs served in House B this lack of 
awareness about risks involved in equity investment was the biggest pitfall. However even 
more experienced, long-term and committed clients could fall into this trap of “continuous 
gains” especially in major trend changes. Hn who was an investment advisor since 1991 and 
in House B since 2001 told me the following on this type of risk (Informal discussion, 15 
April 2008). Two of his three most dedicated and frequently trading clients who had worked 
with him for over seven years did not listen to his advice in the late 2007 to lower their 
exposure to the equity market. Those two had increased their economic capital very 
significantly by short-term trading until the record point in December 2007. Hn 
recommended them to divert most of these profits to real estate investments but this did not 
materialize with the exception of a villa and a Porsche Cayenne bought by the first client 
who lost ¾ of his equity funds in the downward trend. 68 
 
According to Hn, the other client despite losing less money (half of his portfolio was gone 
but his portfolio was the biggest among the three) became too insensitive to risk. To 
68 In fact, Hn kept trading with this client to help generate the monthly instalments for the Porsche 
which was 5,000 TL. The sale price of this car’s basic model was around 80,000 Euro in 2008 when it 
was introduced to Turkish consumers.  
 
 151 
recuperate some of his losses, the client then started taking very short-term but large 
positions in large-capitalisation shares with the help of loans provided by House B. In one 
instance I observed an exposure of almost a million lira in AkBank (a large-capitalisation 
national bank) which made a loss apparently because of the omnipotent “they” figure who 
decided that ‘those who had to close their positions are not going to get any dough’ 
(investment advisor Hn in story number 111, 15 April 2008). On another occasion Hn told 
Bn that they took around two million TL exposure in YapiKredi (another large-capitalisation 
national bank). Both companies were in the  ISE 10 bank index, and second exposure was 
taken on 14 April 2008 and apparently it worked quite well with an approximate 5% rise in 
the share price on that day, allowing Hn and his client to ‘rub his beard’  (a slang phrase for 
profit making by this veteran investment advisor, field notes page 36).  For Hn, this 
relatively  irrational risk taking by clients was down to their mentality of  ‘what comes from 
the stock market goes to the stock market’ and loss of risk aversion when the client becomes 
indifferent to losses due to their scale.  
 
Notice in the above accounts the lack of any fundamental value remark on these banks. Hn 
did not have to know this aspect as much as a sector analyst in the IRS department upstairs. 
Hn was probably not very self-sufficient in chart analysis either. I observed him consulting 
Br regularly for Br’s view on chart dynamics. He once praised a chart analyst who was quite 
famous in DRI circles thanks to his website and regular appearances on CNBC-e ‘as the only 
guy [Hn] trust’ (field notes, page 4, 9 April 2008). However one thing Hn was very 
competent in was observing board dynamics, anticipating where the price would go and what 
“they” might intend to do. He was also quite well-versed in vernacular knowledge on the ISE 
and companies. He was also probably quite good at seeing major turnarounds in markets 
such as the one in late 2007. Hn had a degree in economics like most of his colleagues in the 
dealing floor.  Like all his colleagues, he had the CMB advanced licence which provided the 
second resource of institutionalized cultural capital. Although some part of the investment 
advice service he gave to clients was generated by team work and inter-departmental 
division of labour such as stock picks and macro economy calls, he became the embodiment 
of this distributed and collective sense-making and valuation activity in House B for his 
clients. Like his colleagues, he used these resources of cultural capital to solidify his social 
capital by doing relationship work for clients and trying to protect and enhance clients’ 
economic capital, which would eventually bring him more economic capital (commission fee 
bonuses). On top of these, maybe one point worth mentioning is Hn was a very soft-spoken 
and calm person, which might be seen as a form of embodied capital if such a demeanour 
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was in demand by clients. The importance of demeanour was actually highlighted to me by 
Ky and Bn that sometimes if ‘the stars of client and investment advisor do not align, then 
there is nothing to do but hand the client to another investment advisor.’ (Field notes page 
30-1, 11 April 2008) 
 
In fact, from what I observed in the room and gathered from my informal discussions with 
the investment advisors is that the above description of embodied capital was applicable to 
all the investment advisors in the room with varying degrees of competences in different 
items such as chart analysis, reading board dynamics, acquiring private knowledge, 
restraining and encouraging clients’ risk appetite at the right time and so on. On aggregate, in 
fact during my observations all the investment advisors were the same figure of investment 
advisor who reflected the organisational disposition of House B in serving the DRIs, namely 
pro-active in relationship work but conservative in investment outlook. None of the 
investment advisors had actually provided a service that would be novel in that uncertain 
time apart from the agreed strategy of seizing short-term opportunities, restraining long-term 
commitments and marketing liquid and fixed-income funds of the AMC. However, there 
were two exceptions. The first exception was Br the enigmatic investment advisor who I 
later learnt had worked with all sorts of clients before, including a domestic speculator with 
15 brokers on his line (Informal discussion, 22 August 2008). From the second day of my 
observations until I finished in the floor, Br and his client had generated significant amount 
of trading and taken a sizable position in the real estate investment trust company. Some of 
the other shares Br mentioned to his client(s) during my observations were definitely under 
the research department’s radar and sounded familiar to me after my stay at House A branch. 
But this was a novelty on this floor.  
 
The second novelty was provided by Fr. A veteran in the field since 1996, Fr seemed quite 
competent in chart analysis and observing scopic market screens with a macroeconomic 
perception frame in mind. As mentioned in footnote 65, he managed to convince ten clients 
to take exposures in the VOB to benefit from the downward markets which reflected the 
increasing doubts about the future of the global economy and financial markets. Fr was of 
the view that a global economic and financial meltdown was in the offing and this would 
provide a great opportunity to sell contracts in the VOB and buy them back at short intervals 
depending on the data/news flows from the US and major economic centres of the world. He 
was also worried about the exposure of Turkish banks to short-term currency debt taken as 
syndicated loans. His scenario was of a doomsday on all fronts but he was selective in his 
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observation of data/news flows. During the time I was there, his focus went beyond US 
financial companies and turned to real sector balance sheets and macro figures on 
consumption and production in the US. However, he did not use each and every 
announcement from the US to convince clients to buy or sell contracts unlike the VOB 
strategy in House A. As he told me several times by coming to my desk or inviting me to his, 
the strategy was to stay relatively liquid courtesy of the VOB bi-directional trading and make 
money when asset prices were on their way to hitting rock bottom which would leave all 
those optimistic investors in shock.  
 
Fr also made fun of the uneasiness of some other investment advisors in the floor in the face 
of volatility in markets and negative data/news flows. He argued most investment advisors 
were depressed and wanted to hang on to every bit of positive news to be able to resume 
trading with their waiting clients.  In one instance he called the volatile but ‘foamy’ ISE 
index ‘a stray ox’ only to be picked on by Ay who told him off because of this joke. Ay told 
him off right before this joke when he made fun of the popular chart analyst on CNBC-e and 
his followers. Later that day Z despite endorsing a negative global economy outlook told me 
that each and every investment advisor told me stories according to their exposures in the 
market, implying that Fr was exaggerating the situation because he had many contracts short 
in the VOB (Field notes, pages 15-20 10 April 2008).69 In hindsight, Fr was not actually 
exaggerating when he told me the ISE index was to see a point between 20,000 and 15,000 
and that was the best time to collect shares again, similar to the opportunity when the ISE 
started its great convergence march back in late 2003. Maybe 15,000 point was a bit of an 
exaggeration considering that the ISE 100 saw its lowest point at 20,912 points on 20 
October 2008 and has never gone below that point since! 
 
I think Fr was a good example of the naïve scientist who wanted to delve beyond the rather 
mechanized “good data, bad data” reactions in the era of “US data following”. He also 
managed to learn and use VOB trading almost single-handedly in House B. However this 
was in a manner which was in stark contrast with the way in which the VOB trading was 
used in House A! Other investment advisors were capable of being naïve scientists or 
learning VOB trading but some had a stronger belief in charts and board dynamics whereas 
others wanted to blend the fundamental value approach with short-term market dynamics 
based on news/data flows. Yet in all these instances, it was a unidirectional hope that drove 

69 In April 2008, House B had 860 shorts and  780  of them belonged to Fr’s clients (Informal 
discussion, 11 April 2008) 
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the sense-making activities in the dealing floor. Unfortunately, the omnipotent “they” figure 
sometimes seemed to have other ideas about the direction of the markets.  
 
Did the research department, the chief economist and his assistant economist know better 
than these investment advisors when it came to converting their cultural capital into timely 
advice and economic capital for their clients? The young chief economist Er who was 
another darling of CNBC-e courtesy of his regular appearances actually worked in one of the 
Federal Reserve Banks in the US as a researcher for several years! Or did S, the chief 
strategist of House B, who with her husband made chart analysis accessible to masses in 
Turkey back in the 1990s, know better (Interview, 12 May 2008)? Or did those fund 
managers in the AMC some of whom had MA degrees or PG certificates from American, 
British and prestigious Turkish universities know better than Z whom they made fun of just 
because she dared to make some remarks about the global markets in the weekly market 
strategy meeting?70  
 
I shall provide an answer to the last question in the next chapter where I discuss five fund 
managers’ sense-making activities. For now it should be stated that as far as Z and her team 
was concerned, those people did not know better.  In fact, according to Z, they could not 
even agree among themselves about macroeconomic and market situation in the globe during 
the strategy meetings, and blamed each other for excess pessimism or optimism (field notes, 
page 46 15 April 2008). Moreover, investment advisors recounted instances where the Er’s 
macro economy related calls made their clients lose money in the face of contra-moves by 
the market. When it was about the strategist’s daily calls and research department’s model 
portfolio, similar contra-instances were mentioned. In fact, in the past House B made it a 
performance criterion to follow calls of the strategist and the research department. However 
after some backlash from investment advisors and branch dealers this criterion was relaxed 
(Interview, head of branches 1 September 2008). As Bn put it  
as an investment advisor, I would like to use my own ideas...yes we do look at the 
[research] department’s share recommendations and use them but you can’t always 
comply with model portfolio. They sometimes put dead shares there, you can’t 
recommend such shares to your clients...when they [the management] saw this was 




70 To be fair, the fund managers were not talking nastily about her. It was just that they hated these 
strategy meetings because people would talk for ages and could not agree with each other and for 
them Z’s speaking about the global economy was another unnecessary five to 10 minutes on top of the 
duration of the meeting!  
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However, these negative incidences did not mean that the team would altogether ignore 
everything that came from upstairs. They incorporated the objects created by upstairs in their 
sense-making activities with a critical eye that took into consideration the local market 
dynamics. 71 
 
In the above quote, Bn hinted at the importance of embodied capital and skills in an 
investment advisor as something that could make a difference for individual client needs. 
She was to get a nasty surprise when she learned who was recruited to fill her place as she 
went to London to get married and start her new job in a newly found subsidiary brokerage 
house of a national bank in Istanbul: ‘You know what Emre, it turns out we did not have any 
worth here in the eyes of the house, you know who they recruited in my place, a girl who 
born in 1983! I have worked in this house for eight years and they recruit a novice in my 
place’ (Informal discussion, 17 April 2008) .72 It is true that embodied capital could make a 
difference for investment advisors and their clients but it was also true that investment 
advisors were highly fungible and relatively cheap assets as far as the DRI scene and large 
and highly institutionalized one-stop-shop houses such as House B were concerned. In the 
next chapter, I turn my attention to the buy-side managers and examine how more esteemed 
institutionalized cultural capitals (read much higher salaries) shaped sense-making and 




71 The aforementioned backlash in DRI scenes against the foreigner figure including their analyst 
reports, trading activities and so on was not observed in House B during my stay. Generally speaking, 
investment advisors acknowledged the “foreigner” presence in the ISE and perceived it as a benign 
force in the market.  
72 The second surprise she was to get was how domestic speculators churned out millions of liras 
despite negative news/data flows in intra day trading as she started serving several of them in her new 





CHAPTER 9 THE ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANY 
 
The AMC is a mid-size asset management company among the 23 such companies operating 
with a CMB licence. It had approximately 110 million USD under its management during 
the time of my observations.73 It was owned by House B. It managed six different open-end 
mutual funds issued by House B and funds of a closed-end investment company owned by 
the parent holding. Apart from those funds, the AMC managed seven pension fund products 
issued by a local branch of a GIC, and assets of 180 individual investors. I started my 
observations in the AMC on 18 April 2008 and completed them almost a month later on 16 
May 2008 with 12.5 days of full observation. There were five Turkish male managers in the 
trading room each with an average of 15 years experience in leading companies of the fund 
management industry in Turkey. Managers A, K, and S managed funds that had most weight 
in equities.74 Managers C and G looked after the funds that had the greatest weight in fixed-
income securities.75 Each manager was connected to the markets via scopic market screens. 
They also used proprietary monitoring programmes. These were basically calculation and 
monitoring models developed on Excel sheets and fed by real-time data distributed by data 
vendors.  They measured each fund’s performance on a real-time basis by breaking down the 
product into its constituent parts. This technology freed a very significant amount of time for 
the managers and allowed them, especially the equity managers, to concentrate on their 
scopic screens with intensity and preparedness. The fixed-income managers on the other 
hand seemed to have more free time in their hands which they passed by playing arcade 
games on their computer, snoozing at their desks or joking about me due to my constant note 
taking! I shall explain the reasons behind this free time later in the chapter.  
 
Formal rules of engagement with the markets: the fund charters and 
benchmark criteria  
 
Because each fund that was managed by the AMC had an investment charter overseen by the 
CMB, the managers operated within the rules and objectives stated in the fund charters. The 
most significant of these rules was the asset management sector-wide benchmark rule. This 
73 I rounded up the figures from what some fund managers told me (not all of them were eager to 
disclose the exact size of their funds under management) and from Fonbul, the data portal for Turkish 
fund industry.  
74 A and K studied Economics and Management in the US, and S has a BSc and MSc in Management 
Engineering-a quantitative focussed degree from a prestigious university Turkey.  
75 C had a degree in Statistics from another prestigious university in Turkey and then studied in 
Scotland for a PG certificate and got an MBA from a top private university in Turkey. G was a 
Management graduate of a prestigious Turkish university. All the Turkey based-degrees had been 
taught in English. 
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rule stipulated a fund product to carry a certain percentage of its total investment in a pre-
determined security class. For instance, if the fund managed was an ‘A type’ fund, the weight 
of Turkish equities in the fund’s total value could not be lower than 25 %. Another crucial 
rule was the 10 % limit on a single share’s weight in an A-type fund. This meant that equity 
managers could not increase their exposures (risks) in a single share to generate better 
performance. The general equity exposure of traditional A-type funds managed in the room 
varied from 40 % to 100 % depending on the market conditions. What I mean by traditional 
is these funds, which are quite widespread in the sector, were issued in late 1990s or early 
millennium and they usually had two constituent asset classes, equity and government papers 
or liquid money market securities such as repo. However, the weight of equities in the A type 
funds could be 100 %. There was an exception to this type of traditional fund,  the Manager 
A’s conservative “analyst fund” which had ‘a narrower manoeuvre space’, unlike the 
traditional A-type funds managed by S and K, due to the limited upward range for the equity 
exposure with a maximum 80 % cap. The fund aimed at generating larger profits when ISE 
index went down by using the VOB ISE 30 contracts (always short). When the ISE was on 
an upward trend, the aim was to increase the weight in outperforming shares in order to 
minimize the loss generated by the VOB contracts (Informal discussion with A, 21 April 
2008).  
 
Although the assets of the closed-end investment company (around 25 million TL by then) 
which was managed by K did not have to abide by any strict rules or compete with any 
publicly declared benchmark, the public statements of the AMC showed a similar mix of 
equities and government papers in the closed-end investment company’s investments, with 
the former having a larger weight. Moreover, K told me that he would never invest outside 
the ISE 100 index (Informal discussion 18 April 2008). Due to similar structures of funds 
and same share universe that they invested in, namely ISE 100, the equity managers usually 
applied the same stock picks and trading strategies to these funds, including the GIC funds 
which were a mix of traditional A-type funds and mixed-funds.  Even private portfolio 
investors who had preference for equities (60 clients) did not get a bespoke service as far as 
the equity managers were concerned. Their assets were allocated into a pool and the 
operations department allocated equities, fixed income or currency products to these 
investors according to their risk profiles and preferences (Interview, head of marketing 15 
May 2008). This notion of pooling made the managers’ job much easier as they did not have 




The fixed-income managers and their funds mainly consisted of what the CMB calls B-type 
funds, open-end fund products which do not have to carry minimum 25 % equities in their 
portfolio at all times. C managed two B-type funds. One of them was what he called a 
conventional B-type fund that consisted of short-term government debt papers (600 day 
bonds) and repo. The other fund was called B-type growth fund which C said ‘could be seen 
as a [fixed-income] hedge fund, it has everything inside, Eurobonds [Turkish bond 
denominated in foreign currency], currency, and stocks. But I can only sell currency futures 
traded in the VOB, this is the CMB rule’ (Informal discussion, 5 May 2008). C also looked 
after the AMC’s cash positions. G did not explain to me much about the fund products he 
managed but I gathered during my observations that he managed a conventional B-type fund 
which was very similar to the fund managed by C but with a difference of 49 % cap on its 
maximum equity exposure. In C’s fund, this could go up to 100 % but none of these 
managers had any meaningful equity exposures in these two funds. It was predominantly 
government debt papers in which these funds had the greatest exposure. G and C also shared 
the management of the assets of 120 private investors who had preference for fixed-income 
securities and currencies.  
 
The rather complicated charter rules for House B’s funds became more complicated for 
performance measuring criteria and using of benchmark securities. To begin with, none of 
these funds were single index or benchmark replicators. For instance one conventional A-
type fund had 70 % ISE 100 and 30 % repo benchmarks. The other conventional A-fund had 
a 50/50 benchmark of the ISE 100 index and a fixed-income benchmark respectively. The 
latter had two components in it, a global bond benchmark (7.5 %) and an over-night repo 
index that was generated by the Turkish Institutional Investors Association (42.5 %).  On the 
other hand, the A-type analyst fund did not have any benchmark criteria in its charter circular 
yet a minimum 30% equity exposure requirement meant that it had to carry equities under all 
circumstances.  
 
One of the conventional fixed-income funds had a 90 % and 10 % government paper and 
repo index benchmarks respectively whereas the other did not have a benchmark. The B-type 
growth fund had the most complicated benchmark which consisted of  the Turkish Eurobond 
index (35 %), the state domestic borrowing bill index (456 day-performance-22 %), the repo 
index (35 %), and the ISE 30 index (8 %). In fact, I did not inquire about the rationale behind 
these benchmark criteria some of which I gathered from the AMC’s public information 
platform. However, it can be said that these are rather arbitrary and set by the AMC’s board 
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and fund manager in question in line with the fund products’ aims and objectives. The latter 
was eventually decided by the AMC’s board bearing in mind the fund market conditions 
(Interview, general manager, AMC 14 May 2008). 
 
In the global insurance company funds managed by the AMC, two A-type funds had 90% 
ISE 100 and 35 % ISE 100 benchmark rules respectively. The remaining parts were allocated 
to fixed-income benchmarks composed of government bills and liquid papers. The B-type 
funds had a benchmark index that was composed of various government bill and money 
market indexes (source, fund circulars on the global insurance company website- source 
withdrawn due to anonymity).  
 
Informal rules of engagement with the market 
 
In fact, none of my informants gave any detailed information about the global insurance 
company funds and their benchmark rules. I also noted that the managers did not want to 
share too much information on particular trading moves they made and why they made it 
with a reference to the benchmark rules. Some gave me general explanations about this on 
the spot or after the trading session. However from these explanations, my in situ 
observations and the informal discussions with the managers, the following can be said about 
their practical rules of engagement with the market.  
 
The fund charters and benchmark rules meant that almost all these funds could be seen as 
long-only funds. This was so because the funds had to carry a minimum amount of a certain 
asset class in their portfolio. While a direct short position in spot securities was impossible, 
one could talk about a practical short or asset-weight decreasing to minimize the damage to 
the fund performances in downward trends. For instance an A-type fund could lower its 
equity weight from 70% down to 50% in a downward trend to outperform the benchmark 
indexes irrespective of the prospective real loss. However, these lowering of share exposure 
or ‘increasing/decreasing weight’ as the managers put it did not take place in the form of a 
daily change of say +/- 20 %. It was done incrementally and in a conservative manner to 
make sure that the fund in question would not take too much risk and trade too many times 
like a day trader. Doing so would be against the fund charters, the CMB regulations and the 
whole notion of ‘professional risk management’ motto of the AMC (Interview, general 
manager, AMC 14 May 2008). By all means these fund products were traditional and 
conservative and would mimic the direction of the ISE indexes but provide the performance 
difference with marginal out-performances of the benchmarks by several percentages 
 
 161 
(negative/positive).   
 
Consequently, for the equity fund managers, sense-making activities before the scopic 
screens were focussed on two things. First was detecting and observing the continuation of 
an index trend. This was to allow trading in shares which had a target price in the managers’ 
opinion. This target price opinion was set by the managers’ own simple fundamental value 
analysis with the help of the research department and observing market consensus. The latter 
was gathered via data platform surveys and analyst reports coming from other houses via 
private email groups. The analysis would also focus on several ratios such as Price/Earning 
ratio, Enterprise Value/Earnings-Before-Tax-and-Depreciation, Profit/Equity ratio and so on. 
These ratios were all available on the scopic screens thanks to data platforms (Informal 
discussion with K and S-18 April, with A-21 April 2008). However, instead of taking 
positions in a share and waiting for a particular target price to be reached in several months, 
the managers would sell and buy back the shares to generate short-term profits and keep their 
exposures intact with the conviction that the share and the index was on an upward trend.  
The second was spotting short-term volatility or more importantly a trend change in the 
index and then taking defensive measures or ‘position adjusting’. This position adjusting 
according to S was done to realize small profit opportunities and to keep up with the 
benchmarks’ performance (Informal discussion, 7 May 2008). Irrespective of the strategy, 
the equity managers seemed to rely on charts to be able to judge the short-term trading 
dynamics. For them charts were not about predicting the future by plotting the past on the 
future. It was more about seeing the trading volume and ‘investor intentions’ on a graph with 
the help of various statistical indicators (above discussions).  
 
It can be said that, during my observations, the equity managers were trying to make-sense 
of the volatility not only in the ISE but also in global markets and decide how to change their 
funds’ weight in ISE equities. In this respect, they were in search of an outlying share in 
terms of price performance to be able to outperform their benchmarks. However, this search 
was never motivated by those thinly or in-depth traded, well-performing but “dodgy” shares. 
Such a view of “dodgy” on a share was not because of the existence of a speculator on the 
board or shares being “owned-board” which meant that the company owners/boss held 
significant sway in share trading. The equity managers told me that they would never 
hesitate buying a share if it had good fundamentals and promising returns for the future. 
Although the equity managers knew there could be risks in entering an “owned-share”, they 
thought domestic speculators or company bosses would realize the AMC’s institutional 
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identity quickly. This would be done either on the spot by private means or publicly at T+2 
by checking on the scopic screens asset management companies’ exposure to a share. Such 
recognition meant that the real “owners” of the board would not make the managers ‘vomit’ 
the shares they bought. Yet, the managers were aware that short-term buy-sell activity like a 
day-trader might not be possible due to board dynamics and the nature of fund products they 
managed (above discussions-manager S said he would stay away from shares about which 
there were bad rumours/news).   
 
The fixed-income managers had a similar strategy of trading on an upward trend. This aimed 
at generating more income by benefiting from short-term price changes in a given asset class 
or security (Informal discussion with G 24 April 2008). Similarly on downward trends, the 
fixed-income managers would take defensive measures in benchmark securities to 
outperform the overall negative performance coming from the benchmarks. However what 
made the fixed-income managers’ sense-making activity slightly different from that of the 
equity managers was down to the following. The fixed-income funds were composed of 
maximum four or five asset classes. Generally it was bond and repo products that populated 
the funds with the exception of the B-type growth fund which had currency contracts. 
Moreover, C and G managed private portfolio clients’ assets and took exposures to the USD 
in that pool of clients’ money alongside the exposures to government bonds or repo. All these 
meant that C and G did not have to observe any equity trading on the scopic screen nor any 
equity-related news flows. For them, macro economy related news flows that might affect 
inflation, consumption, employment, currency parities and central banks’ interest rate 
policies were the most important items to be focussed on.  
 
Compared to the items on the equity managers’ scopic market screen itinerary of 30 plus 
shares, several fixed-income products and data/news flows about macro and micro 
economies of the US, Europe and Turkey, the fixed-income managers were relatively easy on 
their eyes, fingers and elbows.76 They did observe equity and futures index values, bond and 
bill markets abroad, as well as prices of commodities but these items were observed 
intermittently to gauge the reaction of investors to direct or indirect news on macro 
economies. C also observed the LIBOR and several other rates related to the mortgage 

76 K joked “our elbows rotten” a Turkish idiom used for hard work at desk (field notes, p 29 2 May 
2008). However this was not mere metaphor, the equity managers adopted a slouching posture at their 
desk with their elbows on the table to be able to operate the mouse and keyboard faster. One did not 
have to take that posture playing Tetris games online or snoozing at the table, which were two 
activities the fixed income managers were frequently occupied in! 
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market in the US, the latter was the courtesy of his Bloomberg data/information terminal. 
Otherwise while the equity managers looked as if they were watching a tennis match while 
they roamed their screens with tilts of head and rolling eyes coupled with constant sound of 
mouse clicking, the fixed-income managers passed time. C said the following about their 
“leisure” activities in the room and being observed by an outsider. This was after he swore at 
“they” who ‘reacted positively’ to better than expected US 1st quarter 2008 ex-agricultural 
efficiency data and ‘ignored’ the previous negative news about Fannie Mae, one of the two 
biggest US state-owned mortgage lenders:  
C-look at him, he is writing again, what are you writing? 
E-I wrote down your reaction to the reaction of investors to the 15:30 data.  
C-Oh well, he is writing “trader was sleeping then data came and he was woken up 
by it [Bloomberg data platform loudly verbalizes data results], swore at it and then 
went away to smoke!” (Field notes, page 50, 7 May 2008).  
 
In the following I present the stories I captured in the fund managers room over 12 ½ full 
day observations. The table is followed by contra-logic stories which are hoped to give a 
flavour of the differences between the equity and fixed-income managers’ sense-making 
activities and how they perceived “what is wrong with the markets”. After that I analyze the 
numbers by telling the story behind them to complement the contra-logic stories. In the last 
section I comment on the cultural and social capital of the managers and how those shaped 
sense-making and decision making among these professional/institutional investors who 























































































































































D-1 101 12 4 - - 15 15 4-1 7 1 2 5 3 - 3 
D-2 3 1 5 - - 9 8 1-0 2 - 1 3 2 1 2 
D-3 7 - 9 - - 16 16 4-0 5 - 2 8 4 1 1 
D-4 4 - 7 - - 11 10 3-0 4 2 2 4 3 - - 
D-5 7 - 9 - - 16 15 1-3 5 2 3 6 2 1 2 
D-6* 2 - 6 - - 8 7 2-0 2 - 1 1 4 1 1 
D-7* 44 23 5 - - 11 10 3-0 6 - 5 3 2 1 - 
D-8 35 1 13 1 - 18 17 8-0 5 3 3 8 3 - 1 
D-9 66 - 8 - 1 15 11 4-2 6 - 7 5 1 - 2 
D-10 15 8 17 7 - 19 24 23 18-0 3 1 11 6 2 - 4 
D-11* 210 - 2 - - 4 4 2-0 1 - 1 2 1 - - 
D-12* 4 211 4 - - 10 9 3-0 4 - 1 8 1 - - 
D-13 7 - 5 2 - 14 12 2-2 5 1 2 3 3 3 1 
D-14* 2 - 8 1 - 11 10 2-0 5 - 2 8 1 - - 
D-15 131213 1 12 1 - 27 27 9-0 12 2 6 7 8 - 4 
Total 89 9 104 5 2 209 194 66-8 72 12 49 77 39 8 23 
*Half day observations 
 
What is wrong with the markets?  
 
1-Day 1-Contra-cause-effect: C laments the positive stock markets in the US despite 
the hike in the interest rates: ‘their interest rates are at 3 %, the six month bills, from 
2.6, and they are still buying the stocks. I don’t get it, what bullshit, they announce 
losses, and still they get the stocks, look at the DAX, 1.3 % up, why, what is the 
reason?’ 
2-Day 1-Contra-correlation: A observes the stagnation in the ISE despite the recent 
upbeat performance of the US and European stock markets: ‘Well, what will we do 
now? The outside has been going up for a few days and here it does not move an 
inch’. 
3-Day 7-Contra-correlation: A ‘the US has opened positive but why the hell are they 
selling here!’ 
4-Day 7-Contra cause-effect: C ‘Oops, look at the DOW, still positive, I don’t get it, 
it is around 12,900 and they are still buying it. If it was around 12,300, I could 
understand’ (chart based expectation and contra-realization). 
5-Day 8-Contra-cause-effect: S observes some specific sellings in several securities 
and the overall sellings in the ISE (despite positive expectations about the US 1st 
quarter GDP announcement). He adds: ‘what kind of a herd is this, they are selling 
without a reason!’ 
6-Day 9-Contra-cause-effect: C tells G that ‘one of my contacts in Citibank sold 700 
million TL worth of two different bonds for Lehman [Brothers], though he did not 
disclose the buyers because there were many’. G does not believe it as he does not 
see any significant change on his scopic market screen. C says the trade was 
completed OTC. G then explodes ‘then why the hell they don’t buy dollars with it!’ 
7-Day 10 -Contra-correlation (cause-effect): S and K chat about the positive markets 
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abroad and then observe the negative index in the ISE. They attributed it to the IPO 
of the Turk Telekom (the assumption in the room was that investors were selling 
shares and USD – a popular hard currency among Turkish savers, to free up capital 
for the Turk Telekom IPO. The fixed-income managers C and G anticipated that 
once the IPO was completed, the USD would recover against the TL). 
8-Day 10 -Contra-cause-effect: C reacts to the positive market reaction to the FED’s 
and the European Central Bank’s decisions to pump money into the markets by 
buying back banks’ loss-making securities: ‘Bro, I don’t get this, all central banks are 
acting like this, they are about to buy back even toilet paper saying “no no don’t 
chuck it, we will buy it” and people are getting excited about this. The problem is 
huge and these [central banks] will buy back almost everything’. 
9-Day 10 -Contra-similarity: C observes several US employment data to be released 
at 15:30 pm. Despite the better than expected ‘ex-agriculture’ employment data, 
other employment data came worse than expected. However, the market reaction in 
the US was positive: ‘what the f***! The data is minus and they are still buying it 
like hell. A couple of months ago, the DOW was 13,200 and with a minus figure in 
the same data, it just collapsed here and there, and now it is minus again and they are 
buying it like hell!’ Manager S: ‘it is due to the charts’. S and K are quite content 
with the rises in the stock markets; K says ‘now the mood is different’. C stands up 
from his desk ‘f***. the mood ... look at the fundamentals ... I never used to swear so 
much ... I’m resigning!’ he leaves the room for a cigarette not to tender his 
resignation! 
10-Day 11 -Contra-cause-effect: Manager A hears an interview with a company 
official on CNBC-e and notices a small price hike in the company’s share. After 
listening to the interview for a few seconds, A rules out a connection, which is 
agreed by K. 
11-Day 12 -Contra-correlation: Manager C ‘bond is down, the stock market is down, 
but then why the f***. the dollar is down...’77 
12-Day 15-Contra-cause-effect: C observes the Eurobonds index: ‘the Eurobond is 
getting hit too, shit we [his fund assets] are getting hits everywhere.’ K and A came 
back to the room and seconds later they reacted to the falling USD/TL parity ‘aha 
look at the dollar.’ C briefs them on the news ‘Bro there is a new statement, the 
National Insurance contribution debts are to be amnestied. This will worsen the 
relationship [of Turkey] with the IMF, so I can’t understand how much worse it can 
really get here’ (he expects the USD/TL to go up on the back of this news. C holds 
more than half of the private portfolio clients’ assets in the USD). 
13-Day 15-Contra-cause-effect: C makes the following remarks after the Turk 
Telekom IPO is completed and the company is floated on the ISE: ‘The Turk 
Telekom is over, we said after that the dollar would be up, and that did not 
materialize either, f***. it!’ 
 
The story behind the numbers and C’s anger 
 
To contextualize the numbers, I begin with some more numbers on the ISE 100 index that 
are gathered from the ISE index database. Between 18 April and 16 May 2008, the ISE 100 
77 Although C told me that there is no universal mechanism of “equity market down, bond market up”, 
or “both these markets down, currency up”, during my observations he was of the expectation that 
different security classes would not be moving in the same direction which was occasionally 
contradicted by the markets. That is why I characterised this as a contra-correlation story but this is 
not similar to the notion of correlation that connects index figures abroad to the ISE index movements 
(Informal discussions 5, 9  May 2008)  
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index had been quite volatile. On Friday the 18th of April, it hit 41,449 at its lowest point but 
closed the day at 42,641 points. The following week of 21 and 25 April, it hit 42,304 points 
at its lowest point but closed the week approximately 1000 points up from the previous 
week’s close. Between 28 April and 2 May, it hovered between 42,927 and 43,995 points 
with a 43,425 point close at the end. However after the middle of the following week of 5-9 
May, the index fell below 42,000 points and closed just above 42,000 points on 9 May. The 
final week of 12-16 May witnessed a further fall down to 41,407 points toward the middle of 
the week, and then the index recovered back above 42,000 levels and closed at 42,498 points 
on 16 May.  
 
In the first two weeks until the middle of week three, the equity managers kept their funds’ 
equity weight over the benchmark. This was not only because of a random upward index 
move. The managers were observing both data/news flows and index movements abroad and 
trying to gauge the reactions in the ISE which were mainly positive with several exceptions 
as mentioned before in the contra-correlation stories. There was also the USD 1st quarter 
GDP to be announced on 30 May. This was a highly anticipated data as any deterioration in 
the already miniscule US growth data from the 4th quarter of 2007 would mean a formal 
recession in the offing. However the positive markets and micro-data releases before 30 May 
helped the equity managers convince themselves that there was no room for too much 
pessimism. They were right as the US recorded a 0.6 % growth in the 1st quarter of 2008, 
which was 0.1 % better than the previous quarter (field notes, page 17-8, 30 May 2008) 
 
In these first two weeks, there was hardly any news from Turkey that would have 
necessitated a great concentration or change of strategy apart from the Turk Telekom IPO. It 
was the 24th of April when I heard about the IPO of Turk Telekom for the first time. After 
this, there would be 14 instances where the news about the floatation price, distribution of 
shares among DRIs and FIIs and so on and so forth would be discussed and incorporated into 
sense-making activities. From a trend perspective, the equity managers were of the view that 
Turk Telekom IPO would lead to some fall in the ISE index because of DRIs and FIIs selling 
shares to spare cash for the floatation. This would also affect the USD/TL parity as Turkish 
domestic savers would part with some of their favourite “savings” vehicle, the USD. A fresh 
flow of FII cash in various currencies including the USD would also be converted to TL 
(around 1.9 billion USD was invested for the flotation- Radikal 12 May 2008). All the 
managers in the room took positions in the Turk Telekom IPO with an anticipation of 
multiple ceiling prices. This was due to the over-demand for the IPO and the relatively low 
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floatation price compared to the company’s previous block-sale price (field observations, 
page 6-7 28 April 2008).  
 
Apart from this, in the second week, there was some negative news coming from the Central 
Bank of Turkey on their growth and inflation forecasts. Two days later on 1 May, the Turkish 
producer price index came way higher than expected. The negative inflation expectations 
were then incorporated into the sense-making activities alongside the Turk Telekom IPO to 
explain the sometimes pedestrian and sometimes falling ISE 100 index which was in contrast 
to the positive markets abroad. After the announcement of the bad inflation data, the equity 
managers seemed a bit disheartened about their optimism about the upward trend. Yet the 
negative market reactions were mostly intra-day, and the second-week index close did not 
disappoint the equity managers. It was the fall in the third week which they struggled to 
make sense of only by the Turk Telekom IPO. In this week, due to the downward volatility, 
the equity managers lowered their weight in equities and hoped that the flotation of Turk 
Telekom shares in the ISE in the following week would give them some respite and trading 
opportunity as they expected to see several ceiling prices in Turk Telekom.  
 
Throughout these weeks, the fixed-income managers were almost on a different sense-
making plane despite looking at the same markets. As can be seen in the contra-stories, 
almost half of the stories were about how markets abroad and in Turkey were reacting in the 
“wrong” way in the face of news/data flows on global and local macro-economies. Not 
surprisingly these were mostly told by C. Notice especially in the contra-story 9 how C loses 
it in the face of the negative US employment data but the positive market reaction. He 
remembers how the markets reacted to a similar negative data outcome a month ago. The 
equity managers- though half-joking half-serious point to the fact that investors are in a 
better mood.  For the fixed-income managers, investor sentiment or mood was not something 
they would trade on. As shall be explained, they used categorical/economics knowledge to 
make-sense of (or swear at) what went on and/or what should have happened in the markets. 
Moreover, they reflected this type of sense-making activity in their fund strategies. In the 
first week of my observations, G told me that both he and C were ‘short’ in their fund 
products. This meant that they had the greatest weight in repo to avoid losing on government 
bonds with the anticipation that high inflation in Turkey would lead to interest rate increases 
and a fall in bond prices. What G said in the following actually captures all the managers’ 
rather uneasy co-existence with the market:  
we all try to predict something like the market and it is not easy to predict where it 
goes in the short-term, we know that in the long run it is going to be bad [referring to 
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the global economy and markets] but short-term is hard [to predict] and you need to 
make money in that short-term’ (Informal discussion, 24 April 2008).  
 
G admitted that in the recent weeks he frequently changed his view on the trend, first from a 
pessimistic to an optimistic one, and then back to a pessimistic one. Despite being relatively 
undecided, G expected a ‘quasi-permanent downward trend in a month or so... [and added] 
until then we need to make money’. On the seemingly positive news/data flows which made 
markets rally and the equity managers optimistic, G told A the following on 28 April: 
G- If it goes on like this, I will be f***ed... 
A- Did you turn back?  
G- No I don’t believe in this 
A- That is the worst thing...  
 
On a lighter note, though not for those private portfolio clients who preferred to keep 
currency exposures in downward trends, C and G picked on me especially after the middle of 
the second week because they jokingly believed that it was my presence in the room that 
pushed the USD/TL parity down. Despite the joke, they tried to find other explanations to 
this fall. The culprits included the Turk Telekom IPO, the IMF SDR credit given to Turkey. 
At one point C suspected a possible flow of credit from the Gulf States to Turkey which 
would be aiming to shore up the JDP government during the global turmoil. This was 
because ‘weird banks [read banks associated with conservative/religious capital] were 
buying TL all the time’ (C brainstorming with the general manager of House B 2 May 2008). 
Sometimes they could not find a meaningful reason at all on the screens and swore at their 
“plight”.  
 
Generally the fixed-income managers’ had a naïve scientist approach to making sense of 
data/news flows on scopic screens. Coupled with the nature of products they managed, their 
focus was on major news events and indexes that represented equity and fixed-income 
markets. On the other hand the equity managers adopted a cognitive miser approach when 
they were convinced that there was a certain upward trend in which they could be trend 
trading. In such trends, they stopped being very inquisitive with a categorical mind (see the 
reference to the market mood in the contra-story 9). The market dynamics and the necessity 
to outperform the benchmarks overrode such a categorical sense-making stance. K remarked 
the following on 5 May after the strategist visited the room and told us during the 
conversation that she was always cautious as a chart analyst unlike the popular chart analyst 
on CNBC-e (the much anticipated remark came after she left as there was some sort of 
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tension during the conversation)78: ‘How can you be cautious in the stock market, you buy 
and sell when there is a profit opportunity, is this a bond market for god’s sake!’  
 
Despite this market oriented stance, the equity managers were also aware of the fragile 
situation in the global economic and financial system. In fact, right behind S’s desk on the 
glass wall that separated the managers’ room from the marketing department, there was an 
A-4 paper. On it, the following was written in capital letters: THE SUBPRIME FALLOUT 
WILL GET WORSE. Apparently this was stuck there back in June 2007 (Informal 
discussion with S, 21 April 2008). However this did not mean that the equity managers 
should sit idle, not trading and waiting for the day when the whole financial system reached 
the brink of catastrophe (that was actually five months away!). In the following, I briefly 
provide a summary of the distribution of logics and types of knowledge in the stories 
captured in the AMC according to manager type. This is aimed to support the observations 




Among the 89 cause-effect stories, 58 of them were told by the equity managers as the 
dominant plot provider. 10 of these stories focussed on chart dynamics as the dominant cause 
of what was (to be) observed on the scopic screen. Eight of these stories were on the ISE 100 
index or specific shares. The remaining two looked at indexes abroad. 22 stories took news 
as the dominant cause of things observed on the screen. 11 of these stories came from 
Turkey, eight of them were on specific shares and the remaining three were on the Turkish 
macro-economy. Among the 11 news events abroad, all came from the US and five of them 
were on companies and the remaining six were on the US macro economy (one of them 
bundled the European Central Bank’s decision into the FED’s decision, right after the contra-
story 8). On the other hand, 23 stories relied on proxy figures on the screen that were made 
meaningful by narrative imagination or vernacular knowledge about anonymous investors 
and/or intermediaries in Turkey and abroad. 18 of these stories were on trading dynamics in 
the ISE, four of them on inflation and the USD related themes in Turkey and the remaining 
story was focussed on a proxy figure coming from abroad. Three of the cause-effect stories 
by the equity managers relied on private knowledge to make sense of a local house’s moves 

78 This was actually the strategist’s response to K’s indirect criticism of the strategist that she changed 
her mind very frequently. K said that the popular analysts would insist on his views and would not 




in the VOB. The local house in question was EFG.   
 
Among the 104 proto-stories, 71 were told solely by the equity managers.79 53 of these 
stories focussed on proxy data to make observations about the scopic screen. Only two of 
these stories focussed merely on equity market indexes abroad. The remaining 51 stories 
focussed on the ISE. Among them, there were 21 stories which focussed on specific shares, 
30 stories were on the ISE index itself (7 of them bundled the ISE index with indexes 
abroad, and implied a correlation), and one of them was on the VOB. There were four stories 
that observed specific local brokerage house activity.  Only 18 proto-stories by the equity 
managers focussed on news events in their rudimentary plots. Within this group, there was a 
more balanced distribution between news from abroad and from Turkey. Nine stories 
focussed on news abroad. Five stories focussed on news from Turkey and four stories 
bundled news abroad with news and/or index figures from Turkey. Among the 71 stories 
mentioned above, there were 10 proto-stories which used chart analysis in the sense-making 
process. Three of these were on indexes abroad and the remaining ones were on Turkey, on 
either the index or specific shares.  
 
In total, among the 132 cause-effect and proto-stories told by the equity managers as the plot 
provider, there were 36 stories that mentioned an index or news event abroad to help make 
sense of the flows on scopic screens. Seven of the nine correlation stories captured in the 
room were also generated by the equity managers, which take the number of equity manager 
narratives that have outside market events in them to 43. While this was around a third  of 
the all narratives (140) told by the equity managers, only 17 narratives had direct news from 
abroad which actually necessitated any reconsideration by the managers’ of their views on 
the general state of global economy and financial markets. The remaining 26 stories thrived 
on narrative imagination and the perception frame about the one way correlative movements 
between major markets and the ISE. Nevertheless, the equity managers did not follow 
markets abroad blindly and trade in the ISE based on this master correlation perception. S 
attributed these apparent correlative or cause-effect movements between the US and the ISE 
to DRIs’ psychology (Informal discussion, 18 April 2008). K agreed with me that the 
correlation belief was an attempt on the part of DRIs to fix some sort of frame onto markets 
to be able to predict them (field notes, page 98 25 April 2008). A gave a more detailed 

79 There are only three stories in which the equity managers were in conversation with the fixed-
income managers as the dominant plot provider (two about shares and one about the ISE index). Apart 
from these, there are five stories in which the equity and fixed-income managers seemed to co-
construct the story.  
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explanation by arguing that correlation was not about ‘like and like’ movements among 
emerging markets but moving in the same ‘canal’ (referring to trend lines they drew on the 
charts). For the US data, he said the following to make a point about his belief that those 
reactions in the ISE to the US data/news were exaggerated: ‘when they fart there, we shit 
here’ (field notes, page 63 18 April 2008).  
 
None of the managers provided me with a categorical explanation that would reject or accept 
the validity of this popular observation and trading activity based on the belief of one-way 
correlation. They acknowledged the effects of this belief on ISE’s market outcomes. By their 
routine sense-making activity as described above, the equity managers tried to take 
advantage from or cope with this popular belief and its market outcomes depending on the 
reactions of anonymous investors abroad and in Turkey. From the stories and explanations of 
the equity managers, it seemed like this anonymous investor mass did not have a categorical 
mind. That is why the equity managers never solely relied on their categorical knowledge on 
economy and markets. They tried to gauge market reactions over the days to ascertain 
whether it was a trend change or mere volatility.  
 
Fixed-income managers  
 
C and G used the cause-effect logic 31 times in their sense-making narratives. In seven of 
these stories they were in a dialogue with one equity manager, started the conversation and 
provided the cause-effect logic to close the co-sense-making activity. In 11 stories, C and G 
used direct news. Six of these stories looked at news from the US (one bundled the news on 
the European Central Bank’s decision to the FED’s decision in the contra-story 8). The 
remaining five stories were from Turkey, two on the inflation, two on the Turk Telekom IPO 
and one on the National Insurance amnesty. In five of these 11 direct news stories C or G 
were quite critical of the market reactions to the news as gauged by C and G looking at 
proxy figures such as the ISE 100 index or the USD/TL parity.  In three stories they resorted 
to charts, two for local items on the screen and one for the DOW.  In 20 stories they relied on 
proxy data to make sense of the situation on the screen. 16 of these stories were on items 
from Turkey which included the USD/TL parity, the bond market, and the Turk Telekom IPO 
and a possible Central Bank of Turkey interest rate decision. Six of these stories contained 
jokes either at my expense because “I made them lose money or I was the reason behind the 
USD/TL parity fall” or at that of anonymous investors. The four stories that looked at proxy 
figures abroad were on the USD/YEN parity and carry trade, the LIBOR and mortgage rate 
indexes, and other index figures abroad. In four stories, they used private knowledge to make 
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sense of the situation in the USD/TL parity and bond prices in the ISE bond market.  
 
C and G generated 25 proto-stories during my stay in the room. Seven of these stories 
involved one or more of the equity managers but C or G provided the implicit logic in these 
rudimentary stories. In fact three of these co-stories were reactions against the exuberance of 
equity managers in the face of positive market reactions that seemed contrary to the direct 
news in question or the general state of the global or Turkish economy and markets. On the 
other hand, C and G used direct news/data release from the US and Turkey in 10 and one 
proto-story cases respectively. In all but one US news/data release cases, they were very 
critical of the market reactions. In fact in one of them C said the following: ‘I have been 
shouting for the last 10 minutes “If I trade according to data and I lose, then how am I going 
to trade man!” then there shouldn’t be any market really!’ (Field notes, page 79 15 May 
2008). In 14 proto-story cases they relied on proxy data from the Turkish markets to make 
sense of the situation on the scopic screen. 12 of these were on one or more of the local asset 
classes they carried in their funds, including Turk Telekom shares, and two were on the ISE 
index. In the remaining two proto-stories, they looked at proxy figures abroad to make sense 
of a past news/data or the anticipated news on the back of changing index figures abroad. 
Among these stories, there was only one case of a chart being used. It was for making sense 
of the USD/TL parity.  
 
In fact, during my stay in the room, both C and G were very stressed and critical of the 
market reactions to data/news releases. Apart from the instances mentioned above, four of 
the five randomness stories were told by one or both of them which reflected their frustration 
with market reactions to negative macro and/or microeconomic data. Both the fixed-income 
and equity managers perceived data/news releases in a broader framework of the global 
economy/markets theme mentioned in the previous chapter. However, the equity managers 
were willing to accept short-term market reactions based on a “consensus expectation and 
actual result” dynamic. On the other hand, the fixed- income managers had a tendency to 
perceive all data/news releases as a new piece which would fill in another gap in the soon-to-
be-completed jigsaw of a global economic and financial meltdown. In 16 stories out 64 (25 
%), C and G referred to direct news/data releases from the US for this broader sense-making 
activity, which is almost 2.1 times the frequency of which the equity managers did so (17 out 
of 140, 12 %). Moreover, the reactions of the equity managers in these 17 cases were mostly 
positive in line with the narrow expectation and result dynamic for individual data releases. 
This only changed towards the end of my observation period when the equity managers had 
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to lower their equity weight in their fund products and started to broaden their sense-making 
frame beyond the narrow expectation-result dynamic. The following quote captures this 
change in sense-making frame and the frustration that may come with contra-market moves:  
 
It is 13 May 2008 (field notes, p 64) and right after the 15:30 pm US April Retail Sales data 
release. The expectations were -0.2 % and -0.1 % on Bloomberg and Reuters respectively. 
The data came as -0.2 %:  
C: -0.2, bad  
S: actually it is good excluding auto sales [just like the March data last month] as Er 
estimated, well as it was said in A’s email [the assistant economist]. 
C: oh okay, buy the [Turkish] bonds with this marginal data, you don’t price bad data 
and go and price “good data” [he sighs]80 
S is silent. He is probably reflecting on the month-on-month negative US monthly 
retail sales data in relation to the recession worries. Then he reacts to the upbeat 
equity markets, starting with a swear word which he hardly used during my stay in 
the room: 
S-F…king hell, these are irrational moves, this is a bad data and you go and buy it, 
they don’t need us here, gets monkeys and they can trade... 
 
A note on the capitals: do fund managers know and fare better?  
 
On its day of flotation, 15 May 2008, the Turk Telekom did not deliver what all the managers 
wished for. It did not hit the price ceiling. A was rather disappointed as they only made 2 
kurus profit per share by midday. S reduced his exposure to Turk Telekom by 40 %.  The 
fixed income managers sold all their exposures to Turk Telekom early in the trading but they 
were also disappointed not to see a sign of a rebound in the USD/TL parity.  A thought that 
the “they” figure would press the price down to collect small investors shares as the demand 
for Turk Telekom IPO was 4.6 times higher than the shares floated during the IPO.  A and K 
then observed the Turk Telekom board trading, Citi Menkul and some other local brokers 
clocking more than 100 million TL trading volume on their own. A with a sour face said ‘we 
are at the fringe of this with the money we have…’  
 
A was quite right in his observation. As an institutional investor managing retail and 
corporate funds, the AMC was relatively marginal in its assets under management. In fact, 
the DIIs in general were quite a marginal investor group in the ISE with their annual 15 % 
share ownership and 15 % trading volume contribution to the ISE equity market.  The 

80 I asked C to clarify his ‘buy bonds’ comment. He told me there was a reaction in the ISE bond 
market probably on the back of an interpretation of no FED rate cuts ‘because data came as 
expected...so you sell US bills and buy the highest yielding bonds in the world!’ I think he implied 
that this was an irrational stretch of interpretation with an optimistic mind. C then left for a cigarette! 
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disinterest of the general public in fund products and professional money management meant 
that the cultural capital of the managers did not convert into economic capital as far as assets 
under management were concerned. It was in fact this lack of economic capital that made the 
effects of cultural capital owned by the managers and their colleagues in the fund 
management industry less tangible in the ISE equity market. That is why the equity 
managers had to be more market oriented to be able to benefit and cope with opportunities 
and challenges brought by the dominance of DRIs in trading volume and that of FIIs in share 
ownership in the ISE.  
 
The relative size situation was actually much more marginal for the fixed-income managers 
as the size of their B-type funds were miniscule when one considered the size of bond and 
repo markets in the ISE (almost 10 times larger than the equity market in terms of volume-
ISE data). Another peculiarity of the markets where the fixed-income managers were active 
was the dominance of other DIIs and national banks’ treasury departments. Especially the 
latter was the most dominant force in the market as they managed national banks’ cash 
positions on a day to day basis. For the fixed-income managers, it was hard to gauge 
intentions of major players in these markets because none of the markets provided the level 
of information/data depth the ISE equity market provided including the settlement figures. 
Similarly the USD/TL market was inter-bank and hence OTC and real-time data did not go 
beyond who bought and sold at what price (no quantity). These differences in scopic 
representations as well as the long-term nature of news-price dynamics of most of the assets 
they managed, the fixed-income managers had more faith in their macroeconomics and 
finance knowledge for their sense-making and decision-making activities. In fact their 
discontent with the market was mostly concerned with the “unwarranted” positive market 
reactions in the US and Europe to the worsening economic and financial woes. Locally, it 
was mainly the USD/TL parity that bothered them.  
 
All in all, all of the managers had a well-regarded institutionalized and embodied cultural 
capital which allowed them to earn six digit annual salaries in the AMC. All of them were 
quite self-reliant in making sense of the markets and making decisions on their own 
irrespective of the fact that sometimes they got the markets wrong. As K put it ‘fund 
management is a job of egos, you have no client on the line, and it is not about convincing 
someone. You are your own boss. You are on your own.’ (Informal discussion, 18 April 
2008). In that respect, the managers did not have any strong esteem for any group or figure 
in House B or in the ISE field. In fact they constantly made fun of the research department, 
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the strategist and the chief economist of the House B whenever these figures seemed to be 
caught short by the market. The managers were confident in their market experiences and 
skills in coping with the markets but they also accepted that markets were unpredictable and 
uncertain and did not always work according to categorical rules they learned during their 
education and vernacular rules they observed during their practice. Maybe it can be added 
here that despite their conservatism, the fund charters, and the AMC and House B’s general 
disposition of ‘telling clients pinks [positive] and blacks [negative] together’ about the 
markets (Interview, head of marketing 15 May 2008) provided a buffer for the managers 
should they fail to guess the markets right. In a complex field like the ISE, such a disposition 
ensured that the AMC’s investment activities would never slip into the abandoned DRI 





















81 The head of marketing told me that this disposition was the vision of the current general manager of 
House B who founded the AMC as a department in House B in 1995: ‘since then we tell clients we 
manage risks here not money, this is the Mr [name of the general manager] School!’ The general 






CHAPTER 10 HOUSE C 
 
I began my observation in House C on 8 July 2008 and I remained there until 15 August 
2008. After finishing my observations in the AMC on 16 May 2008, the ISE 100 index was 
over 40,000 points for a week and then fell to between 39,000 and 35,000 points in June and 
hit 33,208 points a week before I started in House C. One reason behind this downward 
volatility was the increasing political uncertainty in Turkey which had started in early March 
2008. This was about an ongoing constitutional court case that was brought against the ruling 
party JDP and the Prime Minister and 70 other members of the parliament by the chief 
prosecutor in March 2008.82 The outcome of this trial was expected in late July or early 
August. Another reason of the downward volatility was of course the ongoing but worsening 
woes in the global economy and financial markets. The problems started to become 
especially acute in the global banking industry as there were an increasing number of news 
stories on loss-making items in banks’ balance sheets. On the other hand there was a flight to 
commodities, especially to oil, which seemed to put extra pressure on the equity markets.  
 
However as noted in House A and C’s daily bulletins on 8, 9 and 10 July 2008, the week I 
started in House C was when things seemed to be turning for the positive yet the authors of 
respective reports disagreed on the causes. After hitting its lowest point in 2008 on 3 July at 
32,645 points, the ISE 100 index recovered by almost 10 % a week later, and closed at 
35,574 points.  As I read from House A’s daily bulletins on these three days, this was a 
rebound from the bottom ISE index point in 2008 on the back of the recent improvements in 
the US macro economy data with the exception of the employment figures. There were also 
positive expectations about the 2nd quarter balance sheet announcements for US companies. 
These announcements started in the week I began at House C. Like House A’s bulletins, 
House C’s bulletins acknowledged the fall in oil prices and positive sentiments and reactions 
in the markets. However, they were too cautious to attribute these positive reactions to a 
fundamental trend change towards the positive in the global economy. Interestingly, House C 
also acknowledged some ‘market rumours’ that the constitutional court would not ban the 
JDP. However these were dismissed as mere speculation and due to the impossibility of 
‘predicting the outcome at this stage’.    
 
On a more general note, the bulletins of each house were fundamentally different in their 

82 The case was mainly based on the law to lift the headscarf ban in universities which had been 
passed in January 2008.  
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format. While House A’s bulletin and its author, the strategist G, would devote usually half or 
three quarters of his commentary to what (was to) happen abroad, House C’s bulletins and its 
author Mrs A, the head of research, touched on the global markets in two or three sentences 
maximum. The rest of the bulletins were devoted to news about Turkish economy, politics 
and companies with several-sentence commentaries about the possible effects of news on the 
ISE index value or share prices.  House C bulletins finished with a ‘what to watch’ section 
that listed local news agenda followed by several news/data items abroad. Mrs A’s dailies 
were written mainly for investors abroad who were assumed to follow and know what 
happened in their economies and markets better than A. Yet, they needed her expertise and 
dedicated time to follow what was going on in the ISE and Turkey but in a concise and to-
the-point form. Mrs A thought that writing long daily-bulletins like that of House A and 
focussing too much on what was going on abroad could be seen by her clients as a sign of 
not knowing or being sure: ‘One has to have one’s own opinion and justify it, you can read 
all these [commentary about what goes on abroad] everywhere’ (Informal discussion, 14 July 
2008).  
 
This was the market and organisational context in which I started my observations in House 
C. I was an intern, a participant observant for the first time in a brokerage house. I was given 
translation jobs and very simple analysis tasks which included writing very short 
commentaries for items in company balance sheets. I also logged data for various databases 
and updated them, including something called ‘Datascan’ which showed basic multiples of 
all the ISE companies and highlighted ‘cheap’ shares. I sat next to the research analyst G. We 
shared the desk with the head of research who sat opposite us behind a computer screen high 
partition. Two meters away behind her was the sales desk which was populated by the two 
veteran sales traders, Br, a private high school graduate, and S, a graduate of economics from 
a top Turkish university. Br and S had two desk associates. One was a broker who used to 
work on the ISE floor for House C. She executed orders with sales traders and another 
broker in the ISE floor.  The other desk associate was someone the sales traders had worked 
with for several years and brought with them from their former workplace. She was mainly 
responsible for keeping record of orders and doing the electronic paperwork for settlement of 
orders after the trading session. The domestic sales team was located a floor downstairs. 
 
There was another sales trader in the IRS team, Af who was educated in the UK and US. He 
stayed downstairs on the open trading floor used by the domestic sales team after he was 
moved from a small office which he shared with the research team. The IRS team was 
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located downstairs until the new sales traders, Br, S and their desk associate arrived in May 
2008 from a local branch of a global bank. Em, the general manager of the house, a CFA 
holder and educated in Europe, probably kept Af downstairs due to the fact that Af had only 
several long-only clients (all from the same global asset management company) who gave 
few orders a year and brought relatively little in commissions to the firm. There was always 
the risk that the domestic team would take the opportunity to front-run these very large 
orders of several million shares of large-capitalisation companies but they were so few that 
they were able to tolerate the risks. This actually happened once back in early 2008 when a 
‘novice’ buy side trader told the sales trader Af to buy 3 million shares of IsBank at 5.25 TL 
per share. Af told the trader about the danger of a limit price order of this size to no avail. 
Once the order was noticed by the domestic sales team and day-traders in the ISE, the price 
shot up to 5.50 TL and the order was completed at that price instead of a possible average 
price between  5.30- 5.35 TL! (Informal discussion, Af 6 August 2008).  
 
I shall describe the main characters on the domestic sales floor later in the chapter. For now, I 
shall concentrate on two topics. First is the nature of Br’s and S’ activities and how they 
made sense of the markets. Second is how G and A made sense of the markets and interact 
with Br and S and their clients by using the objects they generated such as company reports, 
research notes and in situ stories 
 
Sales traders in House C 
 
In fact, the above mentioned discretion and prudence that Af pressed for on the buy side 
trader is the essence of the job of sales traders and traders in IRS departments. Because there 
is no comprehensive direct market access system in the ISE, end-client and global broker 
orders are for most of the time executed manually by IRS traders. IRS traders and their 
colleagues abroad, generally buy-side traders, have devised different trading strategies such 
as doing 1/3 or 1/5 of the volume on the board at any time to make sure that specific orders-
‘tickets’ in the IRS parlance do not dramatically alter the trading dynamics on a given board.  
In that sense and bearing in mind the low level of volume contribution made by the FIIs to 
the ISE 100 index and beyond, IRS teams usually wait and join the trading activity rather 
than lead it. However ISE 30 and especially the ISE 10 shares (large-capitalisation banks) 
can be seen as exceptions to the rule as most FII activity takes place on these very liquid 
boards, especially those of Garanti Bank and IsBank. The FIIs’ contribution to trading 
volume in these boards and indexes are much higher than their average contribution to the 
ISE’s annual trading volume and one can easily buy and sell several million shares at the 
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stroke of a key on these boards.  
 
During my stay in the IRS room, Br and especially S were kept very busy by orders they 
received from global and regional brokers in Europe and North America. These clients 
constituted the majority of their most active 15 clients. Additionally, there were several end-
clients who managed Emerging Market funds and several proprietary traders and hedge fund 
managers who had worked on Turkey and other similar markets for a considerable time 
period beyond the last three or four years (Informal discussion, S-7 August, Interview, Br- 29 
July 2008). It looked like S, the junior of this duo, attended to the global and regional 
brokers’ multiple share -‘basket’ orders whereas Br was the person who did the relationship-
work with fund managers and proprietary traders. Thanks to his experience in the IRS 
business which stretched back to 1990s, some of Br’s core clients were also his good friends 
(above interview).  Moreover, one of the fund managers was Br’s relative and both S and Br 
were quite informal with him on the phone and in giving him investment advice.  
 
Due to this division of labour, S hardly gave any comprehensive investment advice on the 
phone to any client. Although this might be down to the fact that most of her 
communications about tickets were done on Bloomberg chat platform, she explained to me 
that her market calls were mostly answers to clients’ questions. These answers were based on 
her observation of ‘the boards’ all day, and continuously following news/data flows on 
shares, markets and Turkey (Interview, 10 August 2008). On top of this, she sent emails to 
her clients in the mornings (I was cc-ed in the emails) which summarized the top Turkish and 
global news with her very short comments on their possible effects on the ISE and specific 
shares. Each email started or ended with a prediction of where the ISE index would be 
heading on that day in the face of global news/data flows. These predictions were given as 
warnings or advice.  S liked to use lots of abbreviations which made her emails resemble 
mobile phone text message language. This was in direct contrast with the head of research’s 
very formal writing style! S also used metaphors in her emails which gave clues about how 
she perceived the relationship between the global markets and the ISE. In one of the emails 
sent on 30 July 2008, she used the following metaphor at the end of the email (in bold) 
which, I think, captured her perception frame about the ISE place in this relationship: 
g'day~singing"one way or another i'm gonna win ya'"..coyote ugly 
-dyoby**says owner in talks w potential buyers..  
-tcell**to buy 80% Belarus telecommunicatn shs for $500mio..cnbc 
-+ve global mkts and momentum directing mkt to 40k levels..US/TL is @ 
1.19..expect stronger $ on the following days..this wud also help the decline in 
oil..and than above 40k is inevitable.. 
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i dont't buy that mkt knows the result will be mkt friendly from Akp's closure 
case..what i know is utc whatever result comes from the court, we'll comment on it as 
it's mkt friendly..this is already being marketed..even though some dailies like FT say 
it's gonna be doomsday if it results in 1 way, i see Turkish mkt as a branch in the 
river (=developed mkts).so global sentiment is the only reality, which is all 
bounded to oil these days.. rgds 
 
AKP is the Turkish abbreviation for the JDP and this email was sent a day before the court 
declared a non-ban decision for the JDP. The title of the email implies that the court decision 
will not affect the markets significantly because there is a growing perception in the market 
that it is going to be a market-friendly decision. Although it is not easy to decipher what S 
actually wants to say in the email (this carelessness in her construction of narratives were 
observed in all the emails), the closing sentence summarizes her perception about the ISE 
and its place in the global markets with specific reference to the then situation caused by oil 
price. In accordance with this general perception, both S and Br would follow what went on 
in the US and Europe in terms of data/news flows and stock and futures market movements 
there. They would ask A’s view on what specific events might mean for the markets if she 
had not already flagged them up in her daily bulletin.  
 
Between 17 July and 15 August 2008, S sent 22 morning email calls. 17 of them predicted 
the ISE to correlate with global markets. There was one contra-prediction based on the 
anticipated JDP court decision. The other contra-prediction was made because the US 
markets did react contrary to the worse than expected US consumer price index data which 
was announced the previous day. Among these 17 emails, 10 highlighted specific US data 
releases as a factor that would affect trading in the ISE. In two emails on 12 and 13 August 
2008, which both highlighted positive global markets without any news/data agenda, very 
positive news expected for Turkey were flagged up as performance boosters in short-term 
and mid-term index movements. One item of this news was on a possible IMF-Turkey deal 
which was expected to be coupled by falling interest rates in Turkey. The second item of 
news was on the resumption of the Cyprus peace talks between the Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot leaders. This was very important news for the EU-Turkey relationships and the 




Creation of a theme and giving market calls 
 
In fact this “multiple causes and positive effects” theme for the ISE’s near future 
performance was first outlined during the in situ deliberations between S, Br and A which 
took place a week after the JDP non-ban decision by the court. After the court decision, the 
ISE seemed to lack a short-term catalyst for any upward index move. The team therefore 
highlighted the above news agenda for September 2008 as a mid-term market catalyst (field 
notes 194-5, 5 August 2008). In the following week, Br and S updated their theme view with 
the incoming public news and private knowledge they had gathered from multiple sources.83 
This mid-term investment theme took an exact form on 12 August 2008 when S sent the 
above-mentioned email with the two positive items of news. The Central Bank of Turkey 
decided on 14 August 2008 to stop raising the interest rates and signalled that it would keep 
the rates unchanged until the end of the year (daily bulletins 14-15 August 2008). This was in 
line with what A had argued about the prospective Central Bank of Turkey rate decisions 
during her deliberations with the sales traders and in her daily bulletins.    
 
On the back of these events and S’s emails, Br gave six market calls to his clients and 
encouraged them to go long in those Turkish banks which A had flagged up as better 
performers in her banking sector update on 16 June 2008. In one of these market calls and in 
S’s two emails on 15 August, 2008, both sales traders picked IsBank over Garanti Bank 
without any in situ deliberation with A on which bank was the better pick according to a 
fundamental view. These were basically a trader’s call based on board and chart dynamics as 
well as A’s target prices in the bank sector report and the current share prices of these two 
banks. Moreover, Br in his verbal market calls after the Central Bank of Turkey decision 
argued that there was to be a rate cut in the coming months ‘because conditions were right’. 
However, in his pre-Central Bank of Turkey-decision calls, Br used the phrase ‘declining 
rates’ rather than a direct rate cut. On the other hand, S used phrases ‘falling’ ‘declining’ 
interest rates without predicting an actual rate cut even after the Central Bank of Turkey 
decision. These calls by Br and S were based on A’s view on macro dynamics in Turkey but 
they were embellished with a trader’s touch.  Interestingly, during Br’s calls to his clients 
after the rate decision, I noted the pessimism of the clients about the global markets and 
banking system and their worry about the recent positive performance of the ISE index 
which made the large-capitalisation banks relatively ‘pricey’. Br concurred with those views 
83 The general manager went to Ankara in the beginning of August to have deliberations with several 
bureaucrats and politicians on various matters including Turkey and IMF deal, which contradicted the 
negative public news on the deal on 12 August 2008 (field notes 222, 12 August 2008). 
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but talked about a possible decoupling of Turkey on the back of the positive theme he was 
trying to pitch (field notes 247-8 15 August 2008). I guess no one in the room actually 
predicted a total collapse of the global money market by then despite discussing the so-called 
“credit crunch” frequently. For Br and S, their job was more about flagging up short-term 
and mid-term trading and investment opportunities which they firmly believed in as traders, 
and getting clients to take positions accordingly. 
 
On a general note, Br explained me the reason why he followed indexes such as the DOW 
and the DAX and the data/news agenda abroad:  
Of course I do follow global indexes, because my clients follow them too. You can 
think of this data/market watching according to horizons, daily, mid-term and long-
term. For mid-term and long-term you check news and indicators that might affect 
liquidity and its injection into Turkey. Day-wise, you check the DAX, the DOW, etc 
and adjust your trading strategy accordingly, 1/3 [volume] etc. If the market falls 
quickly you sell quickly, if it goes up quickly you buy quickly. What I do here is I 
calculate the quantity with a calculator and use my discretion according to the 
momentum in the markets (Informal discussion, 6 August, 2008).  
 
Although this explanation also applied to S, during trading S was always much more 
focussed on board dynamics and managing her desk associates and the broker on the line. 
Because sometimes she had to do 10 or more trades on different boards, she was very strict 
on her associates and not at all tolerant of any delays, mistakes and distractions caused by 
them. On 31 July when the court was to declare its decision on the JDP case was a day like 
this. After we learned from the TV that the court decision was to be announced soon, one of 
S’s desk associates mentioned this to her. S’s reaction was: ‘don't tell me anything even if it 
is the end of the world!’ On an opposite note, when she was on the phone with a prospective 
client from Croatia and giving them a market update, she scolded one of the associates 
because the associate failed to notify S of a trading event in one of the orders S was working 
on: ‘notify me about the trade even if I am talking to the president!’ (Field notes page 153, 
24 July 2008). 
 
Research analysts’ activities: ‘sometimes it is like operating on Siamese 
twins’ 
   
In contrast to  the above discussed sense-making dynamic between A and the sales traders, A 
and G as research analysts devoted most of their time to coverage of companies in the ISE 
and keeping a fundamental-view perspective on the macro economy of Turkey. 84  The share 
84 The VOB director, Er downstairs who had an MSc in Finance from a London university was also 
contributing to A’s macroeconomic research.  However Er’s value to the company did not only come 
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coverage by the research team was limited to around 35 companies which were not as many 
as those which would be covered by a larger IRS department. Em was more like an editor 
and general research director and did not directly contribute to the research team. To 
compensate for the size of the team, A and G would keep company valuation models 
extended to whole sectors to have a comparative perspective in terms of relative 
performances and price levels. However, this was confined to sectors where information/data 
flow from companies was more detailed and timely. For instance automobile, banking, and 
to smaller extent cement sectors were easier to follow thanks to sector-wide regular data 
circulation. A would thus write sector updates which would include those companies that 
were not individually covered.   
 
Otherwise there were issues in covering companies due to one main reason, namely the 
unwillingness of companies to share detailed information/data with brokerage houses. 
Although all companies are obliged to provide standardized quarterly balance sheets, for 
research analysts the most important thing was cost and profit breakdowns to be able to 
make their forecast models more accurate. However this cost and revenue breakdown was an 
optional thing and some companies did not want to share a higher level of detail about their 
performance. G likened the lack of breakdowns on balance sheets and having to create 
models from them to ‘operating on Siamese twins’ (Informal discussion, 7 August 2008) 
Interestingly, the unwillingness to provide minute breakdowns did not only come from 
small-capitalisation and thinly traded companies which were in the stock market just to raise 
money and pay no dividend (as explained in the dividend performance report by Bizim 
Menkul Degerler 2010). Even large holding companies, technology blue chips and even 
banks would create difficulties in providing detailed breakdowns on “business secret” 
grounds or for no reason at all. In one instance Turkcell, the largest telecommunications 
company in Turkey, and also quoted in the NYSE decided not to provide a certain 
breakdown it used to provide before, namely subscription acquisition in the 2nd quarter of 
2008. The balance sheet was announced on 6 August 2008.  A and I were working on her 
regular Turkcell update after the quarterly announcement.  A imploded (12 August 2008):  
A-I am so cross at them, there is no consistency. Look, being an analyst is a job like 
this. You deal with this type of stuff. They also removed them from New York 
tables! 

from his cultural capital. He was very much involved with a conservative and pro-government social 
network, and got insider view about the government from this group. He also tried to bring money 
from investors in this social network to a prospective ‘Islamic’ private asset management service by 
House C (namely not investing in companies which relied on interest rate revenues-banks, and 
production of alcoholic beverages).  
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E-It is quite meaningful isn’t it, them removing this despite the profit of 800m [TL]  
A-it is more important to look at the profit from the subscription level, and then 
adjust it. 
 
Interestingly, two days later on 14 August when S’s clients were selling Turkcell and made 
House C the biggest seller in Turkcell, A got a call from the investment relations department 
of Turkcell and was asked why they were selling Turkcell. A was a bit taken aback and made 
the following story up: 
Our client is decreasing its positions in 7 -8 shares, nothing specific to Turkcell, we 
will update it with a buy! [After hanging up to us] They are really mad, they ask 
these questions and then they become quite mean when it comes to giving analysts 
information. (Field notes, page, 230).  
 
In fact a day later, she published her Turkcell update report by upgrading her previous 
‘neutral’ advice to a ‘buy’ on the back of positive communications market expectations in the 
2nd half of 2008. The previous day’s selling activity was indeed nothing to do with her team’s 
call on Turkcell. This lack of a link between analysts’ call and client trading activity was 
generally the case in many instances partially due to the fact that House C mainly acted as a 
discount broker for FIIs.85 A later explained to me that Turkcell’s investor relations 
department was actually very professional and would strive to keep a tap on both brokerage 
houses’ trading and analyst-report activities on Turkcell. They would even request analyst 
reports’ drafts to prevent factual errors. This was actually a common practice by large-
capitalisation and investor-friendly companies. Overall she was content with Turkcell as a 
company and mentioned several other large-capitalisation companies and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
investor relations departments.  
 
From what I heard and observed from the research team, I gathered that they would not shy 
away from initiating coverage in the face of significant themes emerging for a company or a 
sector. For them, difficulties in company coverage were something to rant about and a factor 
that unfortunately would make their job much harder but not a deterrent to produce the final 
product. Interestingly, in many cases, if companies thought that an analyst knew his/her job 
well (read perceptions about cultural capital), they would share more information with 
analysts and give them better guidance on cost and profit breakdowns. In a few extreme 
cases, some companies would decide who was to be included in analyst meetings based on a 
judgement of which analysts were worth inviting. On the opposite end of this spectrum, 
85 Being a discount broker was not the only reason between the tenuous link between analyst call and 
trading activity. As shall be discussed in the following chapter, even large IRS departments like that of 
House D are subject to this tenuous link. 
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some small-capitalisation companies would make analysts deal with accountants who ‘had 
no idea about or sympathy for the notions of investor and investment’ (Informal discussion 
with G, 9 July 2008). A added that global data vendor companies such as Reuters and 
Bloomberg and the local business channel CNBC-e usually had around 15 to 25 brokerage 
houses, including House C in their survey samples on company profit expectations and 
macroeconomic predictions. This she thought reflected the trust and confidence of these 
media and research organisations in the quality of her team’s research output (Informal 
discussion, 9 July 2010).86 This group of brokers could actually be seen as constituting the 
universe of reputable research departments in the ISE which were producing similar research 
objects, using similar methods and capable of serving institutional investors.  
 
Analyst activity: No room for narrative imagination? 
 
All in all, observing and working with A and G for over a month made it clear to me that 
research analysts’ take on the market was informed by the existence of many different 
variables in micro and macro economies and how they would interact with each other in 
determination of share prices. As A put it ‘assumptions [in valuation models] can create 
differences but there are fundamentals that don’t change, these are the things you have to 
take into consideration’ (15 July 2008).  This constant fact was reflected in the stories they 
told me about companies and the macro economy. All these stories were precise in their 
cause-effect logics and took into consideration categorical and vernacular realities about 
companies and economies. In these explanations there was little room for narrative 
imagination as the main way of finding a cause or making a prediction. Although A was a 
more market-oriented research analyst thanks to her several years of fund manager 
experience and partial exposure to chart analysis, she scolded a downstairs dealer, H four 
times.87 H and A started to co-manage funds in the newly established private portfolio 
management service of House C. In all the instances, it was H who bought shares which was 
either pricey or performing badly in profit generation according to A and G’s formal analyst 
calls. G on the other hand always spoke with a categorical discourse about the research 
team’s activities, the markets, investors, Turkey and so on. There was a sense of contempt in 
the air when G spoke of the DRI scene and sense-making activities there. His categorical 
thinking led to this funny conversation in the lift between me, him and the head of operations 
department, S on 11 June 2008.  
86  A added that in cases of significant deviations, company profit/loss expectation surveys 
interestingly did not affect prices or indexes as much as the deviations from macroeconomy surveys.  
87 H is the former domestic speculator mentioned in Chapter 4.  
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E- How are the markets? 
S-they are confusing, they were galloping like a horse, now it is like rolling dice 
G-rolling dice for a number has 1/6 chances of getting it! [then looks at me and 
similes] 
S-here, it is worse than that. 
 
Despite this categorical mind, even G had to use his narrative imagination once but with 
guidance from the ‘fundamental’ story. Like House B and House D, House C started its 
coverage of fertilizer shares in the ISE in the second half of 2007 on the back of a strong 
global demand for the product. Between the initiation in December 2007 and until the day of 
this event on 25 July 2008, G wrote six update reports for the fertilizer companies in the ISE 
after major news events and quarterly balance sheet announcements. The prices of these 
companies went into a slide after June 2008. This was brought to G’s attention by A after she 
received a call from downstairs about the fall. Before this call, I and A were trying to make 
sense of the fertilizers’ price fall. I told A that on this particular day, the popular chart analyst 
on CNBC-e gave a downward price target in his email to several hundred people (including 
me) on one of the fertilizer companies. The target price was based on the formation of a 
‘shoulder-head-shoulder’ figure on the chart. A burst into laughter, dismissed the email and 
then asked G to look into this recent price fall in fertilizer shares (page 163).  In fact, G did 
not follow share prices of the companies he covered on a daily basis. He would occasionally 
look at prices only for regular and unexpected news. After deliberations with the investor 
relations officials of two fertilizer companies, G wrote the following piece (I translated it 
into English but  G edited my translation to make it formal-apparently I took on board some 
trader language,  and we then sent it to 40 plus FII clients of House C). 
Today, we have talked to the representatives of the listed fertilizer companies upon 
the sharp declines in their share price in recent weeks. The impression we have 
obtained is that there is no deterioration in the sector’s expectations. June and July 
are generally low season for fertilizer sales. With the start of the new season in 
August, Bagfas expects a 10-15% price hike in global fertilizer prices. We believe 
that the psychological effects of the rapid decline in oil prices in recent months 
(please note that high oil prices push bio-diesel production and hence the demand for 
fertilizers; if bio-diesel activities slow down because of cheap oil prices, the 
redundant capacity will be utilized for food-related farming activities and sustain the 
demand for fertilizers), and the tendency of investors to pick relatively cheap shares 
during the recent rebound of the ISE index has put the long-time over-performing 
fertilizer company shares under heavy selling pressure. Since there is no change in 
the fundamentals, we keep our long-term price targets unchanged. Our price target 
for Gubre Fabrikalari is 59 TL per share and for Bagfas, 255 TL per share. We 
believe that once the selling pressure fades, the long-term potential offered by the 
fertilizer shares can be exploited. 
 
In the above story, there is no single company/sector related fundamental cause that explains 
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the fertilizers’ price fall apart from the low season observation which is not directly 
incorporated into the explanation. Otherwise the reason behind the fall in share prices is 
attributed to the psychology of investors as inferred from the proxy figure, i.e., price and 
explained by attributing unity and motive to anonymous investors. G, by using his narrative 
imagination, assumes that the rapid decline in oil prices and the long-running stellar 
performance of the fertilizers’ share price made investors in the ISE jittery and switch to 
cheaper shares. At the end, G reiterates his target prices from the last update in June and puts 
indirect faith in anonymous investors for the eventual realization of his target prices. As said 
before, G did not follow the ISE trading on his scopic screen, not to mention trading in the 
fertilizers’ boards. His narrative imagination about ‘investors in the ISE’ is informed by the 
unchanged fundamental story. He also indirectly dismisses the imagined fears of investors 
about the future of fertilizers’ share price with his argument in parentheses about the bio-fuel 
production. This is also a reference to the general theme about the global demand for 
fertilizers which he set out in the initiation report back in December 2007.  
 
Although A was more competent than G as an analyst as far as possession of institutionalized 
cultural capital (CFA certificate) was concerned, this did not mean that, like G, A only spoke 
a categorical language during in situ sense-making activities. Due to her fund management 
experience as well as her managerial role in the newly established private portfolio 
management service of House C, A would occasionally resort to her narrative imagination 
and more importantly her vernacular knowledge about the ISE and companies to provide a 
comment on a share price or the ISE index value.  In the following, I will examine the stories 

























































































































































D-1 - - 2 - - 2 2 - 2 - - 2 - - - 
D-2 4 - 3 - - 7 6 2-0 2 - - 3 3 1 - 
D-3 4 - 5 - - 9 8 3-0 4 - - 6 3 - - 
D-4 2 - 1 - - 3 3 - - - 1 - 2 - - 
D-5 1 - 2 - - 3 2 2-0 - - - 2 - - 1 
D-6 7 - 4 - - 11 10 5-0 2 - 1 5 2 - 3 
D-7 41 - 7 - - 11 10 4-0 6 1 2 3 5 - - 
D-8 5 - 8 - - 13 10 5-2 2 - 6 5 2 - - 
D-9 2 - 1 - - 3 0 3-0 2 - - 1 2 - - 
D-10 1 - 2 - - 3 1 2-1 1 - 1 1 1 - - 
D-11 1 - 7 1 - 9 9 1-0 4 - 3 1 5 - - 
D-12 3 - 3 - - 6 6 3-0 1 - 2 1 1 2 - 
D-13 22 - 4 - - 6 6 2-0 2 - 1 4 1 - - 
D-14 5 - 2 - - 7 7 0-1 1 - - 4 2 - 1 
D-15 1 - 1 - - 2 1 1-0 - 1 - 1  - - 
D-16 3 1 2 - - 6 6 4-0 - - 3 - 1 2 - 
D-17 2 - - - - 2 2 2-0 - - 1 1  - - 
D-18 2 - - - - 2 1 1-0 - - - - 2 - - 
D-19 8 - 5 - - 13 12 4-1 2 - 4 1 4 2 2 
D-20 3 13 8 - - 12 10 1-1 7 - 5 4 2 - 1 
D-21 2 - 3 - - 5 4 1-0 2 - - 4 - - 1 
D-22 3 - 5 - - 8 8 1-2 - 1 1 2 2 - 2 
D-23 3 - 10 - - 13 11 1-3 5 - 4 5 3 1 - 
D-24 2 - 6 - - 8 8 1-1 1 - - 2 5 1 - 
D-25 7 24 7 - - 16 11 4-2 - - 3 4 4 - 5 
D-26 85 1 5 1 - 15 12 9-1 - 1 3 4 2 2 3 
Total 85 5 103 2 - 195 166 62-15 46 4 41 66 54 11 18 
 
What is wrong with the markets? 
 
1-Day 7- contra-cause-effect: Em comes to the room to have a chat with the IRS 
team.  
Em: Everything looks superb, it is an unannounced rise. They might form a bubble.  
S: the US data is bad but they are taking it [markets] up just because the oil price 
went down. 
Em: You have periods like this, the sentiment is dominant, quite fit for behavioural 
finance [looks at me- I never told him or A anything to give the impression that I was 
studying behavioural finance!] 
2-Day 13 - contra-cause-effect: G explains to the dealer downstairs that there is 
nothing wrong with the fertilizer company Gubretas ‘Everything looks good with the 
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recent orders and the price they got for them... so there is no fundamental change to 
explain the fall in share price...okay.’ 
3-Day 20- contra-correlation: Br observes his screen and talks out loud: ‘Europe is 
positive, we have nothing here, no volume.’ 
4-Day 25-conta-correlation: A, G, and I observe the ISE and global index values 
A: Look at the market, it is just us which is up 
G: The world is upside down (giggles) 
E: Now the world shall follow us (we all laugh)  
5-Day 26- contra-cause-effect: Br talks to a client in English. He first conveys S’s 
email message on the IMF, interest rates and banks. He then wraps up:  
Br: I think I am right to be bullish... [he was probably challenged on what he thought 
about the global markets after his optimism thanks to the local news agenda] well I 
was scared yesterday after the US consumer price index data...Europe fell yesterday 
but we stood still so I think decoupling is a possibility... 
 
The stories behind the numbers  
 
Because of my participant observant status and discount brokerage activities of the IRS 
team, the number of stories I captured in House C were relatively limited compared to the 
previous observation sites. Due to these factors, I could only capture around seven stories per 
day.  Despite this relatively low number of stories, distribution of the news/data flows’ 
origins support my initial observation about sense-making activities of the IRS team, namely 
its local focus. Among 85 cause-effect stories captured in the room, 44 were based on the 
publicly available news/data release events. In line with the team’s focus on the ISE and 
local news, only 14 stories were about news abroad and 11 bundled those news stories with 
the ISE index and/or local shares. Among the 31 cause-effect stories which relied on proxy 
data to make sense of other proxy data, only three stories turned to proxy data from abroad 
(two of them were on oil price and one was about an index abroad). Eight stories relied on 
charts to plot actions and events together and only two of these looked at proxy data from 
abroad. These two stories were about global steel prices and one of them connected the 
chart-based price expectation for global steel prices to Eregli’s share price (a large-
capitalisation steel producer in Turkey). This was a market call by Br to a client.  There were 
two stories which relied on private knowledge to explain observations on shares and local 
houses. One was told by Br to A. The other one was S noticing a house trading in a share 
which was made sense of by her private knowledge about that house.  
 
Among the 103 proto-stories, 20 of them relied on publicly available news. However only 
six of them looked at news events abroad and three of them bundled the event with one or 
more local items observed on the scopic screen. 67 proto-stories relied on proxy data but 
only two of them focussed on an item abroad, namely oil price and commodity prices 
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respectively. Three stories relied on charts to make sense of the ISE 100 index and a share. 
There were 13 proto-stories which relied on private knowledge to make sense of proxy 
figures noticed on the scopic screen. Eight of these stories were on local houses and used 
private knowledge about them, and five of the eight stories bundled the house in question 
with the observation of a board. Four stories relied on private knowledge about a share, and 
one story relied on private knowledge on the IMF-Turkey deal. 11 of the private knowledge 
proto-stories were told by Br or S (three stories to a client, four stories to A, one story to the 
broker on the line, and three stories told among Br and S). A told only two stories which 
relied on private knowledge (one was about a local house report acquired via email and the 
other was private knowledge about a share given to her by a dealer during the morning 
meeting). 
 
With regards to the impact of the popular “one-way correlation” perception, this perception 
did materialize in a relatively insignificant way compared to its effects on story outcomes in 
DRI scenes discussed before. Adding the five correlation stories plus one randomness story 
which was about the views on global markets that changed like ‘day and night’, there were 
only 33 stories (17 %) out of 195 which looked at items concerned with the global markets 
and economies in order to make sense of a local item on the scopic market screen. Only 10 
of these were told by Br or S. The remaining stories were told by A and/or G.  
 
Who were the most vocal storytellers in the room? 
 
Not surprisingly the least vocal person was G.. There was only one story in which G reacted 
to what he observed on the screen. This was on a Lehman Brothers research note on the JDP 
case and the report’s perceived effect on the ISE index. The remaining eight stories that 
featured G were co-constructed with A and/or me, and a dealer downstairs.  G was the person 
who provided the dominant logic in six stories.  In two stories (one proto-story on the FED 
statement about possible bankruptcies in the US, and one anti-correlation story) he made 
additional observations alongside A or me.  Half of these stories focussed on events abroad. 
G never engaged with Br or S for in situ sense-making. 
 
A was involved with 59 stories as the dominant logic provider. Not surprisingly 31 of these 
stories relied on publicly available news events. 22 of them relied on proxy data, three on 
private knowledge88, and one on charts (she provided her chart-based prediction for a share 

88 Although A provided private knowledge in only two stories, in the third story, the private knowledge 
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to Br). The remaining two stories were correlation stories. In 15 stories, A relied on her 
narrative imagination to make sense of local house and anonymous investor activities as 
observed via proxy figures.89 However all of these stories were kept in the IRS room. For 
instance, three days after G sent the research note on the fertilizers; Gubretas made a price 
ceiling and recorded a 15 % rise (field notes 177, 30 July 2008). 
A-Gubre hit the ceiling, 15 % gain in one day, I think some people have been shaken 
down today [shake down –“silkeleme” in the ISE parlance refers to manipulative acts 
to attract unsuspecting small investors to snatch their goods) 
S-have they snatched their goods? 
A-those who panicked must have sold [in the previous days].   
 
A also attributed any significant Istanbul-based global broker activity in the days to the JDP 
decision to getting an insider information about the result of the court case. In one instance 
on 28 July 2008, not surprisingly EFG again becomes the protagonist in the story thanks to 
its high volume generating trading activity: 
A: look at EFG; they must have heard something about the JDP case, a non-ban 
decision.  
B: maybe it is just tickets coming from clients 
A: Morgan [Stanley], EFG, and Ekspress [IRS only house] seem to do this,  
S: [checks the live settlement] but the settlement figure does not imply something 
like that [probably because net trading figures for these houses are close to zero] 
A: Maybe they buy Garanti and sell IsBank to take the index up [Garanti Bank has a 
slightly higher index weight – or ‘beta’ then IsBank] and then maybe they will nail it 
down. 
S: I am on the side, waiting to see what happens 
A: to take such a risk [referring to the EFG activity] you can’t help but tremble, 
sitting on this large position. What kind of clients EFG have? 
S: they are generally end-clients unlike ours.  
A: maybe the end-client decided nothing worse than this could happen [this refers to 
the fall trend since the beginning of 2008 in the ISE - she used this as a cause in a 
story before on 17 July 2008].  
 
Because A believed that making a prediction on the outcome of the ban case was nothing but 
a gamble, she refrained from giving a definite call to clients on this event. This no-call on the 
court case also meant that she restrained H and made him take a greater exposure in liquid 
fixed-income products instead of the soaring ISE index. The more the ISE index surged on 
the back of non-ban reports by global brokers and their local branches including EFG, the 
more uneasy and upset A seemed to become. After the non-ban decision, A was quite upset 
about the missed opportunity but she was content that this political uncertainty saga was over 

was given by Br but the dominant logic was provided by A.  
89 In three additional stories she attributed to anonymous investors in various markets abroad a motive 
for acting according to changing oil price.  
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(field notes 182 30 July 2008).90 On 29 July, she provided me with an explanation as to why 
she refrained from giving a definite call on the court case. This was given after we discussed 
a JP Morgan non-ban call with an 80 % probability! 
JP Morgan is a global broker covering many markets and serving very large long-
only funds which do not demand very detailed country service. So their call is just 
seen as investment advice by the long-only funds. If it is banned then JP will say “the 
court surprised us”. House C is different; we are a boutique house and try to compete 
with the likes of JP with a best Turkey coverage for a small number of Turkey- 
dedicated clients. So you can’t take a gamble like this, giving a definite non-ban call. 
That is either insider info or a really bold bet! (29 July 2008).  
 
The economic and social capital of House C was a factor in A’s hesitation about a definite 
call on the JDP court case. Her formal role as the head of research was another factor. The 
latter made her written and spoken research outputs to clients and the media very much 
devoid of any narrative imagination. When asked by Reuters, London why the ISE was 
soaring on 28 July, she told the following:  
That is what we wonder here, it is probably some investors betting on a non-ban 
decision by the court. The recent news flows suggest a result like that in between the 
lines. But as far as I am concerned it is a 50/50 chance and I think that is the best bet! 
 
Br and S: ‘House B shafted Citi Menkul, has it gone through Matriks?’ 
 
The above humorous question in the title was asked by Br to the room when he noticed 
trading activity on a board and came to the conclusion that House B traded at the expense of 
Citi Menkul. Although a joke, this proto-story actually captures the nature of stories told by 
Br and S. Most of these were based on observation of boards and house activities on the 
scopic screen and tried to make sense of these moves by using vernacular/private knowledge 
and narrative imagination. Among the 67 proto-stories that relied on proxy data, 55 of them 
(82 %) were told by Br and/or S. On the other hand among the 31 cause-effect stories based 
on proxy data, only 21 (68 %) were told by the sales traders. When it comes to use direct 
news, the traders’ share drops to 18 stories (41 %) among 44 such narratives under cause-
effect logic and to only five (20 %) among the 20 such proto-stories. However, in chart-
based cause-effect and proto stories, 10 out of 11 stories were told by Br and/or S. When it 
comes to use of private knowledge, out of 15 such stories, 13 were told by the traders.  
 
Thanks to her major occupation, namely order execution, S told 25 stories in which it 
sounded like she was in dialogue with actants she observed on the screen. These actants were 
90 On the day of the decision, a national newspaper Vatan gave a prediction of 6 in favour 5 against 
among 11-strong constitutional court judges. That prediction was right on spot!  
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mainly boards (shares) she was active on, houses she seemed to be competing against during 
order execution and/or the figure of “they” and “you” which referred to anonymous investors 
and/or their traders/dealers. It was therefore not surprising to hear quite metaphorical 
remarks from her that captured the competitive nature of trading on boards: 
This is for you Deutsche [Securities], up your arse... I am gonna f*** your mother 
[very harsh insult in Turkish], oh this Deutsche has fallen on its arse very badly 
[laughs] (7 August 2008) 
 
Morgan [Stanley], you and I we have become bored of f***ing each other on 
Akcansa [a middle-capitalisation cement company] (8 August 2008). 
 
On a not very pleasant note for S, some “gomlekci” traders downstairs and on the ISE floor 
working for House C tried to front her clients’ tickets nine times over 26 days. These 
fronting attempts were possible by observation of House C on the scopic screen and inferring 
what type of client would be behind the observed trading activity. Once the day-trader 
convinced himself that it was an FII ticket then he would take the price up tick by tick to sell 
shares back to S.  In all cases, S was furious with these ostensible fronting attempts. This 
was because she was wary of being observed by her clients on the line and being accused of 
bad execution or worse, being complicit in the fronting. In all cases, she warned Em to 
censure these day-traders and make them stop trading from House C and find another house 
to trade in that particular share. She also called day-traders interesting names such as 
‘cannibals’, ‘a rebel group’. 
 
All in all, the traders told stories mainly for their own sense-making needs. Among the 112 
cause-effect and proto-stories told by the traders, only 40 of them were told to clients. Only 
10 of these stories were told by S to clients and five of them were intra-day or short-term 
trading calls based on board/index dynamics and news events and rumours (two). The 
remaining 30 stories were told by Br to his clients and 20 of them were short-term and mid-
term trading calls (three of them were based on rumours about Dogan Holding- an ostensibly 
anti-JDP media, retail and energy conglomerate). Interestingly, Br told well-substantiated 
stories to two FII clients about the rumour in question, and one call ended with success. The 
client bought 700,000 shares (the client had continuing exposure to the share). However 
when it came to giving the same call to his cousin who was a fund manager in an 
international asset management company, Br basically said two sentences, that there was a 
rumour and one of his clients bought 700,000 shares. Then, the phone conversation ended 
with Br saying ‘f*** off now’. In another share call, Br tried to market TT to his core clients 
based on A’s and EFG’s soon-to-be published TT report (private knowledge). He embellished 
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the story with upside potentials in the reports and a rumour of 12 % dividend. Again when it 
came to giving the same call to the cousin, it was the market colour (who bought how many 
TT shares) rather than the fundamental story that informed the TT call.    
 
When not telling trading stories to clients, Br’s and S’s focus was predominantly on the ISE 
index, boards and local houses as well as any news/data flows that could affect the ISE’s 
index dynamics. All these items had the potential to be turned into a market call. As 
discussed before, most of Br’s and S’s trading ideas were not created in situ as a reaction to 
changing global and local index figures and/or US data releases. They were a product of 
deliberations with A but embellished by the traders’ touch. Interestingly, neither Br nor S 
gave any verbal trading call based on the JDP court case. However in her morning calls, S 
mentioned the JDP related news flows and rumours but never embellished her stories with a 
strong verdict on the outcome. The following excerpt comes from the morning email on 25 
July 2008. It summarizes her JDP court case call very nicely by use of a metaphor (in bold): 
g'day time to be selective..  
-tdy and next week is very important in terms of politics..tdy  cyprus leaders to 
decide on peace talks..also Ergenekon case indictment tba..next week Akp's closure 
case result..supreme military council meeting starts..to be honest; it is for gamblers 
to play on odds this week, but if u r a cowboy, than be selective and act w 
caution.. 
 
Both Br and S thanks to their skills in trade execution and social capital in FII circles 
enjoyed quite privileged positions in the ISE field.  In that sense, there was not too much 
pressure on them to make the right and most straightforward calls or strive to build new 
relationships with FIIs to generate more income.  This duo, as S described themselves, were 
‘like a saviour for struggling brokerage houses which need to grow but in an aggressive and 
independent way without too much bureaucracy’ (Interview, 10 August 2008). Br and S 
could make this happen thanks to their cultural and social capital. In the following, I turn to 
the domestic sales team which seemed to capitalize on a different type of social and cultural 
capital to compete in the ISE field.  
 
Domestic sales floor and morning strategy meetings 
 
Domestic sales team consisted of 15 personnel. Five of these were “gomlekci” dealers in the 
ISE spot market who had a portfolio of long-term clients that consisted of close friends and 
relatives. This meant that “gomlekci” dealers did not have to do a formal relationship work 
like formal dealers in House A or investment advisors in House B. As discussed before in 
previous chapters, day-traders did not hesitate to trade bidirectional in large-capitalisation 
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shares to benefit from the index momentum. They would also capitalize on a different type 
of social capital, namely their connections with other day traders and dealers in other 
brokerage houses, quoted company staff and domestic speculators. This helped them access 
information which was not available on data platforms. One of these day-traders, Is and a 
dealer U were friendly to me and shared their market stories. They were former brokers of 
two very well-known domestic speculators. The third dealer H used to be a small scale 
speculator himself with several million TL he risked and took on Investor Ali-type 
speculators in relatively illiquid boards. He became a speculator himself thanks to being a 
confidant of another well-known domestic speculator. However, H lost a significant part of 
his economic capital when a very close friend to whom he entrusted his funds ran abroad 
with the funds (Informal discussion, 24 July 2008). Apart from these characters, there were 
four VOB dealers, another ISE spot dealer and one marketing personnel in the team. The 
team was headed by the deputy general manager and the head of domestic sales, M who had 
extensive experience in serving domestic speculators in a much larger DRI-only brokerage 
house.  
 
Although I did not have the chance to observe the domestic sales team in situ, I attended 17 
morning strategy meetings. 10 of these meetings were held before the JDP decision. The 
meetings lasted around 20 minutes and were chaired by the general manager, Em. They were 
attended regularly by Is, U, H, Af, his assistant and also a veteran dealer Sl, the VOB dealer-
cum-research analyst Er. The VOB dealers T and C made occasional appearances in the 
meetings. The remaining four day-traders some of whom had tried to front-run S’s FII tickets 
never attended a meeting. The meetings seemed to have a routine order.  Em would start the 
meeting by reading the daily bulletin written by A, and then ask H to take it away with what 
happened a day before in the global economy and markets with a focus on the US. Then Is, 
Er, Af, U, and H would take turns and give their specific views on the direction of the global 
economy and markets. They would blend their observations of the ISE index and shares into 
their global economy and markets narratives.  
 
However this blending was not always made in a manner to make what went on abroad 
effective on the ISE. There were items in the domestic news agenda such as the JDP case 
which would undermine or boost the master correlation perception held widely in the DRI 
scenes. The discussion was moderated and sometimes challenged by Em who would interject 
his categorical and vernacular wisdom into participants’ stories. Then, Em would ask 
predictions on the ISE index, followed by his request for stock tips and rumours. Most of the 
 
 197
index predictions were based on a blend of chart analysis, global and local market agendas, 
board dynamics and houses’ trading activities. There was also a good deal of responses by 
the participants to the Em’s stock tip and rumour question thanks to their social capital. In 
fact, one of the rumours was even sent to IRS clients after Em cross checked it with 
company officials.  
 
During the meetings there were frequent disagreements between the participants on the 
significance of market events discussed. As far as I could understand, these disagreements 
mainly stemmed from participants’ mode of existence in the market. For instance day-trader 
Is and equity dealers U and H who also traded for their own accounts were generally more 
pessimistic about the ISE index’s future. This was because they experienced the index 
dynamics on a daily basis by taking exposures and some times failing to make profits or 
worse having their ‘goods snatched’ and being prevented from ‘buying’ shares by the “they” 
figure (U during the 17 July meeting). According to the dealers, a game was being played 
and the “they” figure was up to something in the days before the JDP decision as they were 
taking the index up mainly with large-capitalisation shares. On 29 July, Is asked A who 
chaired the meeting on that day whether she followed a small-capitalisation but rather 
notorious company share thanks to manipulation activities by the likes of Investor Ali. A told 
Is that she had not looked at the company in the last three years:  
A- It is a small paper.  
Is-yeah but it is obvious what happens in the big papers, it closes 3.60 and opens with 
3.42, 200 point down, so I prefer to be robbed in 15 days rather than being swindled 
in two and a half hours [laughs].91 
 
The pessimism of the high frequency trading participants in the meetings was partly reduced 
after the JDP non-ban decision. However,  this time Is became much more vocal about the 
‘froth’ in the ISE and how it could not keep on going like this in the face of the worsening 
woes in the global economic and financial system. Is argued that there was no “hikaye”-story 
to ‘sell’ in the ISE, especially in ‘blue chip’ shares (7 August 2008). This was agreed by H 
and U and they added that it was now time to look at middle-capitalisation shares if one was 
to make money in the market.    
 
On the other hand, both Er and Af were more optimistic about a story to sell both before and 
after the JDP decision. They both stressed news stories or emergent themes on the Turkish 
91 Both A and Is used the term paper “kagit” in Turkish to refer to shares. This comes from the 
physical shares era of the 1990s. Paper is still a very popular term in the ISE field, like the term 
“tahta” – board to refer to electronic trading activity in shares.   
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economy and politics that could be pitched to clients despite the woes in the global economy 
and markets. Af was especially very optimistic about the future of the ISE index and the 
Turkish economy on the back of his mid-term and long-term predictions about the Turkish 
politics and economy. This was understandable as his client was a long-only fund which 
would not invest in Turkey on the back of a short-term and one-dimensional story. Er’s 
optimism was a bit more curious. Unlike Af, Er was almost equally exposed as day-traders to 
the vagaries of the ISE and the VOB indexes and what “they” were up to in these markets on 
a daily basis. However this exposure was as a wage earner not like a day-trader risking one’s 
own capital on the index dynamics. Instead, Er would use his institutional cultural capital as 
well as his unique social capital (see footnote 85) to expand his effectiveness in House C and 
generate more economic capital. In that sense, he seemed quite eager to go beyond the news 
flows during the meetings and present a more sophisticated story that went beyond simple 
‘bad abroad – bad Turkey’ or “they” figure stories.  However, Em occasionally reminded Er 
during the meetings that it was Er’s job as a research analyst to be exact in his use of 
numbers and be more robust methodologically in his sophisticated stories.  
 
All in all, the stories told in the morning strategy meetings reflected the participants’ 
positions in the ISE field. Although there were many common actants in stories told during 
the morning strategy meetings, plots and morals of each story seemed to differ due to 
storytellers’ differing material, cultural and social resources and consequent dispositions in 
the ISE field. Nevertheless, every participant agreed on the necessity of having a robust 
“hikaye”-story or theme to justify an optimistic market call to clients but they could not 
agree on one. This disagreement or polyphony in stories was also the case on the domestic 
sales floor. I observed the floor twice (24 July and 7 August 2008) for very short periods of 
time. In both cases I noted that the floor was noisy from an audio and mainstream finance 
literature perspective. Everybody but especially the formal dealers seemed to be constantly 
vocalising their observations of minute changes on the scopic screens as well as rumours, 
tips and research reports they got from their market contacts. On the other hand, the 
“gomlekci” day-traders were congregated and relatively silent at the other end of the floor 




House C is a good example of how social and cultural capital of certain actors can transform 
a brokerage house’s fortunes in the ISE. Br and S came to House C with a dozen or so FIIs 
some of whom had been involved with the ISE for over a decade. Br and S were probably 
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not the most sophisticated sales traders in the ISE when it came to a categorical 
understanding of economy and finance. However, their skills in flawless trade execution and 
feeding short-termist FIIs such as hedge fund managers and proprietary traders had allowed 
them to expand and sustain their social capital and convert it into very significant levels of 
economic capital among the wage-earning market actors in the ISE field.  
 
House C can also be seen as an example of how the IRS business works in the ISE field. To 
compete for the FII pie in the ISE, houses have to speak a specific language of global finance 
and be able to produce objects such as analyst reports, research notes and macro analyses on 
Turkey that are in demand by the global financial community. Nevertheless, even this type of 
service provided by CFA-holding IRS personnel is not sufficient to survive as an 
intermediary due to the aforementioned transformation in the IRS business.  To be successful 
with a smaller IRS team and FII client base, one therefore needs a robust social capital and 
an uncompromised care in keeping this type of capital intact even if this comes at the 
expense of short-term losses in economic capital of the brokerage house. This was the 
business model of Br and S. It sometimes put Br and S at odds with House C’s operations 
department as well as A who warned them about violation of the ISE’s and the CMB’s 
trading and settlement directives.  In all these cases, the traders dictated their way of doing 
business on the operations department and shrugged off A’s warnings due to “small” 
financial figures in fines for the violation in question.  
 
In the next chapter, I shall look at sense-making activities in the domestic sales and IRS 
departments of House D which is one of the biggest brokerage houses in the ISE both in 
terms of client types and numbers and trading volume. To give a flavour about the business 
model of House D, I would like to remind the reader that Br actually worked in House D’s 
IRS department back in the early 2000s. According to S, Br resigned after a month due to 
irreconcilable differences between him and the operations department in settlement of trades 








CHAPTER 11 HOUSE D 
 
I started my observations in House D on 4 May 2009. I spent five full-observation days with 
the domestic VIP sales team and spent the remaining three weeks in the IRS department.92 To 
briefly contextualize my observation period, after the storm in 2008 the global economy and 
financial markets seemed to be in doldrums in the 1st quarter of 2009. According to the daily 
and weekly reports of House D published before and during the observation period, the 
dominant news agenda in 2009 had been the global economic recession, led by the US 
economy, and the recent signs in May that the intensity of the recession was abating. On the 
Turkish front, the global economic woes seemed to dominate the fortunes of the local 
economy and markets. This was especially evident in the local GDP figures which recorded a 
spectacular contraction of 13.8 % in the 1st quarter of 2009 on the back of contracting export 
sectors.  The ISE 100 index after closing the year 2008 at 26,864 points had stagnated within 
20,000 point-range in the first four months of 2009. This was until 29 April when it leapt 
over the 30,700 mark. On 4 May the index closed at 32,047 points. In fact, May 2009 was to 
be a month of an upbeat index which was to reach 36,000 points, an approximate 10 % rise 
over 30 days. Interestingly, this upbeat index performance did not bring joy to some of my 
informants in the IRS department.  The main reason for this was the disagreements between 
the six-strong sales and trading team and the nine-strong research team. These disagreements 
were not only on the specific market and company calls of the research team but also the 
way each team did business with FIIs and DIIs.  The differences of opinion in market and 
company calls that were to be observed throughout my stay in the IRS department were 
actually encapsulated in the following excerpt from the research team’s daily report on 4 
May 2009: 
Markets, emerging markets in particular, continue their bullish stance. Consequently, 
the ISE-100 broke a very important resistance of 30,000 and is heading for a next and 
strong resistance point of 33,000 (2.7% higher). In our view, the ISE-100 will reach 
the 33,000 level, but from a fundamental perspective, we continue to believe that all 
the potential good news for the economy is priced in by the sharp rally and we are 
reluctant to chase the overbought banks. Looking forward, we believe fundamentally 
solid names with a decent growth outlook and valuation will continue outperform 
and/or provide solid absolute returns. We continue to recommend Ak Enerji, Birlesik 
Magazalar AS, Otokar, Tat Konserve [producers of drinks, pickles and jam], Tofas 
and Turk Telekom. 
 
The argument that the index had priced in every potential good news and especially the view 
92 The domestic sales team shared the open office floor with the VOB Sales, the Branches, and the IT 
team.  The IRS department was partitioned from the floor by coloured glass walls with a further 
partition inside that separated the sales and trading team from the research team.  The operations and 
the upper management were on the other wing of the office floor.  
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that banks were overbought meant that the research department’s focus was on specific non-
financial shares some of which actually moved independently of the index or did not move at 
all! The research team’s non-financial company call and view that there was a lack of macro 
catalyst for the index  to go over 33,000 points meant that the sales traders had to stick to 
these opinions and do nothing but watch any index movements that were seemingly 
instigated by global and local news/data and market dynamics.  The ISE 100 index actually 
broke the ‘strong resistance point’ on the next day,  the 5th of May, and the sales and trading 
team had to watch another 3,000 point surge between 14 May and 1 June while they were 
trading in jam!93 This hapless waiting without an updated and momentum-friendly market 
call by the research team reflected the gist of doing IRS business in well-institutionalized 
large houses like House D: fundamental reality as perceived by the research team overrides 
vernacular and impromptu opportunities spotted by the sales traders.  
 
The domestic VIP sales team on the other hand were fussed about neither the research team 
calls nor the trading activity by the IRS traders. They seemed happy to rely on Ib, an 
economics graduate and a self-taught chart analyst and the official domestic sales strategist, 
and Ib’s daily in situ sense-making assistance. This in situ assistance was supported by Ib’s 
daily, weekly and monthly written reports on the ISE and other local and global markets. Ib 
was in fact like a conduit between the research team and the investment advisors and their 
clients. He liaised with analysts and translated their sophisticated company call stories into a 
story that blended fundamental and chart dynamics of a company. These stories would be 
several sentence long and flag up chart and board dynamics for short-term trading 
opportunities. As put by the head of operations department Sk, DRIs served by the domestic 
sales team were more interested in spotting intra-day and inter-day trading opportunities than 
‘research proper, Ib is enough for them, say “a bowl formation”, “it broke the band, canal” 
our DRIs look at such stuff, research proper is not their interest’ (Informal discussion*, 5 
June 2009).94  
 
Another non-interest of the DRIs was what the IRS trading team were up to. During my stay 
in House D there was only one implied instance of a fronting attempt, but it was a half-
serious remark made by the head of trading Bl, which was not pursued by any formal means 
93 Until 14 May the index had stagnated between 32,000 and 34,000 points. On 5 June when I finished 
my stay in House D, the index fell back to 34,388 points, completing its week-long slide from its 
36,001 points-close on 1 June 2009. 
94 In Turkish, a bowl formation or “canak yapma” is an inverted bell jar on a graph and the “kanali 
kirdi” -it broke the canal- indicates the statistical figures on a graph had gone through the margins in 
which they were normally confined.  
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(field notes, p 55 1 June 2009). In fact, it was the IRS trading team who frequently talked 
about what DRIs in House D and elsewhere in the ISE were up to. In these discussions there 
was a mix of contempt and dismissal of DRIs’ cultural capital as expressed mainly by the 
sales trader T.  He liked to call DRIs ‘Apaches’. However the team’s contempt and dismissal 
of DRIs was at times balanced with deference to the trading volumes generated by DRIs 
which made House D commercially more robust. The latter was in a way normal because 
with the global financial meltdown and the closure and downsizing of proprietary  books of 
global investment banks and FII funds, the share of FII trading in House D’s trading volumes 
went down from a fair split to a 20% and 80 % distribution in 2009 (above discussion with 
Sk). In the following, I first look at the momentary stories captured in the domestic sales 
department and discuss their significance bearing in mind the place of House D in the ISE 
field. This is followed by an elaboration of the momentary stories captured in the IRS 
department. 
 
‘Welcome to the mentals!’ 
 
This was a welcome remark for me made by Hn, a very experienced senior investment 
advisor who served several high frequency and/or high net worth day-traders, including the 
‘middleman in the grocery market’ day-trader. Her past clients included the flow trader 
mentioned before. She made the ‘mental’ remark after I explained to her that I studied 
sociology. Although she might have confused psychology and sociology, something that I 
occasionally observed among my informants, she explained why she called her colleagues 
and clients mental:  ‘trading on a daily basis is a form of insanity, a form of gambling. 
People have made this a vocation for themselves, they’re mental. I don’t think there is any 
“investor” left in this market’ (Informal discussion*, 12 May 2009). Hn later explained her 
client typology, which shone light on what she understood of the concept of “investor”. The 
first type referred to high net worth day-trading individuals mentioned above. They were the 
main liquidity providers to the ISE. The second type was the ‘forced’ investor who wanted to 
seize short-term opportunities without becoming a day-trader but was stuck in a share due to 
being ‘a bit greedy’ and failing to make up their mind to sell at the right time. The third type 
was those ‘wannabe day-traders’ who frequently pursued intra-day and inter-day price 
changes but could not commit as much as the first type to the ISE equity trading (Informal 
discussion*, 14 May 2009).  
 
In fact, to serve any type of these clients, Hn did not have to use any of her institutionalized 
cultural capital. She like the middleman day-trader started her career in the ISE in the mid 
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1990s after she graduated with an engineering degree from a very prestigious Istanbul-based 
and English-instruction university. By mid 1990s, working in a brokerage house as an 
ordinary dealer or broker was the job many university graduates wanted to be in, even for 
those high flyers that could get a degree from the most prestigious Turkish universities. 
Similar prestigious degrees were held by many senior IRS personnel I interviewed.  Yet, 
unlike in the IRS circles, Hn’s institutional cultural capital or any analytical or quantitative 
skills that might have been honed with such a degree meant hardly anything in the DRI 
circles. As Sk said, Ib was enough for the DRIs served by the team. In fact, the first type 
investors did not even need Ib’s services. Ib was of value to second and third type investors. 
It was also the second and third type investors’ demands which contributed most to the 
generation of in situ stories as well as the occasional client-investment advisor rows. In this 
respect, House D resembled House B in terms of the equity investor profile. None of the 
clients were abandoned DRIs unlike those in the House A branch. They had considerable 
equity in their accounts and most of them were willing to trade when they saw or were 
shown short-term trading opportunities. 
 
During the seven day observations, I sat next to Ib who was next to Ms and Bg, two male 
investment advisors. Opposite us were the three female investment advisors, Hn, Ml, and 
Dm. The domestic sales desk was a VIP desk and served approximately 200 clients who had 
dedicated very significant amounts to equity trading and/or who had the potential to trade 
frequently and generate commission income for House D. Failing to deliver such a 
performance by a client might mean being sent back to a House D branch and getting a less-
personalized service despite having several million TL in one’s equity account. On a 
different note, several clients with equity funds as small as 50,000 TL had the knack, 
dedication and some help from House D lending facilities to generate around 10 million TL 
trading volume a day! (Informal discussion* with Hn 14 May 2009) In that respect, House D 
dealing room was not the privilege of relatively sanitized House B-type DRIs who 
significantly relied on relationship work stories rather than a seamless and flawless execution 
service. House D VIP desk was therefore like the equity market version of House A’s VIP 
dealing floor.  Although House D was in the ISE top 10 trading volume table between 2007 
and 2009, the domestic sales room was unusually calm in terms of in situ sense-making and 
trading activity.  This was mainly because many high volume generating equity clients 
preferred to use House D’s proprietary online trading platform which allowed them to access 
order execution system as fast as an investment advisor. This was a faster alternative to 
calling investment advisors for order execution (Informal discussion*, head of branches, 5 
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May 2009). On a related note, I observed the three female dealers and Bg occasionally 
chiding undecided or over-demanding second and third type clients who accused these 
investment advisors of not helping/allowing them to make money!   In the following table, I 
present the descriptive statistics for the momentary stories captured in the domestic sales 
department. This is followed by the story behind the numbers presented in the table.  
  



















































































































































D-1* 4 - - - 1 5 5 3-0 - - -  2 - 3 
D-2 8 312 6 - - 17 17 5-1 - - 6 2 5 2 2 
D-3 83 - 15 - - 23 23 7-0 1 - 8 5 6 - 4 
D-4* 4 - - - - 4 4 2-0 - - - 1 - 3 - 
D-5 10 - 5 - - 15 15 7-0 - 3 7 1 2 - 2 
D-7* 2 - 2 - - 4 4 2-0 - - 3 - - - 1 
D-8* 6 - 7 2 - 15 14 9-0 1 - 7 4  - 4 
Total 42 3 35 2 1 83 82 35-1 2 3 31 13 15 5 16 
*Day 1 and Day 8 were half day observations in the morning; the rest of the day was spent in the IRS 
department. Day 4 and Day 7 were shorter 2 hour observations in the morning and afternoon sessions 
respectively due to having to attend a private matter. Both days are counted as a half day in the aggregate 
observation days  
 
What is wrong with the markets?  
 
1-Day 1 - Contra-correlation: Ms and Ib discuss the opening of the ISE’s afternoon 
session. The ISE 100 index is up by 1.25 % over the previous day’s closing figure 
despite the short-lived selling-spree towards the end of morning session: 
Ms: What do reckon about the afternoon session? 
Ib: They [investors in the ISE] have given it too fast, there is no news abroad, they 
are gonna get it back. 
2-Day 1- Contra (over)-correlation: Ml receives a phone call at 16:55 pm from a 
client, five minutes before the ISE’s closing, and summarizes the trading day so far. 
The ISE 100 is up by 2.25 % 
Ml: The DOW is up 0.25 %, the DAX is 0.30 %, we loosen here a bit but it [ISE 100] 
is up by 2.25 %, it is a confusing situation.  We [the ISE] have 40 million [lira] 
capital injection, 30 million [lira] of it is in Garanti [bank]. [All the trading figures 
reflect the net trading activity by the five most active buying and selling brokerage 
houses as represented on the data platform’s “money entry/exit” function] 
3-Day 2- Contra-cause-effect: Ml on the phone with a client, tries to make sense of 
the ISE 100’s upbeat performance despite the ‘money exit’ as observed on the data 
screen 
Ml: It is hard to make sense of this rally in the afternoon, there is 25 million [TL] exit 





The story behind the numbers 
 
Because of Ib’s central role in the domestic sales team, 43 stories featured him as the plot 
provider out of the 51 stories he was involved with. 15 of these stories were told to me, and 
six directly to clients. The remaining 22 stories were told to the investment advisors and 
other staff in the room including the VOB team. Six of these stories were then conveyed to 
clients by an investment advisor.   On top of this the investment advisors told 25 stories to 
clients.  The remaining seven stories were self-constructed by an investment advisor (3 self-
narrative, and two told to me as a joke by Ms because I ‘destroyed the spell and made the 
index fall by leaving the desk’). The second most vocal storyteller after Ib was Ml, the junior 
female investment advisor who looked after second and third type clients. She told 17 stories 
to her clients and most of the chiding remarks to clients were made by her. Ms told only four 
stories to his clients despite frequently vocalizing what was going on in the boards with one-
sentence observations.  Similarly Hn was busy with such live commentary for the trading 
activity but she told only three stories to her clients.  Two of these sounded as if they were 
addressing a third type client who was undecided and a bit grumpy. There was only one story 
told to the ‘middle-man’ day trader. This was despite the fact that Hn was connected to him 
via telephone line throughout most of the trading session. I did not hear much from the 
investment advisors Dm and Bg as they were sitting at the far end of the table. However, Dm 
asked three questions to Ib which generated three stories. I also heard Bg telling a proto-
story once to a client.  
 
Regarding logics used in narratives captured in the room, 42 stories relied on cause-effect 
logic, and 35 proto-stories had a rudimentary plot. Among these 77 stories, there were only 
five stories which relied purely on chart analysis to make sense of and predict the market. 
This is in line with the earlier observation that Ib always tried to blend fundamental news 
items with insights based on charts. In that sense there were six more stories by Ib which 
incorporated charts as a secondary cause in the plot.  When it comes to invoking the master 
perception of one-way correlation widely held among DRIs and their brokers in the ISE, 21 
cause-effect stories incorporated news or a market event abroad as a causal factor in their 
plots. This went down to 10 instances among the proto-stories. Ib provided the plots in 18 of 
these stories which invoked the master perception of one-way correlation. As Ib explained to 
me, he had been seeing this ‘very strong correlation’ between world indexes and the ISE in 
the last couple of years ‘when you plot the graphs [of indexes]. If there is a decoupling, it 
lasts only few days, you can find the reason behind it; you need to make sense of events with 
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this broad perspective’ (Informal discussion*, 6 May 2009). Adding the three correlation and 
one randomness stories, there were 35 stories (42 %) that invoked the master perception of 
one-way correlation/cause-effect, which is in line with other mainstream DRI scenes 
observed-with the exception of House A branch. 
 
Among the stories told by the domestic sales team, several items featured frequently. One of 
them was the ‘stress test’ on the US banks by which the FED aimed to find out the health of 
the US banking sector. This featured nine times in the narratives. Another frequently 
featuring actant was the IMF-Turkey deal. The deal was still on the agenda in May 2009 and 
featured eight times in the stories. Although featured only three times (oil once and 
commodity prices twice), rising commodity prices were seen as something positive in May 
2009 in a global recession environment, as a sign of recovery. This was in total contrast to 
their perceived effect on the market in summer of 2008, especially that of oil. For me it was 
interesting to observe how actants were made to take on different attributes depending on the 
general conditions of the markets and economies as perceived by storytellers.  
 
All in all, the stories captured in the domestic VIP sales room reflected the service given to 
DRIs. The clients were those who had significant levels of economic capital and/or pertinent 
cultural capital for short-term trading or a willingness to acquire it. The bottom line for 
inclusion in the VIP service was the commission fee generation capacity of clients. When 
clients needed any assistance in the form of fundamental view and/or chart analysis, this was 
given promptly thanks to Ib’s skills of translation between the research department’s and 
DRIs’ languages. If the research department did not cover a company, Ib would quickly 
examine the fundamental indicators and news about the company to conjure up the 
fundamental side of the story. With the continuous assistance of Ib, the investment advisors 
seemed to take their job as part of a routine which consisted of giving prompt updates, 
executing orders without blemish, and if necessary doing some relationship work in the form 
of restraining clients or attending to their depression  and euphoria about the market.  
 
The overall impression I got from the VIP sales team and House D domestic sales in general 
was that the size of the House’s economic capital (highest equity base among the four 
houses-backed by the parent bank, which meant generous lending facilities for clients) and 
social capital (20 branches around Turkey and around 40,000 clients) made the place a 
relaxed environment for sense-making and trading. Like House B, investment advisors were 
fungible as they did not make a huge difference for a client in terms of universal 
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intermediation services such as sense-making and order execution. The only difference they 
could make would be in more personal aspects of the relationship such as a long-running 
client-investment advisor relationship as observed in House B.  Otherwise, the biggest 
difference between House B and House D was that the latter perceived clients as fungible 
too. The investment advisors did not seem to care too much about hapless investors who 
were playing the waiting game or who got grumpy because they thought investment advisors 
was incompetent or slow. There was an air of formalness towards clients with the exception 
of most valued ones who had been working with investment advisors for a few years. 
Otherwise, roles were roles and rules were rules. Even the flow-trader who could generate 
more than 10 billion TL trading volume per year was virtually cut off from the loan and 
trading services of House D due to a disagreement over terms of his short-selling activities 
via House D (Informal discussion*, Hn 1 June 2009). In that respect, House D was 
conservative in its approach to overall operational risks. That was one of the reasons why the 
veteran sales trader, Br in House C quit his job in House D IRS department after several 
months.95 In the following, I turn to the IRS department and demonstrate the repercussions of 
this conservatism in its service to FIIs and DIIs. 
 
The white man versus the white man: the IRS department 
 
The white man metaphor in the title refers to the sales and research teams who seemed to 
have some sort of contempt towards ‘Apaches’, namely DRIs. However, the aim of the 
metaphor in the title is to emphasize how respective teams seemed to be at odds during the 
three week observation period due to the reasons mentioned before. I shall substantiate these 
differences which went beyond the observation period. For now, a brief introduction to the 
department and their client types shall help to contextualize the sense-making and trading 
activities observed. The trading team had two senior sales traders, T and Hs who were both 
educated in the US. T also worked in the US in an investment bank. The head of trading Bl 
was educated and worked in the US as a trader. His desk associates C and Y were both 
educated in Turkish universities. Cn was the assistant of Bl and worked more like a 
settlement officer whereas Y did trade execution for T’s clients as well as his own client 
portfolio. The latter consisted of a Turkish proprietary  trader based in Istanbul working for a 
global investment bank and a local asset management company which had several billion TL 
under management (though most of these assets were in fixed-income products). There was a 
third desk associate, S an experienced broker who joined the team from the ISE floor whilst I 
95 The operations department cut HSBC London Turkish equity desk including its proprietary trader in 
Br’s case as told to me by S (Interview, 10 August 2008). 
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was there. There were also two derivates traders in the room sitting across Y who executed 
orders for a European investment bank which also owned the majority shares of House D 
and the parent bank. The derivatives traders also made cold calls to prospective clients in 
Europe.   
 
All these figures apart from Y and S were very fluent in English. Y usually got assistance 
from T in giving market colour and updates to the clients over the Bloomberg chat 
programme. Y actually had enough English to write simple updates on price and board 
dynamics as well as flash news or to give market colour-namely what order and in what 
quantity the team was executing. The reason for the English language assistance from T was 
more about the wording of updates and how much private information the team actually 
wanted to share with clients. The wording was important for T mostly because he did not 
want to give a risky short-term market call to his much-valued and frequently trading client 
K, a hedge fund manager based in a European city. Otherwise Y was quite unrestrained in his 
market calls to the Turkish proprietary trader as well as the local asset management 
company. These calls were mainly based on flash news flows as well as chart analysis and 
were only restrained by Bl if they blended in too much private information about an order Bl 
was executing. As T observed in Y’s absence (field notes, p 63 3 June 2009), Y was quite 
driven by generating a flow and commission fees despite not quite well understanding what 
foreign clients were saying or what the research department officially recommended. T 
actually commended Y several times after Y quickly spotted news beyond the data platforms 
and conjured up updates which resulted in extra-trades by clients.  
 
Although the team was serving a 150 plus client portfolio together, there was a division of 
labour in who attended which client. In that respect, Bl served a core of five to 10 clients, 
most of which were global broker traders in London who worked at the Turkish or region 
desks. These traders sent orders to Bl almost on a daily basis. Some of these traders also 
worked as proprietary traders. In Bl’s case, the service was mainly about providing a 
flawless execution service to clients, giving them market colour and making sure that their 
orders were not fronted due to poor execution. Apart from these, if asked, Bl would give his 
view to proprietary traders on short-term trading opportunities. Otherwise, he did not strive 
to give trading calls on a daily basis unlike Y. Moreover, Bl was quite wary of putting his 
core client group at risk by giving them short-term trading calls given his past experiences 
and his knowledge about vernacular dynamics of the ISE spot index and major trading actors 
there. In one instances he restrained a proprietary trader from a global investment bank from 
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short-selling bank shares. Bl reasoned that without any ‘corporate or global sentiment’ or ‘a 
decent fundamental reason’ that would allow a strong downward trend, shorting banks in the 
ISE spot market ‘against the market sentiment’ was a ‘ballsy move’, something akin to 
‘pissing against the wind’. This was due to the vernacular dynamic of the ISE spot market 
and the large-capitalisation banks. As Bl perceived it, their price could easily shoot up by a 
random ‘large ticket’ from an FII, the effect of which would be magnified by ‘front-running’ 
and ‘churning’ locals (Apaches!) (Field notes, Bloomberg Chat logs, 25 May 2009). Bl also 
reiterated the research department’s view of “dislike banks, like industrials”. At the end, the 
client decided not to trade at all.  
 
T and Hs’ clients, on the other hand, were a blend of large and small asset management 
companies from Western and Eastern Europe. Some of these were alternative asset managers 
(hedge funds). The sales traders were also in contact with global brokers but as Hs put it, 
global brokers constituted only a small section of their client portfolio and they would not 
serve global brokers as comprehensively as the end-clients due to direct competition between 
House D and global brokers for end-clients. Hs added that 90 % of the market calls he gave 
were based on the research team output and the remaining 10 % was based on Hs’ own view. 
The latter was possible thanks to long-term good personal relationships which allowed Hs to 
slightly deviate from the formal calls (Informal discussion, 22 May 2009). In fact I observed 
Hs twice (4 and 19 May) over the three week-observation period pitching trading ideas to his 
end-clients on the phone all day-long. First he prepared a half page summary of freshly 
published analyst reports which reduced the moral of the story told in these reports to three 
to four sentences. Then he started calling his clients. In most of the cases, Hs talked to an 
answering machine rather than a real person. He explained to me that talking to a client or an 
answering machine was not a sign of good or bad relationship. It was just a matter of clients’ 
workload at the time (4 May 2009). T also made two idea-pitches similar to those of Hs in 
terms of the preparation and content but T’s pitches happened on different days. Apart from 
these formal idea pitches, there were a dozen or so impromptu share calls mostly by T which 
went beyond the official research “like” list. These calls were on the back of flash news on 
companies or changes in certain share prices which were significant due to a previous client 
exposure or interest in a given share. However both Hs and T always stated their research 
analysts’ positions on a given share and never tried to override the official research calls. 
They always used the subject “we” when they made formal pitches to clients. They hardly 




Both Hs and T explained to me that it was important to generally stick to the research 
department calls’ for several reasons. First of all, the research department provided company 
and market views generated in the official language of model-based calculations and 
predictions as described in the previous chapter. These calculations and fundamental stories 
were better informed by analysts’ relationships with company officials and economy 
bureaucrats. Going outside this comfort zone and say, giving market calls based solely on 
one’s own view or worse by relying on chart analysis was therefore a very risky move, 
especially if such a call was given to end-clients who were armed with their own buy side 
analysts and strategists. Hs was actually quite emphatic when he made the point about the 
official language to me- I dared to use the words ‘bet’ and ‘guess’ in my follow up to 
understand what he meant by ‘forecast’ (Informal discussion, 22 May 2009):  
Of course, it [share or macro calls] is a bet but it is based on models, calculations, 
and all the rest. In fact, you can't even call it a guess, it is always a forecast. It is 
imperative that we go along that line [of forecasts]. This is also because you are 
constantly being challenged by your counterpart, you say “the income will go up by 
this much” he says “why not 10 %”, you say “because of inflation, or USD/TL 
parity, or it won't grow this much etc.” It is a constant idea challenge and you need to 
be ready with the necessary information and knowledge. That is why I or T we never 
look at the charts, roll the dice and say “it will break 35” to give a share call! 
 
The second reason was the necessity to show an organisational integrity and harmony to 
clients, which, according T, was a key to success as an IRS department. The following 
incident between T and the analyst Kn about Hurriyet Gazete (owned by Dogan Holding) 
demonstrates this quite well. On 20 May, T thought without any numbers or figures to back 
up his impromptu idea that the popular national newspaper would perform quite well during 
the coming summer months in terms of advertisement revenues. T reasoned that people 
would buy more newspapers instead of watching TV during their summer holidays. This idea 
was actually on the back of recent surges in Hurriyet’s share price and T spotting the amount 
of advertisements the newspaper got whilst he skimmed a physical copy of the newspaper on 
20 May and several days before (field notes, p 9 18 May 2009). However the recent price 
surge for Hurriyet was not directly related to the company’s performance. It was more about 
the parent company’s changing fortunes in its ostensible political wrangling with the JDP as 
well as the latest positive developments for the parent company in a court case about tax 
evasion. Apparently, T wanted to pitch the share to his clients before but Kn gave a very 
gloomy view on the share:  
He made me quite scared, it was 0.5, 0.6 lira and now it is 1 lira, I am hesitant to give 
a call now to K [the hedge fund manager] after it hit 1 lira. When it was cheap, Kn 
sat down with me for half an hour and told me very professionally why I should not 




Several hours after this remark when Kn was back in the trading room in the afternoon 
session, T again tried to convince Kn to write a formal note on the company but Kn 
countered T by his categorical answer based on the newspaper’s circulation numbers and unit 
price for  advertisements. An analyst note on the company would allow T to pitch Hurriyet 
with more confidence to a larger client base. T told me the following after the analyst left:   
T: It is not desirable to go against your analyst view, you can't just say “my analyst is 
a dickhead” [which he actually did whilst talking to me], then they [clients] will say 
that your organisation is cracking.  
E: Don't your clients get angry when an opportunity is missed? 
T: No, it is not about anger. It is just that they can't make money. Look at the size of 
these advertisements... [T shows me the newspaper’s advertisement pages!].  
 
That is why both T and Hs and often Bl had to bite their tongues and say nothing but ‘we 
don’t like banks, we prefer industrials’ or ‘we don’t like [share name]’ in accordance with the 
research department calls despite surges in prices of those “disliked” shares. As mentioned 
before it was only a dozen or so occasions I observed T and Hs pitching “disliked” shares on 
the back of rumours or previous client-interest or exposure in those shares. The perceived 
problem for sales traders was that the lack of ‘any attention to market colour and flavour’ on 
the part of the research team ‘hurt the trading volumes coming from end-clients’ with the 
exception of one or two trades thanks to some personal relationship-based nonstandard calls 
to end-clients (Observation of T, Hs and Bl’s discussion, field notes, p 22, 20 May 2008).  I 
also observed the sales team several times indirectly complaining about the research team’s 
calls to their clients on the phone. This was probably when they were challenged by clients 
about the research team’s share calls. There was another source of grievance on the part of 
sales traders, namely lack of analyst coverage on some well-performing and FII-liked 
companies.    
 
All these grievances led to some funny jokes or bitter comments made in the trading room 
about analysts- of course these were made when the door leading to the research department 
was closed! Here is a selection of these reactions:  ‘too slow’ to publish a report, I will chuck 
X house’s company report in her face now’ (T on 2 June 2009);   ‘ask [analyst name] she 
does not even know what Selec means [referring to a large-capitalisation  pharmaceutical 
company Selcuk Ecza Deposu with its code name-a joke on the analyst’s non-coverage] (T 
on 1 June 2009), or ‘they have never given a right macro call since 2006 apart from those 
right share calls’ (T on 20 May 2009) and so on. Hs actually joked about this prevailing 
perception about the research team: ‘since I came to the IRS, I learned to say “market knows 
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the best” [Bl noded to agree]’ (field notes, p 22 20 May).   
 
In fact, during my stay in the trading room, I observed only four instances of a formal share 
pitch resulting in a trading activity by clients. In two of these, apparently Kn and the head of 
research A did the pitch and were excited enough to come to the room and boast about their 
success or plead with Bl to prioritize the order in question because of a past flop in a call 
which resulted in loss of client’s funds.  The third instance was after Hs’s pitch of ‘top-
picks’- research department calls that led to one very small trade. The last one was a 
significantly large order from an end-client which was directed to House D via a global 
broker as the end-client in question did not use House D for trade execution. The origin of 
the call came from the quantitative analyst, O who graduated with a financial engineering 
post-graduate degree from a top Turkish university. He regularly published switch calls 
(going long and short in two different shares or a share and the ISE 100 index) but did not do 
verbal idea pitching apart from sending a bulk email to the clients. This ‘quant call’ actually 
contradicted the analyst C’s long-term ‘market-perform’ call on the company in question, 
namely Turkcell. 
 
This ostensible lack of research output driven trading activity did not mean that research 
team was incompetent as far as the institutional and/or career-generated cultural capital they 
possessed was concerned. The nine-strong team had undergraduate and postgraduate degrees 
in finance, economics, business administration and mathematics from top Turkish, European 
or American universities. The head of the department worked for a global investment bank in 
the US for a few years. The bank analyst Br was a former fund manager in Europe. Kn held 
CFA certificate and O held two global industry certificates related to risk and alternative 
asset management. One of their former analysts was snapped up by a global investment bank 
in London.   
 
If there was an issue with performance of the research team, this was more to do with the 
nature of their job in an over-brokered and over-researched market like the ISE. The apparent 
issue as far as the sales team was concerned was about not having immediate results from 
time-consuming research output or sales traders’ pitches with the exception of working with 
proprietary traders (Informal discussion with Hs, 22 May 2009).  But the latter was in 
decline after the global financial meltdown. Otherwise, the IRS department was awarded 
with votes from end-clients in industry-wide surveys and/or the department would get ‘soft 
commissions’ in the lack of direct trading from end-clients. These rewards were based on 
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positive opinions about the IRS department’s market/share call performance (field 
observation, p 28, 21 May, and informal discussion* with Cn, 28 May 2009). As put by Hs, 
there was no clear and continuous link between the research output and trading activity in the 
IRS department: ‘We don't know the origins of the 7 out of 10 orders, you give your idea, 
they like it and give you the order, but this does not mean that idea creation is always down 
to you, they have their own opinion too, they have their own analyst’ (Informal discussion, 
22 May 2009). But the official research output written in the right language of global finance 
had to be there be able to serve 100 plus clients. This language also informed the regular 
email and telephone contacts with clients. The type of service in House D was unlike that of 
House C which relied on the social capital of its two veteran sales traders to be viable.96 
However, this tenuous link between research output and trading activity in House D did not 
mean that the trading room was silent at all. It was one of the noisiest and entertaining sites I 
observed during my field research in Istanbul. This was thanks to the trading team’s constant 
jokes and antiques which often included me as a joke-victim due to my note-taking and my 
being a researcher observing ‘monkeys in a zoo’ and ‘Bl, the chief orangutan’ (Br and Bl’s 
joke, p 42, 27 May 2009).   In the following section, I shall present the descriptive statistics 
on stories captured in the trading room and then substantiate the story behind the numbers. 
This is followed by a concluding commentary on the types of capitals the IRS department 
relied on in their daily activities, and the indirect response of the research team to the sales 
and trading team’s criticism.  

96 Interestingly, when I met up with  the analyst in House C G a year later, he lamented that producing 
formal analyst reports was rather futile as it was very time consuming and it looked like no-one 























































































































































1 - 7 - - 13 13 7-1 4 - 2 7 - 2 2 
D-2* 6 - 3 - - 9 9 3-1 6 1 2 5 - 1 - 
D-3 10
2 3 13 - - 26 15 3-2 4 - 6 7 10 1 2 
D-4 17
3 1 13 - - 31 27 5-8 3 4 10 7 4 1 5 
D-5 14
4 15 9 - - 24 21 5-3 4 1 12 4 5 - 2 
D-6 14 - 11 - - 25 22 3-4 2 1 8 9 3 2 2 
D-7 7 1 12 - - 20 19 2-4 3 1 6 8 3 - 2 
D-8 17 1 13 1 - 32 21 16-0 8 1 11 7 7 - 6 
D-9* 3 - 4 - 1 8 6 4-0 1 1 3 2 1 - 1 
D-10* 11 - 4 - - 15 11 4-0 - - 9 - 3 1 2 
D-11 12 4 8 - - 24 23 4-2 3 4 7 6 4 3 - 
D-12 12 4 8 - -- 24 20 6-4  2 11 4 4 1 2 
D-13* 6 - 2 - - 8 8 4-0 3 - - 3 4 - 1 
Total 135 15 107 1 1 259 215 66-29 41 16 87 69 48 12 27 
* Half-day observations 
 
 
What is wrong with the markets? 
 
1-Day 1-Contra-cause-effect: Hs observes Arcelik share price hitting the price ceiling 
despite the not very promising fundamental indicators 
Hs: What is the deal with Arcelik, it hits the ceiling. It is dead inside! 
2-Day 2-Contra-correlation: T observes the downward change in the US futures 
index, G the VOB trader joins the observation  
T: Oh, they’ve nailed it on the US, and here mad people are buying Sabanci [holding 
shares]. They’re mad! 
G: I think we will come to a point of decoupling, we are approaching that point. 
3-Day 4- Contra-cause effect: Bl observes Garanti trading and wonders why it is up 
despite some negative rumours on the IMF-Turkey deal as heard by the chief 
strategist Sr, from his bureaucrat insiders in Ankara. 
Bl: What is happening here, Garanti [bank] is going [up] despite this stuff that the 
IMF deal is in jeopardy? 
T: Yeah that is what we say but it looks like there won’t be any need for the IMF 
deal after all.  
4-Day 5- Contra-cause effect: T, Bl and Y observe their screens towards the 
anticipated 15:30 pm US unemployment figure release. Bloomberg data platform 
voices the results; it is 6,000 more than the expected figure. The markets are now 
addressed as “you” figure and the observers seem undecided about how to interpret 
it:  
T: [observing the index indicators turning red] don’t sell it hastily! They are gonna 
sell it here, we also might have to sell! 




T: [observes the abating sell pressure] Now you’re buying back despite the data, 
aren’t you 
Bl: Why are you guys selling? You just keep on pissing against the wind! 
5-Day 5- Contra-correlation: Bl observes the BOVESPA and wonders how the ISE 
can manage to be quite resilient in the face of falls in other markets: 
Bl: Yesterday, Brazil was up 5 %, today it is down 5 %, they’re giving back what 
they got yesterday but we’re down only 1 %, what’s going on? 
S: It’s this never-ending saga of IMF-Turkey deal, nothing else.  
 
The story behind the numbers 
 
Over ten and a half full observation days, I collected 259 stories in the sales and trading 
room. The main reason behind the difference in the average number of stories per day 
between House D IRS (24.6) and the general average across the observation sites (17.2) was 
the conversations between traders and sales traders on price changes and their discussions 
about giving market colour or intra-day trading calls to clients. There were 87 cause-effect 
and 65 proto-stories that were generated by sales traders and/or traders mainly for this 
purpose of firstly making-sense of the scopic screen and beyond (client activity) and then 
deciding what type of an update to give to clients. However, 18 of these 152 sense-making 
stories involved a joke about the situation in the market and/or the official market/share 
views of the IRS department which seemed to be at odds with each other. Five of these jokes 
were directly about the research team’s specific research outputs or lack of it! Another 18 of 
the 152 stories generated among the sales and trading team relied on private knowledge. The 
source of the information in these stories was either client positions in a share (12) or non-
public knowledge about other brokerage houses (6). The team was also kind enough to 
answer my questions on market events and this generated eight of the 152 stories. On top of 
these cause-effect and proto-stories, there were 13 correlations stories generated by the 
trading team as a manifestation of the master perception of one-way correlation between the 
world markets and the ISE. Although members of the research team infrequently visited the 
trading room, there were an additional 32 stories where one of the analysts got involved in 
the story either as the plot provider (18) or as the recipient of an answer about his/her inquiry 
about ISE trading activity (14). Including the single instances of randomness and similarity 
logics, there were 199 stories generated by members of the trading and research team for 
their own sense-making needs.  
 
The remaining 60 stories captured during my observation period were told to the clients. 22 
of these stories were told by the sales traders and eight of them (four cause-effect and three 
proto-stories) relied on private knowledge. The source of private knowledge was either 
private information acquired from other clients or “market colour” in the form of what other 
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clients were buying or selling. Five of the 22 stories by the sales traders were based on the 
research team’s official company/market calls, and two stories were based on rumours 
circulating in the market via data platforms. The remaining nine stories were on share and 
brokerage house moves ostensibly caused with or without news as spotted by the sales 
traders. These stories were conveyed to clients due to previous interest/exposure of clients to 
shares in question.    
 
The traders were more active than the sales traders in telling stories to clients and generated 
38 stories in this category. Only three of these stories were based on the official research 
department calls and a fourth one mentioned a report by a global broker in its plot. The 
traders relied on private knowledge in four of the 38 stories told to clients but three of these 
stories were actually based on the lie that it was ‘domestics’ in House D who were trading in 
the share not the IRS trading team. In the remaining 30 stories, 15 of them were market 
colour based on publicly available data on share price and houses actively trading on the 
board. The remaining 13 stories were market and share calls based on publicly available 
data/information on data platforms. Four of these stories bundled what happened abroad into 
their plots to embellish the call in question. Adding the remaining two correlation stories told 
to a client by Bl, six market call stories by the traders invoked the master perception of one 
way correlation.   
 
Interestingly in none of the stories told to clients, chart analysis featured as the dominant 
item in the plot. In fact, there were only six stories out of 259 which had chart dynamics as 
the dominant logic. Otherwise five more stories included charts in their plots as secondary 
observations or causes. When it comes to the general use among the trading team of the 
master perception of one-way correlation/cause-effect, there were 38 cause-effect and proto-
stories in addition to 15 pure correlation stories, which takes the total number of cases that 
invoked the master perception about the ISE’s peripheral role in the global financial markets 
to 53 (20 %). This ratio is significantly lower than what was observed in the four DRI sites 
but quite close to the percentage found in House C’s IRS department (17 %). These lower 
percentages attest to the general sense-making focus of IRS teams, namely the ISE and the 




View from the other side of the department: analysts speaking 
 
As mentioned before, the sales and trading team had grievances about the research team. The 
sales and trading team believed that the research team had little interest in “market colour”. 
Moreover, the research team was seen to be quite inflexible about watering down their 
fundamental views on companies in the face of short-term catalysts for share price increases. 
Additionally, the sales and trading team criticised some analysts due to their slowness in 
generating formal outputs on promising companies. But how did the analysts understand 
their job responsibilities and role of the sales and trading team in shaping of an analyst’s job 
description? Below is a discussion that draws on the interviews with the research team 
members. 97 
 
While I was interviewing C on 2 June 2009, he had to attend Hs’ telephone call, and 
coincidentally I overheard the following conversation between a female analyst D, and an 
intern proper who was there to get some job experience:  
Intern- Could the sales team dictate anything on how or what [company] report you 
write? 
D [Seems taken aback with the question and answers emphatically] Nobody can 
interfere in our job! Only A checks it for editing. I have my assumptions about 
companies and the economy and I write accordingly.  
Intern- Do you buy shares yourself? 
D- No, I don’t invest in the bourse, I buy gold. Not that I never think about buying, 
say fertilizers, though I would buy it not for investing but for my garden [laughs]. 
 
Despite the joke, D made two points which were confirmed by all the other analysts I 
interviewed. First is that the analyst’s and the head of research’s judgment determined what 
company was to be covered and how it was covered. Although requests to cover a company 
could come from clients or the sales and trading team, these passed through an initial 
evaluation by analysts. This was generally followed by analysts’ company visits. The latter 
aimed to go beyond the publicly available information, and if possible, create an initial 
rapport with the company management, and get a qualitative understanding of the 
management intentions. If analysts decided that there were risks associated with a company 
management such as lack of transparency or risky organisational structure that might 
jeopardize investor rights and interest, they usually decided not to initiate cover irrespective 
of any spectacular market performance of the company’s share (E, 4 June 2009).98 The 
analysts believed that the fundamentals of a company eventually prevailed over its market 

97 I interviewed all but one analyst, Kn who was always busy!  
98 E was the figure who was blamed most by the sales traders. 
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price, of course unless it was a very problematic share under the control of Investor Ali-type 
figures. That is why the analysts did not want to mislead their clients with short-term 
exuberances caused by non-sustainable factors.   
 
Second are, like A and G in House C, the analysts who always work with a valuation model 
that provides a detailed breakdown of company revenues and costs. Whilst the models 
seemed to be universal within the IRS field and beyond, assumptions about the effects of 
different emergent themes of a company on its earning and/or cost structure could vary 
among analysts from different intermediary organisations and would lead to differences in 
predictions about a share’s target price (C, 2 June 2009). However, the bottom line of any 
analyst activity was the fact that models and a probabilistic framework shaped analysts’ 
observation and sense-making activities. This distanced them in their routine analyst work 
from market colour or even short-term non-significant but related news flows about a 
company (Br, 29 May 2009). That was why Br, a month after starting his 80 page-long 
initiation report for banks with an “under-perform” call, stuck to this long-term call in his 
routine update that was to be published after the quarterly bank balance sheet 
announcements. For him there was to be no significant change in the key banking-related 
themes that informed his initiation call and hence no fundamental reason to change his call 
on banks. This was despite the unpleasantness of being on the ‘wrong side’ of the existing 
short-term market dynamic (above interview). 
 
Importance of social capital in generating better research output  
 
In the light of the above discussion, one would assume that institutional and career-based 
cultural capital is what matters most in becoming a successful research analyst. Although 
that type of capital is an absolute minimum requirement on the way to success as an analyst 
in the field, the social capital of analysts also matters. As the analysts E, C, and D (3 June 
2009) explained to me, the relationships they started and built up with company 
representatives and investor relations staff could really make a difference. The latter was 
about getting a better informed insight into company operations, which could help the 
analyst to see what other analysts might not notice and put him/her ahead of the crowd. 
Moreover, some companies would also judge the breadth of institutional investor base 
represented by an analyst and would change their attitude to the analyst for the positive (E, 4 
June 2009).  
 
Otherwise, none of the analysts argued that the quality of their research output (or 
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effectiveness of their cultural capital) was an important determinant in the amount and depth 
of their social capital, especially when their relationship with investor relations departments 
was concerned.  Using universal valuation models, benefiting from peer-review on their 
outputs provided by the head of research, and company revenue and cost guidance given by 
investor relations departments made the House D’s analysts confident that there would not be 
a huge risk of getting a call spectacularly wrong, at least according to fundamental valuation 
factors. The confidence about the quality of their work was in contrast with the House C’s 
head of research Mrs A’s emphasis on the importance of the quality of research output 
(cultural capital) in a successful IRS department. This was despite the fact that all the 
analysts in House C and House D had very similar institutional and embodied cultural 
capitals. This difference in perceptions about the importance of cultural capital could 
therefore be attributed to House C’s and House D’s significantly differing organisational 
capital resources and their position in the ISE’s intermediation field mentioned before.  
 
Apart from their IR-related relationship work, the analysts in House D did not actually do 
any significant relationship work with their buy-side counterparts. For them, their job was 
more about generating timely research outputs, making telephone calls to those interested 
buy-side analysts after major updates and answering questions from sales traders and fund 
manager clients. None of the analysts I interviewed did actually follow up whether a client 
bought a share after a company report/update or a telephone call that pitched this particular 
call. The analysts believed in the virtue of division of labour and they were not naïve enough 
to think that their clients only worked with House D or would welcome pressure-selling from 
an analyst!  
 
O’s quantitative portfolio  
 
It was actually the head of research A, the chief strategist S, and the quantitative analyst O 
who provided a more direct and market oriented service to the IRS clients. O actually runs a 
model portfolio for statistical arbitrage based on shares’ under-performance or over-
performance vis-à-vis the ISE 100 index or peer companies. He told me that his arbitrage 
calls had nothing to do with fundamental views provided by the analysts but it was good to 
have that view as a complementary input which sometimes helped them reach a wider client 
audience. Otherwise, O’s most active client was an arbitrage desk run by the European 
parent company. Yet again O would rarely follow up what clients had done apart from 
feedback given to him by sales traders or clients themselves. Again, the onus of relationship 
work, which was usually needed for those non-quantitative oriented clients, seemed to be on 
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the sales traders and conventional analysts (Interview, 27 May 2009).  
 
Strategist’s social capital  
 
Apart from his routine report writing and client updating activities, the strategist’s task in the 
research team was to provide an overall view on the global and Turkish economy and politics 
and detect macro trend changes in advance so that both sales traders and analysts would be 
better informed in their routine sense-making and trading activities. On top of this, Sr 
facilitated client contacts with top level and mid-level Turkish economy bureaucrats as well 
as important mid-level and upper level managers in largest corporations in Turkey. These 
meetings were possible thanks to the social capital Sr had amassed over the years.  He 
explained to me that to make the most out of these meetings, he also gave guidance to his 
clients about what should be asked to whom and what should be followed up. Although the 
aim of these two track meetings were to get more information from mid-level managers and 
bureaucrats who always had a higher tendency to tell facts rather than speaking rhetorically, 
sometimes top-level informants would surprise clients with insights they gave into the 
Turkish economy or companies’ activities. All in all, for Sr using publicly available data and 
working with models and forecasting the future of the Turkish economy was a relatively easy 
chore. More important was acquiring genuine perceptions of decision-makers on public and 
private data/information and being able to form his own view and help clients benefit from 
this type of insight or higher datum that would never be available on scopic screens 
(Interview, 3 June 2009).   
 
A’s marketing activities  
 
Last but not least, the head of research, A, seemed to have a more active marketing role in 
the research team. Apart from running the whole IRS department as the assistant general 
manager of House D, A worked in tandem with Sr and other analysts to formulate short-term 
and long-term macro and micro strategy calls. He also supervised and, if necessary, helped 
the generation of routine research literature, such as dailies and strategy reports on economy 
and politics (Interview, 4 June 2009). Because A did not have any company or sector 
coverage responsibilities, he had more time to not only market the official research outputs 
to the IRS department’s clients but also create short-term macro and micro trading ideas that 
could be marketed to alternative asset managers.  In this vein, A had a core client group 
whom he had daily contact with like a sales trader via Bloomberg chat platform. It seemed as 




Territory demarcations  
 
There were two significant grievances on the part of the sales traders stemming from A’s 
daily activities. First, the sales traders were of the view that that A did not focus enough on 
equity research and finding the ‘outperforming share’. This, they believed, was due to A 
paying too much attention to creating short-term market calls and doing too much 
relationship work with clients (conversation between T and Hs, 3 June 2009, field notes p, 
59-60). Although I observed from A’s frequent visits to the trading room that he always 
incorporated fundamental view into his relatively short-term share and market calls to the 
sales team, the sales traders and especially T got irritated if A got a bit insistent on his calls, 
which seemed like a breach into the sales trader’s core client group and hence his social 
capital.  
 
In one significant instance, A insisted on T getting K, the hedge fund manager, decrease his 
position in a share, Tat Konserve, to buy it back later. As mentioned before, the initial formal 
long-term buy call for the share in question was part of the IRS department’s top-picks list. A 
tried to convince T for this particular short-term trading call first by giving reference to how 
he got one of his close clients to trade in the share and secondly by reminding T that K ‘was 
a f***ing trader’ (field notes, p 65 4 June 2009). As far as I observed during my stay, T and 
his trader Y were quite careful about sustaining and increasing K’s appreciation of T’s and 
Y’s service and making sure that they only gave K what he wanted from them. Of course this 
perception of T and Y about what K wanted from them as a hedge fund manager was being 
formed over the months since the relationship started. A did not seem to have that particular 
insight about K. This was despite the fact that A told me that half of their business was about 
relationship work and giving clients what they wanted.  
 
Wrapping up: House D’s organisational cultural capital 
 
Perhaps, the grievances of the sales traders about the research team was actually a blessing 
as most of the analysts stuck to their core responsibilities and did not interfere with what 
other IRS personnel and their specific clients were up to. As C put it, the primary goal of the 
IRS department was to ‘make money’ but everybody was expected to fulfil different primary 
responsibilities in achieving this goal: ‘when I generate my research output and tell this to 
people, then it means I have done my best’ (2 June 2009). In that respect, the team members 
seemed to be rather defensive about their routine activities and the integrity of their cultural 
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and social capital as manifested in D’s reaction to the intern and in T’s resistance to A in the 
case of giving K a short-term trading call. In fact, these territorial demarcations could be 
seen as the manifestation of House D’s organisational cultural capital, namely having non-
personal devices and knowledge to manage risks with a sophisticated division of labour and 
not having to rely on particular figures or risky methods for success in the ISE. House D’s 
size in terms of its equity base (economic capital) and client numbers (social capital) 
consolidated this organisational cultural capital. However without the latter, both economic 
and social capital of House D could not be sustainable. House D’ all three types of capital 
were mutually constituted and allowed its IRS and domestic sales staff to enjoy a relatively 









As a summary of the conceptual arguments of the thesis, the following can be stated about 
the role of narratives in financial markets. Firstly, market actors, irrespective of their 
differing roles, resources and identities in the field, resort to storytelling to make sense of the 
past, present and future of market events and actions as abstracted on scopic market screens. 
This is because scopic market screens have a contradictory architecture: they move more and 
more market place events and actions to a calculative space in the form of simple data, but 
this increasing abstraction and disembedding of events and actions from their origins in 
subjective realities of a multitude of market actors increases the need for storytelling. Stories 
act as an anti-market device that aims to generate a higher datum or an apperception over 
simple data. This is particularly convenient for the attribution of agency, motive, credit and 
blame to otherwise anonymous investors, which is based on the proxy data representations of 
their activities. The argument that storytelling acts as a sense-making device is also boosted 
by the sequential and contemporaneous representation modes in the scopic market devices 
that encourage market actors to detect connections among alpha-numerical figures and news 
narratives constantly streaming in a contemporaneous manner. However, from a sociological 
perspective, the evolution of storytelling acts, and the scopic market screens, and the existing 
modes of sense-making practices based on these (anti) market devices should be seen as 
embedded in social, cultural and material circumstances. Market actors voluntarily and 
involuntarily position themselves vis-à-vis other market actors in relation to the historical 
evolution and current circumstances of a market. This embeddedness leads to differences in 
the ways storytelling is used in sense-making among different types of market actors, despite 
the fact that storytelling universally achieves sense-making via sequencing in a non-random 
manner.  
 
In this thesis, I demonstrated the case of the ISE from this perspective of dispositions and 
position-taking acts and their effects on the modes of sense-making and narrative outcomes 
in financial markets. I did so by identifying three dominant investor types in the ISE, namely 
DRIs, DIIs and FIIs. Furthermore, I identified two sub-DRI types, namely domestic 
speculators and abandoned DRIs. I traced the origins and evolution of these three investor 
types in the ISE with a view to describing their material, cultural and social resources and 
consequent dispositions and position-taking acts in the ISE since its opening in 1985. My 
observation sites provided me with a cross section of these core investor types in the ISE and 
their dispositions and position-taking acts between 2007 and 2009. In terms of the 
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intermediation sector in the ISE, there were sites that I could not observe such as a 
foreigners-only brokerage house, a domestics-only and independently-owned discount 
brokerage house, and a domestics-only conglomerate-owned house. However, as discussed 
in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2, the lack of direct observation in these sites was compensated 
by interviews and informal discussions with representatives from a sample of these houses. 
Thanks to these triangulation efforts, it became apparent that House A’s and House D’s 
domestic sales teams served a representative sample of high-frequency and high net worth 
DRIs’ activities in the ISE. House B’s domestic sales team, on the other hand, was a place 
where I had the chance to observe in-depth the less opportunistic and less privately and 
vernacularly informed DRIs which were also found in House D but they were less visible 
thanks to the House D’s relatively formalised service to them. On the other hand,  House A’s 
branch looked like a representative field site for abandoned DRIs which could be found in all 
types of brokerage houses and their telephone dealing and branch networks, even in that of 
House B. On the FIIs’ front, House C and House D provided a cross section of these 
institutional investors in the ISE which included proprietary traders, global asset 
management companies, alternative asset managers (hedge funds) and global brokers located 
in global financial hubs. Similar to what I did for the DRI scene, I complemented my indirect 
observations of FIIs in House C and House D with interviews and informal discussions with 
representatives from one-stop-shop brokerage houses and foreigners-only houses, and with 
FIIs located in Istanbul and London.  
 
From an in situ sense-making perspective, all these scenes of investor and intermediation 
types resorted to the anti-market device of storytelling. Leaving aside the acknowledgment 
that my field observations did not represent every story told during my observation period, 
the captured stories as well as the informal discussions with my informants demonstrated 
that storytelling acts were not an aberration in dominant cognitive and decision-making 
activities in these pockets of the ISE. They were in fact the main mechanisms to cope with 
the uncertainty about the past, present and future that were ever present in the flow of 
data/information and funds on scopic market screens. However, in line with the 
conceptualisation of narrative sense-making as embedded in the field-specific configurations 
of resources and dispositions, there were significant differences among the field sites in 
terms of the captured stories’ semiotic structures and their instrumental purpose.  
 
To begin with, in the domestic sales departments of House A, B, and D, the storytelling acts 
were more client-oriented and happened with a view to satisfying the daily sense-making 
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needs of clients and spotting the risks and opportunities provided by the short-term 
movements and news events  in global markets and economies. This type of observation 
activity and the resultant sense-making stories were not challenged by DRIs as they, like 
their intermediaries, believed in the master perception of correlation between the global 
markets and the ISE. As a result, in House A headquarters, 157 stories invoked (54 %) the 
master correlation perception. In House B, this was 48.5% with 62 stories, and in House D it 
was similarly 42% with 35 stories. On the other hand, the number of  stories that were told 
clients in these three core DRI scenes were 32 % in House A,  44.5 % in House B, and 
similarly 44.5 % in House D. The biggest reason behind the House A’s lesser number of 
stories told to clients was its VIP clients’ relatively self-sufficient cognitive and trading skills 
which made House A one of the most formidable actors in the VOB despite its relatively 
small size in terms of client numbers and branch network. On the other hand, both House B’s 
and House D’s DRI clients were a mixture of more to less competent retail investors some of 
whom acted as domestic speculators and some others had very little idea about the nooks and 
crannies of equity investment. The higher percentage of stories told to the clients in these 
houses were due to this core DRI mix and their ISE equity market activities, which 
necessitated a more intense relationship work by investment advisors. However as noted in 
Chapter 8 and 10, there were organisational differences between House B and House D in 
their approach to serving DRIs, which led to differences in the tone of storytelling acts done 
for relationship work.  
 
On the other hand, the only direct observation of the abandoned DRI scene, namely my 
residence in House A’s branch revealed several things. To begin with, the abandoned DRI 
scene was marked by the relative importance of social networks and one’s position in these 
networks in access to information beyond scopic screens. Consequently, the private 
information/knowledge use in House A’s branch happened in 20 % of all the stories captured 
there. This compares with 2 % in House A’s VIP dealing floor, 4.6% in House B’s VIP 
dealing floor, and 1.2 % in House D’s VIP dealing floor! In fact, the percentage of private 
information/knowledge use in House B was skewed by an investment advisor there who was 
serving a high-frequency trading and high net worth individual who seemed to act as a 
domestic speculator in a middle-capitalisation share. Otherwise, in the core DRI scenes 
indirectly observed private knowledge/information was subordinated to the dominant 
cognitive schema about the ISE’s peripheral position in the grand scheme of global economy 
and financial markets. The residents in House A branch, on the other hand, seemed to mock 
the sense-making and trading consequences of this dominant cognitive schema and did not 
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pay much attention to it. This manifested itself in the number of stories which invoked this 
master correlation perception, namely 22 stories (23 %). In fact, one would have observed 
lesser numbers in this type of story, if it had not been for the relationship work stories told by 
the informal dealers in the room, especially H, who was acting as a domestic speculator in 
small-capitalisation and middle-capitalisation shares. In these relationship stories, the 
foreigners in the ISE and their share in the ISE’s overall portfolio value became the 
guarantee that everything was stable in the ISE despite the turmoil in the global economy 
and financial markets.   The insignificant share of private information/knowledge use in the 
VIP dealing floors of the three houses however should not be read as the insignificance of 
social capital in House A’s, B’s and D’s success in the DRI scenes.  Both House A and House 
D served a core of the core DRIs in the ISE, at least in terms of trading volume generation, 
namely domestic speculators and day-traders. Serving this type of DRI necessitated a type of 
social capital on the part of the Houses’ management that was based on mutual trust and, to 
some extent, tolerance by the managements towards the excesses of these high frequency 
traders. On the other hand, House B’s management decided to disassociate the House from 
this type of domestic speculator and invest more time and energy into sustaining an ordinary 
DRI client base which posed lesser regulatory and operational risks.  
 
What was the situation in the FII scene? From a storytelling perspective, both House C’s and 
House D’s IRS teams seemed to focus on the local events and actions within and outwith the 
ISE in line with their role in the division of labour between FIIs and their local brokers. This 
manifested itself in the relatively low number of stories that invoked the master correlation 
perception. In House D this amounted to 20 % of the stories. Similarly, House C’s IRS team 
invoked this logic only in 17 % of the stories. More interestingly, the number stories told to 
clients in both houses were quite limited compared to the VIP dealing floors observed in this 
study. In House D’s IRS department, this was only 60 stories (% 23). Only 22 of them were 
told by the sales traders whose main job was to pitch the research team’s market and share 
calls that were generated by the use of established market devices such as universal valuation 
models and statistical analysis for arbitrage opportunities. In fact, only five of these stories 
were based on the official research team calls. Similarly only three stories by the traders to 
their clients were an instance of such a formal pitch!   
 
In House C’s IRS department, the number of stories told to clients went down to 44 stories 
42 of which were all told by Br and S, the veteran sales traders. This constituted 22.5 % of 
all stories captured in the department. In Br’s and S’s case, 27 of these stories (64 %) were 
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market calls conjured up by them. These were based on short-term and mid-term catalysts on 
the ISE’s index value that originated from Turkey and/or abroad. These stories occasionally 
relied on the head of research’s official macro economy and sometimes share calls on banks 
but were embellished by a trader’s touch. On the other hand, sales traders and traders in 
House D  told only 15 such stories (25 %) which were  mainly based on very short-term 
catalysts in shares that were based on publicly available data/information.  Two of these were 
actually based on rumours about the Turkish banking sector circulating on the scopic 
screens. My conclusion from these statistics is that both Br and S in House C felt more 
confident about giving impromptu index and share calls to their FII clients thanks to their 
long-running relationships with them. These market calls relied more on the narrative sense-
making than they did on official analyst calls as a market device. On the other hand, House 
D’s sales and trading team, despite having a broader social capital compared to that of House 
C’s IRS team, were constrained by the overriding nature of the IRS department’s and its FII 
clients’ mutually constituted cultural capital. This was based on the generation of valuation 
objects by use of market devices such as universal valuation models and probability 
calculations. As a result, the official research outputs, no matter how wrong they seemed in 
the short-run, undermined any narrative imagination or vernacular knowledge on the part of 
sales traders that could be used to create impromptu trading and profit opportunities for their 
clients. Maybe the latter was possible back in 2008 when proprietary traders from global 
brokers demanded such a service and dominated the ISE’s trading alongside domestic 
speculators but due to the global financial meltdown in late 2008, such trading activity by the 
proprietary traders was told to have declined very significantly during my observations in 
2009.  
 
Otherwise, both sales and trading teams in House C and House D relied on narrative sense-
making as an anti-market device for their own sense-making needs. In that respect, they had 
a similar cognitive schema to that of the domestic sales teams but with a lesser focus on 
abroad due to their essential task of providing the best Turkish coverage to their FII clients.  
On a different note, there was relatively high number of cases in which private 
information/knowledge was used as the plot provider in the stories captured in House C (7.6 
%) and House D (11.2 %). However these cases were not the same as the mode of such 
knowledge use in House A’s branch. In House D’s IRS department, a significant part of the 
private information/knowledge use (62%) stemmed from the trading activity of clients and 
the attempts of the sales and trading team to generate more trading activity from other clients 
who were interested in those shares being traded. However, in House C, I only captured three 
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stories as such out of 15 private knowledge use, which was mainly due to the limitations of 
my observation mode in the IRS room as well as S’s modus operandi in clients’ order 
execution. However it was observed that none of the instances of private 
information/knowledge use in the IRS departments of House C and House D, unlike House 
A’s branch,  implied the existence of any guided and long-lasting price movement in a share 
nor a figure of domestic speculator with individual whims and peculiarities behind this 
guided move.  
 
Last but not least, my observations in the AMC provided insights into a market setting where 
a multitude of market devices, such as proprietary benchmark monitoring models, fund 
products’ charters, and the scopic market screens, embedded the fund managers in a 
calculative platform from which they reacted to uncertainty that was constantly present on 
the scopic screens. The narrative outcomes in the AMC should be seen from this 
foundational calculative perspective. However, a distinction was observed between the 
equity and fixed-income fund managers despite this shared calculative platform. The equity-
fund managers were constantly adjusting their funds’ exposure to various securities, which 
was based on their anticipation of what anonymous investors’ reactions would be to the 
data/information and fund flows on the scopic market screens. These anticipations were 
based on a mixture of categorical and vernacular knowledge that the equity managers 
possessed about the Turkish economy and markets and about their dynamics in relation to 
market events abroad. In this regard, the equity-fund managers could become cognitive 
misers, especially when an index trend seemed too strong to warrant a naïve scientist mode. 
Their stories before the scopic screens reflected this flexibility and resembled those that were 
captured on the VIP trading floors in terms of the master correlation perception and use of 
narrative imagination.   
 
On the other hand, the fixed-income managers constantly seemed to be in a naïve scientist 
mode due to the nature of securities in which they invested and their beliefs in the validity of 
the categorical knowledge that they possessed about these securities and the markets in 
general. When the markets seemed to have other ideas about these securities and how they 
were supposed to move in the face of data/information and fund flows, the fixed-income 
managers became quite upset. This was exacerbated by the losses their funds were incurring 
due to these seemingly contra-moves. However, towards the end of my residence in the 
AMC, I also observed the equity managers getting upset because of a similar reason, after 
they decided that it was time to decrease their fund products’ weights in equities. This 
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decision was based on the data/information flow on the state of the Turkish economy and the 
global markets.   
 
In general, the narrative outcomes captured in the AMC reflected the effects of the market 
devices, including the fund charters, on the fund manager’s cognitive and investment 
activities. None of the managers in the room blindly believed in the dominant local cognitive 
schemata that seemed to move the ISE equity market index on a daily basis thanks to the 
dominance of DRIs’ in the daily trading volume. Ironically, the availability of numerical 
proxy representations on the scopic screens about the trading acts of  anonymous investors in 
the ISE and other world markets and about their intentions encouraged the equity managers’ 
to resort to storytelling acts as an anti-market device. On the other hand, the fixed-income 
managers operated in a relatively dim scopic market environment where proxy data about 
anonymous investor intentions were hardly available. This was another market device-
related factor, alongside the fixed-income fund charters, that left the fixed-income managers 
pretty much reliant on their categorical knowledge about the markets and macro economy.  
 
To recap the answers given to the main questions posed in this thesis, market actors in the 
ISE, despite occupying different positions and sustaining different dispositions, invariably 
resorted to the anti-market device of storytelling. This was the main method of coping with 
the uncertainty that was ever present on the scopic market devices about the past, present and 
future of the markets. However, due to the different individual and organisational 
dispositions, and different social, cultural and material resources among the major 
intermediary/investor types in the ISE field, the storytelling acts and outcomes among the 
five representative observation sites showed differences with regard to the in situ narratives’ 






APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE SCOPIC MARKET SCREEN  
 
In order to give a conceptual visualisation of the present scopic market system in the ISE 
since the introduction of the remote access system in late 2001, I describe a regular market 
screen here that buy-side and sell-side market actors use. Market screens are powered by 
desktop computers that have Windows network operating systems. Trading platform 
software provided by local software companies connects these computers to Express-Api 
interface (Ex-Api), the remote access system of the ISE. The Ex-api system works with 
terminals installed in brokerage houses which are connected to the ISE's main computer 
systems in Istinye via a dedicated cable line. The Ex-Api software installed on individual 
computers for market actors usually comes with integrated book keeping tools to enforce the 
ISE's exchange and settlement rules as well as brokerage house specific trading restrictions 
and/or privileges on each client.  This software however does not provide data/information 
flow to the scopic screens. This is provided by data vendor companies such as Matriks Bilgi 
As., Plato Ltd., Thompson Reuters, and Bloomberg. Brokerage houses usually prefer 
information and data platforms provided by one of the first two companies as they are local 
and cheaper than the international ones. However, in all the four houses and the AMC, there 
were Bloomberg and Reuters data terminals.  
 
A regular market screen powered by Ex-Api software, and the data/information platform fed 
by one of the local or global data vendor companies constitutes the essence of the ISE scopic 
market. Market actors are connected to a central trading system via the Ex-api software, and 
to the outside world that pertains to the ISE trading activity via the data/information 
platform. Configuration of Ex-Api software is done by IT staff in brokerage houses to reflect 
the houses’ order execution, loan lending and short selling policies on clients that can be 
customized and modified. The Ex-Api software with its bookkeeping capacity actually 
becomes an important register and surveillance mechanism which would otherwise be 
discharged manually by brokerage house staff. On the other hand, data/information platforms 
have to be customized by dealers/brokers/investment advisors to reflect one’s individual 
focus on a vast field of symbols and data/information with a personal twist of sounds, 
colours and different font types that might visually aid one’s concentration on the screen. 
The basic configuration then necessitates what sort of data/information the user would like to 
follow on the screen from a multitude of continuous data/information streams. Moreover, 
users need to learn how to use the data/information platform software that runs a plethora of 
data analysis tools about settlement figures, trading volume, and so on. For instance, Matriks 
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provides 20 different tools to analyse data/information about share trading in the ISE. One 
proprietary tool among these, which they call ‘a gift to the brokerage sector’, is the ‘money 
entry-exit’ tool. The logic behind this tool is to see what sort of net trading activity brokerage 
houses engage in at a given time. Users of the tool are able to include any number of the 
most active brokers buying or selling specific shares into their analysis tool, and judge 
whether there is a significant buy or sell order from a handful of clients, or it is just churning 
out activity by high frequency traders without a meaningful trading order. Once all brokerage 
houses are included in the analysis, the money entry-exit comes to 0 TL.  
 
Apart from these tools which can be retrieved with a stroke of a key, a typical 
data/information platform screen of a market professional is composed of different virtual 
boxes. These boxes have rectangular/square shapes that are fully adjustable. However there 
are specific algorithms and interaction rules for each type of box in reference to data flow 
and its analysis. These virtual boxes represent different events happening within and outwith 
the ISE. For instance, there are boxes or what ISE’s market actors call ‘boards’ that represent 
individual share trading in the ISE with five aggregate and anonymised ask and bid orders at 
specific prices. This box is linked to other boxes that bring forth settlement records, traded 
amounts sorted by brokerage house names, money entry-exit, graphs that represent these 
figures, all news narratives about the company, and so on. Another box (which can be 
duplicated) represents a long list of various market indices and prices of commodities a 
market actor would like to follow with similar sub-boxes that bring forth related past data on 
these figures and their graphs.  There is also a live trading book box for the ISE which 
sequentially records trading matches in all the ISE shares according to asking and bidding 
brokerage houses, amount of shares and money exchanged and the exchange price. Last but 
not least, a news wire box that channels national and global news and information about 
market related events is another staple of the market screen. The news wire is fed by data 
provider, national and global news agencies. One can search the news wire box with key 
words and retrieve all the news that is related to these keywords.    
 
In both Matriks and Euroline, which are scopic monitoring platforms of Matriks A.S and the 
Plato Ltd, one is able to use the computer keyboard to write code names for shares and 
indexes on specific areas on the screen to switch from one share to another or retrieve a 
specific index/price stream. For instance, if there are two boxes open on the screen that 
represent individual share trading, these boxes with several strokes of keys can bring forth 
share trading for other companies. One can switch from the box that represent live trading in 
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Garanti Bank to the one that represent live trading in IsBank (one of the two most traded 
shares in the ISE with a significant weight on the ISE 30 and ISE 100 index), by basically 
writing ISCTR (code of IsBank) on the top bar of the box of GARANT (code of Garanti 
Bank). Therefore, the screen and its virtual boxes are modifiable and quite responsive to 
individual demands. Number of boxes on a screen is a matter of screen space. Therefore 
most dealers/investment advisors I observed use two or three screens. This increased to six 
screens at House C’s two veteran IRS traders’ desk.  Moreover, any series of data values 
such as price, index, and custody figures, and so on that is retrieved from these boxes or the 
menu of the data/information platform can be plotted on graphs.99 Multiple data can be 
plotted on a single graph, which is very handy for many users to confirm their beliefs in co-
movements of indexes. The database of each programme runs back for decades and is 
constantly updated, which provides a comprehensive memory source for their users. 
Therefore users of the data platforms can check back the history in terms of numbers, chart 
figures and news stories and see the long-term picture of various realms they observe with 
intensity and preparedness.  
 
As part of their analysis tools, these data/information platforms also provide visual and audio 
alerts that flag up certain statistical events. For instance, users can customize the platform to 
alert him/her about trading momentum in a share over a certain time period as measured by 
gross and net trading volume and ask and bid price steps. There are other tools that provide 
statistical figures about shares such as ‘Beta’ which tells how much a share contributes to the 
index performance historically and momentarily, or ‘seanskop’ session-scope – a proprietary 
tool of Matriks which gives its users an idea about historical and real-time performance of 
shares within trading sessions in relation to their price performance and percentage 
contribution to the ISE indexes’ movements. Although digitization and quantification of 
market events and actions mean that these platforms provide novel ways of seeing these in 
alpha-numerical figures, they also provide quantification in relation to a fundamental value 
approach. For instance Matriks provides a ‘rating module’ which helps determine ‘whether a 
share is suitable for investment by incorporating fundamental and chart indicators’ 
(http://www.matriks.web.tr/Urun.aspx?UrunID=15). On the same company website page, the 
company explains ‘the fundamental value module’ which retrieves companies’ balance 
sheets and allows investors to run ratio analyses and compare a company with its peers in the 

99A chart analyst who is very famous in the DRI scene and a regular of CNBC-e likes to plot the 
portfolio ownership figures of FII and 'predicts' what the next move of foreigners will be. During the 
interview (29 May 2008), he said anything can be plotted on the screen as long as it has a series of 
values assigned to it! 
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ISE. Despite all these conveniences provided to users in the form of single figures or signals 
that encourage buy or sell activities, two single most important aspects of these 
representation and monitoring platforms are, firstly, their representation of contemporaneous 
event all at once on their screens, and, secondly, doing the single representations such as 
price change in sequential manner. When combined, these two aspects allow users to see 
and/or confirm various logical relationships among information/data flows as represented on 





Above is the first part of a screenshot of a typical scopic screen (taken on 11 May 2011) that is 
provided by Matriks and projected on two computer screens. It is used by an investment advisor in 
House B. Notice the virtual boxes on the right half of the screen which represent trading in companies 
with five ask and bid steps. At the bottom of each box, there is a “money entry and exit” indicator set 
for top five buyers and sellers in the share. They all indicate 0 due to the ISE’s decision back in 
October 2010 to withhold real-time trading data classified according to brokerage houses. This type of 
data is now confined to T+2 settlement data only. On the left half, the top box represents the current 
ask and bid prices and trading volume in a number of shares, and percentage changes in their prices. 
The box below that retrieves a number of index values and traded volumes. Notice that the DAX and 
the DOW (DJI) are present in there but without the trading volume data. Just below them is the ISE 
bank index, followed by the price of Brent oil and the Nikkei futures index without the trading volume 






The boxes on the top left corner and below respectively represent the ISE 30 futures and the USD/TL 
futures contracts that are traded in the VOB. Notice the triple X in the top box, which now represents 
an anonymous brokerage house that just bought 73 contracts in the ISE 30 futures. The third box 
represents share trading in ITTFK (Ittifak Holding). The bottom box represents the interbank currency 
market. In this box, the first line represents the best buyer and seller in the USD/TL with the name of 
banks. The remaining lines represent other currencies without any bank names. The graphs that span 
the rest of the screen represent the ISE 30 futures contracts (top) and the ISE 100 Index (bottom) with 





APPENDIX 2: ‘THE STUDY’. AN INFORMAL ACCOUNT 
 
If ethnography as a research process is partly about immersion into the culture of a social 
group, the notion of embodiment of the researcher highlights the importance of the 
researcher’s socio-cultural, ethnic, and economic and other backgrounds in shaping this 
research process (Swain, 2004). The embodiment factor in social science research 
problematises the positivistic understanding of research process which sees the role of 
researcher as administrating scientifically designed and standardized inquiry tools over 
subjects to explore social phenomenon, and confirm or refute causal claims drawn from a 
universal theory.  It introduces the notion of reflectivity, namely the necessity to account for 
the embodied and interpretive presence of researcher in the field and its effects on the 
research process and outcomes, including informants’ and researcher reflexive reactions to 
each other. The notion of reflectivity reminds us that researchers are ‘part of the social world 
[they] investigate’ (Berg, 2001:139) in order to move beyond the debate about what the 
nature of social research and researchers’ role should be in generating knowledge. Both 
positivistic (interventionist) and naturalistic (non-interventionist) approaches in exploring the 
‘reality’ out there, whether this reality is understood to be outside our subjective 
consciousnesses or socially constructed by members of society, may ignore the effects of 
researchers’ embodied and reflexive involvement in the research process from formulation of 
research topic to reporting of the research outcomes (Atkinson and Hammersley, 2007:10-
17).  
 
The main method of incorporating the notions of embodiment and reflectivity into the 
research process is through raising one’s awareness about their socio-cultural identity as well 
as physical and intellectual performance in the field with regards to data collection and how 
these affect the research process from formulation of research questions to writing of 
findings (Ellingson, 2008). This awareness should be shared with audiences in an honest 
account of research process, if not directly with informants and gatekeepers during research, 
because such an unsolicited confiding to them may adversely affect informants’ attitude 
towards the researcher (Berg, 2001:139-40; Bryman, 2008: 408-9). Similarly, the process of 
knowledge generation by the researcher before, during and after the field should be subjected 
to an ‘ongoing conversation with one’s self’ to reflect on ‘what the researcher knows and 
how the researcher came to know this’ (Berg, 2001:139). One practical way of keeping track 
of this conversation and use it more accurately in the writing up process is to keep a separate 
journal about the progress of research and one’s feelings and reflections on field relations 
(Spradley, 1979; Dowling, 2008). The recounting of my research experience in the field 
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presented here in Appendix 2 had been assisted by a separate journal as such, and my email 
conversations with my supervisors. In the following section, I present a detailed reflective 
story of ‘the Study’ from the very start.  
 
Pre-PhD research ideas and their evolution during the first year of PhD  
 
My PhD research story started with writing up a research proposal to apply to PhD 
programmes in the UK in late 2005. After getting my MA degree in International Relations 
at Keele University, UK with a dissertation on state sovereignty and credit rating agencies, I 
decided to focus more on what goes on within the ‘blackbox’ of finance and financial 
markets (Mackenzie, 2004; Hudson, 2005). Motivated by my early and rather purposeless 
and curious observations of CNBC-e, a dedicated business channel in Turkey that covers 
local and global financial markets and news, I decided to investigate how real-time TV 
broadcasts, with their constant upkeep of seeming drama and action in financial markets, 
contribute to ‘the making of markets’ in relation to trading and investment decisions made in 
brokerage houses. Despite not having a background in sociology, financial markets, nor any 
practical exposure to qualitative research methodologies, the initial research proposal 
integrated notions of fieldwork and ethnography in a TV station and a brokerage house, 
interviews, and document/literature reviews and some very limited reference to previous 
ethnographic/social science studies of financial markets and the media. The core research 
topic in the proposal was concerned with production of news about local and global financial 
markets/events on TV screens and observation, sense-making and decision making protocols 
in brokerage houses. The aim was to understand the role of these TV broadcasts in day-to-
day sense-making and decision-making activities in market intermediaries.  
 
During the first year of my studies in the Sociology Department between September 2006 
and May 2007, I received generic theory and research training courses, including 
ethnographic methods, as well as an Honours degree course convened by my primary 
supervisor, Dr Preda on various aspects of financial markets from the social studies of 
finance perspective.100 These helped me to ground my research proposal into relatively new 
100 As Mackenzie (2009a) explains there are two different understandings of the term ‘social studies of 
finance’. The first one refers to application of different social science disciplines to study of economy 
and finance and transcending economics’ essential axioms and concepts. The second understanding 
refers to a more specific understanding of the role of non-human agencies such as theories, machines, 
and measurement tools, how they come to be formed and function, and how they modify the human 
agency in financial markets.  This dissertation broadly falls into the first meaning of the social studies 
of finance approach to financial markets and applies sociological and literary concepts to the study of 
sense-making in financial markets.   
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literature on research methods, finance and sociology that I was hardly exposed to before. 
My then second supervisor Mr Ercan Balaban from the Finance Department also encouraged 
me to look into behavioural finance literature on sense-making and decision making. He also 
reflected on his experience in Turkish financial markets as a manager in a brokerage house in 
late 1990s with a view to where daily market activity took place, namely brokerage houses 
and their special trading rooms where dedicated domestic investors/day traders observed and 
traded in the market by means of data screens, TVs and live commentary from brokers in the 
floor.  
 
Before I departed for my pilot fieldwork in the ISE’s headquarters as a trainee for two weeks 
in June 2007, I had a modified research topic with the advice of Dr Preda, namely the 
investigation of cognitive, information-seeking and decision-making activities of traders 
operating in electronic markets and what role TV broadcasts might have in this process.  The 
ISE was to be a case study to demonstrate an example of this. Moreover, I incorporated into 
my research the problematic of the existence of different platforms for information and data 
search, namely electronic market screens enabling remote access to market trading, real-time 
TV broadcasts, and social networks of investors/intermediaries.  Studying the website of the 
ISE gave me an idea about the diversity in intermediation sector with regards to trading 
volumes, ownership structures (existence of global investment bank branches as well as joint 
ventures between local and global banks), and effects of these on traders’ cognitive activities. 
Despite this awareness of organisational variations, I did not conceptually address who these 
traders would be and what their organisational responsibilities were. In fact, a year later, after 
staying in three brokerage houses, and an asset management company, and the CNBC-e 
studios,  I would have a very different picture about the ISE’s structure in terms of investor 
and intermediary types and their cognitive and investment activities.  
 
The pilot fieldwork in the ISE  
My pilot fieldwork in the ISE’s headquarters as a trainee was a two-week programme 
between 16 and 27 July 2007 that consisted of a series of lectures and residence in one of the 
departments of the ISE. The lecture series were quite informative in relation to understanding 
the basic role structure in the ISE equity market in relation to intermediation and investor 
types, market rules and regulations, data generation and dissemination, and the role of the 
ISE trading floor and brokerage house headquarters and branches. My residence in the 
research department was rather uninformative as I was not given any tasks and there was not 
much going on in a small department of five personnel and two trainees.  Yet this turned out 
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to be an advantage as I had the chance to venture into other departments of the stock 
exchange to have informal discussions with senior stock exchange staff as recommended by 
their colleagues in the research department. Many of these professionals had witnessed the 
foundation and the early years of the exchange and milestone events like automation. They 
also reflected on their perceptions about investor and intermediary types with the help of 
very telling anecdotal events about brokerage houses, trading floors and investors. Moreover, 
I had the chance to talk to a dozen floor brokers, some of whom were “gomlekci” day-
traders. These informal discussions and interviews provided insights about their daily trading 
activities, their job descriptions and relations with their clients and superiors. I also managed 
to observe two brokers in the members’ offices over three trading sessions thanks to one 
senior research staff’s facilitation. This was particularly helpful in understanding how 
brokers who executed orders for clients used trading terminals and scopic market screens on 
the ISE floor or in the members’ offices.  
 
The informal discussions and interviews helped me realize two important things for the 
trajectory of my field investigations. Firstly, thematic TV broadcasts were at best a 
background sound for brokers in the members’ offices. Otherwise the TV was usually muted 
during the trading session as it might become a distraction during the observation of data 
screens and trading terminals. On the trading floor there was no TV allowed but this did not 
make any difference for broker/day traders.  The brokers usually pointed to the usefulness of 
the TV broadcasts before the session as it wrapped up what happened abroad (the US and 
Asian markets) and the day’s data/information events calendar. Secondly, the ISE had gone 
through a transformation after the 2001 crisis in relation to investor types and habits, modes 
of observation among market professionals, and the role of the ISE trading floor and brokers, 
all of which were interrelated according to my broker informants. The ISE staff also gave 
their insights into the domestic investors’ and foreign investors’ rationales in relation to 
trading and investment. The internship was the first time I heard about the seemingly 
different rationalities among domestic (retail) and foreign (institutional) investors as well as 
the perceived ‘indifference’ of the ISE board and staff towards the problems of brokers and 
small investors as claimed by the broker informants. It became evident that those I could 
manage to speak to sometimes saw me as a third party, a journalist-like person to whom they 
could open up.  On the other hand, the ISE staff were more interested in giving insights into 
the history, rules and regulations of the ISE and investor types as well as recommendations 
as to how to proceed in my ‘very interesting’ but ‘rather unconventional’ method of 
 
 243
studying.101   
 
From a data collection point of view, I had the chance to practice writing down very minute 
details of trading activity in an unobtrusive manner in the members’ office room.  On the 
other hand, the use of digital recording device during interviews seemed to be problematic at 
times, firstly due to the uneasiness of my informants when the device was produced right 
after the permission to record was asked. It was observed that some informants who showed 
unusual rapport and enthusiasm in a previous informal discussion or right up to the point of 
my question about being recorded showed a dramatic adoption of formality after declining to 
be recorded, which continued throughout the interview. Secondly, some of the contacts with 
informants happened in the way of informal discussions that were confined to short time 
periods after my cold-introduction to them about me and my intentions, all of which made 
me rather uneasy about touting the recording machine. These difficulties in recording were to 
be repeated in my subsequent field work. However, I was amazed by how fast one could 
write whilst listening and how much one can remember right after the interview to fill in the 
gaps of what is jotted down during informal discussions.102   
 
First access attempts  
Before leaving Istanbul around late July 2007, I had managed to talk to two gatekeepers, a 
general manager of operations and co-owner in a mid-size brokerage house in terms of 
trading volume, and a veteran chief floor broker for a large one-stop-shop brokerage house. 
The first was thanks to my brother-in-law who happened to know the gatekeeper through his 
father. The gatekeeper gentleman made his fortunes by shifting to brokerage house co-
ownership and finance career from an engineering career in the 1990s. After an introductory 
dinner party with family friends in his large loft apartment in a wealthy and upmarket 
Istanbul neighbourhood, we decided to get in touch once I was back in Istanbul for the 
fieldwork to discuss the terms of access to the brokerage house.103 The second gatekeeper 

101 A larger number of ISE staff had graduate degrees and PhDs in finance and management but not in 
sociology. It turned out to be normal that this type of academic demographic inside and outside the 
ISE was rather at pains in understanding the virtue of ethnography as a method that started with vague 
questions that did not sound like robust hypotheses.  
102 It is not uncommon to face this ‘recording’ problem in ethnographic interviews or informal 
discussions as opportunity may come up rather spontaneously rather than careful selection process in 
interview only research process. Therefore it becomes important to use one’s notepad and memory as 
efficiently as possible to be able to capture what is said, skills which become honed as the field stay 
progresses (O’Neill 2005) 
103 This house had a website in English which made a comprehensive introduction to the ISE’s and the 
company’s history and to ‘its advanced IT infrastructure that gives it a competitive advantage in the 
sector’. However, I learned later on that it was a DRI only brokerage house which had an asset 
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was also a lecturer in the interns programme and that was how I met him. He had extensive 
experience in all ranks of brokerage industry including co-ownership, commentary on TV 
and even an uncompleted PhD.  He told me something could be arranged in his brokerage 
house, a leading house that served both foreigners and domestics and had a sister asset 
management company acting as a domestic institutional investor, and encouraged me to 
make an application to the human resources by giving his name as reference for an 
internship, which got no response. After that, he told me he could also arrange a longer work 
experience in a much smaller domestics-only brokerage house that was owned by a close 
friend of his, which  would consist of ‘everything from the back office to trading, but this is 
going to be real work, not just observation for a PhD’. Not wanting to close any doors, I 
thought why not but I was a bit wary of being in such a small brokerage house and becoming 
a virtual office boy with little chance to have time for making any meaningful observation.  
The owner being on holiday ‘probably somewhere in his yacht in the Mediterranean’ and 
unreachable via phone, the gatekeeper told me we would try again once I was back in 
Istanbul.  Yet, I felt better pursuing the first lead once I was back because I thought the first 
brokerage house was more convenient for securing a less physically and emotionally 
demanding access. I felt quite content on the way back to Edinburgh after three weeks stay in 
Istanbul as I managed to make a significant progress in access attempts as well as getting a 
rough idea about the ISE equity market in relation to investor types and sense-making and 
decision-making activities. However, I did not know that the first gatekeeper lead would 
falter very swiftly once I was in Istanbul in 2008.  
 
First year PhD progress review board 
 
Once back in Edinburgh, there was one hurdle to jump, namely the first year progress review 
board. It was a chance to present a detailed research proposal for the following long stint in 
Istanbul to academic experts from Finance and Accounting, Politics, and Sociology 
departments and get their feedback and steering for the rest of the project. Writing the 
proposal was a challenge in two respects. Firstly, I was still not sure about the exact research 
questions to be answered in the field as I still felt I did not have enough primary and 
secondary data to formulate exact questions. This can be seen as normal as it is in the nature 
of ethnographic research not to have exact, hypothesis-like questions but to have emergent 
themes as the research progresses. The second challenge stemmed from what I reported from 
management department. This house, like House B, was owned by a conglomerate but the parent 
company was much smaller in size and reputation compared to the House B’s parent company. 
Genuine one-stop-shop houses or foreigners-only houses usually had very short introductions on their 
websites to their IRS services with a phone number and contact name.  
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the field to my supervisors and what the literature on TV broadcasts and financial markets 
seemed to say. This was a case of a rather weak relationship in relation to information search 
by market actors due to apparent weakness of the TV broadcasts compared with the use of 
real-time data screens. My argument then was that the TV broadcasts might play a more 
important role in relation to interpretation of simple datum and reflecting the part or totality 
of market sentiment, especially in an environment where networks of relationships as 
conduits of data/information and perception frames could be weakened with closure of 
trading floors as well as automation and digitization of markets. What I tried to integrate 
from the sociological literature on financial markets was the notion of perception frames as 
knowledge that helps process information. I would then try to open these perception frames 
to investigation in relation to their formation, use, and modifications by market actors. This 
would be achieved by delving into market actors’ routine observation activity, use of 
technical tools, theoretical and vernacular knowledge. Therefore, cognition and decision-
making were singled out as the main investigation themes with a view to understanding the 
role of TV broadcasts in them. I tried to argue that TV broadcasts would be a platform where 
interpretations and commentary of market actors would be aired and contribute to creation 
and sustenance of intersubjective (shared) meanings among the market community.  
 
However, with hindsight, this proposal did not address several issues. To begin with, it did 
not discuss how to methodologically address the existence of different intermediary and 
investor groups both in the floor and off the exchange. This issue was raised by the members 
of the review board. Although I then responded that  imitation (of cognition and decision-
making protocols) among different organisations and investor types would be an answer to 
justify being in only one brokerage house, I was to realize that imitation or isomorphism as 
such in the ISE did not happen between domestic sales and institutional sales departments. 
There were other issues weakly addressed according to the review board such as the 
theoretical merit of studying the production side (broadcasters) when the topic seemed to be 
focussing on cognition and decision-making activities of intermediaries/investors in the face 
of information/data flows on data screens and TV channels.  So the board recommended that 
I scrap the production side observation and focus on how the information/data search and 
decision-making in investments/trading incorporate real-time TV broadcasts in brokerage 
houses. Another recommendation by one of the board members, Prof. Richard Taffler from 
the Management School was to focus on the notion of storytelling or mythmaking in 
financial markets from the perspective of market actors in brokerage houses and how they 
would use the information/data flows coming from the TV in these storytelling/myth-making 
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activities. This recommendation, reiterated by my supervisors in a subsequent meeting, was 
to turn this research into a totally new one that focussed on the role of narrative mode of 
knowing and explanation in cognition and decision-making in financial markets. Other 
issues highlighted during the meeting were the necessity of learning techniques to avoid 
going native in the field, namely taking the informants’ intellectual posture and ignoring the 
analytical perspective where the ethnographer might tell what was observed and what it 
signified. With hindsight, I think the board members were worried about my intentions to 
spend a few months in a single brokerage house to observe and participate in different 
departments’ activities such as domestic sales, institutional sales (foreigners), fund 
management, and so on. My proposal to spend that much time in a single brokerage house 
was thought to pose the danger of ‘going native’.  This was actually tied to the general 
concerns about broadening the observation base and making sure that the research design 
had the sociological sampling necessary for the study of the very fragmented brokerage 
industry and investor types in the ISE. This was highlighted by the board members but 
temporarily staved off by me by referring to imitation/isomorphism among the brokerage 
sector and the convenience of being in a less-bureaucratic mid-size brokerage house. 
Because I was also planning to attempt to take a CMB licence examination to increase my 
chances of participant observation in a brokerage house as an apprentice in different roles, 
the board members recommended taking self-observation/experience as a valid method of 
data-capture as well.  
 
Modifying the research and preparing for the CMB licence examination 
After the board examination, I focussed on addressing these issues as well as preparing for 
the CMB licence examination in late January 2008. From a theoretical perspective, the 
discussions with my supervisors led to a draft chapter on the notion of 
storytelling/mythmaking and legitimacy in institutional and organisational relations. This 
allowed me, for the first time, to look deeper into literature on the role of narratives in 
organisations such as sense-making, legitimation, and organisational control. I was also 
given a task of observation by my first supervisor to practically avoid going native whilst 
observing my informants. This consisted of going to a café in Edinburgh and taking very 
minute notes about how people enter the café, look for seats, order something, and interact 
with the waiters. Initially this felt like a quite a weird exercise in relation to describing every 
detail and trying not to look like a weirdo staring at people and taking notes. However, later I 
came to appreciate the exercise as it allowed me to note down speedy descriptions of what is 




The CMB licence preparations on the other hand proved to be useful in two respects for the 
subsequent data collection methods. The initial reason why I decided to take the exam was 
my insecurity about access. I thought if I did not offer something back to an organisation as a 
graduate student without any expert authority, why a brokerage house would allow me to be 
in their organisation. I also thought that having the licence would increase my credibility as a 
researcher with regard to what I knew about the markets. However my supervisors also 
reminded me that there was merit in studying for the exam as it was another way of 
immersing, although rather formally, into local rationalities, rules and roles found in the ISE.  
Yet, whether I had the licence or not would turn out to be irrelevant in my field experience. 
From the subsequent data collection perspective, the exam proved to be useful in two 
respects. Firstly, I made myself familiar with rules of thumb or heuristics of macroeconomic 
relationships in Turkey and abroad. This was also the case, but to a lesser extent, in the notes 
of analysis methods for valuation such as fundamental and chart methods. My diary notes on 
studying these topics from the ACMIT notes available from their website described how I 
felt whilst studying. There were very few mathematical expressions of the propositions made 
about different components of an economy and their manifestations in the Turkish economy. 
Moreover, there were observations about the quality of statistical data and the timeliness of 
data releases about the Turkish economy. These pointed to the issues in these data flows 
compared with the timeliness and comprehensives of such data in the developed world. 
Therefore, the notes mentioned other proxy data and rules of thumb in use to be able to have 
an informed view about certain components of the Turkish economy. The general impression 
I got from the study notes related to possible sense-making activities for data/information 
flows in trading and research departments was that there were many correlative, cause-effect 
relationships within the macro economy and to some extent in valuation of companies as this 
was affected by these macroeconomic heuristics. These heuristics were a combination of 
paradigmatic and vernacular knowledge about the Turkish economy and had the potential to 
connect screen based representation of events to each other in order to explain and predict 
outcomes.  Below is an excerpt from my study diary on the macro economy and finance 
notes: 
Towards the end of the second PDF [second book of Macro economy and Finance 
notes], after reading all these different “indicators” about financial markets and 
crises, I had this feeling of mechanised knowledge. I say mechanised in the sense of 
knowledge that is made meaningful by benchmarks, thresholds, correlations, and 
causal effects. As mentioned in my earlier notes, the second book is full of such 
benchmarks without any reference to any academic study. This knowledge seems to 
come from extrapolation of future from previous statistics and events duo. Moreover, 
it mentions some other benchmarks from the EU’s criteria for a “sound economy”. 
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As far as I can tell, this idea of observing the economy and commenting on the past 
and future is not an exact science derived from economics and any other relevant 
field. These notes attest to the practicalisation of scientific knowledge by a group of 
academics. Moreover, practical knowledge about Turkish economy is sometimes 
couched in scientific terms as in the case of correlations between several statistics 
and the economic crises in Turkey. (23 December 2007) 
 
However, other study notes on the remaining modules such as Financial Management, which 
seemed to target those who wanted to be in asset management business, were more 
mathematical despite incorporating some vernacular characteristics from Turkey such as the 
accounting standards and their effects on some universal concepts such as price to earning 
ratio.  This module included portfolio models, pricing models, and so on which were 
explained sometimes both quantitatively and qualitatively, and sometimes only 
quantitatively.  For me it was hard to grasp these models, especially those that were related 
to equity portfolios, such as Capital Asset Pricing Model, and I wondered whether these 
would be used by dealers and investment advisors of domestic retail investors or even by the 
sales traders and analysts serving foreigners. The remaining modules were mostly concerned 
with rules and regulations within different financial markets in Turkey, properties of 
securities traded in these markets, the commercial and debt codes, and the capital markets 
code, accounting standards and ethics. These modules and their study notes were mostly 
about formal descriptions, rules and regulations. They did not include anything significant 
about vernacular practices within different markets that might have an ethnographic value. 
Overall, I covered more than 2500 pages of study note material in an intermittent manner in 
3 months until the exam date. In my first attempt I passed six modules out of eight. These 
two failed modules were the Capital Markets Code and the Accounting Standards and Ethics. 
To be frank, the exam being multiple choices helped me a lot in some modules that I passed 
such as Financial Management as I gave answers by eliminating the less plausible options. In 
May 2008, I took the exam again to pass the failed modules. I passed the Accounting 
Standards with an 80 % mark but failed the Capital Markets Code again because I did not 
have time to study for it properly during an intense period of field activities which I shall 
explain below. I have yet to pass that remaining module to get my advance licence before my 
passed modules expire in January 2012.  
 
The second aspect of the benefit of taking this exam was seeing the attempt of the CMB, the 
ISE, and the ACMIT to ring fence entry conditions to the intermediation, asset management 
and other financial professions in Turkey and ensuring professionalisation of different jobs in 
the sector. These examinations were held since early 2002, after a decade when anybody 
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could become a dealer/broker, fund manager etc without a licence. Seeing the examination 
venue in Istanbul, my former graduate school campus in Marmara University, and all sorts 
and types of men and women, some of whom looked too old to start a new career was very 
interesting. I could gather that some of these older people were those who had been trying to 
pass the exam to make sure that they did not lose their jobs once the transition period 
expired. Other candidates seemed to be unemployed university graduates looking to get an 
extra qualification to find a job in an already shrinking intermediation sector in terms of 
employee numbers. Later on, I found out that the success rates (number of licences given) in 
these examinations were very low (on average around 13% in the advanced licence 
examination out of an average 2,000 attendees, and around 7.5 % out of an average 10,000 
attendees for basic licence for brokers and dealers (ACMIT exam results between 2002 and 
2009 available at http://www.tspakb.org.tr/tr/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=101). These figures 
helped me  realize that  the notion of a career in intermediation and asset management sector 
was not actually attracting too many dedicated new graduates who would pass this relatively 
easy exam at once and start their career in a house. A job was not guaranteed after passing 
this exam and from the trends in the intermediation sector and my informants’ remarks, I was 
to realize that Turkey was an over-brokered country for both domestic retail and foreign 
institutional investors.  
 
Access proves difficult unless you have the right contact! 
Once the exam was over on 20th of January 2008, I set out to facilitate the access to the 
brokerage house through the co-owner. There was one issue with this as my gatekeeper sold 
his shares in the house and retired from his job as the operations manager after I left Istanbul 
in summer. After explaining my research to the gatekeeper, this time in much greater detail, I 
was told that he would contact the general manager of the house to facilitate a telephone 
contact between me and the general manager to discuss the mode of access. During the 
telephone conversation, which happened three days after I met my lead, the general manager 
was not at all sympathetic to my research and my gatekeeper. He said the house would not 
take an outsider and that my contact knew nothing about my research. This was despite the 
fact that I and the gatekeeper had a chat about my research and the ISE for over an hour. I 
was told to send a CV and a brief description of my research aims104 and that he would talk 
to the biggest share holder in the house to see whether my access would be possible for a 

104 I wrote a two page proposal which summarized my research goals, proposed methods and the 
theoretical merit of the study. It was not easy writing something in Turkish as I had had no exposure to 
any literature in Turkish on sociology, financial markets, and so on.  
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period that was longer than a couple of days or at most a week to see around and what they 
were doing before their scopic screens. I and the gatekeeper initially mooted a two-month 
stay idea but this proved to be rather futile in the face of the general manager’s attitude. Once 
I sent the documents, a waiting game started and after a week, I contacted my gatekeeper to 
tell him that there was no response. I thought I had better not call the general manager as it 
was clear that I had little chance of access. The general manager told me that the chairman of 
the executive board who was the 3rd biggest shareholder would decide about my access but 
because he was very angry at something the general manager decided to wait for him to calm 
down. I knew that this would lead nowhere so I gave up on this house after two weeks. 
In the meantime I started to look for other leads for access to other houses. The first house, 
House B was a one-stop-shop brokerage. The sole reason why I went for this house was the 
general manager of the house was a beneficiary of a very prestigious study-abroad Masters 
Degree scholarship like me and I noticed his name on the group’s emailing list. Although 
House B was by all means a better place to start observation than the above house due to its 
size, diversity of operations, and branch network, the beneficiary link became apparent to me 
only after the botched attempt of access mentioned above and the desperation that followed. 
The second lead that I found was thanks to a think tank I worked before I came to 
Edinburgh. One of the affiliates of the think tank was also an executive board member and 
director in a brokerage house renowned for its exclusive service to foreigners. I checked 
other house’s websites too, usually large houses owned by banks to see whether there was 
any offer of internships but there was not any immediate lead in that. I also felt more 
comfortable talking to gatekeepers with whom I had some sort of social connection. I was 
hoping that such a rapport would make them sympathize with me. Between the end of 
January and end of February 2008, I pestered these two gatekeepers with a dozen emails and 
phone calls, which led to different phone calls and emails to another gatekeeper, namely the 
head of corporate finance who was also the beneficiary of the same scholarship, and the 
secretary of the general manager in House B. In the foreigners-only house, the think tank 
affiliate would negotiate access on behalf of me to the research department. One common 
thing among my gatekeepers was that they both referred my case to different departments, 
ranging from asset management to research. The research affiliate said their interns would 
always go to the research department after I told him I did not have to be in that department 
to find answers to my research questions. He told me that it was the head of research 
department who would decide my case but added that there was no reason why I could not 
become an intern there. I did not press too much on my point as I thought once I accessed the 
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house I could negotiate my way to the institutional sales and trading department.  
 
In House B, it seemed to me that the general manager sent my case to different departments 
to find out whether one was willing to take me. The interesting thing was I never had the 
chance to talk to the general manager on the phone. It was either the head of corporate 
finance or the general manager’s secretary who informed me about the progress of my 
application. My short research proposal became my virtual voice while the general manager 
seemed to be looking for a department to fit me into and I sometimes got the impression that 
my proposal was not even properly read with the exception of the head of corporate finance 
in House B.  Another important point to note here was concerned with my research proposal 
title. I thought presenting a jargon-laden title would not be beneficial, so I opted for 
‘decision-making process in financial markets: the ISE equity market and CNBC-e case’. 
Although I scrapped the production side observation and stressed the importance of 
observation of intermediary side in my research, once a gatekeeper heard the title, they 
would be more interested in stressing the weak effect of the CNBC-e or making anecdotal 
comments on CNBC-E. This was especially the case for House B. Once I managed to make 
my point that the research was more about observing cognitive and decision-making 
activities in situ then the conversation would revert to ‘ask the general manager for access’ as 
there would be a recognition of the possibility of deep immersion into routine activities of 
different departments. In the affiliate’s case for the foreigners-only house, he did not seem to 
have any problem with my research proposal. He did not question my research despite 
having a PhD in economics. He probably thought I could combine the internship with data 
collection and I would come handy as someone who could read and write English. 
Considering that the affiliate often forgot who I was in between the phone calls, it was no 
wonder he did not actually pay attention to my research as much as he did to getting an 
intern to the research department. Two months later the affiliate during an interview with him 
would become so patronizing about the importance of hypothesis testing in research, he 
inadvertently  made it clear that he neither listened to what I said about my research nor read 




Finding the right contact 
Getting increasingly frustrated about a direct response to my request despite accessing the 
most senior gatekeepers, I was making my frustration very clear at home to my sister and her 
husband both of whom were kind enough to allow me to stay in their place until I found 
somewhere else in March 2008. Feeling sorry about my state, they decided to help me in my 
search for access to a brokerage house. Their connections in the Turkish media proved to be 
quite handy in accessing gatekeepers. A famous female economy columnist in a high 
circulation national newspaper, who happened to be a friend of their work partner - a 
political columnist himself, offered her help to find me a brokerage house. This led me to 
House A’s female general manager who also had a PhD in economics. So from the point I 
contacted the female economy columnist it took only six days to start my observations in 
House A on the 19th of February. On the other hand, I was yet to hear a response from House 
B and the house of the affiliate, 20 days after my first contact with them. Despite the female 
boss’ very understanding approach to my rather ‘unconventional research’ she was 
considerate enough to ask the head of domestic sales whether it was okay for me to observe 
the dealing and research room.  He was also positive about my research and the merit of 
what I wanted to find out. Both told me that I would only need around two to three weeks to 
reach a saturation point in learning about how dealers and research personnel observed the 
scopic screens and made sense of the flows and turned them into advice to their clients. Yet 
they insisted I could stay as long as I wanted. They were also quite insistent on the need to 
venture into activities in a branch, which I did by basically venturing a floor up to one of 
their branches where domestic retail investors were day trading, and into other houses to get 
a better understanding of other types of investors and brokerage houses. They believed that 
because the VIP dealing room only served high frequency and high net worth individuals 
with a team of dedicated investment advisors and a small research team, I needed to be able 
to present a more representative picture of cognitive activities in the ISE equity market.  I 
was also given a gentle but formidable warning about the privacy of clients and the 
importance of not disturbing dealers whilst they were busy.  
 
My sisters’ second contact who was a veteran of the Turkish media in various ranks and also 
a former advisor to a Turkish PM, heard about my presence in Istanbul and my research.  
Again my decision to include CNBC-e in describing my research to my sister led him to 
offer me to arrange an internship in the CNBC-e studios. This was despite the fact that I 
planned to have interviews with CNBC-e producers once the brokerage house observations 
were finished. The interesting thing was that the contact was good friends with the chief 
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executive officer of CNBC-e and I was now offered exclusive access to the studio. The only 
request from me was to send a research proposal in English so that the franchise holder NBC 
could see what the research was about. I am not sure whether my research proposal was sent 
somewhere in Europe or US to get the green light but in the end, I included a week long 
observation in the studio in my proposal of interviewing CNBC-e staff and guests on their 
programmes. I thought with the pace and success in gaining access to brokerage houses, a 
week spent in CNBC-e would not hurt the research. After an initial meeting with an HR 
officer, I was told that I could start my observation whenever I finished in House A and that I 
should see the general manager of the CNBC-e for the details of my presence in the studio 
once I start.  The moral of both stories was that if done through appropriate channels, namely 
people with power and social capital, access to organisational settings is very easy.  
 
So what happened to House B and the affiliate’s house? The head of corporate finance 
seemed to fight hard to find me a suitable place in House B. I gathered that the institutional 
sales and research did not like my presence in their department and he managed to arrange a 
short two-week stay in the domestic sales department and possible interviews with other 
departments that did not like my presence. Another interesting thing I noted was the effect of 
using the word ‘intern’ in written and verbal communication. Although I did not use the term 
in the proposal, in telephone conversations, the term was sometimes used as a short cut to 
explain participant observation. Yet, I was to realize that the term intern for gatekeepers 
usually meant a burden in relation to teaching me things and giving a novice person tasks 
which might lead to time wasting, and worse, irreparable mistakes.  Yet it was apparent that 
the head of domestic sales department understood what I wanted to do there. Once I started 
my observations there in early April after three weeks stay in CNBC-e studios, she was 
really helpful and encouraged her team to help me by letting me observe them at their desks 
and answering my questions. Sometimes, the head was a bit too helpful and interested in my 
research that there were some embarrassing moments when she picked up my notebook and 
start reading out loud what I put down.  
 
The access to the house of the affiliate, after a month and five days wait, faltered on 5th of 
March 2008. According to the affiliate this was because the head of research was not very 
eager to get an intern-cum-researcher. A couple of weeks later I was to run into him in 
CNBC-e studios and he explained to me why the access had failed. This was apparently 
because the head of research was newly appointed to this position from another house and he 
was a bit petulant and insecure about his new environment in this very prestigious 
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foreigners-only brokerage house. So rejecting my application was a demonstration of power 
and authority. I do not know whether this was an explanation made up on the spot but later in 
the field work, I was told by different gatekeepers in top brokerage houses (including House 
D) that internships in these internationally-owned, “sexy” sounding brokerage houses were 
in high demand and getting them was usually possible only by network relationships 
between parents of students going to top rank, English-instruction universities in Istanbul 
and senior staff of the houses.105  
 
My access to the AMC kind of happened naturally. After finishing observations in House B’s 
domestic sales department in the third week of April, 2008, I asked my corporate finance 
manager gatekeeper whether it was possible to stay some time in the institutional sales 
department. We were told that only an interview was possible by the manager of the sales 
department and observation was not convenient ‘due to nature and sensitivity of what they 
do’. What they did in the department as I was to learn later in House D was basically 
executing trades on behalf of foreign institutional investors, pitching formal trading ideas to 
traders and asset managers abroad, and chatting to their closer clients via Bloomberg, and 
making cold calls to prospective and dormant clients. However, the manager of the 
department, who used to work in House D, was known for his no non-sense approach to his 
job. His apparently rather overt discipline in the trading room was mocked by his former 
colleagues in House D. Maybe a butt of jokes and fun to hear, this attitude of the institutional 
sales manager cost me valuable observation opportunity in a comprehensive institutional 
sales and research environment. Once that possibility was ruled out, I came back to my 
gatekeeper in House B and asked him whether it was possible to observe the asset 
management team for a short period of time. This was accepted by one of the managers 
whom I had talked to initially on the phone. The fund managers did not seem to be bothered 
by my existence in their room and I spent three weeks there, which became quite handy in 




105 During my observations in the asset management company, this head of research suddenly 
appeared on CNBC-e and one of his former colleagues whom I was observing showed his surprise  
that this man was the head of research at such a prestigious house. He suddenly said ‘bu adam fraud 
ya! [This man is a fraud]’. I asked him why he had called this head of research a fraud and why he 
used the English word “fraud”. He said ‘interns [like me] needn’t know everything’. I did not insist on 
the rest of the story. Then I thought to myself that the affiliate above might have been telling me the 
truth about my failed internship.    
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Embodied tools of data collection and their limitations 
Once I was finished in mid-May 2008 with House A, House B, and CNBC-e, I was 
physically exhausted of negotiating my way to field sites in rush hour traffic, noting down 
every minute detail of things happened and said in trading rooms, chasing informal 
discussion and formal interview opportunities within and outwith the field sites. The café 
exercise in Edinburgh was very useful in reminding myself that nothing was irrelevant or too 
trivial to note down, which ended up in very detailed descriptions of my days in the field 
sites. Overall, the total number of pages I wrote down in my field notes exceeded 1000 pages 
of various notebook sizes of A4 and A5.  I did not voice record any event during my stay as 
note taking was much easier than voice recording and transcribing afterwards. Besides due to 
the positions where I was seated (being given separate desks in each house) voice recording 
with my recorder would be rather futile. In House A, maybe sound recording would work as 
the trading room was rather small and people seemed to be quite loud but on my first day of 
observation during the trading halt one of the senior investment advisors warned me not to 
bring a voice recorder to the room as this might upset other investment advisors and the 
senior management. I concurred and did not even ask my gatekeepers whether this was okay. 
Later in the research, I sometimes thought about asking to acquire voice recordings of 
conversations between investment advisors and their clients that took place during my 
observation days. Recording telephone conversations is a requirement for all brokerage 
houses and they keep their records for five years. Sometimes, not hearing what was said on 
the other side of the telephone by the client was frustrating as I did not exactly know what 
they were saying unless they were on the speakerphone. Though I could guess what this was 
roughly about by the answers of investment advisors. However, I did not ask my gatekeepers 
for voice recordings for two reasons. First of all, in House A I grew more cautious of my 
obtrusiveness or worse invasiveness because I was getting signals from some of the 
informants that they did not want to go into too much detail about their clients. In fact it was 
the more willing informants who gave insights into what less enthusiastic investment 
advisors were up to, which revealed some sensitive facts about House A.  
 
Secondly, the head of domestic sales’ warning about some things needing to stay in house 
persisted in my mind. Coupled with the revelations by an underdog junior investment 
advisor, I thought I had better stick to what I described as my research, namely observing 
what was going on in the dealing room before scopic screens and between the ‘traders’. My 
hesitancy about asking for voice recordings continued in House B’s domestic sales floor 
despite the fact that dealers there were much more open and willing to talk about their clients 
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with the exception of one dealer who seemed to serve some volume churning, speculating 
individual.  At the end I decided that asking for this type of data might be a step too far as 
there would be different people involved in the decision, ranging from legal affairs and IT to 
the general manager. Asking permission from clients would be another matter. I thought this 
might lead to me moving from a rather low maintenance researcher/observer to someone 
who was a bit “nosey” and demanding. A year later I actually got the courage to ask to small 
and big gatekeepers to get voice-recordings in House D, but I got a very definitive no on the 
grounds of anonymity, technical impossibility, and so on. The reason why I asked for this, 
apart from having more self-confidence as a researcher and the rather informal atmosphere in 
House D’s dealing rooms, was that I thought I might analyze the conversational data to see 
how narrative sense-making might be shaped by the audience (clients).  
 
However, in the case of sales traders and research analysts in House D serving institutional 
investors there was rarely any phone conversation as the clients seemed to be very busy and 
they preferred to hear what the sales traders had to say from answering machine or email. 
This was also the case in House C. The sales desk being more involved with order execution 
than pitching formal trading ideas also made the number of conversations between sales 
traders and clients relatively negligible.  Moreover, the explosive characters of the sales 
traders in House C during trading sessions in the face of the slightest mistake or unusual 
event in the department room made me feel really cautious about being even slightly 
demanding about anything or nosey.  On the other hand, it was domestic sales teams in 
Houses A, B, and D who had telephone conversations on a daily basis with their clients.  
Actually the IT personnel in House D was more willing to make access to the telephone 
recordings happen arguing that it was possible for me to listen to them on site in the 
brokerage house but going through several weeks of conversation records in a room in the 
house and generating transcripts and so on would be an impossible task given the time 
limitation on this research. However, even in the case of a less technically demanding 
request, namely asking for chat logs between sales traders/senior research analyst and their 
clients abroad proved to be rather tricky as people in House D, apart from the head of 
trading, seemed to be rather uneasy about giving away chat logs and told me to ask someone 
else. 
 
In general, I got used to having a notebook rather than a tape-recorder, even for informal 
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discussions or interviews in the observation sites.106 The notebook felt less obtrusive and 
more engaging with the informants as they would notice me writing down something and ask 
what I was writing. These questions became good opportunities to explain/remind my 
informants about what I was after as data and my methods of acquiring them. Sometimes, 
they would add something onto what was said naturally, giving further explanation.  In 
House C, no one but the research analyst sharing the same desk with me noticed that I was 
taking notes. Other members of research and sales staff did not notice that I was taking notes 
yet I informed my gatekeepers that I would take notes. All in all, these barriers set by my 
gatekeepers and me due to my mixed feelings about my researcher/observer/intern status, 
being obtrusive, and my wariness about minimizing any confrontational/demanding identity 
in places where I was mostly hosted as a favour shaped the sense-making data collected in 
this research. Almost all the data consists of dealing room conversations among my 
informants, and sense-making narratives told by them to their clients/contacts. In this 
respect, there are full conversational narratives/dialogues from the site as well as those half 
conversational narratives to the clients. In this respect, some parts of the narrative data is not 
very conducive to conduct conversation analysis not to mention its translated and mostly 
non-taped nature which undermines an attempt to go for the conversation analysis method 
with a specific focus on highlighting pauses, intonations, and so on in the speech. Therefore, 
the analysis remains limited to revealing plot (causality) structures, actor/actant types, and 
temporal orientations  
 
Despite these limitations of the narrative data, compared to experiences and problems of 
ethnographers with taking contemporaneous notes detailing what happens in the field, I was 
lucky to have my notebooks out and open all the time and be able to take notes whenever I 
wanted (Emerson et al., 1995: 12-38). In this respect, I did not have to use jottings, or rely on 
sketchy descriptions of conversations because of wariness about note-taking before my 
informants. My informants were busy doing their jobs at their desks and they did not really 
mind being observed. Therefore my observation days were quite intense, either sitting at my 
desk situated next to an informant and paying full attention to what happens in the room and 
describing it as detailed as possible in my notes, or visiting an informants’ desks to have an 
informal discussion about their activities and noting down what they told me and others.   
 
Emerson et al. (1995:39-42) discusses strategies of creating time and space for writing field 
notes in circumstances where writing in detail is not possible for the ethnographer. This 
106 In House D, I tape-recorded all the interviews and some informal discussions with my informants.  
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involves writing up extensive notes once the researcher leaves the field site and retires to 
his/her accommodation. In this vein, jottings and memory plays a great part in describing not 
only field events but also inscribing researcher’s ‘thick descriptions’. In my field experience, 
retiring home was a relief after writing around 30-40 pages of notes over five hours of 
observation. Such intense observations were actually something my body clock was not used 
to, not to mention waking up at 7:00 am or 8:00 am and go to the field site during Istanbul 
rush hour. So coming back home around 19:00 pm exhausted meant that I sometimes could 
not find the power to write my diary unless there was a significant but unusual event that 
reflected organisational conflicts happened on that day.  
 
Therefore, my field notes started to incorporate some jottings about my feelings in order for 
me to write more detailed accounts about my experience. In instances where I did not have 
my notebook such as having a chat with someone in the corridor or in the toilet, or during the 
commute, I would go back to my desk in the field site or at home for those cases where 
writing down a big argument between informants would be rather risky, to write down what 
was said, discussed or transpired.  Only in House C where I was a proper unpaid intern, 
taking contemporaneous notes often took the form of jotting down and using my head notes 
(memory) to be able to write detailed field notes later on, during lunch break or at the end of 
the observation day. However, if there was an instance of sense-making narrative, I would 
immediately note this down no matter what I was doing. During the daily investment 
meetings in House C, I took contemporaneous notes. In House D, I tape-recorded the 
morning meetings in the institutional sales and research department.  None of this meeting 
material however is included in the story dataset as they were not generated before scopic 
market screens.107 
 
Going native? Being a Sociologist? 
My attempts to be rather low profile as a researcher in the observational sites as well as not 
being very knowledgeable about vernacular and paradigmatic aspects of the equity market 
sometimes left me rather clueless about what was being discussed in the field sites. Despite 
taking the licence exam and studying the notes, some concepts went over my head as to what 
certain numerical values did actually mean in the domestic sales scenes and conversations. 
For instance, in line with what was discussed in study notes, the Price/Earning as a ratio 
107 I tape-recorded some in situ events, such as data releases or close of the trading day in the IRS 
department as a supplement to my contemporaneous note-taking. However, in line with what was 
discussed before, note-taking always turned out to be sufficient to capture in situ events and narratives 
after comparing the written notes about the in situ events with their tape-recordings.  
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about profitability and price had many caveats depending on the company’s performance in 
other ratios as well as relative to other companies in the sector. Therefore, I was not always 
able to make sense of what I was recording as conversations that included these ratios 
because I did not know much about the background stories. During in situ events, it was 
imprudent to interrupt people to clarify things. Even sometimes after asking them for 
clarification in their free time, things were not easy to comprehend in the first instance and 
one ran the risk of sounding a bit stupid after asking the same question twice!  In the case of 
interviewing and observing analysts, sales traders, and fund managers, who all seemed to 
have a rather more sophisticated and formalist approach to markets compared with that of 
domestic sales teams, there were more concepts that I did not hear before or could not make 
sense of in the given context. I tried to ask for clarifications or did explore them myself when 
it was not possible to ask. Of course there were other things that I could make sense as 
stimuli but could not go beyond and reach apperception because they turned out to be either 
private and people did not want to share it or they would give very general explanations or 
typologies with the help of my follow up questions.  All in all, the relatively short time 
periods for observation, as well as my decision to be not so inquisitive on topics that people 
did not show much enthusiasm to talk about or those that I did not grasp quite quickly, left 
my immersion into meaning and feeling world of my informants rather limited compared to 
a field experience that could be longer and more educational with an ‘intern’ status. In an 
email correspondence with my second supervisor I made the following remarks after she 
asked me the following about going native and being a sociologist: 
Dear Emre, 
Thanks for your news - all very interesting, and very positive. You sound very much 
on-track to me. Are you managing to maintain a sense of 'being the sociologist' or are 




Good to hear from you. 
I sometimes feel like I give reactions like them to the changing indicators or flowing 
data with regard to my language but as I don’t take any responsibility and don’t trade 
nor have in depth information unlike them about how markets work , I think I am 
still an  observer there, yet to become a sociologist! I though sympathize with them 
regarding their feelings about ignorant customers doing suicidal trades, problems 
within financial markets and their criticisms about other things. But I try to keep my 
cool and don’t comment as much as possible. (6 May 2008) 
 
With hindsight, my uneasiness was not about being more of sociologist because I could see 
the emergent patterns among people with similar market identities and roles in terms of 
stories they tell, the observational modes they took before the screens. It was rather the lack 
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of a deeper immersion into feelings, vernacular and paradigmatic knowledge that my 
informants possessed, or the knack they had in managing funds, clients, or mass of raw 
data/information and turning them into a higher datum. This was in a way natural because 
my observation periods were relatively short considered with what might be required from a 
participant observer who aimed to have a ‘prolonged engagement’ (Lundy, 2008) or worse  
‘over-rapport’ with his/her informants and their field practices, namely ‘going native’ 
(Ballinger, 2008). On the other hand, the sense-making narratives which are analyzed in this 
dissertation was relatively easier to grasp as they were very much based on what was 
observed on the screen, and easier to put into the categories devised in this dissertation. This 
was so because I had the chance to observe the screen and hear conversations and reactions 
to it at the same time. So self-learning worked in that respect. Additionally, I asked my 
informants during informal discussions or interviews at their desk about what they would 
observe on the screen and how they would know what was observed would mean for the 
past, present and future. So by engaging in a dialogue about the vernacular epistemology of 
storytelling before scopic screens, I could make more confident decisions about reaching 
second order explanations once I started analyzing my data and writing up the thesis. For the 
lack of embodied immersion into relatively inaccessible feelings and knacks by observation, 
I could do nothing but move onto the next house as from a sociological perspective I still 
lacked observations in an institutional sales and research department as well as in a larger 
house with a more diverse client base and bigger size in terms of trading volume than House 
A and House B.  So below is the story how I accessed House C and D after ending my 
observations in the middle of May 2008 in the AMC.  
 
Looking for access to an IRS department: House C  
After I finished my stay in CNBC-e, the journalist contact who facilitated CNBC-e access 
told me that he had two relatives who worked in senior positions in two leading brokerage 
houses. These two houses were owned by two large national banks with very extensive 
branch networks. One of them also had a large institutional sales department, and the other 
has a sister company which - like the affiliate’s house - ‘only served’ foreigners. I told the 
contact that I would be free from mid-May or beginning of June to start my observations. I 
told him that I did not need to stay too long in either house with a view to seeing whether I 
could create enough rapport with informants there to justify a longer stay once I had 
accessed the field site. I thought the contact would at least arrange one of the two houses and 
I would be able to observe domestic sales and institutional sales in action in a larger 
brokerage house. After a while, the contact told me that the ‘foreigners only’ house would 
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not even allow someone from the sister brokerage house (where the gatekeeper worked) on 
their trading floor, let alone an observer/intern from outside. The contact told me that he 
would press on to arrange something for the other house, the largest brokerage house in 
Turkey. I was of the expectation that this would not take too long as my contact mentioned as 
the gatekeeper a ‘cousin’ who was a senior manager in the house. Unfortunately, the waiting 
game lasted for several weeks without any concrete result and I decided to take the initiative 
to find a place for internship myself. It was already June and I was planning to go back to 
Edinburgh on 15 September 2008. To speed up the process, I decided not to approach large 
houses or houses serving institutional investors only without any facilitator in between as I 
felt this would be just waste of time for large, bureaucratized houses which also happened to 
be serving institutional investors. I then scanned house names via the ISE website alongside 
their trading volumes and checked the websites of houses one by one to find a suitable target.  
 
In the end, House C seemed quite interesting and rather unique in the brokerage sector as it 
was an independently owned brokerage house by a bunch of finance professionals with 
CFAs. In their websites they stressed their ‘dedication to CFA standards’ in serving 
institutional clients and their trading volume was quite significant for an independent house 
seeming to serve only foreigners, which I thought was a sign of a meaningful client base 
from abroad.  In the end, I emailed both co-owners, one of them the general manager and the 
other one head of research. I explained to them my research and my intentions in the house 
in terms of duration of stay, and my data collection methods. Several days later, the head of 
research emailed back with positive news. Yet, she warned me about two things, first 
summer months were traditionally low trading volume months, and that I would not be paid 
anything. Not bothered by any of these problems, I was elated that I could access an 
institutional sales and research department as an ‘intern’.  When I got the green light for 
access to House C for July, it was already mid June and I was yet to hear anything from the 
contact regarding the access to the brokerage house where the cousin worked.  So I decided 
to take a break from the fieldwork and went on a holiday to see my parents and then spent 
some time travelling around Turkey.  
 
My stay in House C lasted for one and a half months. It differed from the previous stays 
(with the exception of CNBC-e) as it was a participant observation experience. At times, it 
was more participation than observation as I was given some tasks such as translation, 
updating company/sector databases, assisting the research analysts and head of research in 
their data collection for company reports. For the first time, I was doing something instead of 
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only taking detailed notes of what was being said and done in the room.  Contemporaneous 
note-taking of each and every incidence in the room was therefore not always possible due to 
the reasons mentioned above and because of a lack of meaningful collective in situ sense-
making activity among the research team and the sales team unlike the domestic sales 
departments. But one unique thing about the participant observation status was that two very 
experienced research analysts were teaching me the vernacular and paradigmatic aspects of 
analyzing companies and Turkish economy, managing relationships with company 
representatives and economy bureaucracy, and establishing relationships with institutional 
clients abroad, and so on. So everyday was a great learning process. After I discovered that 
House C also served domestic retail clients, I ventured into their world by attending morning 
meetings and having informal discussions with dealers/informal portfolio managers/day 
traders who had very close ties with high net worth clients and/or and domestic speculators. 
The respective worlds of institutional sales and research and domestic sales teams in House 
C seemed like poles apart, similar to the physical separation of these teams (each were on a 
different floor of a skyscraper in a bourgeoning business district of Istanbul). During my stay 
in House C, I happened to meet interesting figures from and outwith House C, thanks to my 
informants’ eagerness, but especially that of the  research analyst who shared the desk with 
me, to introduce me to his contacts in other houses, most of which were located in the same 
business district. This was quite a convenience as I was introduced to them over lunches, 
which led to lengthy conversations and many different stories I had never heard before.108 
 
One of the analyst’s contacts was a sales trader in House D, pseudo-named as T in this thesis, 
who worked with the analyst for several years in an international bank in Turkey. The 
research analyst said the sales trader could arrange a stay in his department in House D, 
which according to the analyst was bigger than House C in terms of client base, trading 
activity, and company coverage universe. In fact, House D was one of the top ten brokerage 
houses in Turkey in terms of client numbers and trading volume thanks to being owned by a 
large national bank with an extensive branch network. So it was rather exciting to have a 
lead for access to this house.  The sales trader was quite positive about my intentions and 
said that he came to Edinburgh frequently to visit his clients. He even suggested meeting in 
Edinburgh when he was on a client visit and said I could be like their informal post there. I 
never figured out whether he was serious or not about these. About the internship, although 
we talked about what the HR department would need for my access after the current intern, 
108 Although House C did not give me any lunch vouchers, the analyst was very kind to offer me his 
vouchers which accumulated over the months due to not spending all of them, so I had free lunches 
for almost 30 days. This was a considerable saving for me around 600 lira or £ 300!  
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who was a Turk studying in the US, left, the sales trader later reminded via email that the 
final decision belonged to the ‘general manager’.  This email sent on the 30th of July was the 
harbinger of bad news. After a wait of a week or so, it turned out that the general manager 
decided that after three interns in so many months, it was time to stop having new interns in 
House D. So my plans to spend the last month or so in House D and put a definitive end to 
field work in Turkey was foiled. Spurred with that disappointment, I pressed on for more 
interviews with market professionals, mostly in institutional sales and research, from other 
houses.  Most of these interviews were facilitated with ‘snowball’ method, namely asking an 
interviewee or a contact whether he/she could recommend someone for an interview. 
Otherwise cold calls or cold emails to prospective interviewees returned no responses. The 
reason why I pushed for more interviews with the institutional sales teams, not to mention 
for the internship in House D, was mainly down to the fact that House C despite being an 
important actor in trade execution was not the best place to observe the nature of the formal 
idea pitching to institutional clients, and dynamics between institutional sales and research 
teams in strong local houses in the institutional sales business.   During the time I was 
expecting a response from House D, some of my new informants, whom I was seeing almost 
every day over lunch plus the general manager of House C, were quite willing to utilize their 
contacts in large bank-owned brokerage houses or local branches of global investment banks 
to arrange me internships there. These attempts again revealed the fact that these houses 
were in high demand by final year students of top universities and internship decisions were 
usually made by grace-and-favour among parents. Despite this, my informants and their 
contacts told me to remind them of my internship requests in the following months with a 
view to start in early 2010.  
 
Going back to Edinburgh and reflecting on the collected data 
I left Istanbul on 15 September 2008, on that fateful Monday when it was announced that 
Lehman Brothers failed to find a buyer and collapsed. I was in a taxi with my sister and her 
husband, hearing the news report, on our way to the airport.  My brother-in-law in his usual 
dark humorist approach to life and the future said this was the beginning of the end of the 
world. In hindsight, he was right about the market scene in Istanbul and the rest of the 
market places around globe for the following seven or eight months. The contact who 
facilitated access to CNBC-e, on the other hand, had kind of become the butt of jokes among 
us as despite being a very well-connected man. Sometimes he was very slow to make things 
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happen, which gradually turned into giving up hope on him.109 
 
Once back in Edinburgh, I watched the global financial markets melt and started to think 
about what to do next in terms of fieldwork. Right before I left Istanbul, I was much more 
informed about informal trading groups that revolve around domestic speculators as well as 
the world of institutional investors abroad. Yet, there was more scope for fieldwork to learn 
about these two different worlds which seem to be in some sort of competition in trading and 
investments. I was also made aware of the annual research reports written by the ACMIT 
which indirectly revealed the divisions between domestic retail, domestic institutional, and 
foreign institutional investors via aggregate statistics in terms of trading volume, portfolio 
holding periods, and so on. Moreover, these statistics also confirmed what I was hearing 
from the senior managers of the houses I was in, namely the domestic retail scene that was 
composed of not more than 30,000 or 40,000 investors served by more than 80 brokerage 
houses despite the total number of domestic retail investors that was around a million. A 
similar picture could be observed in institutional sales and research in relation to foreigners’ 
accounts and the number of brokers that served them. This was around 2,000 to 3,000 
accounts vis-à-vis 20 to 25 brokerage houses vying to serve the most active 200 or 300 
clients who issued those funds. House C was generating volume because the sales traders 
were very busy with continuous order flows thanks to their long-running relationships with 
global brokers and asset managers located in global financial hubs. Yet, there was not a great 
depth in the department’s client book compared to House D or other similar departments that 
were stronger in relation to the research output.   
 
So there seemed to be two topics that necessitated further investigation. The first was the 
world of domestic speculators and how they operated, and second in need of more 
investigation, was the relationships between local brokers and foreigners. The first topic was 
relatively clearer for me as I managed to interview a dozen people who claimed they used to 
work as the close confidants or brokers of these speculators as well as a former speculator 
who lost sizable amount of capital in his trading activities. One missing thing was reaching 
one or two active domestic speculators and observing them for a day and talk to them about 
their activities. The second topic of investigation necessitated more fieldwork or interviews 
due to the above mentioned reason as well as getting an insight from the foreigners about 

109 Being both in the media sector, the contact and my sister and her husband had a similar networking 
relationship and similar disappointments due to the contact being rather inconclusive.  From the house 




their exposure to the ISE.  In Edinburgh, I focussed on developing the data analysis 
framework for collected narratives and improving the thesis and chapter outlines. In the 
meantime, I tried to figure out whether anything in the UK could be arranged in the form of 
summer internships in asset management companies or global brokers in London. So I 
attended the graduate careers meetings in Edinburgh held by different asset management 
companies and global brokers and managed to have informal discussions with finance 
professionals dealing with the region and Turkey as well as getting leads to conduct a couple 
of interviews. I then proceeded to apply to six different summer internships offered by three 
asset management companies and three investment banks. I was quite honest in my letters of 
intent in these applications regarding my research interests but I made a slight twist that I 
might be interested in pursuing a combined career of academia and finance, which was 
actually untrue.  
 
Unfortunately none of these applications were successful. Some of these organisations stated 
that my background was not suited for the position whereas others sent a standard letter 
stating I was unsuccessful. It was understandable that these organisations wanted to select 
the most promising candidates with a view to offering the best performing interns a long-
term position after they graduated from university. If I had been successful, the project 
would have incorporated a direct observation of foreigners abroad and their generation and 
use of narrative knowledge and how they perceived the sell-side services coming from 
different brokers in Istanbul. Although I learned many things about the latter aspects from 
the perspective of local brokers thanks to interviews and direct observation in House C, there 
were still gaps that could be filled with direct observation. Once I was back in Istanbul in 
May 2009, I actually managed to interview two fund managers who were managing 
investments of two global asset management companies in Turkey, which were in the region 
of 1 billion USD.  These were quite informative interviews when coupled with the stay in 
House D and they filled in the existing gaps that I had in my data in relation to institutional 
sell-side and buy-side organisations. 
 
Accessing House D  
So how did I manage to access House D in the end? To begin with,  the sales trader contact  
in House D told me after the formal interview with him in late August 2008 that I should re-
apply towards the end of year with a view to spending time in their department. Other 
informants also told me to remind them towards the end of the year my intention to apply for 
an internship with a view to beginning the formal process of access to their houses or 
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elsewhere where they had contacts. Interestingly, none of the contacts replied to my emails 
or turned out to be reachable via phone when I tried to contact them to remind about my 
intentions. This was rather disappointing as some of these informants were like ‘if we knew 
your intentions, we could easily arrange an internship in House X, Y, Z’. There was one 
exception to this, the head of domestic sales in House D, whom I interviewed in September 
2008 thanks to one of my contacts. After failing to reach the sales trader, I emailed on 13 
January 2010 the head of domestic sales regarding my intentions and after three hours I got 
the confirmation for a month long ‘internship’ in the institutional sales and research 
department in May-June 2009. I was ecstatic with the prospect of completing the fieldwork 
with an intense month-long observation in the heart of institutional sales and research. I also 
decided to take a more demanding stance as a researcher and venture into new types of data 
such as conversations between traders and their clients, and a more confident use of my 
voice recording machine for in situ conversations, attended meetings, and informal 
discussions to complement my note-taking.  
 
Although I was to do the latter in most of the instances I deemed necessary, several days 
before I left for Turkey, I received a bombshell from an HR officer in a very formal email in 
which I was informed that House D had stopped accepting interns and that they wished me 
the best of luck in my career.  I had actually emailed the head of HR to ask her what 
documents to bring with me and I got this reply from a junior member of staff. I reminded 
them that my stay was already arranged by the head of domestic sales and I had bought my 
return tickets to Istanbul and arranged permissions from my university department and so on. 
A couple of hours later, I got the confirmation that my internship stay was to go ahead but 
with a difference, namely I was to spend one week in each of these departments: domestic 
sales, institutional sales, research, and derivatives sales department. The bombshell in the 
form of an email and the ensuing change in my internship itinerary turned out to be due to 
fact that the head of institutional sales had recently left House D, and the department was 
without a manager. To this date I am not fully informed as to why I was sent that bombshell 
email and what actually happened afterwards among senior managers and the general 
manager but I was told by the head of domestic sales that he had to tell people that I was his 
cousin- and I should tell this to others if asked who I was. He also said that an internship was 
promised to me before the head of the institutional sales had left the House D so it would not 
be nice to deny me at the very last minute. Yet, I believe the cousin pretext was a stronger 
reason than keeping their commitment to offering me an internship. In fact during my stay, 
there was nothing that was participatory in the house. My gatekeeper assigned me to the 
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chart analyst’s desk where he served the domestic sales team by translating and embellishing 
research department’s idea calls with charts to make them consumable by short-termist 
domestic retail clients.  After spending a week or so at the domestic sales desk, I sneaked 
into the institutional sales and research department and made myself comfortable there at an 
empty desk, observing the sales and trading team for the remainder of the stay. The team 
there was welcoming but strangely no formal introduction of me was made by an HR 
member of staff. It was the sales trader who told me where to sit down and gave me a couple 
of research department output. It seemed like he wanted to look after me in the department 
but at the same time made fun of my insistence on this ‘internship’ on the grounds that I 
already knew too much via interviews and that it was time to start ‘working’ in this field. I 
reminded him again that I was pursuing a career in academia...   
 
The moral of the story: Social networks matter for access and finding 
interviewees 
 
All in all, these access adventures made it clear that relationships matter and joining the 
existing relationship networks of others can change one’s stock of opportunities. Some 
relationship networks such as my sister’s were denser in terms of duration, closeness, and 
comprehensiveness of relationships. On the other hand those relationship networks I was part 
of, such as the scholarship foundation network, or my contacts through the think tank I 
worked for a while, were quite loose and needed a lot relationship work to convert them into 
outcomes. Interestingly, the contact who arranged my access to CNBC-e failed to manage 
access to the biggest brokerage house in Turkey where his cousin was a senior manager. The 
CNBC-e access was based on his friendship; the other access failure happened despite the 
cousin factor which I assumed would be stronger.  I think it can be said that the friend being 
the head of CNBC-e and NTV news channel - biggest private news channel in Turkey, made 
the difference whereas in the cousin case, the cousin probably decided not to work for my 
access due to his position in the house and his relationships with other senior managers. 
Similarly, access to House D was the direct outcome of a network relationship I built and 
also the determination of the head of domestic sales gatekeeper to make this happen.  If it 
had not been for him, I would have been struggling again in Istanbul, trying to find a suitable 
place to observe.  
 
A similar network effect was observed in finding interviewees outwith the houses observed. 
Out of 53 interviews, only a quarter of them were arranged via cold calls or emails which 
were positively responded to by my informants.  The rest was possible by recommendations 
given by interviewees who agreed to talk to me after I reached them via a closer contact such 
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as the scholarship foundation officer, a contact I met and became good friends in the field, a 
cold call, a recommendation of my former supervisor, and finance professionals I met in 
CNBC-e studios. One of the interviewees that I reached via the scholarship foundation told 
me that they actually had frequent interview or data requests from academics and research 
students in Istanbul and that as busy professionals they sometimes had to ignore these 
requests, and that being contacted via the foundation made a difference. In this respect, I do 
not really know how much of a difference being a Turkish research student from the 
University of Edinburgh made in other cases.  
 
This can be seen as a valid curiosity as in Turkey studying abroad is seen as a more 
distinguished source of cultural capital that implies one or more of sometimes mutually 
exclusive descriptors in the following: economic wealth of parents, hard-work and 
determination, academic brilliance, rare achievement, dodging the military service, not being 
very smart but having fun with parents’ money, rite of passage, and so on. But I guess doing 
a PhD abroad would rule out some of these descriptors in the mind of my informants. Some 
of my interviewees from institutional sales and research departments had MA and BA 
degrees from abroad. Most of the informants from the domestic sales business had degrees 
from Turkish universities with varying national and international prestige. Although few of 
my informants made any remark about my achievement of going abroad for a PhD degree, 
one thing was rather common among most of my informants, the assumption that I knew 
more than I actually knew because I was doing a PhD, the highest stage of university 
education, a step shy of being a doctor. Few informants who turned out to be less assuming 
about my identity would ask me whether I knew what the term/phenomenon they mentioned 
meant, which was useful if I was introduced to the term for the first time. But this type of 
question/explanation without solicitation sometimes felt strange especially after I 
interviewed one or two dozens people doing similar jobs and using similar concepts with 
which I was already familiar.  Although interview situations as such were not hard to 
manage, one rather unpleasant consequence of this assumption of knowledge due to me 
being a PhD student was observed in House C.  
 
A story on the effects of informants’ perceptions about the researcher and his 
incompetence with Excel! 
The head of the research department, who had an MA degree in finance from the US, gave 
me tasks to perform on Excel programme. Most of these tasks were about updating the 
existing valuation dataset on companies, which was later to be circulated to the sales and 
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trading staff via email. Being a total novice in Excel not to mention having hardly any clue 
about the components of basic company balance sheets and valuations, I was frequently 
making mistakes and asking questions to her. Although I was shown how to perform the task 
mechanically on Excel, the mistakes happened because she assumed that I had some 
minimum knowledge to be able to use my judgement in applying the changes across 
different sectors as well as checking their accuracy by detecting unusual numbers/values. In 
one of the early days of my stay, a mistake of mine led to miscalculations across the board, 
and an inaccurate valuation dataset was sent to the staff only to be recalled immediately after 
the head of research noticed the unusual values in the dataset. This was very embarrassing 
for me as the recall failed and she sent an email to the staff saying that ‘the intern made a 
mistake and correct dataset was to be sent soon’.  For me those numbers on the Excel sheet 
did not mean anything beyond being numbers. On the other hand, for the head of research 
those numbers were telling a new but predicted episode in on-going stories about respective 
companies. So any deviation from those values meant either an exceptional news story not 
shared with public yet or a mistake made on Excel. We had the same sensual perception 
about the Excel sheet but our apperception of it was dramatically and sometimes dangerously 
different for the sake of the House C’s staff! 
 
Right into the midst of my stay whilst working on the dataset again, I could not figure out 
why Excel was giving me an error message while I was trying to apply values to a new 
column. After several attempts, I asked the head of research’s assistance and I think she got a 
bit wound up by the question and the simplicity of the solution. But because the solution 
needed some simple mathematical and financial knowledge which I lacked, she must have 
felt the need to ask the following rhetorical question with a rather surprised tone in her voice 
after demonstrating me the model on paper several times as I struggled to get it:  ‘don’t they 
teach you this stuff in the PhD?’ Relieved to be presented the chance to make my case in the 
face of a rather frustrated voice and animated body language, I explained to her in detail 
what the PhD programme was like from the very beginning and that I had very little 
knowledge about mathematical or paradigmatic aspects of financial knowledge. After this, 
she was more tolerant and more informative towards me, giving me extra explanation and 
sociological insights into the task I was given. I think this was the most significant practical 
manifestation what I observed about my researcher status in my correspondence with my 
second supervisor, namely not being able to possess enough vernacular/paradigmatic 
knowledge to have a quick click with what was said and discussed about more sophisticated 
aspects of the given activity. Although this lack of knowledge  never manifested itself as a 
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problem in other houses apart from my uncomfortable feelings in House C, it turned into a 
rather tense few minutes between me and the head of research, not to mention my prior 
embarrassment before the whole house courtesy of email technology! 
 
Creating rapport is not 100% down to the researcher  
Before concluding the field story, another aspect of access is worth mentioning, namely 
creating rapport with informants in field sites.  Although it was great relief to be able to 
access the houses and have the opportunity to see what goes inside the blackbox, creating 
rapport inside the houses was another challenge. Because most of the gatekeepers hardly 
introduced me to their junior staff with a general announcement or email, I was usually 
assigned to a caretaker such as the strategist in House A and House D, or inadvertently got 
closer to the female senior investment advisor in House B and the research analyst in House 
D because I happened to sit very close to them. The very first day when I started observation 
in House A, I remember standing up from my desk and then joining the adjacent desk of the 
strategist which was separated from my and the chief broker’s desk with a short partition 
panel in the darker corner of the trading floor. I asked for permission only from the strategist 
but the desk was shared by another investment advisor whom I was not introduced to. As this 
investment advisor was talking with his client, I did not have the chance to introduce myself. 
Once at the desk, I started taking note of what the strategist and the investment advisor were 
doing and saying to each other and it was a weird situation as the advisor had no idea what I 
was doing but he did not bother to ask who I was for half an hour. After that we met and he 
turned out to be quite a good informant.  
 
On the other hand, some informants, despite being willing to talk during lunch or after 
trading hours about their thoughts on the market, their clients and investors in general, and 
their sense-making activities, were not very eager to be observed at their desks for a session 
or two. Sometimes the situation was worse as informants whom I could not socialize with 
during lunch time or after the trading day would elude my requests to talk by saying 
“insallah” –god willing (a polite refusal) or “I am busy today god willing some other time”. 
Although I could always get a round up from senior managers about the aspects I could not 
explore myself, I observed that there were differences in accounts given by an investment 
advisor and his/her boss. While the former could include more minute details about the 
social relationships, sometimes with a critical edge, the latter would be giving a more 
analytical and bigger picture about the nature of the business as well as some information 
that would change one’s perception about formal accounts given by regulators and other 
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market professionals.  
 
Another aspect of my residences in the houses was the hardship of venturing into other 
departments and hearing their perspective on the topics I was investigating or I should have 
investigated more. This was especially in topics which were on the operations side and not 
immediately available in my field station.  Spending time in operations department would be 
rather strange and a form of time wasting as their activities would not generate any directly 
relevant data about sense-making. Yet creating rapport with staff from a department that I 
hardly had any contact with was not the easiest thing. So I resorted to informal discussions 
with operations staff or indirect investigation via my immediate informants. All in all, when I 
was not exposed to their daily routine, it was hard to find the most relevant questions to 
operations staff which would lead to a deeper learning process.  
 
The field trip to Istanbul in 2009 ended with a high note as I managed to interview very 
influential market actors, ranging from two domestic speculators (one in his office the other 
one on the phone) and a confident of a rather notorious domestic speculator/manipulator, to a 
fund manager/analyst of a key global asset management company and a hedge fund manager 
in their Istanbul offices. Coupled with what I observed and learnt in House D as well as from 
follow up interviews/informal discussions with more willing informants from institutional 
sales and research, and domestic sales departments about new topics I learnt or older topics 
that I felt I should investigate more, I was able to shift my perception a notch up on topics 
such as domestic speculator, broker-day trader, foreign institutional investor, proprietary  
traders of global investment banks, investment idea creation, departmental conflicts among 
institutional sales and research, and so on. I felt that I now had a clear vision about general 
trading and sense-making dynamics between different investor types and their brokers in the 
ISE as well as how these different groups possessing different capital sources used the scopic 
market screens and other media that contained simple datum in their pursuit of generating 
higher datum.  Although more interviews with or observation of foreign institutional 
investors in situ would have made the collected data about some specific aspects more 
robust, I decided to put a stop to the field work and pursuit of interviews at the end of June 
2009 to concentrate on writing up the dissertation as I had only 14 months to submit the final 
output.   
 
Writing up  
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, writing up an ethnographic account aims to reach 
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etic explanations of researcher’s field observations and informants’ emic practices and 
accounts. This should be seen as a continuum with a starting point of very simple 
descriptions or sensual perceptions of field settings, sounds, smells, and so on from the very 
first day to a mid-point where ethnographer feels he/she can now make sense of what has 
become rather mundane and repetitive acts of his/her informants from an immediate/practical 
and deeper/sociological cause-effect perspective no matter how rough and sketchy this 
perspective is in its mental and written form. This mid-point is followed by filling in the gaps 
by asking more specific questions or securing observational access into realms which the 
researcher thinks would provide new perspectives and data. The funnel metaphor of 
Atkinson and Hammersley (2007:160) makes the point about this continuum of ethnographic 
journey and its final parts, namely an increased focus towards the end of ethnographic study 
both in relation to data collected and its intermittent analysis. By intermittent I refer to a lack 
of full-time commitment to revisiting field notes and recorded materials with a view to 
convert them into final product for an academic audience (Emerson et al., 1995:169). This 
process is usually left to post-field work time with a view to formalize the sketchy and rough 
analytical explanations.  
 
In my field-work experience, I actually had the chance to do the latter in between two field 
visits in 2008 and 2009. This gave me the opportunity to go through my field data, analyze 
some of it in a more focussed manner with the help of specific literature on narratives 
(Gabriel, 2000; Boje, 2001; Czarniawska, 2004), and turn some aspects of it into two 
academic publications, one on Tilly’s (2006) notion of technical stories among professionals 
and lack thereof in the ISE’s story exchanges about a specific claim of market squeeze 
(Tarim, 2009), and the other one on applying the notion of storytelling organisation (Gabriel, 
2000; Boje, 2001) to the ISE and its intermediation sector in relation to legitimisation 
activities in the ISE (2011a).110 Once the 2009 field visit was over, the analysis turned into a 
more focussed one with a view to write relevant chapters for the thesis as overseen by my 
supervisors, which started with a more focussed literature review. In the meantime I 
continued presenting at different conferences on finance and economy, one of which resulted 
in the idea of bringing in a numerical perspective into the narrative analysis of sense-making 

110 Both publications, Tarim (2009; 2011a) focus on the notion of narrative mode of knowing and 
explanation in organisational settings and how organisational identities and resources led to 
conflicting sense-making and/or legitimisation stories in the ISE. Both publications give specific 
narrative examples as well as general analytical presentations of organisational variations in field sites 
but do not give an overall picture of narrative mode of knowing and explanation in in situ sense-
making stories by using a semiotic and socio-linguistic perspective, the latter informed by Bourdieu, 
as it is done in this thesis.  
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stories and a pioneering academic article on the evolution of DRI figure since the opening of 
the ISE in 1985. This article takes Abolafia’s (1996; 1998) notion of local rationalities as 
frame of analysis and applies it to the ISE by concentrating on the DRIs’ evolution since 
1985 (Tarim, 2010). Another publication will come out in June 2011 as a book chapter on the 
AMC by using Mackenzie’s (2009b) notion of ‘evaluative cultures’ and applying it to the 
equity-fund and fixed-income fund managers’ cognitive and investment activities (Tarim, 
2011b).   
 
All in all, apart from what was specifically discussed in the methodology chapter regarding 
narrative analysis, the rest of the thesis had been written in a manner that is explained by 
Richardson (1994: 516), namely ‘writing as a method of inquiry’. This means that different 
writing styles, starting from very descriptive and sense-based perceptions to the final written 
output, namely my PhD thesis, provided me with ‘different aspects of our topic and our 
relationship to it’ (Richardson, 1994:516). One can add to this the intertextuality effect, 
namely reading and experiencing different texts (written or text as observed/lived 
experience) and incorporating aspects of these into the text that is being written (Boje, 2001). 
In this respect, the final written outcome of the thesis had been informed by the rather recent 
re-readings of the notion of types of capital, habitus, and the field by Bourdieu. This 
theoretical framework had been integrated to my knowledge about the ISE intermediation 
and investor scenes to reach this final written form with an honest account of the limitations 
of data collected in the field.  Before moving onto a short commentary on the issue of ethics 
and credibility tests on ethnographic studies, it should be admitted here that the specific 
narrative analysis and capturing stories from the field data and ensuring consistency in the 
way stories were categorized into the plot logics across the five field sites were quite 
challenging. This was so because everything had to be done manually, ranging from 
capturing a story from the hand written field notes in accordance with the operationalised 
definition provided in the methodology chapter, to rewriting and codifying these stories on 
Excel sheets according to plot logics, storytellers’ identity, actants, and temporal orientation. 
To ensure consistency and prevent mistakes in the analysis, the 1,261 strong story dataset as 
well as the raw field data had been checked multiple times from scratch according to these 
quantified components. Moreover, making a decision about what was to be included in the 
final written output from the several thousand pages of field notes and interview data was 
another difficulty. 53 interviews plus fieldnote data that described 73 days of full observation 
in field sites initially led to much longer and several additional chapters which had to be 
edited or merged into shorter chapters as presented in the thesis. In this vein, Bourdieu’s 
 
 274
theoretical framework eased those editorial decisions. However all these writing up 
challenges meant that I had to ask for a six month extension for the final submission of the 
thesis. I am grateful to my supervisors for facilitating this extension and overseeing my 




In the 1st year board, there were no recommendations about possible ethical issues raised by 
the proposed study. This should not be seen surprising as my status as a PhD student who 
was trying to immerse himself into the world of finance professionals did not pose as much 
physical or emotional harm or distress to them as it could have done to the researcher who 
seemed to have much less social and economic resources than his informants, not to mention 
my lack of possession of a symbolic capital or status that would exert unethical influence on 
my research subjects. To confirm the review board’s rather implicit prophecy, I can confirm, 
based on my observations and feelings, that during the exploration of these topics in the 
field, no-one was physically or emotionally harmed or put into socially awkward situations 
because of their relationship with me. The requests of my gatekeepers for general 
confidentiality and privacy of what was observed in their sites were respected in the sense 
that these were not shared in detail and in a revealing fashion with other informants from 
other sites nor did I insist on getting confidential data such as telephone recordings or names 
of investors and things that my informants did not want to discuss. Otherwise, I was given 
the green light to use the collected data with full anonymisation yet none of my informants 
wanted to see a draft of the thesis before it was submitted. The gatekeepers in House A 
rationalized my stay there as a contributory thing from a “rational outsider” perspective and 
asked to see some sort of report on my findings but I never sent them any due to time 
constraints and not knowing how to write such a report. Besides, they never followed up that 
request despite the fact that I am still in touch with them. Other gatekeepers were probably 
motivated by factors other than an interest in an academic study or what a researcher had to 
say. Although my informants/gatekeepers did not seem to be terribly interested in what my 
thesis has to say, I keep my online public academic profile up to date and supplement it with 
an informal research blog and I plan to write an article or a book in Turkish about my 
findings to share it with the general public. However that attempt will be very cautious and 
barren in detail of narrative evidence (such as Tarim, 2010 in English) because I have learnt 
in my field stay that the ISE organisational field and domestic retail scene is quite fond of 
imaginative and sensationalist stories with a view to (de)legitimizing the ISE and the VOB 




Validity, reliability and objectivity  
 
Although the issues of validity and reliability and objectivity were initially designed for 
measuring the credibility of findings in quantitative studies and/or positivist approaches to 
social science research in general, they have been adopted for assessment of qualitative 
studies’ findings (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982; Denzin, 1994; Altheide and Johnson, 1994; 
Bryman, 2004).  This section is of course not written to prove that my findings that are 
presented in evidence chapters and summarized in my Conclusion are totally valid and 
credible and should not be questioned. Rather, it is written as a guide to introduce these 
concepts as understood by qualitative researchers and provide the reader with a summary of 
what had been done to ensure the credibility of my findings. It is up to the reader to decide in 
the light of the totality of the thesis to decide whether this study gives credible and valid 
answers to the research question posed. 
 
To begin with, validity in its original form refers to the question of whether collected data 
actually provides an answer/result to the question/measurement technique posed in research. 
While this constitutes internal validity, external validity refers to generalizability of findings 
in one context to other similar contexts. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to replicability 
of a study with the same design and findings by another researcher. Last but not least, 
objectivity refers ‘to the extent to which findings are free from bias’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994:100).  For qualitative studies in general and ethnography in particular, an answer to 
internal validity question can be considered with the concept of credibility, namely ‘how 
truthful, plausible, and credible an account is’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 204-4). As for the 
data captured for exploration of sense-making narratives, or more specifically the role of 
narratives in in situ sense-making in the ISE, the comparative strengths of ethnography over 
other methods such as surveys or interviews in capturing in situ reality is well-established 
(LeCompte and Goetz, 1982:43; Cetina and Brugger, 2002).  In this respect, the collected 
data in this ethnography is rich and unique in capturing the in situ processes. Minute details 
of in situ dealing room activities were recorded via field notes and when possible voice-
recording without any bias over what was relevant to sense-making. To ensure credibility 
and validity of the in situ data and its interpretation, informal discussions with informants 
from the field sites were conducted to find out about how they read information/data flows 
and come up with higher datum. Written market commentaries published on a routine basis 
in the houses were also collected and analyzed to check whether relatively formal narratives 
differed significantly from oral and conversational narratives, which revealed that they did 
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use similar emplotment techniques but hardly any expletives! Both methods ensured 
triangulation of data (Denzin, 2006: 471-2) and boosted the internal validity of collected oral 
narratives and their interpretation in answering the main research question of this thesis.  
 
When it comes to external validity or relevance of findings in the field sites to other similar 
field sites or markets, one can think of Bryman’s (2004:30) notion of 'transferability, namely 
the question of “do the findings apply to other contexts?”’. In regards to the ‘over-brokered’ 
intermediation sector in the ISE, interviewing market professionals from organisations that I 
could not observe revealed similarities in what I call master narratives of vernacular 
knowledge about the Turkish economy, the ISE and its investor types, and so on. Findings 
about in situ narratives in the field sites can therefore be roughly generalized with confidence 
to other similar organisations and their domestic sales and institutional sales and research 
departments. Additionally, the observations in the four houses, which successfully covered 
significant parts of both domestic retail and foreign institutional sales activities in the ISE, 
reveal similarities and differences among these two dominant investor types in relation to the 
collected stories’ specific plot structures, actants, and meaning tropes. This finding increases 
the robustness of the observational methods employed in this study as they generated similar 
narrative outcomes across similar organisational settings.  
 
As for reliability or replication of this study by another researcher and coming up with 
similar data, this criteria of evaluation does not really apply well to ethnographic studies due 
to notions of embodiment. As explained in this Appendix, each researcher may bring his/her 
own theoretical perspective to the field which might affect the research design/selection of 
field sites not to mention their individual and social identities which may affect the collected 
data. Despite this, the main topic of this research, namely the use of narratives for cognition 
before scopic market screens, some aspects of the field sites have the potential to generate 
similar sense-making narratives or raw findings in relation to plot structures, actants, and 
protocols of observation and sense-making, if in situ sense-making and trading events are 
recorded without any bias about their relevance. This is mainly down to the argument of this 
dissertation that individuals or organisations’ cultural, social, and economic capital within 
and outwith market settings are poised to affect their sense-making and decision-making 
activities. If the described conditions of domestic retail investors remain relatively constant 
in the ISE, there is no reason why one should not observe similar high frequency, short-
termist trading activity among DRIs which generate a specific genre of sense-making 
narratives in the ISE. On the other hand, in the FII and institutional sales and research scene, 
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the future seems rather bleak for sales traders pitching formal trading ideas or skilled traders 
executing orders for their clients. This is because the technology of direct market access and 
infrastructure for remote automated trading systems seem to be making its way to the ISE in 
the coming years. Therefore, soon it may not be possible for a researcher to hear any in situ 





APPENDIX 3: PROBLEMATIC PEOPLE AND INVESTOR ALI  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the phrase problematic people refer to the persistent 
manipulators. This group of domestic speculators are more interested in relatively low 
liquidity small-capitalisation and middle-capitalisation shares where FIIs’ share ownership is 
not significant. Their aim is to keep control of a share, sometimes in collaboration with or 
orders from company bosses-owners, and sometimes against the company owners’ will. 
Their actions can be triggered by a rumour or public news about the company in question. As 
explained by a former broker of a problematic domestic speculator: ‘there has to be 
something, an expectation, news, or a story about a company’s activities or financials that 
you spot. Without that, you can’t be successful. This is also the case in other realms of life, 
there has to be a selling point’ (Interview, 18 June 2009).   
 
In the past, apparently one of the ways of creating this so called selling point was basically 
spreading rumours, most of which were rather hollow, about companies where these 
speculators took positions beforehand. The above former day-trader/broker had worked with 
the problematic speculator who had received a dozen or so CMB trading bans based on the 
CMB statute number 47. This speculator was the mastermind behind the Investor Ali scheme 
briefly mentioned in Chapter 4. His former broker tells the following story about the Investor 
Ali scheme in the mid 1990s and onwards, which helped them become a formidable 
speculator group in the ISE: 
Broker: Let me tell you how X Abi111 [the speculator] became so powerful in the 
ISE…We agreed with the editor of Borsamatik for the column ‘Investor Ali’ [I 
remind them that there was an academic study by Yazici and Muradoglu (2002) on 
this Ali!]. By then there was so much interest in these investment magazines, we had 
a lunch with X Abi to discuss what to do. I told X Abi that I would find the company 
on Thursday and write the column for it and we would tell the friend [the editor of 
the magazine] to publish it on Monday. Of course the friend would spread this 
privately to his broker/dealer and investor friends. Then on Monday when it [share 
price] went up 20 per cent and more investors come to the board after reading the 
magazine, we would sell it....it was not big money we invested [initially], it was like 
today’s 30,000 lira but we got loan leverage like 3  or 4 times the collateral X Abi 
deposited. After we made the profit, a part of it would go to the friend, well that 
friend made a hell lot of money thanks to us... after a year or so, he became an 
investor, resigned from the magazine... sometimes the rumours we created would 
come back to us, I remember about Mardin Cement. By then Lafarge, the French 
company was interested in buying a plant in Turkey, so we knew that, and we 
decided it was going to buy Mardin!  
Tarim: I see, so it was not just a hollow rumour, it was about a public story but you 
111 Abi means elder brother in Turkish. It is used among friends and colleagues to informally address 
and refer to an older person.  
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kind of added your imagination on it 
Broker: Yes, of course but I was looking at the cement companies and selected 
Mardin randomly. So we had an Investor Ali article written about this, and before 
that was published, we started collecting shares. Three months later we exited 
Mardin, someone in the house from downstairs tells me “look Lafarge is going to 
buy Mardin”, then I tell X Abi [they were in the trading session room of a brokerage 
house] “look they are going to buy Mardin” he tells me “did not we write it sport!” 
well you see we totally forgot about it! So you had funny stories like this on the way 
to becoming a big speculator.  
 
The former broker then goes on to give the name of another investment magazines in which 
he wrote with another alias ‘the Bear, the Bull and the Fox’. He adds that there were other 
speculator groups who had anonymous columns in investment magazines, and that it was 
like partition of magazines’ columns among speculators. Apparently, one of the sidekicks of 
a speculator wrote under the alias of ‘Roaring Bull’. According to the former broker, the 
1990s was a period of unsuspecting DRIs and weak control or lack of regulation by the CMB 
and the ISE. But unsuspecting DRIs eventually realized the game and then the CMB banned 
such columns in these magazines in 1999. Most of those tainted magazines gradually ceased 
to publish.112 Nowadays, investment ideas are given in investment magazines and national 
newspapers by quoting chart analysts’, economists’, and research analysts’ commentaries or 
inviting them to write weekly columns in these magazines.  Most of these market 
professional pundits are from domestics-only brokerage houses. These commentaries are 
always published with disclaimers about their non-investment advice status.   
 
As for Investor Ali, Yazici and Muradoglu (2002) looked at all the available issues of 
Paramatik between 1993 and 1998 and the 206 buy recommendations by Investor Ali. 
Interestingly (!) there was no sell recommendation by Investor Ali. They concluded that if 
one was a ‘preferred investor’, namely someone who joined the trading move ‘five days’ 
before it was made public, one could ‘earn more than 5% per week in excess of the index’s 
return. Compounded annually, the excess return of a preferred investor would be more than 
an amazing 1500% per annum.’ (2002:29). Yazici and Muradoglu (2002) were well-aware of 
the fact that this was an orchestrated abuse which had its antecedents and contemporary 
examples in London and New York. The name of the magazine in that study, Paramatik and 

112 The last public news about such an organized attempt was published in July 2006 after the police 
under a public prosecutor’s order investigated a trading group for more than six months and found out 
that this group was collaborating with editors in an investment magazine. Funnily, a rival investment 
magazine was the first to blow the whistle on this group. Apparently at least 20 million TL was made 
by abusing investors outside the group (Haber 7, 9 July 2006). More recently, it was revealed in the 
popular press that the CMB had summoned some newspaper pundits with significant portfolios (one 
apparently had 15 million TL) to gently warn them not to sway investors by their columns  
 
 281
what the former broker used, Borsamatik, are not the same but it is highly probable that the 
former broker did not remember the name accurately as he could not remember other things 
during the interview and decided not to insist on remembering with accuracy. In fact, he 
mentioned Paramatik later in the discussion but Investor Ali from the very beginning as the 
column’s nickname. It was this scheme that helped them make X Abi’s initial 30,000 lira 
investment tens of million liras in the 1990s.  
 
Despite the crack down on unscrupulous magazine columns which spread ‘the selling points’ 
to unsuspecting investors, the modus operandi of manipulation groups in the ISE seems to 
stay the same. This consists of  commanding control over the share trading by initially 
collecting shares, and then attracting more DRIs with rumours and news spread to networks, 
and ‘flashing lights’ or top performer indicators on the screen, and finally realizing profits 
gradually at significantly higher prices. Once a cycle is completed with a dump of shares on 
the last batch of DRIs who joined the game at a higher price level, another cycle begins 
(Informal discussion with the former speculator, H 24 July 2008).  If there is low liquidity in 
those manipulated shares, the chances of ‘board wars’ and territorial marking is high among 
‘problematic people’: ‘there can be wars, retaliations; these are not very patient people’ 
(Interview, head of domestic sales, House C 4 August, 2008). The former speculator, H adds 
that ‘problematic people’ do have a very strong grasp of the boards where they are active 
with the help of various screen-based and network-based means, such as checking settlement 
figures and contacting brokerage houses to learn who is who on the board. One can add on 
these attempts to acquire this type of ‘information’ from the very source, namely the 
Takasbank or the Central Registry Agency. Although I heard vaguely from an interviewee 
that when one is in the market for many years as a committed speculator, one increases 
his/her information source and can get very minute details of who is doing what with ease 
(Interview, flow trader 24 June 2009). Another informant who used to work as the operations 
manager in one of the Houses I observed said that this was usually done via contacts in the 
Takasbank or the CRA (email correspondence 10 October 2010).  
 
Moreover, it is not unknown among the domestic speculator circles that these speculators, 
whether or not one deems them ‘problematic’, are still using the notion of ‘selling point’ in 
trying to control shares or justify significant trading moves but seemingly with more cautious 
manner by using publicly available news and over a longer period of time. The former broker 
of X Abi gives the following example about a new breed of speculator group who were 
engaged in ‘board-making’, the vernacular term for controlling a share, for a considerable 
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time, in the above manner: 
Broker: Now there is a share called Besiktas [one of the four biggest football clubs in 
Turkey which are also floated in the ISE], I know the guys who do it, the Bear 
Mehmet and his team 
Tarim: I know the Besiktas story from BorsaGundem but they say the Besiktas board 
has been made by the Muslim Brothers.113 
Broker: No, it is Bear Mehmet, and I know the guy... [picks up the phone]...where 
was I? 
Tarim: the Bear Mehmet 
Broker: Yes, I know the guy, he is a friend of my brother-in-law...so yeah Bear 
Mehmet, they started [collecting shares in Besiktas] from 2 lira, well first they got it 
from 3 lira but then it fell to 1 lira, the financial crisis hit them. But they bought very 
sizable amounts initially; when the Bear Mehmet was skint then those Muslim 
Brothers gave him a hand and accumulated more shares.  
Tarim: So the Muslim Brothers are like the sidekicks of the Bear Mehmet? 
Broker: Well, when you are in difficulty you approach another group and offer them 
to do the board together or you go into their board and ease their hand and they 
return the favour, so it often works like that. So when Mustafa Denizli made Besiktas 
the Turkish league champion, they took the share price up to 12, 13, 14... and their 
average buying cost must have been around 3 or 4 lira maximum. Now look at the 
price, it is just around that average cost, around 5, it doesn’t go below that because 
that won’t be profitable because they still have a lot of shares because they couldn’t 
sell them all with profit. So what now, you have the Champions League games, 
maybe Besiktas will win a game there and then it will be like ‘oh they won!’ and the 
UEFA pays Besiktas money, so these guys will take the price up, they won’t exit the 
shares until they have zero cost...114 

113 BorsaGundem is a news portal which, among others, disseminates gossips about speculators, 
company bosses, and so on. According to one of my informants, it is unofficially run by a large 
domestic-only brokerage house. The Muslim Brothers refer to two domestic speculator brothers who 
are apparently a bit religious. They were mentioned several times in House A Branch as M, who was 
one of the day-trading investors, had a personal connection with them and told me why they were 
given this nickname.  
114 The Besiktas shares are not in the ISE 100 index but with a price level around 11 lira, the market 
capitalisation of the company goes up to 300 million USD. Its trading volume is approximately 
around 5 million TL a day which is quite significant for a non-ISE 100 share. In 2009 with 4.26 billion 
TL annual trading volume the share contributed to 0.44 per cent of the ISE’s annual trading volume in 
2009 (968 billion TL). The alias of the speculator has been changed but the nickname “bear” belongs 
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